Conservation, Sustainable Use and Equity in Biological Resource Research and Development Governance: Australian Scientists’ Perspectives

Abstract

The access and benefit sharing (ABS) concept was originally intended to promote the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the use of biological resources and traditional knowledge for research and development (R and D). Many anecdotal studies suggest that global regulatory models are failing to deliver expected outcomes, with increasing calls to rethink ABS governance. Through the first nationwide survey of Australian scientists, this article aims to fill a significant gap in empirical research about biological resource user perspectives on the effectiveness of ABS regulation. The survey results include insights into: (a) the nature and diversity of bioscience activities; (b) bioscience researcher engagement with benefit sharing and ABS procedures; (c) perspectives of effectiveness (impacts and efficiency); and (d) ideas for regulatory reform. The study finds that participants support benefit sharing goals but generally perceive current approaches to ABS to be ineffective. Highlighting a thriving benefit sharing culture in R and D but low levels of engagement with ABS processes, the study reveals insights into motivations for benefit sharing and indicators of effectiveness for regulatory regimes. The findings offer lessons for countries that are developing ABS measures to achieve conservation, sustainable use, and equity outcomes.

1. Introduction

Access and benefit sharing (ABS) is the internationally recognised law and policy framework for regulating the activities of research and development (R and D) for the purposes of the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources and fair and equitable benefit sharing. International ABS frameworks vary in their objectives, scope (Table 1), rules, procedures and infrastructure, and there is wide variation in the national implementation of obligations. Generally, they apply to physical biological samples, associated traditional knowledge and, in some cases, digital sequence information (DSI). In the presence of disparate ABS rules across the globe, there is an increasing amount of studies in the literature suggesting that ABS is failing to achieve its objectives [1,2,3] and may be a deterrent for R and D, bio-innovation [4] (p. 291) and biodiversity conservation [2]. However, much of the literature refers to speculative or anecdotal evidence about the effectiveness of ABS regulation, which suggests a lack of systematic empirical analysis of the assumed problem [5]. This article argues that evidence-based ABS policy would benefit from analysing the effects of regulation on R and D communities (the users of genetic resources) and their perspectives on: (a) the effectiveness of ABS regulation, including its positive and negative impacts on benefit-sharing and R and D activities; and (b) regulatory efficiency, including any ideas for reform. This article addresses this research gap using Australia as a case study because it is one of the most mega-diverse countries [6]; however, there is evidence of untapped R and D potential and ongoing biopiracy, as outlined below. Biopiracy refers to the ‘unauthorised commercial use of biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, or the patenting of spurious inventions based on such knowledge, without compensation’ [7] (p. 13). The results of this first nationwide survey of Australian researchers about the effectiveness of ABS regulation offers valuable lessons for countries developing or refining their own ABS frameworks to meet global sustainability and equity goals and to reduce the risks of biopiracy.

Biopiracy was one of the problems that the ABS framework, under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) [8], was designed to address [9]. There have been high-profile cases of low-income countries being exploited by companies in high-income countries, concerning, for example, the patenting of turmeric, basmati rice, neem, and rooibos [10,11,12,13,14]; however, communities in high-income countries are also vulnerable. Australian Indigenous communities’ ongoing relationships with Australian biodiversity for food, medicinal and other purposes that have evolved over thousands of years are widely documented (e.g., [15]); however, their knowledge is highly susceptible to misappropriation or biopiracy (e.g., [16,17,18,19]). The examples of commercial exploitation of the Indigenous Australian plants, smokebush [16,20], Kakadu plum [17,21], gumby gumby [18], to name a few, illustrate how some local and overseas researchers have used Australian Indigenous or traditional knowledge and associated cultural resources without permission or benefits to the Indigenous communities and knowledge holders (see [19,22,23]). Patenting is a strong indication of commercial interest in biological resources [24] (p. 95). In a patent landscape search of more than 150 patents relating to endemic Australian plant species associated with published Indigenous knowledge, Robinson and Raven [17] found only three patents acknowledging that an ABS agreement or partnership existed or would be entered into if the derived product was to become commercially successful [17] (p. 187). These examples suggest the widespread occurrence of biopiracy in Australia, even in recent years.

Related to biopiracy is the issue that biological resources could be used without compensating the communities or countries who were responsible for ensuring their conservation and sustainable use. One of the reasons for introducing ABS was to promote ‘economic incentives for engaging in protection and provision of diverse genetic resources’ [25] (p. 316). The CBD recognises state sovereignty over its biological resources and established a bilateral transaction ABS system to ensure that benefits from the use of biological resources and associated traditional knowledge flow back to the providers of those resources and knowledge in accordance with national rules. The CBD’s implementing agreement, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol), further developed a bilateral transactional regulatory model including prior informed consent (authorisation) from the source country, benefit sharing on mutually agreed terms (e.g., benefit sharing contracts) and supportive infrastructure for monitoring and compliance [8] (article 15), [26] (articles 5–7). However, the Nagoya Protocol merely encourages States Parties to direct benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources towards the conservation of biodiversity (article 9); to date, there is limited evidence that its processes have had a positive influence on biodiversity conservation [2] (p. 10).

Australia is a good example of the importance of ensuring that its measures for achieving fair and equitable benefit sharing support the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity to optimise equity and biodiversity management outcomes. Approximately 70% of Australian lands form part of the Indigenous estate, which are either Indigenous owned (20%) or subject to other special rights and Indigenous management [21,27] (p. 562), [22] (p. 177). Nearly all Indigenous-owned or controlled lands are in remote areas of high biodiversity [28] (p. 254). Many traditional knowledge practices for caring for country drive biodiversity management through a range of initiatives, including ranger programs and Indigenous protected areas [21,29]. The Australian government has prioritised the maintenance of Indigenous peoples’ customary knowledge and biodiversity management through genuine partnerships with Australia’s Indigenous peoples and communities [29]. The conservation and sustainable use of Australia’s biodiversity is intricately tied to the health of Indigenous Australian knowledge systems, communities and peoples.

Australia is also a good example of untapped potential in R and D and bio-innovation. At the time of writing, the Australian government is reviewing Australia’s R and D system following evidence that R and D intensity is in decline (See Department of Industry, Science and Resources review—https://www.industry.gov.au/news/examining-australias-research-and-development-rd-system, accessed on 22 March 2026). Investment in science, research and innovation is below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average, impacting on productivity growth and innovation [30]. On the other hand, there are signs of growth in Australia’s bioinnovation and bio-economy sectors (e.g., [31,32]). While there are studies in the literature on the role of gene technology, intellectual property and other regulation in accelerating R and D and bioinnovation (e.g., [31]), a significant gap in analysis is the role of ABS regulation for accelerating bioinnovation and biodiversity research at the systems level [33]. An underexplored area is the extent to which legal tools for benefit sharing can drive collaboration, resource, knowledge and infrastructure sharing at value-chain and landscape/seascape levels, rather than the current ABS focus at the individual researcher or project levels [34].

Over the last two decades, the ABS concept has spread to four other ABS regimes premised on a multilateral system—where benefits flow back to the system for re-distribution, rather than back to the provider (Table 1). These regimes relate to: (a) plant genetic resources for food and agriculture—International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Plant Treaty) [35]; (b) marine genetic resources from areas beyond national jurisdiction—the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (the BBNJ Agreement) [36]; and (c) certain virus genetic resources—Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (World Health Organization, 2011) [37] and the proposed Pandemic Access and Benefit Sharing System under the Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response Agreement [38]. The Conference of the Parties to the CBD is developing a multilateral mechanism for benefit sharing from the use of DSI and an associated benefit sharing fund to address regulatory loopholes for DSI in the CBD and Nagoya Protocol bilateral models [39,40]. The ABS concept has, therefore, been adapted to address issues other than resource conservation and sustainable use such as human health and food security.

Table 1. International ABS regimes.

ABS Regime	Objectives	Scope
(1) CBD [8]	(1) Conservation of biodiversity; (2) Sustainable use; (3) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing (article 2)	Non-human biological resources and associated traditional knowledge within national jurisdiction
(2) Nagoya Protocol [26]	(1) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing that contributes to conservation and sustainable use (article 2)	Non-human biological resources and associated traditional knowledge within national jurisdiction
(3) Plant Treaty [35]	(1) Conservation; (2) Sustainable use; (3) Fair and equitable benefit sharing; (4) Sustainable agriculture and food security (article 1)	Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
(4) DSI Multilateral Mechanism [39] (non-binding UN decision)	(1) Support generation, access and use of DSI; (2) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing; (3) Achieve CBD objectives and sustainable development	DSI of genetic resources within publicly accessible databases
(5) BBNJ Agreement [36]	(1) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing; (2) Capacity building (3) Generation of knowledge, scientific understanding and technological innovation; (4) Transfer of marine technology (article 9)	Marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction and associated digital sequence information and traditional knowledge
(6) PIP Framework [37]	(1) Improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response; (2) Protect against pandemic influenza; (3) Fair, transparent, equitable, efficient and effective system for the sharing of influenza viruses with pandemic potential and access to vaccines and sharing other benefits (article 2)	H5N1 influenza virus and other influenza viruses with pandemic potential (but not seasonal influenza viruses)

Table 1. International ABS regimes.

ABS Regime	Objectives	Scope
(1) CBD [8]	(1) Conservation of biodiversity; (2) Sustainable use; (3) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing (article 2)	Non-human biological resources and associated traditional knowledge within national jurisdiction
(2) Nagoya Protocol [26]	(1) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing that contributes to conservation and sustainable use (article 2)	Non-human biological resources and associated traditional knowledge within national jurisdiction
(3) Plant Treaty [35]	(1) Conservation; (2) Sustainable use; (3) Fair and equitable benefit sharing; (4) Sustainable agriculture and food security (article 1)	Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
(4) DSI Multilateral Mechanism [39] (non-binding UN decision)	(1) Support generation, access and use of DSI; (2) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing; (3) Achieve CBD objectives and sustainable development	DSI of genetic resources within publicly accessible databases
(5) BBNJ Agreement [36]	(1) Fair and equitable benefit-sharing; (2) Capacity building (3) Generation of knowledge, scientific understanding and technological innovation; (4) Transfer of marine technology (article 9)	Marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction and associated digital sequence information and traditional knowledge
(6) PIP Framework [37]	(1) Improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response; (2) Protect against pandemic influenza; (3) Fair, transparent, equitable, efficient and effective system for the sharing of influenza viruses with pandemic potential and access to vaccines and sharing other benefits (article 2)	H5N1 influenza virus and other influenza viruses with pandemic potential (but not seasonal influenza viruses)

Australia is a useful case study for regulatory effectiveness because, after being an early adopter of the ABS concept under the CBD, policy reform has stagnated. In 2002, all Commonwealth, State and Territory governments endorsed a nationally consistent approach to ABS, outlining basic principles. However, Australia’s federal system of government, where Australian states and territories manage the bulk of the lands and the national government manages most of its marine jurisdiction [41] (p. 397), makes national leadership and the consistency of ABS arrangements challenging. As of February 2026, Australia only has dedicated ABS laws in Queensland, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory and Commonwealth areas (i.e., specific Commonwealth facilities, water and lands) (Figure 1). The other state jurisdictions have a range of legislation requiring authorisations for collecting flora and fauna species but without the inclusion of a specific benefit sharing regime. These jurisdictional differences create regulatory loopholes and perverse incentives, increasing the risk of ‘forum shopping’, where researchers may collect biological resources from states without ABS laws to avoid benefit sharing requirements [21] (p. 578). Australia has not ratified the Nagoya Protocol; however, it is a Party to the Plant Treaty and BBNJ Agreement and a member of the PIP framework. With rapid international developments in policy relating to DSI and the protection of traditional knowledge, the time is right for a national conversation about the effectiveness of its approach to ABS.

For Australian jurisdictions that have dedicated ABS laws (Figure 1), there is little consistency in regulatory measures. While they use similar regulatory tools, they differ significantly in their scope and procedures. The tools in common are the use of permits for collection authorisation (prior informed consent) and contracts for negotiating the terms and conditions of benefit sharing with the provider of biological resources under certain circumstances. However, key differences exist in:

• subject matter scope—differences in regulated objects, regulated R and D activities (commercial and non-commercial) and exclusions from scope;
• geographic scope—differences in whether public or private lands, waters and repositories are regulated;
• providers entitled to benefits—providers are mostly government, Indigenous peoples and communities and traditional knowledge holders, but they can be private landowners in the Northern Territory; and
• procedures and requirements for both authorisations and benefit sharing agreements—these differ significantly (see e.g., [42,43,44]).

Due to the broad interpretation of definitions, the differences in procedures and the discretionary nature of ABS decision-making, R and D activities need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis about whether ABS rules apply to their specific circumstances [45].

There are, however, more consistent ethical and moral obligations on Australian researchers (regardless of legal frameworks) when conducting research [46], including research involving Indigenous Australians and their traditional knowledge. The Guide to applying the AIATSIS Code of Ethics highlights the key principle of Indigenous-led research, which ensures that a proposed research project addresses a priority that has been determined by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, rather than asking Indigenous communities to contribute to the researchers’ interests [47] (p. 5) (see also [48,49,50,51]). Australia’s approach includes respecting self-determination, underpinning research projects by a negotiated agreement or protocol and obtaining the free prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples or groups through culturally and linguistically-appropriate mechanisms [49] (pp. 1, 9–11), [52] (principle 1). The consequences of breaching Australian ethical guidelines include institutional disciplinary actions, the loss of funding and legal penalties for serious breaches [53]. The Australian government is continuing to work with Indigenous communities on proposed stand-alone intellectual property laws to protect Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property (ICIP) [54], which will affect how benefit sharing from the use of traditional knowledge is governed in Australia.

Many international commentators argue that the complexity and unenforceability of national ABS laws are contributing to the persistence of biopiracy, having little effect on reversing biodiversity decline (e.g., [3,55,56]) and adversely impacting bio-R and D (e.g., [4,57]). Accordingly, academics are calling on policy makers to rethink and re-evaluate the ABS regulatory concept, including how it is enacted in practice [1,2,3,4]. However, there are relatively few empirical studies to confirm the veracity of their claims about regulatory effectiveness [58] (for a review of studies see [5]). Assessing the veracity would require conceptual clarity and consistency about how to measure ‘effectiveness’. While there are studies about high-level metrics for measuring benefit sharing outcomes in the CBD fora [59], to our knowledge, there is currently no universally agreed or standard way to conceptualise and/or measure the effectiveness of ABS governance and regulation.

In Australia, there has been comparatively less research attention given to pointedly evaluating or commentating on the effectiveness of ABS. However, the available literature does suggest that there is a lack of engagement with ABS procedures, inefficiency in regulatory procedures and that more needs to be done to address biopiracy [16,17,18,28,44,60,61,62]—indicating that Australia’s current ABS system is not effective. Furthermore, research examining the impacts of ABS have almost exclusively focused on protecting Indigenous Australians’ knowledge systems and rights to benefit from the use of their resources and knowledge (e.g., [17,18,19,20,21,22,23,28,42,54,61]), with only four studies exploring the impacts or perspectives of researchers involved in R and D with biological resources [24,57,58,63], which is a research gap that this study aims to fill. There are very few empirical studies [19,23,58] and there has been no empirical investigation of whether ABS laws have supported Australian conservation, sustainable use or equity outcomes, nor efforts to establish a set of criteria for measuring the effectiveness of ABS laws.

Upon reviewing the breadth of topics and issues raised in the literature concerning ABS in Australia, the effectiveness of ABS may be partially understood by considering stakeholders’ behaviour, beliefs and perceptions, organised according to the following three broad dimensions:

• stakeholder engagement with ABS laws, comprising such things as motivation to engage with ABS procedures; perceptions of regulatory complexity and associated uncertainty about how to engage in benefit sharing and ABS procedures (e.g., [54,62]); non-compliance with ABS procedures due to lack of enforcement and regulatory loopholes (e.g., [16,23]); and avoidance of ABS procedures (e.g., engagement in forum shopping; e.g., [18]);
• stakeholder perceptions of ABS regulatory impacts, comprising such things as beliefs about whether ABS laws are achieving their objectives; and perceived impacts on benefit sharing [22,44,64,65] and R and D [24];
• stakeholder perceptions of ABS regulatory efficiency, comprising such things as beliefs about whether the regulatory burden is proportionate to the demonstrated outcomes; perceived inefficiency; and the need for regulatory reform [21,60,62].

Perspectives from resource users engaged in R and D about the extent to which they are motivated to participate in benefit sharing and the regulatory regime are crucial for policy makers in their ongoing reviews about a regime’s effectiveness.

The aim of this study was to critically evaluate how stakeholders perceive the ‘effectiveness’ of the ABS concept and procedures, for which there is a significant gap in empirical data in the ABS literature. The study investigates the following question:

To what extent are ABS frameworks perceived as ‘effective’ by users of biological resources, DSI and associated traditional knowledge?

Using survey methodology (Section 2), Section 3 outlines the results of Australia’s first nationwide survey of researchers on the effectiveness of ABS regulation. Section 4 reveals insights into: (a) the nature and diversity of Australia’s R and D biological resource activities; (b) the level of Australian researcher engagement with benefit sharing and ABS procedures; (c) their perspectives of effectiveness, including positive and negative impacts of ABS; and (d) ideas for regulatory (law and policy) reform. While these are Australian perspectives, the findings offer important lessons for other countries that are in the process of designing or reforming ABS law and policy. The results reveal indicators of effectiveness that could apply to any country’s ABS regime under the CBD/Nagoya Protocol models. The study provides a case example (including survey materials and methods) that other countries may follow, should they wish to similarly assess the effectiveness of ABS regulation in their own jurisdiction.

2. Methodology

2.1. Participants

Respondents eligible to participate in the study included Australian researchers, technicians or collection managers who collect, use, store and/or distribute biological resources, digital sequence information and/or associated traditional knowledge. Of an estimated 7363 Australian researchers invited to participate in the study, 74 (n = 74) respondents completed the survey. There are multiple reasons why the response rate was low. To maximise outreach, we selected participants through a manual search of online profiles based on fields of research (Table S1), most of whom would not directly conduct research on ‘the genetic and/or biochemical composition of (non-human) biological resources, sequence information and associated traditional knowledge’ (the selection criteria in the Participant Information sheet attached to the survey link). Other reasons for the low response rate include undelivered emails, unmonitored mailboxes, and junk filters. It may also be possible that there is an element of selection bias here, where only those individuals who are interested in—or have heard of—ABS self-selected into the study [66]. The sample was not designed to be representative of all Australian scientists. It was designed to collate and analyse a sub-sample of the population to explore perceptions that exist among stakeholders engaged in biological resource R and D regarding ABS.

Most respondents worked in government research institutions (n = 44, 62%) followed by universities (n = 21, 28%) with 7% (n = 4) from repositories (i.e., collections like museums and herbaria) and no responses from private sector commercial entities. A little under half (n = 33, 46%) had a lead role in their institutions, 35% (n = 25) had a research role (e.g., fellow), 10% (n = 7) had a technical role (e.g., lab technician), 3% (n = 2) were higher-degree research candidates and the remaining were in specialist roles like infrastructure management. A range of fields of research were represented, including conservation fields like ecology and taxonomy (n = 106, 38%), biology (n = 35, 12%), microbiology (n = 34, 12%), genetics or genomics (n = 28, 10%), other bioinformatics fields (n = 25, 9%) and biotechnology fields (n = 27, 9%). See Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials for the main fields of research of the respondents.

2.2. Measures

The online survey was created and administered using the Qualtrics survey platform (Qualtrics, Qualtrics Experience Management XM [computer software]. Qualtrics (2005)). It comprised 26 questions divided into four main sections (

Table 2. Survey themes and questions.

Part	Theme	Summary of Questions/Stimulus
1	Patterns of subject matter use	Form, source, quantity, use and applications of biological resources, DSI and traditional knowledge
2	Patterns of, and motivations for, benefit sharing	Frequency of listed benefits shared/received, sharing pathways and free text reasons for sharing/not sharing
	Information insert	Brief explanation of the ABS concept and Australia’s ABS landscape, including the provision of a map (Figure 1)
3	Engagement with, and impact of, ABS laws	Knowledge: Extent of knowledge and views on the purpose of ABS and the extent to which they achieve their purpose (free text) Engagement: Organisational culture on engagement, participant engagement with ABS procedures Impacts: Effects of ABS on listed research decisions and behaviour, free text response about the positive and/or negative effects of laws on Australian R and D and how Australia’s approach to ABS could be improved to support deliver of more practical benefits
4	Demographic information	Sector, institutional role, fields of research

, see also the full list of questions in the Supplementary Materials ‘Annex’).

2.3. Procedure

An online survey was conducted from 23 June 2025 to 23 July 2025 to collect data about Australian researchers’ perspectives on existing benefit sharing practices, engagement with ABS procedures and the effectiveness of ABS regulation.

Prospective respondents were emailed a personalised invitation to participate in a ‘Scientist Survey on Biological Resource Regulation’. Interested respondents clicked on a link in this email invitation to directly launch the online survey. In line with ethical requirements for conducting human research, the survey was prefaced with a Participant Information Sheet about the purpose of the study and provided assurances regarding the privacy and data security protections surrounding their responses (CSIRO Ethics Number #148-24). Using the snowball sampling technique, respondents were also encouraged to pass on the survey to relevant colleagues. We received 191 responses. Fifty-five were excluded because they either had no content or had the hallmarks of ‘bot’ responses [67]. Of the 136 final responses, 62 had incomplete/missing data, leaving 74 valid response sets for data analysis.

Respondents were advised in the Participant Information sheet (linked to the survey) that they did not need to know about ABS laws prior to undertaking the survey. Importantly, the survey elicited data about benefit sharing practices (Part 2 of the survey) prior to briefly explaining the ABS concept and Australia’s ABS landscape, including a map (Figure 1), to avoid influencing the participant’s responses about their knowledge or awareness of ABS laws.

3. Results

3.1. The Nature of Australian Bio-R and D: Patterns of Subject Matter Use

The respondents sourced their research subject matter (genetic/biological resources, DSI and traditional knowledge) from diverse locations and in a range of forms. Data show that respondents most often used whole or parts of biological organisms rather than the extracted nucleic acid samples (e.g., DNA) but rarely used synthetic resources (Figure S1). Most Australian researchers used resources from Australia, and while three quarters of these were from wild species rather than domesticated species, only half were collected by the researcher from the wild (nature—mostly from public areas) (Table S2). Only a small number were collected from other laboratories (16%) or from commercial providers like catalogues (5%).

Patterns of use demonstrate multiple biological resources from multiple locations being used for multiple projects over different time scales (Table S3). Nearly all respondents knew the geographical origins of the biological resources they used (Table S2). The source location is needed to determine which ABS laws apply to a specific ‘access’ activity (collection). While only 11% obtained resources from overseas countries, most were obtained from Australian states and territories (64%). Most biological resources were obtained from multiple geographical locations (95%); half of the respondents obtained biological resources from Australian geographical locations that are subject to ABS laws. After respondents obtain biological resources, most first use them within 1 year but a third are used for up to 10 years or more. They mostly use them for multiple projects (76%) and generally, in each project, respondents use genetic materials from multiple biological resources (89%); nearly half use more than 20 biological resources. The data demonstrate widespread use of DSI from genetic material obtained from multiple locations, mostly from public sequence databases, like GenBank (80%), rather than from private databases. Respondents generally use multiple, sometimes millions (16%) of DSI in a single project with not one reporting that they use a single sequence for a project (Table S3). These data indicate the potential application of multiple ABS regimes for a single or for multiple projects across long time scales.

Of the fifteen percent of respondents who reported using traditional knowledge in their research, most used knowledge from Indigenous Australians. Most used knowledge from multiple Indigenous communities for a research project and nearly a third used the same traditional knowledge for multiple projects (Table S3). This indicates that the small number of Australian researchers who use traditional knowledge have collaborations with several communities and that the use is generally centred around individual projects.

The potential applications of participant activities with biological resources, DSI and traditional knowledge were highly varied with clusters around conservation and biotechnology-related applications (Figure S2). Applications were mostly for non-commercial purposes (70%) with the main applications being for conservation/climate change and agriculture/aquaculture. Fewer subject matters were used for biodiscovery (10%) and drug discovery (4%), which were the primary fields for biopiracy that were a motivation for ABS (Section 1).

3.2. The Nature of Australian Benefit Sharing: Patterns and Motivations

The data on the benefits that the respondents generally shared and the benefits they received demonstrate a thriving R and D culture of reciprocity (Figure 2, Table S4). The data indicate that all respondents shared a range of non-monetary benefits, whereas fewer shared monetary benefits from their research. Over three quarters shared their genetic materials and contextual data (environmental and functional data) about their genetic samples or sequences. All but one participant shared opportunities to participate in research collaborations and partnerships, and most shared the results of their research, education/training opportunities, infrastructure (e.g., lab equipment) and joint ownership of intellectual property. Nearly half shared technologies or products arising from genetic research. Around 14% of respondents shared monetary benefits, such as upfront payments, royalties or a percentage of profits, which is a relatively high proportion (nearly half) of those who conduct research with commercial applications (Figure S2). These data suggest a very high level of Australian researcher engagement with monetary and non-monetary benefit sharing.

The data indicate a diversity of beneficiaries from Australian bio-R and D beyond those categories required under ABS laws (‘providers’). Most respondents shared the benefits with colleagues and other research institutions (95%) and ABS providers like governments and IPLCs (60%). More than three quarters share benefits with ‘intermediaries’ (repositories and databases), which fall within a regulatory grey area. A total of15% shared with monetary benefit sharing funds, whereas three quarters shared benefits for the public/society at large and for the benefit of nature for conservation purposes.

Respondents reported a broad range of pathways for sharing genetic resource samples or other benefits from their research (Figure S3). Most genetic resources were generally shared through scientific collaborations, partnerships or networks, formal material transfer agreements and informal arrangements, such as lending, with around a quarter through formal benefit sharing agreements. It is unclear whether the respondents interpreted the latter to mean formal agreements required by ABS laws. The pathways for receiving benefits follow the same trends as those for sharing benefits (Figure S4). These data indicate many sharing pathways outside the prescribed pathways under ABS laws of authorisation (permit) processes and the benefit sharing agreement processes.

Respondents were asked to explain, in their own words, the main reasons why they share or do not share benefits. Several respondents explained that they are motivated to share benefits by R and D culture and public good ideals (Box 1). None of the responses explained that compliance with ABS laws was a motivating factor for benefit sharing. The types of benefits shared were grouped into categories and connected with ABS awareness data in (Figure 3). The data show that many respondents shared non-monetary benefits having been unaware of ABS laws before the survey; however, all the respondents who shared monetary benefits were aware of ABS. This indicates that, while laws may play a role in monetary benefit sharing, there are many reasons other than ABS as to why researchers share samples, sequences, data and non-monetary benefits.

Box 1. Examples of reasons why respondents share benefits.

‘Benefit sharing … fosters collaborative opportunities and when reciprocated, advances the field of research as a whole.’

It is ‘a collaborative act of good faith for those who own or manage said resources and who have given permission to access them.’

‘Sharing benefits is essential as multidisciplinary research relies on inputs from many. Being recognised as a researcher who supports and enables benefit sharing leads to increased wins in the long run.’

3.3. Measures of Effectiveness: Awareness, Engagement and Efficiency of ABS Processes

The data reveal a high awareness of ABS laws by Australian researchers and collection curators but little engagement with ABS processes. Overall, nearly half were aware of the laws but did not know how they work, whereas a quarter had a good understanding of ABS laws but had not engaged with them. A quarter were not aware of ABS laws until this survey. Only 4% said they had engaged with processes under ABS laws (Figure S5). The level of awareness was consistent across institution types, with relatively more knowledge in government research institutions (Table S5). Awareness did not vary significantly depending on the role of the respondent (e.g., lead role or research fellow) (Table S6).

Respondents demonstrated a mixed understanding about who is responsible for ABS compliance and benefit sharing within their organisation (Table S7). Nearly half were not aware of their organisation’s approaches to responsibility for ABS compliance. Most respondents who were aware of their organisation’s culture believed that compliance with ABS laws was the responsibility of individual researchers. Nearly half believed that their organisation manages and demonstrates compliance with ABS laws on behalf of its researchers. Three quarters had access to guidance documents about ABS but needed more advice or guidance about whether ABS applies to their research.

A high proportion of respondents had never engaged in ABS law processes for the collection and utilisation of biological resources and associated traditional knowledge (Figure 4). Of those who reported engagement with measures for collecting resources, most had engaged more than once with processes. The low level of engagement does not necessarily mean non-compliance, as not all research activities attract obligations. Australian law is a patchwork of regulation, the application of which needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis for each resource in question (Section 1). What the data suggest is that those who have engaged with ABS laws mostly follow the procedures on a multiple or ongoing basis for their research activities.

The data indicate similar patterns for low engagement with ABS processes for access to, and use of, traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources (Figure 4). Reasons were not requested from respondents but can be largely explained by the low percentage of respondents who reported using traditional knowledge in their research (15%). Of those who had engaged in ABS processes, most had sought permission more than once. These trends indicate that if researchers do engage with traditional knowledge authorisation and benefit sharing procedures, they usually engage multiple times, potentially with multiple Indigenous communities (73%), rather than a one-off engagement with the legislated process. This is consistent with the Australian research ethics requirements for processes that build trust and long-term engagement with Indigenous Australians when research impacts on matters affecting a range of communities, including their knowledge systems (see [42,47,52]).

The efficiency of ABS procedures was measured in the survey through perspectives about whether processes were easy to follow, completed within reasonable timeframes and with reasonable costs. Satisfaction with the process was used as a more indirect measure of perceived efficiency and effectiveness. Generally, respondents who had engaged in ABS permit processes for biological collections were satisfied with the processes and found the costs to be reasonable, with only a third perceiving them to be efficient (e.g., completed within reasonable timeframes) (35%) and clear or easy to follow (35%)). Those who had engaged in benefit sharing processes (17%) for biological resources found them to be marginally more efficient (55%), easy to follow and reasonably priced (64%) than the permit process. There was less satisfaction with overseas permit and benefit sharing processes, where a greater proportion of respondents reported inefficient and unclear processes and more unreasonable costs than for Australian processes.

The trends demonstrated much less satisfaction with engagement with traditional knowledge processes. Of the respondents who said they had used traditional knowledge in their research, approximately one quarter said they had sought the prior informed consent (permission) from a traditional knowledge holder for its use. Most said the process was inefficient, was not clear or easy to follow, but that the costs were reasonable. This was also found to be the case for the few who reported involvement in a benefit sharing process with the traditional knowledge holders.

3.4. Measures of Effectiveness: Positive and Negative Impacts of ABS Laws

Impact data were assessed from three perspectives: (a) the extent to which respondents believe that ABS achieves its objectives; (b) impacts on the respondents’ activities; and (c) impacts on Australian R and D, more broadly. Overall, the perceived impacts were more negative than positive.

The specific wording of the objectives of ABS varies under Australia’s ABS laws but each import the CBD’s intent, which is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. To avoid priming respondents, and to more accurately measure individual knowledge of ABS objectives, respondents were asked open-ended questions about what they consider to be the purposes of ABS and the extent to which they achieve their purpose. Responses clustered around five objectives:

• fairly and equitably sharing benefits from the use of genetic resources with resource and knowledge owners (73%), nearly half of which emphasised benefits for Indigenous peoples;
• sharing Australia’s resources and knowledge about them (7%);
• protecting the environment and its resources (5%);
• having uniform and clear procedures for clarifying ownership (4%); and
• to preserve the credibility of science (1%).

Only 8% said that ABS laws achieved their purpose; a quarter said they did not achieve their purpose; and the remainder were undecided (Table S8). Box 2 and Box 3 illustrate examples of positive and negative comments.

Box 2. Examples of positive comments on the effectiveness of ABS for achieving its objectives.

‘I think the ABS laws generally achieved the purpose.’

‘They achieve their purpose partially. I think there are many misconceptions about ABS, some parties actively try to ‘get around’ these laws and in doing so harm research more broadly, there is also a significant tension between what resources owners under ABS would like to see done with their data and information vs. what the scientific community think should be done with it (e.g., open access publication of data vs. protecting the interests of biological resource providers).’

‘…conceptionally it is a good thing, however on the ground i am not sure if they achieve their purpose. It would be good if this process happened in a timely manner eg set time frames as negotiating with indigenous communities/groups etc can hinder research.’

‘…protect indigenous knowledge, I think that has come a long way.’

Box 3. Examples of negative comments on the effectiveness of ABS for achieving its objectives.

‘In my experience ABS laws have very limited success in achieving what they were designed for.’

‘Purpose is to make reparations for past wrongs (I know this isn’t the ‘correct’ answer). I don’t think they achieve their purpose.’

‘…they put a up a wall of red tape and legalities that discourages bioprospecting. Bioprospecting is needed for breakthrough developments in medicines and foods.’

‘Difficult to say, since ABS laws are so poorly implemented in Australia.’

‘…lack of consistency across states and territories reduces ABS.’

Respondents were asked about whether ABS laws encourage, discourage, or have no effect on the research decisions and behaviour listed in Figure 5. Most said that ABS laws might encourage researchers to deliver benefits to the providers of resources and traditional knowledge holders. Opinion was evenly split about the effect of ABS on researchers collecting resources from repositories and whether it would encourage benefits from the use of DSI. In contrast, most said that ABS might discourage collections of biological resources from the wild (nature), especially from places where ABS laws apply, indicating a dampening effect on R and D by regulation. Most believed that it might encourage collections from places where ABS laws do not apply, indicating a belief that the current laws promote forum shopping or regulatory avoidance.

Respondents were asked to explain, in their own words, their beliefs about the positive and negative effects of Australia’s ABS laws on Australian R and D, more broadly. Many provided multiple reasons from both perspectives. Overall, perspectives of negative impacts (76%) outweighed the positive impacts (24%) (Table S9). Positive comments mostly related to the capacity for ABS to promote ethical research, particularly the benefits to Indigenous communities. Many noted the role of ABS in encouraging commercial certainty and driving collaborations and other knowledge sharing.

Most of the negative perspectives were clustered around the burden on researchers and a dampening effect on sample collections and R and D. While many respondents recognised that some regulation is necessary to promote benefit sharing, some responses cited burdens on individual researchers from disproportionate or overly restrictive laws or procedures that are overly complex/confusing and time-consuming. This is a similar trend to data on the efficiency of ABS procedures from those respondents who had engaged in ABS procedures (Section 3.3). Ten percent of comments said that ABS laws do not accommodate the varied nature of R and D activities and sectors, which undermines research and its capacity to share benefits.

3.5. Perspectives on Regulatory Reform

Respondents were asked to explain in free-text responses to the question ‘in what ways, if any, do you think that Australia’s approach to ABS could be different or improved to support the delivery of more practical benefits from R and D to providers of biological resources and traditional knowledge?’ The most common responses concerned: (a) improved education and support to navigate rules and procedures (preferably with examples); (b) consistency of ABS rules across Commonwealth, States and Territories; and (c) a better understanding of the nature of R and D by policy makers (Figure 6). Examples of responses for different models are further analysed in Section 4.4.

3.6. Summary

The data illustrate the complex relationships between regulation, regulated entities and the regulated subject matter. Researchers and repository curators generally use multiple resources in multiple forms from multiple locations—mostly from Australian States and Territories, half of which are from locations with ABS laws. The genetic samples, sequences and traditional knowledge are generally used for multiple projects over long time scales for a range of applications, primarily for non-commercial conservation and food security purposes.

The data demonstrate an extensive research culture of sharing data, the results of research, infrastructure, capacity building and collaboration initiatives both within and outside R and D communities. This includes benefit sharing with governments and traditional knowledge holders. There are fewer examples of sharing monetary benefits from the use of biological resources; however, all respondents had shared non-monetary benefits. None of the respondents identified compliance with ABS laws as a motivating factor for benefit sharing generally.

The respondents had high levels of awareness about ABS but low levels of specific knowledge and engagement with ABS processes. The data indicate good knowledge of the objectives of ABS; however, most respondents did not know whether ABS is achieving its objectives. For those who did express an opinion, more believed it did not achieve its purpose. There is a high level of confusion about how the laws apply to their research and who is responsible for engaging with regulators and regulatory procedures. While benefit sharing is commonly practiced by R and D communities, the benefits are being shared primarily through informal pathways, like collaborations, networks and loans, rather than formal procedures under ABS law.

The data indicate that those researchers who do engage with formal ABS processes generally engage in multiple processes and procedures for their research activities. Of these, most perceived the procedures to be inefficient (time-consuming) and unclear; however, most expressed satisfaction with the processes. More broadly, while most respondents believed ABS as a concept might encourage researchers to deliver benefits to the providers of resources, particularly to Indigenous peoples, more respondents said that the complex procedures are more likely to discourage than encourage researchers to use traditional knowledge. Most also believed ABS laws discourage wild-sourced collections of biological resources. They were most concerned about the burden of regulation on researchers from overly restrictive or confusing regulation, followed by concerns about the dampening effect on sample collections and Australian R and D.

4. Discussion

There is a significant gap, in both the international [5] and Australian literature, in empirical data on stakeholder perspectives. The Australian literature is mostly focused on Indigenous peoples’ perspective (e.g., [19,23,42,61]), with a significant gap in understanding R and D actor perspectives. This study offers the first empirical evidence from Australian resource/knowledge users’ perspectives about the extent to which ABS regulation is ‘effective’. Participants did not need knowledge of ABS laws to participate, as questions were crafted broadly around three themes for understanding effectiveness identified in Australian literature: (Section 1)—efficiency (Section 3.2); engagement (Section 3.3); and impacts (Section 3.4). Most of the questions were not specifically related to Australian procedures, although in practice, most participants were using Australian biological resources. Instead, most of the survey results offer insights into user perspectives of the ABS concept, generally, or the CBD/Nagoya Protocol bilateral model of permits and contracts, more specifically, which means that their insights may be useful for policy makers in any country seeking to implement or refine regulations based on the CBD/Nagoya Protocol model.

4.1. Efficiency

International ABS frameworks provide minimum standards for national implementation of ABS; however, neither the CBD nor the Nagoya Protocol have explicit standards of efficiency (achieving policy goals while minimising regulatory burdens, including time, cost and complexity). Whereas the literature mostly focuses on regulatory efficiency in terms of ‘user’ compliance and regulatory loopholes [16,23], the survey data revealed broader efficiency considerations. This included considerations about whether participants believe ABS is achieving its goals, whether the effects of regulatory intervention are proportionate to the expected benefits, and the extent to which the laws accommodate the realities of the regulated entities and regulated activities.

The CBD objectives are the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of biological resources with the providers of resources and knowledge, whereas the Nagoya Protocol focuses more on procedures for benefit sharing (Table 1). The survey data demonstrate that participants generally understood ABS objectives, and focused on addressing biopiracy and unfair exploitation, particularly for Indigenous peoples. For those respondents who gave an opinion about whether the ABS concept is achieving its purpose, most believed that it was not and instead suggested it could be improved to better protect Indigenous peoples’ rights.

The survey data revealed that many respondents believe the effects of regulatory intervention are not proportionate to the expected benefits. Key concerns of respondents about regulatory efficiency related to complex and confusing ABS procedures. The multiple international and national ABS regimes that define the temporal, geographical and subject matter scope mean that every collection needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine which regime applies. The discretionary decisions around scope would place an impractical burden on regulators if every researcher were to seek advice about whether ABS laws apply to their specific activities, promoting regulatory inefficiency. Effective enforcement in this complex matrix of national and international regimes becomes almost impossible because it would require regulators to reverse engineer the final product to determine the multiple ABS regimes that might have applied. Survey data demonstrate that governance complexity was a key deterrent for engagement with ABS procedures (Section 3.2).

The data suggest that CBD/Nagoya Protocol ABS models do not accommodate the dynamic nature of bio-R and D. These models are a paradox of one-size-fits-all legal tools applied to a highly discretionary decision-making structure about scope. On the one hand, the access (permit or authorisation) and benefit sharing (contracts) measures are blunt one-size-fits all legal tools that assume a linear R and D pathway where researchers can negotiate benefits from expected outcomes prior to collection [34] (pp. 20–22), [4] (p. 291). The reality is that outcomes may not be known for years or decades, often by subsequent users of the original resource [68] (p. 202), [41] (p. 399). This model also assumes that collected materials can be traced from collection to the final product; however, R and D processes are much more complex and non-linear [34]. The survey data demonstrate that researchers generally use multiple resources in multiple forms (samples and DSI) from multiple locations over different time scales in multiple projects for multiple purposes and applications. Shoehorning non-linear R and D into a linear one-size-fits-all ABS model of permits and contracts promotes regulatory inefficiency, leaving researchers confused about which ABS rules apply to their activities [34] (p. 8).

Indigenous scholars have argued that the ABS model importing European assumptions about knowledge does not efficiently support traditional knowledge systems and decision-making structures [69] (p. 216). For example, they caution researchers to ‘not presume the view of one group represents the collective view of the community’ [42] (p. 274) (see also [47,51]). Collings [42] argues that conflict between customary law and formal legal rules (positive law) ‘can occur when protective measures seek to impose uniform solutions on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, who are diverse and have diverse governance systems’ [42] (p. 267). Traditional knowledge may be held by more than one group; attempting to simplify rules with a top-down uniform approach is likely to lead to community conflicts about how knowledge is shared and for what purpose [42] (p. 268). Semple et al. [57] argue that from an R and D perspective, it may be ‘difficult to link an individual bioactive compound to a particular species in an area of the country in which it is collected’ and relationships with the species varies between Indigenous communities [57] (p. 947). In Semple’s case, the researchers concluded a benefit sharing agreement in Western Australia (where ABS laws do not apply) to set up a trust fund for Indigenous communities, including those outside the collection area [57] (p. 947). In other words, the benefit sharing solutions were focused on supporting relationships rather than contractual benefit sharing on an individual basis.

4.2. Engagement

4.2.1. Engagement with Benefit Sharing

Much of the international literature questions the extent to which stakeholders engage with benefit sharing laws and procedures e.g., [1,2,3,4,5]. The survey data demonstrate an extensive Australian research culture of sharing non-monetary benefits through informal channels. Most respondents generally share access to physical samples and environmental or functional data about the samples or associated DSI. Sharing these data is important because it provides the context about the samples and DSI for effective use by others [70] (p. 466). Arguably, a significant misunderstanding about R and D by policy makers is the value of these contextual data for the R and D process, which falls between the gaps of the Nagoya Protocol and DSI multilateral mechanism regimes that regulate samples and DSI as legal objects, respectively, resulting in a fragmented regulatory system [34] (pp. 15–16).

The survey data also demonstrate a strong Australian R and D culture of collaboration and capacity building. The literature highlights the crucial importance of information sharing, collaboration, partnerships and infrastructure sharing, which can then lead to further benefits to providers and other beneficiaries [68] (p. 205). Most respondents generally share infrastructure like laboratory equipment or data storage facilities, education and training opportunities like higher degree research positions, research collaborations or partnerships and research and development results. While respondents shared fewer monetary benefits, three quarters share joint ownership of intellectual property, which builds capacity for monetary benefit sharing. Nearly half of the respondents reported sharing technologies or products that arose from their genetic research, demonstrating a strong culture of sharing potentially commercially valuable results of research.

The data indicate that the blunt policy instruments of permits and contracts cannot facilitate nor can they capture the true extent of benefit sharing. While benefit sharing is purportedly universally practiced by respondents, including two thirds of these reporting benefits with resource providers, like governments and Indigenous communities, the benefits are being shared primarily through informal pathways, like collaborations, networks and loans, rather than formal processes under ABS laws. Those researchers who do engage with formal ABS processes generally engage in multiple processes and procedures. This indicates that once researchers have established relationships with the regulators (governments) and providers, the discretionary nature of ABS rules applying on a case-by-case basis become easier to navigate. These trends demonstrate the importance of policy supporting a range of benefit sharing relationships and fostering the existing R and D culture of sharing through means other than permits and contracts on a case-by-case basis [34].

4.2.2. Engagement with ABS Laws and Procedures

The complexity of ABS laws is of universal concern in the international and Australian literature and survey data. The international literature often focuses on the policy/law lag behind new technologies and R and D practices that fall between regulatory gaps (e.g., [71]). Most of the Australian literature analysed specific details of ABS laws and found a general lack of engagement with the procedures, with relatively few examples of benefit sharing reported in government data, e.g., [44] (p. 11). Reasons given in the literature for a lack of engagement included complexity of laws [62] (p. 100), forum shopping [23] (p. 313), and lack of enforcement or regulatory avoidance [62] (p. 100). The survey data echo these trends but provide more nuanced reasons for the high levels of awareness about ABS and low levels of knowledge and engagement with the processes. It revealed a high level of confusion about how the laws apply to their research and whether engagement with the processes is the responsibility of their institution or the individual researcher. Some survey respondents suggested that having different rules in different jurisdictions promotes black markets or forum shopping to avoid burdensome regulatory procedures. The low number of respondents who had engaged with ABS procedures (4%) cited burdens on individual researchers from disproportionate or restrictive laws or procedures, that are overly complex/confusing and time consuming. These data indicate that fragmentation or rules that apply on a case-by-case basis under the CBD/Nagoya Protocol bilateral model is a root cause of the lack of engagement with formal ABS processes.

The fragmentation of ABS laws under the CBD/Nagoya Protocol models risk loopholes and regulatory avoidance. ABS regulates objects (e.g., genetic resources and traditional knowledge); the scope depends on the time (before or after the laws entered into force), location (public or private lands, waters or repositories), manner (‘access’ meaning ‘take’ etc) and purpose of access (commercial, non-commercial, R and D/bioprospecting) (Section 1). As with most other countries’ laws under the CBD/Nagoya Protocol models, none of Australia’s laws are explicitly triggered by the collection of biological resources for direct consumption as a commodity, which is why purchasing Australian bush foods from the market for subsequent R and D investigation is a significant loophole for ABS [64,72]. Nor are the laws triggered by use of Australian native biological resources that were collected from overseas areas or repositories. These are significant loopholes in Australian and overseas ABS regimes, rather than examples of intentional non-compliance. There are studies in the literature in Australia, e.g., [41] (p. 399) and overseas, e.g., [4] (p. 281) that suggest that commercial entities seek the closing of loopholes so that they can prove that the genetic materials have been ethically sourced for commercial and reputation reasons. This is echoed by the survey data, although participants were not directly asked about their knowledge or compliance with the ethical conduct of research obligations (Section 1). In response, many Australian institutions have policies for benefit sharing, particularly with Indigenous communities, regardless of whether the patchwork of ABS laws applies to a collection of a native resource from a given location (and associated traditional knowledge), e.g., [58] (p. 21).

Most respondents said that ABS laws are more likely to discourage than encourage the use of traditional knowledge associated with biological resources. For those who had followed ABS procedures for accessing traditional knowledge, most said they were inefficient and not clear or easy to follow. Generally, the positive comments about ABS from researchers centred on its potential for ensuring that benefits go to Indigenous peoples, but most did not know whether the laws were achieving this. Similar to many countries, under Australian laws, the processes for engagement with Indigenous communities vary not only between states/territories but also within communities [57]. For example, researchers find it challenging to identify the rightful knowledge holders entitled to prior informed consent and benefit sharing [57] (p. 946). In Australia, there is no single centralised Indigenous organisation authorised to speak on behalf of Indigenous communities, which are culturally and linguistically diverse [48] (p. 1). Uncertainty about ensuring engagement with all relevant knowledge holders is a common challenge globally (e.g., [73,74]). However, Indigenous scholars and communities have proposed various reforms to address this uncertainty, highlighting that a one-size-fits-all approach may lead to greater inequity and regulatory inefficiency (Section 4.4).

A common concern in the literature is the lack of enforcement of ABS laws (e.g., [62]). Some cite the discretionary nature and challenges for distinguishing between bioprospecting for commercial and non-commercial uses [24] (p. 94). Others cite low penalties that may outweigh the much higher costs to access resources ethically [16] (p. 22), [23] (p. 312). The universal practices of sharing non-monetary benefits from R and D activities, despite the low number of researchers who understood or who had engaged in ABS procedures, indicates that researchers want to engage in benefit sharing; however, many do not know how to engage in the formal regime. This is supported by free-text comments from researchers in the survey. There is a significant need for governments worldwide to invest in education and awareness campaigns if they are serious about ABS compliance.

4.3. Impacts

Both the literature and survey respondents acknowledge the potential for ABS to have positive impacts on fair and equitable benefit sharing with Indigenous peoples and communities, but that the current arrangements are not delivering on that potential. While there were several positive case studies of effective benefit sharing with communities (e.g., markala tree, uncha and spinifex) [20,75], there were more examples of biopiracy (e.g., Kakadu plum, smokebush, gumby gumby) and negative impacts on communities and their rights to control their knowledge and influence policy [28,61]. Most of the literature argued that Australia’s ABS framework needs to be reformed to prevent ongoing biopiracy and regulatory loopholes [17,18]. The survey data (from resource users) support the literature, saying that ABS has the potential for positive impacts on Indigenous peoples but more needs to be done to deter biopiracy and close loopholes (Section 3.4).

The survey data collected perspectives from resource users (researchers) about the impacts of ABS laws on their activities and R and D more broadly. A limitation of the survey was the absence of responses from private commercial entities and few responses from curators of ex situ collections. Future empirical research using other methods, like interviews, may better suit participation from these sectors, who may seek protection due to commercial and other sensitivities. This section focuses on insights from the literature and survey data about impacts on resource/knowledge users, R and D generally, and on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.

4.3.1. Impacts on Biological Resource Users and R and D

The literature demonstrates a significant gap in analysis about impacts of ABS laws across R and D value chains and often raises concerns about negative impacts on commercial and non-commercial users (see e.g., [4,5]). Concerns include ABS procedures under the Nagoya Protocol model include:

• The procedures are a disproportionate dampener on R and D and innovation at a time when science is needed to address conservation, food and health emergencies [4]; and
• The procedures have disproportionate impacts on publicly funded, non-commercial research while privileging access for commercial users [76,77].

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Commission’s ABS Expert Team noted that the lack of studies in the literature about the positive effects of measures may be due to bias in the literature, ‘which tends to identify problems with the implementation of ABS measures, rather than success stories’ [78] (paragraph 19). This and other reports concluded that further empirical research is necessary to analyse the direct and indirect impacts of ABS measures [5,78,79].

Concerns about the impact of ABS on R and D were echoed by respondents in the survey. Most respondent free-text comments about the impacts of ABS cited a dampening effect on collections and R and D and a disproportionate burden on researchers for a range of reasons (complexity, restrictive regulation, time delays) (see Section 3.4). Most respondents who had engaged in ABS procedures found them to be inefficient (time-consuming) and unclear (see Section 3.3), but most said engaging with the procedures did not adversely impact their research and expressed satisfaction with the process. This suggests a disparity between the perceived impacts of procedures (by those who had not engaged with procedures) and the actual impacts (by those who are familiar with the procedures).

4.3.2. Impacts on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity

A key criticism of the CBD/Nagoya Protocol model is that ABS has moved into the realm of the commercialisation and commodification of nature instead of understanding and supporting biodiversity conservation [80] (pp. 142–143). The Nagoya Protocol’s ABS model was designed to track and trace resources so that monetary value and other benefits from natural products can be redistributed to provider countries [81] (pp. 13–17). In reality, commercial biodiscovery represents a tiny proportion of global bio-R and D, most of which concerns non-commercial ‘public good’ and conservation research [82] (p. 9). Many commercial leads for biodiscovery come from non-commercial research or other sources, rather than in-house industry programs for biological resource collections and research [83] (pp. 6–9). Very few countries’ ABS laws have mandatory requirements for direct benefits for conservation [79]; some, like Australia, have optional or indirect benefits for conservation (e.g., under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2000 (Cth) section 8A.08(k) benefit sharing agreement must provide among other things ‘details of any proposals of the applicant to benefit biodiversity conservation in the area if access is granted’. The language indicates a voluntary rather than mandatory requirement). Most of Australia’s laws have simplified (or no) benefit sharing procedures for non-commercial research coupled with change-of-intent procedures (e.g., Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2000 (Cth) section 8A.07 and 8A.13). However, in practice, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial research needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis, causing uncertainty for users and high costs for government time and resources that could be otherwise spent on direct conservation initiatives (see, e.g., [84]). None of the Australian literature specifically focused on the impacts of ABS laws on Australian biodiversity conservation, which is a key gap requiring empirical evidence to ensure that the laws are achieving their conservation and sustainable use objectives.

The literature suggests that the blunt tools of bilateral ABS designed to capture commercial biodiscovery outcomes (permits and contracts) have a dampening effect on non-commercial biodiversity research [1,2,3,84]. Three quarters of the survey respondents said that they shared benefits from their research with ‘nature e.g., for conservation purposes’, yet few respondents (4%) had engaged in procedures under ABS laws. Most were concerned that ABS procedures would deter wild collections, which adversely affects biodiversity outcomes. In some cases, they claimed that ABS procedures actively undermine the management and conservation of biodiversity. The survey results indicate that while Australian researchers believe that their research delivers conservation benefits, they are motivated by something other than ABS laws. These results support the growing calls for a global rethink of the Nagoya Protocol bilateral model of ABS procedures for achieving the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity [1,2,3], with input from all stakeholders in R and D value chains, including Indigenous communities, research institutions, industry and government.

4.4. Reform and Indicators of Effectiveness

The ABS concept continues to spread beyond its original environmental mandate by being transplanted into other fora with different objectives and contexts. For example, countries are currently negotiating how the concept can be applied in the context of the World Health Organization’s Pandemic Treaty, with significant implications for access to resources for health security [85]. This means that the problems that regulation is attempting to solve are shifting from those for which the ABS concept was originally designed. It also means that different government departments within a country may have different mandates for governing the same biological resources but for different purposes, without a clear agenda for review or reform.

Survey respondents provided suggestions for how ABS could be improved. These included jurisdictional consistency, simplification or removal of ABS rules and better education and support to navigate ABS procedures. Some respondents argued that policy makers need to have a better understanding of the nature of R and D when improving or implementing ABS rules. One respondent suggested changing the model of ‘ownership’ where nature owns the resources, similar to a rights-of-nature approach [86]. Another respondent suggested a model based on co-design, co-implementation and co-dissemination of research with traditional knowledge holders, which is echoed in some of the literature advocating design to accommodate plural legal systems [15] and shifts towards regulating relationships, not objects [33,34]. Another respondent suggested a clearing house where a single negotiation and payment system can be established, like the Cali benefit sharing fund under the DSI multilateral mechanism [40]. However, some respondents urged caution when developing and implementing ABS laws. For example, one person wrote, ‘I despair that some law-makers and decision makers will set up rules that prevent conservation. Their intent may be good, but the lack of expertise in mapping out the unintended consequences could resonate for decades… I urge caution in setting up regulatory frameworks that limit how biodiversity is measured in a biodiversity crisis.’

There are common proposals in Indigenous-authored studies in the literature that may drive successful benefit sharing outcomes for Indigenous peoples. These include (see, e.g., [18,19,20,22,23,42,63,64,87]):

• direct participation in policy, law and decision-making processes relevant to the use of cultural resources and traditional knowledge (self-determination);
• a flexible framework supporting legal pluralism, recognising the diversity in governance and customary laws of Australia’s indigenous communities;
• policy support for indigenous led enterprises and partnerships in bio-innovation (Less than 2% of Australian bush food and botanicals activities are by Indigenous led or owned businesses: [23] (p. 314));
• relationship-building and partnerships based on trust and mutual respect;
• compliance with local community protocols for free prior and informed consent and preserving and recording traditional knowledge;
• negotiations with all or most of the community rather than a process involving a representative person or entity;
• a focus on Indigenous data sovereignty, including operationalising the CARE principles (Collective benefit, Authority to control, Responsibility and Ethics);
• modification of data management systems to ensure culturally appropriate management and protection of traditional knowledge.

The Australian literature calls for a fit-for-purpose regime that deliver on Indigenous self-determination [88,89], a national framework for obtaining the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous/traditional knowledge [54] (p. 48), infrastructure to provide Indigenous communities with the skills and capacity to license Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property rights to authorised third parties [90], and the establishment of an alliance organisation to enable negotiation of rights, contracts, protocols and intellectual property tools [61] (p. 20).

The Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the CBD highlighted, in 2024, the importance of mainstreaming indicators of effectiveness across the ABS fora [91] (paragraph 13). In 2022, CoP recognised that achieving the CBD’s and Nagoya Protocol’s objectives (Table 1) would require clear goals, actions and indicators to measure effectiveness [92]. The Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) is a non-binding strategic framework adopted in 2022 that aims to implement the three objectives of the CBD through 23 targets to be made by 2030 and four global goals for 2050 to preserve biodiversity for current and future generations [93]. Under the GBF, ABS ‘effectiveness’ is largely measured by Party submission of the Nagoya Protocol’s Internationally Recognised Certificates of Compliance, checkpoint communiques and other means of demonstrating engagement with national laws [26] (article 17), see also [59,91]. Australia is not a Party to the Nagoya Protocol; like many other countries, reporting on these measures would not accurately indicate effectiveness in the national context.

Arguably, the measures of effectiveness under the GBF focus on quantitative indicators; however, the survey demonstrates the value of additional qualitative indicators for the achievement of ‘fair and equitable’ benefit sharing. The principle of ‘fair and equitable benefit sharing’ is evolving as a principle of international law but lacks conceptual clarity [94] (p. 4). The BBNJ Agreement imports intergenerational and intragenerational equity into the principle [36] (article 9), see also [95], indicating a shift from the Nagoya Protocol’s intra-generational approach (sharing benefits with current states, communities and individuals) towards more long-term considerations and cooperative relationship-building for benefit sharing outcomes. The survey data demonstrate that a purely procedural approach to regulating and measuring benefits as an end-point of a research project can result in unintended burdens and inequities.

A systems-based approach envisioned for regulation by the Australian government principles on regulatory effectiveness could shift governance towards more outcome-oriented regulation. Outcome-oriented indicators could include considerations about whether benefits were delivered in practice, in what form, with whom, under what timeframes and their usefulness to current and future beneficiaries.

Table 3. Suggested qualitative and quantitative indicators of effectiveness of ABS laws.

Global Biodiversity Framework Headline Indicator	Quantitative Indicators	Qualitative Indicators
Monetary benefits received in accordance with applicable internationally agreed access and benefit sharing instruments	Engagement and Impact—increase in the number of monetary and non-monetary benefits reported to government (voluntary and mandatory disclosures) Efficiency—increase in the number of benefit sharing mechanisms, such as funds	Engagement—an increase in R and D and commercial sectors engaging with ABS processes and Indigenous peoples’ protocols Impact—an increase in the number of publicly available: (a) biological resource samples; (b) digital sequence information; and (c) associated contextual (environmental) data Impact—an increase in the diversity of types of benefits for people and nature Efficiency—evidence that policies promote benefit sharing investments for current and future generations Efficiency—evidence that policies promote collaboration and infrastructure sharing across communities, including R and D and Indigenous peoples and local communities
Non-monetary benefits arising from applicable international access and benefit-sharing instruments

suggests quantitative and qualitative indicators of effectiveness that have arisen from considering the survey dataset as a whole, rather than specific suggestions from respondents. The ABS literature demonstrates a significant gap in stakeholder-driven indicators of effectiveness, particularly around measuring the significant benefit sharing that is already occurring and the extent to which regulation has a supportive or dampening effect on R and D and associated benefit sharing.

5. Conclusions

This study filled a significant gap in empirical data about stakeholder perceptions of the effectiveness of ABS that might offer insights for policy makers in any country that has adopted CBD/Nagoya Protocol bilateral models of resource and knowledge regulation. Australian stakeholders in the survey, and in the literature generally, perceived current approaches to ABS to be ineffective. The research demonstrates that public sector users of biological resources generally support the ambition of benefit sharing, but that bilateral ABS, with its procedures of permits and contracts, is inefficient, with little impact on accelerating benefit sharing. Most respondents wanted to ensure that benefits from the use of endemic biological resources and traditional knowledge are shared with Indigenous peoples and communities but indicated uncertainty about how to engage with the formal procedures. The high levels of awareness about the existence and purpose of ABS are contrasted with significantly low levels of understanding about, and engagement with, ABS processes.

There are several possible explanations for the low levels of formal ABS engagement, with lessons for Australia and overseas countries. First, the survey data support arguments in the literature that complexity, fragmentation and loopholes at the international and national scales are primary reasons for the low level of engagement with benefit sharing under formal ABS procedures. Data revealed confusion about which regimes apply to given R and D activities. Most respondents believe that ABS procedures deter researchers from collecting biological resources in places where ABS laws apply. Second, the survey findings support arguments in the literature that the transactional case-by-case approach to benefit sharing has a disproportionate burden on the original research collector and does not efficiently deliver benefits to the resource providers and other beneficiaries from value chains. Third, the survey data and the literature suggest that the CBD/Nagoya Protocol transactional model of ABS, with its one-size-fits-all tools of permits and contracts, does not effectively accommodate the non-linear nature of R and D. The data demonstrate that R and D is complex, with most researchers using multiple resources, in multiple forms, from multiple locations, often for multiple projects, over different time scales. Far from motivating benefit sharing and bio-innovation, several respondents claimed that ABS regulation has a dampening effect on R and D. Most believed that ABS regulation deters researchers from collecting biological resources from the wild, with serious consequences for biodiversity conservation research. This is a perverse outcome, undermining the achievement of ABS objectives of conservation, sustainable use and fair and equitable benefit sharing.

Despite the limitations of formal ABS procedures, the data revealed positive news—informal benefit sharing is thriving in Australian R and D communities. Most respondents share samples, DSI, environmental data, infrastructure (lab equipment and data storage facilities). Nearly all share opportunities to participate in research collaborations and partnerships and most share joint ownership in intellectual property. While most provided benefits with resource providers and nature, nearly all shared benefits with other researchers and institutions, which invests the benefits for current and future generations. The evidence suggests that this culture of benefit sharing is not necessarily motivated by ABS frameworks but occurs, potentially, despite them. Interestingly, the data suggest a disparity between the perceived impacts of ABS procedures (by those who had not engaged with procedures) and the actual impacts (by those who are familiar with the procedures). The ideas for regulatory improvements by respondents and in the academic literature ranged from the need for more education and training in ABS procedures to more extensive reform, including recalibration of the ABS concept, decision-making structures and legal tools away from an ad hoc approach and towards a cooperative approach that better supports and accelerates benefit sharing relationships in R and D value chains.

International and national ABS policy are now at a crossroads. On the one hand, the ABS concept has succeeded in raising awareness about the importance of fairly and efficiently sharing benefits from research with biological resource and traditional knowledge providers. On the other hand, there is now some evidence to suggest that the legal and policy tools of permits and contracts based on linear misassumptions of R and D have delivered far fewer benefits than expected and risk disrupting existing R and D sharing cultures and benefits for biodiversity. The scope of international ABS frameworks continues to become increasingly fragmented into the location of collection (within and beyond national jurisdiction), sector (e.g., plant, marine) and form (e.g., physical materials and DSI). There is an urgent need for countries to work with affected stakeholders to rethink the implementation of the ABS concept to better support the broader goals of conservation, sustainable use and equity, as well as bio-innovation and knowledge production, in order to accelerate benefit sharing for all.