1. Introduction
The rapid development of online platforms has further promoted the upgrading of products and shortened their life cycle, and the number of waste products has continued to increase. It is reported that between 2014 and 2019, the world produced a record 53.6 million tons of e-waste in 2019; the global amount of e-waste increased by 21%, and it is expected to reach 74 million tons by 2030. In 2021, the global electronic waste and electrical equipment waste exceeded 57.4 million tons (
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1714299926895059962&wfr=spider&for=pc, accessed on 25 December 2022). By 2050, the world will generate 32 billion tons of garbage annually. Experts say that every ton of unrecycled e-waste produces 2 tons of carbon impact. However, the cost of remanufacturing the usable parts in waste products is only 50% of the cost of new products, which can save 60% of energy and 70% of materials (
https://auto.ifeng.com/usecar/news/20090910/101940.shtml, accessed on 25 December 2022). The negative impact on the environment is significantly reduced compared with manufacturing new products. However, in practice, due to the nontransparency of the recycling process and weak consumer awareness of recycling, it is difficult to carry out waste product recycling activities, and the real recycling volume of recyclers does not match the theoretical recycling volume of consumers, which leads to false recycling problems. Considering the value of reusable components in waste products and the potential pollution and waste of resources caused by improper treatment, recycling of waste products has become more important and urgent than ever in the era of continuous product improvement [
1,
2,
3].
Driven by legislation and the economics of resource conservation and reuse, corporate recycling activities have become very common [
4]. Hewlett Packard (HP) separates used equipment into components that can be reused in new manufacturing systems [
5]. For the benefit of consumers and the environment, Apple’s proposed trade-in and recycling process requires that every refurbished product meet Apple’s official new product testing standard. In addition, well-known companies such as Xerox and Epson have incorporated the recycling and remanufacturing plan of waste products into their daily operating plan [
6]. In the process of enterprise recycling activities, due to the inability to monitor the whole recycling process with the existing methods, the real recycling volume of waste products is far away from the theoretical recycling volume, and the problem of false recycling is gradually exposed, which has become a bottleneck problem restricting the development of circular economy (
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1703519650356222772&wfr=spider&for=pc, accessed on 25 December 2022). In the textile industry, more than 70% of used clothing recycling is illegally dumped in other used clothing markets in Africa and China every year, and about 20% of the waste clothing has unclear final flow direction. The real recycling volume is less than 10% of the theoretical one (
http://news.cyol.com/, accessed on 25 December 2022). In addition, the data disclosed in the White Paper on the Development of China’s Lithium-Ion Battery Recycling, Disassembly, and Echelon Utilization Industry shows that in 2020, the theoretical recovery of lithium-ion batteries in the Chinese market reached 478,000 tons, but the actual recovery was 196,000 tons, accounting for only 41% (
http://www.xevcar.com/, accessed on 25 December 2022). This phenomenon, where the actual recycling volume of waste products is much lower than the theoretical recycling volume, is called false recycling. Therefore, the consumer’s awareness is gradually improved. The existence of false recycling not only reduces the efficiency of recycling investment, but also leads to consumer distrust, which greatly damages the company’s image and further reduces consumers’ willingness to return waste products.
The lack of transparency and effective monitoring of the entire recycling process is at the root of false recycling. In recent years, the continuous development of blockchain technology and practical feedback have brought new hope for solving false recycling. Blockchain was born along with bitcoin and has been applied to finance, government, people’s livelihood, and medical care due to its technical characteristics, such as transparency, trustworthiness, traceability, and tamper-proofing [
7,
8]. In recent years, blockchain has proven to play an important role in enabling information sharing, maintaining supply chain traceability, and effectively improving operational efficiency [
9,
10,
11]. Given the technical advantages of blockchain in achieving end-to-end traceability and improving supply chain transparency, companies have used it to monitor the recycling of waste products. China’s Hainan Green Technology and Thunder Chain cooperate to recycle waste textiles, which realized effective supervision of the whole recycling process and increased the amount of textile recycling. By developing the JD Chain Tracking System to track the recycling process of recycled mobile phones and other recycled electronic products, JD & AI Recycling has won consumers’ trust in recycling and greatly improved the company’s reputation. Laiyue’s recycling platform applies blockchain technology to the recycling industry to verify the authenticity of recycling operations. The “battery home” service platform in Guangdong Province, China, uses blockchain to establish a battery recycling system, which realizes the supervision of the recycling process of waste batteries. We can see that the application of blockchain increases the transparency of the recycling process, enables the supervision of the whole recycling process, and increases the trust of consumers. This not only enhances a company’s image, but also promotes the sustainable recycling of waste products, laying the foundation for a circular economy. However, considering the trade-off between the cost of implementation and the effectiveness of blockchain, when to use blockchain to monitor the recycling process and solve the problem of false recycling is one of the important issues considered in this paper.
In addition, the rapid development of the platform economy has not only enabled manufacturers to develop their online sales channels and expand the market scale with the help of the “platform power”, but also made online recycling using the platform an important recycling channel other than manufacturer-independent recycling [
12,
13]. The innovative recycling mode of “Internet + Recycling” has become increasingly popular. On the one hand, the platform has a large amount of online traffic and consumer data. It can accurately locate consumer groups through big data analytics technology, increase brand exposure, and improve sales conversion rate through live online broadcasting and other marketing activities [
12,
14,
15]. On the other hand, in the “Internet + Recycling” mode, by tracking consumers’ product usage, the platform will remind consumers to return the waste products after a certain period of time, and the platform will bear the cost of recycling the waste products [
16]. JD & Aihuishou provides consumers with one-click online ordering and door-to-door pickup. It has cooperated with many manufacturers to realize the recycling of waste products. In China, online recycling platforms, such as taolv.com, Lehuishou, and Huishoubao, have grown rapidly, providing a convenient channel for online recycling of waste products. Therefore, weighing the convenience and cost of online recycling, manufacturers still face the problem of selecting recycling channels in the current recycling process under the background of platform economy. Not only that, but considering the issue of false recycling, how the implementation of blockchain will affect the platform’s original operational strategy, the manufacturer’s choice of recycling channels, and the economic, environmental, and social benefits of a CLSC is also a very challenging and valuable issue that needs to be further explored theoretically.
To this end, this paper focuses on a CLSC system consisting of a manufacturer engaged in manufacturing and remanufacturing and an online platform that sells products as a marketplace. Considering that blockchain can regulate the whole recycling process of waste products, improve consumer trust, and boost the recycling volume, this paper aims to answer the following three questions to fill the gap between blockchain adoption and recycling channel selection in the CLSC:
Q1: What are the optimal conditions for implementing blockchain in the waste recycling process?
Q2: What impact will the adoption of blockchain technology in the recycling process have on corporate decisions, recycling rate, and manufacturer recycling channel selection?
Q3: How to optimize the combination of blockchain implementation and recycling channel selection to further enhance the economic, environmental, and social triple benefits of the CLSC?
In order to answer the above questions, four differential game models are developed, namely, manufacturer recycling channel without blockchain (model ), platform recycling channel without blockchain (model ), manufacturer recycling channel with blockchain (model ), and platform recycling channel with blockchain (model ). With the help of Bellman’s dynamic programming theory, the firm’s decisions, the recycling rate of waste products, the firm’s profits, the consumer surplus, and the social welfare under the four models are obtained. By comparing the economic benefits of blockchain implementation under different recycling channels, the conditions for blockchain implementation are clarified. A comparative analysis illustrates the value of blockchain implementation. It also defines the scope that enables the triple benefits of CLSC with blockchain empowerment. The main conclusions are: (1) Blockchain can effectively solve the phenomenon of false recycling and realize the supervision of the whole recycling process by its transparency, traceability, and tamper-proofing. Under a certain cost range, the blockchain will be adopted by the recycler. Moreover, the greater the difference between the real and theoretical volume of recovery, the greater the need for blockchain implementation. (2) By analyzing decision making, performance, and manufacturer recovery channel selection before and after blockchain implementation, this study summarizes three main effects of blockchain implementation: decision incentive effect, marketing leverage effect, and incentive alignment effect, which reveal the impact of blockchain on increasing the motivation of CLSC members to exert effort, expanding the market size by improving brand goodwill, and enabling both the manufacturer and the platform to be better off from the manufacturer recycling channel under certain conditions. (3) When blockchain is not implemented, the manufacturer’s choice is the manufacturer recycling channel, a finding consistent with the previous research. Under blockchain empowerment, we define a cost range for blockchain implementation, i.e.,, where the manufacturer and the platform reach an agreement on manufacturer recycling with blockchain, and the triple benefits of the CLSC are optimally realized. Furthermore, to illustrate the robustness of the results, we perform an extension with the unit cost of the blockchain implementation. The recycler partners with an established blockchain technology service company. Thus, the cost of implementing blockchain is no longer a fixed cost, as it was in the baseline model, but a variable cost per unit. The results of the extended model are consistent with the baseline model, and the robustness of the results of this paper is tested. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
First of all, the adoption of blockchain to avoid false recycling fills the gap between blockchain implementation and backward supply chain management. In addition, it is worth noting that we introduced blockchain from the perspective of avoiding false recycling, which explores the application of blockchain only in the backward chain. The analysis results demonstrated that the implementation of blockchain in the recycling process of waste products can not only build consumer trust in the recycling chain and promote the recycling of waste products, but also play its marketing leverage function by improving brand goodwill, which can further promote the demand with the improvement of brand premium capacity in forward sales. Therefore, this paper studies blockchain in a CLSC considering forward and backward interactions and proposes corresponding management insights, which will be of great value to both forward sales and reverse recycling.
Second, a growing body of research shows that platforms with platform power act as online marketplaces in online marketing, a sales format that allows brand manufacturers more flexibility in pricing power while avoiding order fulfillment costs and operational risk for the platform. Most of the existing studies explore the static operational strategies in the forward supply chain when the platform acts as a market intermediary. On the one hand, the impact of online marketing on the dynamic change of brand goodwill is not extremely considered on the long-term benefits of the supply chain. On the other hand, given that platforms are closer to consumers, more and more platforms are acting as recyclers. In contrast, few theoretical studies have been reported that consider platforms as recyclers and explore manufacturers’ motivations for recycling channel selection. Therefore, in response to these two current situations, the contribution of this paper is to consider the dynamic impact of blockchain implementation, recycling efforts, and platform online marketing on brand goodwill and its long-term impact on the triple economic, environmental, and social performance in a dynamic CLSC system. At the same time, the platform is involved in the selection of recyclers to explore the optimal recycling channel selection of the manufacturer under blockchain empowerment and its impact on the triple benefits of CLSC.
Finally, one of the outstanding contributions of this paper is the discovery of the inconsistency between the manufacturer and the platform caused by the false recycling status when the blockchain is not implemented. The important contribution of this paper to the study of blockchain is that the research defines the three main effects of the blockchain by analyzing the implementation value of the blockchain. The results confirm the coordinating role of the blockchain in the equilibrium recycling channel selection of the CLSC. The cost range of the blockchain implementation that benefits both the manufacturer and the platform at the same time is clarified. Furthermore, the triple benefit of the entire CLSC has been shown to be improved within this range. Therefore, our research results can further deepen the research scope of blockchain in the supply chain and make an important contribution to the optimization of CLSC operations considering the recycling of waste products.
In order to explore the above issues and draw conclusions and insights, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2, we will review the relevant literature; in
Section 3 and
Section 4, we will make assumptions about the relevant models and analyze optimal corporate decisions and social performance. In
Section 5, we will clarify the conditions for blockchain adoption and illustrate the impact of blockchain implementation on corporate decisions and the triple benefits of CLSC. In
Section 6, we will further verify the robustness of the results obtained in the benchmark model by developing extended models in which the recycler cooperates with a blockchain service company. In
Section 7, we will draw the main conclusions and management insights of the paper.
3. Model Framework
This section may be divided by subheadings. It should provide a concise and precise description of the experimental results, their interpretation, and the experimental conclusions that can be drawn.
This paper investigates a dynamic CLSC system consisting of a manufacturer (
) and an online platform (
), where the manufacturer is responsible for production and remanufacturing, and the platform is responsible for online marketing. In the forward supply chain, the manufacturer sets the retail price
of the product and sells it on the platform, which acts as a marketplace. This agency selling format of direct pricing and sales by manufacturers is widely used by online platforms. For instance, it is used when Amazon sells personal computers with ASUStek, Lenovo, and other brands. In this case, the platform charges a commission from the manufacturer; the commission rate is
. In this paper, we assume that the commission rate is an exogenous variable; this assumption has been adopted in several studies [
34,
42,
44]. In the actual operation of enterprises, the platform’s commission rate for selling the same type of products is basically fixed. For example, when manufacturers’ products are sold on Amazon as a marketplace, Amazon charges a percentage of the retail price as a commission, depending on the category of the item, such as 15% for shoes, 6% for computers, 20% for jewelry, and 8% for electronics and cameras (
http://www.amazon.com, accessed on 25 December 2022). In addition, in order to give scope to “platform power” and expand the potential market demand, the platform will make online marketing efforts
, such as webcast and APP home page recommendation, to target customers with the help of big data and so on.
In the backward supply chain, the recycler(M or P)sets recycling efforts , including door-to-door pickup, recycling logistics, recycling packaging, and other efforts, to increase the volume of waste products recycled. Then, this paper uses the characteristics of blockchain, such as transparency and traceability, to regulate the entire recycling process. It not only solves the phenomenon of false recycling, where the real recycling volume is less than the theoretical recycling volume, increases the real recycling rate of waste products, but also improves the brand goodwill of products and enhances consumers’ recycling confidence through the brand. Finally, we consider the benefits of combining blockchain with an appropriate recycling channel to improve the triple bottom line of economy, environment, and society in the CLSC. Thus, the optimal recycling channel selection with blockchain empowerment is achieved.
In this section, we focus on modeling and analyzing four differential game models: manufacturer recycling channel without blockchain (model
), platform recycling channel without blockchain (model
), manufacturer recycling channel with blockchain (model
), and platform recycling channel with blockchain (model
). The structure of the CLSC and the decision content of the members under the above four models are shown in
Figure 1. In the CLSC without blockchain adoption, the theoretical volume of consumers is defined as
, but the recyclers only receive the real volume
.
of recycling is loss. It can be seen from
Figure 1 In the CLSC with blockchain adoption, thanks to the transparency and traceability of blockchain, the theoretical and real volume of recovery is consistent, that is
. In addition,
is defined as the sales volume in the forward chain. The finance flow, recycle flow, product flow, service flow, and technology flow are labeled in detail. The other notations are defined in
Table 2.
One of the main points used to measure the implementation effect of blockchain in this paper is brand goodwill, which is considered to be an important indicator reflecting the image of enterprises in the minds of consumers, and also an important factor influencing demand. Brand goodwill depends on many aspects, such as high product quality, good company image, perfect management system, and so on. We assume that brand goodwill
is affected by both marketing activities and recycling activities and depends on the entire history, not just the current level of marketing and recycling activities. In this case, a common assumption is that
is the continuous weighted average of past marketing and recycling efforts, and the weight function decays exponentially. This assumption is very intuitive, because brand goodwill is related to consumers’ perception of the brand, which is the “ psychological state “ that consumers acquire over time rather than overnight [
45]. This is also an important consideration for this paper to adopt continuous time dynamic programming theory. This process is captured by defining
as a state variable, and its evolution is controlled by the following linear differential equation:
where Equation (1a) represents the situation where the recycler does not implement blockchain for recycling. It reflects the impact of online marketing on brand goodwill. Based on previous studies, we assume that the platform’s marketing effort
plays an advertising role by increasing product exposure and consumer awareness of products, which has a positive impact on brand goodwill [
12,
46,
47].
is the coefficient of the platform’s marketing effort on the brand goodwill.
is the initial goodwill of the brand when no effort is made.
represents the rate of decline in brand goodwill caused by the change in consumer attitude toward the brand. This assumption comes from the advertising goodwill model of Nerlove–Arrow [
48]. The study points out that a company’s goodwill will naturally decline as consumers forget the brand or switch to other competing brands, and
represents the natural rate of decline. The impact of changes in consumers’ brand attitudes during the recycling process is shown as
, where
is the percentage of real recycling compared with theoretical recycling. Accordingly, the proportion of false recycling
is characterized. We assume that consumers who observe false recycling will directly distrust the brand and accelerate the decline of brand goodwill, which is consistent with our observation in practice. However, if the recycler adopts blockchain, the tracking and tracing of the entire recycling process of blockchain and the technical characteristics of data that is difficult to tamper with will make the real recovery rate infinitely closer to the theoretical recovery rate. We assume that the implementation of blockchain makes the two consistent, thus avoiding false recycling, that is,
. The entire recycling process can be presented transparently to consumers who participate in recycling, avoiding brand distrust caused by false recycling. Brand goodwill with blockchain is represented as
Considering the positive impact of goodwill on market demand, in the forward supply chain, the research assumes that the market demand
at every moment is positively correlated with brand goodwill and negatively correlated with product retail price [
49]:
where
is the basic demand of the market, which reflects the basic appeal of the brand to consumers [
47].
is the basic market power of the product.
represents the potential expansion of market size through “platform power” [
25,
50].
is the ability to expand the potential market size of the platform. The second root of brand goodwill reflects the saturation effect of brand goodwill on market demand [
45].
is the coefficient of price sensitivity of consumers [
38].
is the retail price of every unit of product.
In the reverse recycling chain, it is assumed that the theoretical volume
returned by consumers is positively influenced by the recycling effort
of the recycler (manufacturer/platform) [
51], which is assumed as
where
is the basic theoretical recycling volume without any recycling efforts, and
represents the impact of recycling effort on theoretical recycling volume. Without the adoption of blockchain, the recycling process of waste products is not transparent and regulated, leading to false recycling. We assume the real recycling volume without blockchain as
, which shows that the real recycling volume is lower than the theoretical one as
. While the recycler implements the blockchain in the recycling process, we assume that the real recycling volume is equal to the theoretical recycling volume as
. To ensure that the forward sales volume of the product is greater than the reverse recycling volume, it is assumed that
.
It is also believed that recycling waste products can reduce unit cost
(unit value of waste products–unit remanufacturing cost) for new products [
45]. To build a blockchain system, recyclers must pay a fixed cost
[
22]. In the extended model, we will further consider the case where the recycler collaborates with a blockchain service company, rather than developing it by itself, and the cost of the blockchain is portrayed as a unit cost
. The cost of the recycling effort is
[
29], the cost of the marketing effort is
[
52], all cost functions satisfy the law of diminishing marginal returns [
51], and
is the cost coefficient for the recycling effort and the marketing effort, respectively. Meanwhile, we need to note that the manufacturer signs a residual value sharing contract with the platform in order to motivate the platform to recycle when the manufacturer recycles through the platform, and the platform receives a proportion
of the residual value.
In addition, we assume that both the manufacturer and the platform in the CLSC operate over an infinite planning horizon, profit maximization is the decision objective, and the discount rate is
. For clarity, the notations used in the article are shown in
Table 2.
4. Model Development
This section focuses on further analyzing the optimal decisions of the retail price, the platform’s marketing effort, the recycling effort, and optimal profits under the four models, including manufacturer recycling channel without blockchain (model
), platform recycling channel without blockchain (model
), manufacture recycling channel with blockchain (model
), and platform recycling channel with blockchain (model
). For the sake of clarity, the four recycling models are denoted by superscripts, and the supply chain subjects are denoted by subscripts. The subscript
represents the stable value of each decision variable. All the relevant proofs are listed in
Appendix A.
4.1. Manufacturer Recycling Channel without Blockchain (Model )
Under the model
, the manufacturer first determines the retail price
of the products and the recycling effort
, and the platform determines the marketing effort
. The manufacturer and the platform adopt a manufacturer-driven Stackelberg differential game, where the decision sequence is pricing and recycling decisions by the manufacturer and marketing decisions by the platform on this basis. The differential game model is represented as:
Proposition 1. The time trajectory of brand goodwill is: ; the stable value of brand goodwill under model is: ; and the retail price of the products, the marketing efforts of the platform, and the recycling efforts of the manufacturer are: , , and . The optimal functions of the manufacturer and the platform are, respectively: From the optimal decisions under the model in Proposition 1, we know that: (1) Brand market power and “platform power” have a very important impact on corporate decisions and social performance. Brand goodwill, retail price, the profits of supply chain, and social performance are positively correlated with brand market power and “platform power”. That is, if a product has high market power and the platform has made marketing efforts through advertising and other activities, both the manufacturer and the platform can make more profits. (2) Analyzing the impact of the real recycling rate of waste products, it is found that the real recycling rate has a positive effect on brand goodwill and recycling effort, and the higher the real recycling rate, the higher the brand goodwill of the products, and the higher the retail price of the products. The recycler’s recycling effort is incentivized by the real recycling rate, and the higher the real recycling rate, the higher the reward for the recycler’s recycling effort. In addition, supply chain profits and social performance are positively correlated with the real recycling rate, and supply chain members strive to increase the real recycling rate for optimal profits.
4.2. Platform Recycling Channel without Blockchain (Model )
Under the model
, the manufacturer first sets the retail price
of the products, and then, the platform sets the marketing effort
and the recycling effort
. The platform gives the waste products to the manufacturer for remanufacturing and receives a proportional share
of the residual value. The manufacturer and the platform adopt a manufacturer-driven Stackelberg differential game, and the decision sequence is: the manufacturer makes the pricing decision, and the platform makes the marketing and recycling decisions. The differential game model of the manufacturer and the platform is represented as
Proposition 2. The time trajectory of brand goodwill is: ; the stable value of brand goodwill under model is: ; and the retail price of the products, the marketing effort, and the recycling effort of the platform are: , , and . The optimal functions of the manufacturer and the platform are, respectively: The optimal decisions under the model in Proposition 2 are similar to the optimal decisions under the model . (1) The platform’s brand goodwill, retail price, and marketing efforts are consistent; these are , , and . Brand market power and “platform power” have a positive impact on corporate decisions and social performance, while the real recycling rate of waste products has a positive impact on brand goodwill, recycling effort, and supply chain profits and social performance. (2) The platform will return the waste products to the manufacturer for disposal and remanufacturing when the platform recycles, and the platform will share a proportion of the residual value. The platform’s recycling effort is positively correlated with the proportion. The higher the profits the platform receives from the residual value, the more willing the platform is to make an effort to recycle. At the same time, the proportion of waste products affects the volume of reverse recycling, which has a positive impact on supply chain profits and social performance.
Corollary 1. If the recycler does not implement blockchain to monitor the recycling process, the manufacturer’s recycling channel of choice is manufacturer recycling.
Comparing the profits of the manufacturer between the model and the model , there is always . This illustrates that the manufacturer is always better off collecting the waste products without the blockchain implementation. Compared with the platform-recycling channel, the manufacturer can obtain all the profits of the waste products under the manufacturer recycling channel so that the manufacturer will choose to recycle the waste products. Additionally, when comparing the profits of the platform under the model and the model without blockchain, there is always . The model is better than the model for the platform. That is, the platform prefers to recycle the waste products in order to obtain a share of the residual value of the waste products. Compared with the manufacturer recycling channel, it is clear that the platform makes more profit from recycling.
If the recycler does not implement blockchain, there is a conflict in the choice of recycling channels: both the manufacturer and the platform tend to recycle waste products themselves, without blockchain, in order to keep the residual profits. While the manufacturer makes the choice of recycling channel in its favor, it does not make the platform better off. Therefore, the manufacturer and the platform cannot reach a stable willingness to cooperate on this recycling channel for waste products when blockchain is not implemented.
4.3. Manufacturer Recycling Channel with Blockchain (Model )
Under the model
, the manufacturer will invest in building a blockchain system with a fixed cost, and the decision sequence is this: the manufacturer first makes pricing and recycling decisions and determines the retail price
of the products and the recycling effort
, and the platform makes marketing decisions to determine the marketing effort
. The manufacturer and the platform take a manufacturer-driven Stackelberg differential game. The differential game model for the manufacturer and the platform is represented as
Proposition 3. The time trajectory of brand goodwill is: ; the stable value of brand goodwill under the model is: ; and the retail price of the products, the platform’s marketing effort, and the manufacturer’s recycling effort are: , , and . The optimal functions of the manufacturer and the platform are, respectively: The analysis of optimal decisions and optimal profits under the model
in Proposition 3 shows this: (1) Brand market power and “platform power” will have a positive impact on brand goodwill, the retail price, and the platform’s marketing effort, and corporate decisions and social performance, which is the same as the recycling channel without blockchain. The difference in the intensity of the impact can be observed in particular in
Section 6. (2) Members of the supply chain can monitor the entire recycling process through blockchain, effectively solving the problem of false recycling. The theoretical recycling volume is equal to the real recycling volume; that is, the real recycling rate is
. The manufacturer needs to build a blockchain system to monitor the recycling process under the model
. We assume that the construction of the blockchain system requires a fixed cost
, which will determine whether or not the manufacturer proceeds with the construction of the blockchain system; that is,
has an inverse effect on the manufacturer’s profits, the manufacturer will not establish a blockchain system if the costs are greater than the profits and vice versa, and the manufacturer may choose to adopt blockchain. The manufacturer’s recycling channel will not affect the platform’s profits, but will conversely affect social welfare.
4.4. Platform Recycling Channel with Blockchain (Model )
Under the model
, the platform establishes a blockchain system to monitor the recycling process, which will invest a fixed cost
, and at the same time, the platform gives the waste products to the manufacturer for remanufacturing, and obtains a proportion
of the revenue. Since the residual value of the waste products cannot be shared, the manufacturer pays the platform its share of the revenue up front. The manufacturer and the platform adopt a manufacturer-driven Stackelberg differential game; the decision sequence is: the manufacturer makes pricing decisions, and the platform makes marketing and recycling decisions based on those decisions. The manufacturer determines the retail price of the products, and the platform sets the marketing effort and the recycling effort. The differential game model is expressed as
Proposition 4. The time trajectory of brand goodwill is: ; the stable value of brand goodwill under the model is: ; and the products’ retail price, the platform’s marketing effort, and the platform’s recycling effort are: , , and . The optimal functions of the manufacturer and the platform are, respectively: In Proposition 4, the optimal decisions under the model are similar to the optimal decisions under the model . From that: (1) , , , the stable value of brand goodwill, the retail price, and the marketing effort are consistent; and the brand market power and “platform power” positively influence corporate decisions and social performance. (2) The real recycling rate is under the model . The platform returns the waste products to the manufacturer for disposal and remanufacturing, and receives a proportion of the residual value. Therefore, the recycling effort is positively correlated with the share of residual value, and the higher the residual value profits received by the platform, the more willing it is to make recycling efforts. In addition, the construction of the blockchain system requires a fixed cost , has an inverse effect on the platform’s profits, and the platform will not establish a blockchain system if the cost is higher than the profit. The cost of blockchain will not have a direct impact on the manufacturer’s profits, but it will have an impact on social welfare.
Corollary 2. The optimal recycling channel for manufacturers with blockchain implementation is the manufacturer recycling channel if . If , the result will be the platform recycling channel. Additionally, if , the two recycling channels make no difference to the manufacturer, while .
From Corollary 2, it is concluded that the selection of recycling channel is related to the fixed cost of establishing the blockchain system. In other words, if the profit obtained by the manufacturer from the establishment of the blockchain system is higher than the profit obtained by the platform, the manufacturer will choose to establish the blockchain for the recycling of waste products; otherwise, the choice of the platform recycling channel will be more appropriate. Comparing the profits of the platform under the models and , the platform will benefit from the manufacturer recycling channel if , and the platform recycling channel if . Additionally, there is no difference for the platform if , while . A key finding is that if , the manufacturer will choose the manufacturer recycling channel, and the platform can benefit from it at the same time. At this point, the platform does not need to invest in blockchain to recycle waste products, but it can reap the additional benefits of the manufacturer’s investment in blockchain in the forward sales process: the blockchain implementation drives forward demand by increasing the manufacturer’s incentive to invest in recycling efforts and reducing the brand goodwill decay caused by brand goodwill.
6. Numerical Analysis
This section uses numerical examples to verify the analytical conclusions reached in the previous sections. Through linear analysis of key exogenous variables, such as real recycling rate and “platform power”, we obtain the trajectories of optimal decisions of brand goodwill, the retail price, supply chain members’ profits, and social welfare under different values. Based on the actual situation (Amazon charges a percentage of the retail price as commission according to the item’s category, such as 15% for shoes, 6% for computers, 20% for jewelry, and 8% for electronics and cameras) and referring to some literature [
22,
53], we set the specific parameters as follows:
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
;
.
The manufacturer’s choice and the platform’s willingness to engage in the recycling channel are examined by comparing the changes in the manufacturer’s and platform’s profits with blockchain, as shown in
Figure 2.
As shown in
Figure 2,
and
represent the boundaries, where the manufacturer and the platform choose the same recycling channel. Infeasible Region Ι indicates a completely infeasible region (does not conform to the sales profits being greater than the residual value of the waste products). Feasible Region Ι indicates that the manufacturer chooses the model
in this region, from which the platform can benefit from forward sales; that is, both the manufacturer and the platform can be optimized under the model
. Feasible Region ΙΙ is that neither the manufacturer nor the platform can benefit from blockchain. Feasible Region ΙΙΙ indicates that the manufacturer chooses the model
, from which the platform cannot benefit, but he can benefit from the model
; they will benefit from different recycling channels. Therefore, in order to maximize the benefits, the manufacturer and the platform will choose the recycling channel that can generate revenue to coordinate the profits, and both the manufacturer and the platform will prefer Feasible Region Ι.
In order to compare the impact on corporate decisions and social performance under four recycling channels, we analyze the changes in supply chain profits and social welfare by numerical analysis and derive the following figure of recycling channel selections, and the manufacturer and the platform achieve their optimal interests, respectively, as shown in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows:
and
represent the boundaries, where all the social performance can benefit from this. Infeasible Region Ι represents the infeasible region (does not satisfy the condition that the profit of the new product is greater than the residual value of the waste products). Infeasible Region ΙΙ indicates that social welfare and supply chain profits are not improved under two models with blockchain. Feasible Region Ι indicates that supply chain profits and social welfare can be increased in platform recycling with blockchain. Feasible Region Ι + Feasible Region ΙΙ indicates that the supply chain profits and social welfare under the model
are better than the model
. Therefore, the analysis shows that the goal of recycling with blockchain can be better achieved than without blockchain, for both corporate decisions and social performance, whether for platform recycling or for manufacturer recycling, in Feasible Region Ι.
The selection of recycling channel of the platform is related to the proportion of residual value, when examining the triple benefits of economy, environment, and society in the CLSC under platform recycling, as shown in
Figure 4,
Figure 5 and
Figure 6 below based on numerical analysis.
Figure 4,
Figure 5 and
Figure 6 represent the environmental efficiency, the growth rate of supply chain profits, and the growth rate of social welfare of the model
compared with the model
. From
Figure 4, it can be seen that the environmental efficiency is positively related to the proportion; as the proportion obtained by the platform increases, the platform will be more willing to carry out recycling activities. The platform takes its own interests as a starting point, and the additional profits it gains will enhance its higher sense of social responsibility. According to
Figure 5 and
Figure 6, we can see that the growth rate of supply chain profits and social welfare are negatively related to the fixed cost of blockchain; that is, if the fixed cost increases, both the profits and social performance will decrease, and if their growth rate is less than zero, the members of the supply chain will not choose to establish a blockchain system.
By examining the patterns of products’ price under different initial prices, we analyze the patterns of change over time. The specific trajectory is shown in
Figure 7.
From
Figure 7, it can be observed that if the initial retail price is higher than the stable retail price, the retail price will gradually decrease until it eventually converges to the steady price; if the initial retail price is lower than the stable retail price, the retail price will gradually increase until it eventually converges to the stable price over time. In addition, by observing the linear variation, we find that the retail price of the product gradually converges to, but never reaches, the stable price. Then the price in the model
and the model
is the same, and the price in the model
and the model
is same. The stable price with blockchain is higher than it without blockchain, while the change rate of the price with blockchain is lower than the change rate of the price without blockchain. The reason for this change may be the cost of establishing the blockchain, and in order to make more profits, the manufacturer will increase the retail price.
According to
Figure 8 and
Figure 9, we can find that the steady goodwill and retail price are positively influenced by the real recycling rate; ultimately, it is because the real recycling rate affects the change in steady price. In this paper, we assume that the real recycling rate
affects the speed of the consumer forgetting about the brand without blockchain; the forgetting coefficient of brand goodwill is larger if
is smaller. The steady goodwill and steady price without blockchain gradually converge to them with blockchain as
increases. If
, it reaches the stable value.
From
Figure 10 and
Figure 11, we can see that the demand for forward sales and reverse recycling and the growth rate of recycling are positively correlated with the real recycling rate in the CLSC. First, it can be seen that the forward sales of products are greater than the reverse recycling, which means that the manufacturer is not able to recycle all the waste products after selling new products. There are many reasons for this, such as the lack of residual value or the reluctance of consumers to recycle. Second, the amount of forward demand and reverse recycling with blockchain is greater than it without blockchain, and the real recycling rate limits the amount of forward demand and reverse recycling without blockchain. In addition, manufacturer recycling rates are higher than platform reuse rates, regardless of whether blockchain is used.
As shown in
Figure 12,
Figure 13,
Figure 14 and
Figure 15, optimal decisions such as supply chain profits, manufacturer and platform profits, and social welfare are positively related to the real recycling rate of waste products. We can see that supply chain profits and social welfare are higher in manufacturer recycling than in platform recycling. As the real recycling rate
increases, the manufacturer’s recycling rate is higher than that of the platform without blockchain; it is better for the profits, corporate decisions, and social performance for the manufacturer to recycle directly without secondary transportation. Under this assumption, the manufacturer can obtain more profit if it chooses to establish its blockchain system; if the platform obtains less profit establishing the blockchain system than the manufacturer recycling, both the platform and the manufacturer will choose the model
.
As shown in
Figure 16 and
Figure 17, the stable price and brand goodwill are positively influenced by “platform power” for four models. The stable goodwill and price with blockchain are always greater than them without blockchain. Additionally, the growth rate with blockchain is higher than that without blockchain.
From
Figure 18,
Figure 19 and
Figure 20, we can see that there are equal growth rates of manufacturer profit, platform profit, and social welfare under two channels with blockchain. Similarly, the manufacturer’s profits, platform’s profits, and social welfare grow at the same rate under two channels without blockchain. The figure shows that the profits and social welfare of the manufacturer with blockchain are better than those without blockchain, and the model
is always better than the model
. However, for the platform’s profits, the model is better than the model
; the platform recycling channel is better than the manufacturer recycling channel without blockchain.