# Green Product Development and Order Strategies for Retailers

^{*}

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

- (1)
- Establish the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibriums in the competitive environment and determine the optimal decisions in the monopoly environment.
- (2)
- Comparatively analyze the decisions of competitive retailers and monopoly retailers.
- (3)
- Study the impact of retail price, wholesale price, and greenness R&D investment cost coefficient on retailers’ decision making.
- (4)
- Provide suggestions for the development of the green supply chain.

- (1)
- One pure strategy Nash equilibrium is established in the competitive environment, and one optimal solution is found in the monopoly environment.
- (2)
- The optimal greenness level and the purchase quantity for the stochastic demand are both found to be higher in the competitive environment than those in the monopoly environment when the consumer return rate is low.
- (3)
- As the retail price, the wholesale price, or the greenness R&D investment cost coefficient increases, the greenness level of the product and the supply for stochastic demand either increase or decrease together.

## 2. Literature Review

#### 2.1. Green Strategies in the Supply Chain

#### 2.2. Consumer Returns in Supply Chain

#### 2.3. Green Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand

## 3. Model

#### 3.1. Model Contains Two Competitive Retailers

**Lemma**

**1.**

_{1}, x

_{2}) is jointly quasi-concave in two variables if and only if g (x

_{1}, x

_{2}) is quasi-concave, given mx

_{1}+ x

_{2}= k for any real values m, k.

**Proposition**

**1.**

_{1}, N

_{2}), π

_{i}

^{c}is a jointly quasi-concave function of b

_{i}and z

_{i}. There is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game between two competing retailers (b

_{1}

^{c}, z

_{1}

^{c}, b

_{2}

^{c}, z

_{2}

^{c}).

**Proof**

**of**

**Proposition**

**1.**

_{i}= R − mz

_{i}, and by substituting it into Equation (2), we could obtain:

#### 3.2. Model of the Monopoly Retailer

**Proposition**

**2.**

_{1}, b

_{2}, z

_{1}, andz

_{2}, and the monopolistic retailers have optimal strategiesb

_{1}

^{m}, b

_{2}

^{m}, z

_{1}

^{m}, andz

_{2}

^{m}to maximize the expected profit.

**Proof**

**of**

**Proposition**

**2.**

- $\left|{H}_{2}\right|>0$. For the third-order sequential principal minor

- $\left|{H}_{3}\right|=(\xi -2k\lambda ){\{k\lambda [1-F({z}_{1})]+kF({z}_{1})\}}^{2}-\{(1-\lambda )f({z}_{1})(p-t-k{b}_{1})+sf({z}_{1})\}[{(2k\lambda -\xi )}^{2}-{(2\gamma k\lambda )}^{2}]$

## 4. Comparison and Analysis

**Proposition**

**3.**

**Proof**

**of**

**Proposition 3.**

- 1.
- When ${\mathsf{\Delta}}_{i}\ge 0$, the condition $\lambda \ge \frac{p-w}{p-t-k{b}^{\mathrm{max}}}$ needs to be established, and the following four situations are discussed:
- (1)
- ${b}_{i}^{c}\ge {b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{c}<{z}_{i}^{m}$. This case is impossible, as if $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{c},{z}_{i}^{c})=0$, as $\frac{{\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {z}_{i}^{2}}=\frac{{\partial}^{2}{\pi}^{m}}{\partial {z}_{i}^{2}}<0$ and $\frac{{\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {z}_{i}\partial {b}_{i}}=\frac{{\partial}^{2}{\pi}^{m}}{\partial {z}_{i}\partial {b}_{i}}>0$, then $\frac{\partial {\pi}^{m}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})<0$, which is contradictory to the fact that $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{c},{z}_{i}^{c})=\frac{\partial {\pi}^{m}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})=0$.
- (2)
- ${b}_{i}^{c}<{b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{c}\ge {z}_{i}^{m}$. This case is impossible, similar to the reasoning for case (1); in this case, if $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{c},{z}_{i}^{c})=0$, then $\frac{\partial {\pi}^{m}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})>0$, which is also contradictory to the fact that $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{c},{z}_{i}^{c})=\frac{\partial {\pi}^{m}}{\partial {z}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})=0$.
- (3)
- ${b}_{i}^{c}\ge {b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{c}\ge {z}_{i}^{m}$. This case is impossible; note that $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{c},{z}_{i}^{c})=0$, as ${\pi}_{i}^{c}$ is jointly quasi-concave in ${b}_{i}$ and ${z}_{i}$; therefore, $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})>0$, which leads to $\frac{\partial {\pi}^{m}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})=\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})+{\mathsf{\Delta}}_{i}>0$. Obviously, this is a contradiction.
- (4)
- ${b}_{i}^{c}<{b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{c}<{z}_{i}^{m}$. This case is possible, similar to the reasoning for case (3); we have $\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})<0$, which can lead to $\frac{\partial {\pi}^{m}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})=\frac{\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}}{\partial {b}_{i}}({b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{m})+{\mathsf{\Delta}}_{i}=0$.

- 2.
- When ${\mathsf{\Delta}}_{i}<0$, the condition $\lambda <\frac{p-w}{p-t-k{b}^{\mathrm{min}}}$ is required to be established, similarly to the proof in condition 1, and it is easy to prove that if ${\mathsf{\Delta}}_{i}<0$, then we will have ${b}_{i}^{c}\ge {b}_{i}^{m},{z}_{i}^{c}\ge {z}_{i}^{m}$. □

**Proposition**

**4.**

**Proof of**

**Proposition 4.**

- 1.
- ${b}_{i}^{c}$ increases and ${z}_{i}^{c}$ decreases. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}\partial {z}_{i}>0$, $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ decreases because of the increase in ${b}_{i}^{c}$, so the reduction in ${z}_{i}^{c}$ will result in $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ decreasing its value, and $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ may reach a new equilibrium. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}\partial {b}_{i}>0$, enlarging ${b}_{i}^{c}$ will cause the addition of $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$, the reduction in ${z}_{i}^{c}$ will also lead to enlargement of $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$, and it will make $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$ too big to reach a new equilibrium; therefore, this situation cannot be set up.
- 2.
- ${b}_{i}^{c}$ decreases and ${z}_{i}^{c}$ increases. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}\partial {z}_{i}>0$, $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ will increase after ${b}_{i}^{c}$ decreases, and enlarging ${z}_{i}^{c}$ will also give rise to the increase in $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$, which will make it impossible to reach a new balance on account of the enlargement of $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$; in summary, this situation cannot be supported.
- 3.
- ${b}_{i}^{c}$ increases and ${z}_{i}^{c}$ increases. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}\partial {z}_{i}>0$, the addition of ${b}_{i}^{c}$ will reduce $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$, and increasing ${z}_{i}^{c}$ leads to the increase in $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$; $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ may reach a new equilibrium. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}\partial {b}_{i}>0$, if ${b}_{i}^{c}$ increases, $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$ will become larger, and the enlargement of ${z}_{i}^{c}$ will lead to the reduction in $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$; $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$ may reach a new equilibrium, meaning there is still potential for this situation to be supported.
- 4.
- ${b}_{i}^{c}$ decreases and ${z}_{i}^{c}$ decreases. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}\partial {z}_{i}>0$, the reduction in ${b}_{i}^{c}$ will cause the increase in $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$, and $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ will become smaller after ${z}_{i}^{c}$ decreases its value, so $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {b}_{i}$ may reach to a new equilibrium. Because ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}^{2}<0$ and ${\partial}^{2}{\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}\partial {b}_{i}>0$, a diminution in ${b}_{i}^{c}$ will lead to a diminution in $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$, and if ${z}_{i}^{c}$ decreases its value, $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$ will get larger; $\partial {\pi}_{i}^{c}/\partial {z}_{i}$ may reach a new equilibrium, and this situation is likely to happen.

_{i}and z

_{i}determine the purchase quantity for i = 1, 2. As we all know, when retailers believe that a market has good prospects, they will increase their investment in procuring products from suppliers; otherwise, they will reduce their purchase quantity to avoid potential market loss. Therefore, b

_{i}and z

_{i}are supposed to change their values in the same direction, either becoming larger or smaller. Specifically, no matter whether the retailers are in a competitive market or monopolistic market, if p increases, some retailers will decide to expand their purchase quantity so they will receive additional profits, but others may consider whether there will be a market bubble, so they will reduce their purchase quantity. The same reasoning applies to wholesale price w and greenness R&D investment cost coefficient $\xi $. If $w$ increases, some retailers might believe this to foreshadow an increase in retail price $p$, so they will aim to improve ${b}_{i}$ and increase ${z}_{i}$. However, some retailers are conservative, recognizing the price increase as a signal for future revenue loss; therefore, they will opt for a lower greenness level and less purchase quantity for stochastic demand. Similarly, when $\xi $ increases, some retailers will only be concerned about putting more money into greenness investment, and they will curtail their budget for purchasing commodities. Meanwhile, other retailers may consider products with a high greenness level to have obvious advantages in market competition, and thus, it is inevitable that they would choose to increase ${b}_{i}$ and ${z}_{i}$.

## 5. Numerical Results

## 6. Discussion

#### 6.1. Theoretical Implications

#### 6.2. Practical Implications

## 7. Conclusions

## Author Contributions

## Funding

## Data Availability Statement

## Conflicts of Interest

## Nomenclature

Notations | Description |

Parameters | |

α | Market size of the green product |

γ | Demand sensitivity coefficient to the greenness level |

w | Wholesale price of the green product |

p | Retail price of the green product |

ξ | R & D investment cost coefficient to product greenness |

λ | Return rate of the products sold |

t | Residual value which is independent of the greenness level |

k | Greenness level coefficient to product residual value |

i | i = 1, 2, we used “retailer i” to refer to retailer 1 or retailer 2 |

Decision variables | |

b_{i} | Greenness level of retailer i, i = 1, 2 |

Q_{i} | Purchase quantity of retailer i, i = 1, 2 |

y_{i} | Retailer i’s non-random portion of total market demand, i = 1, 2 |

z_{i} | Purchase quantity of retailer i to satisfy stochastic demand, i = 1, 2 |

Other variables | |

D_{i} | Demand function of retailer i, i = 1, 2 |

ε_{i} | Stochastic demand variable of retailer i, i = 1, 2 |

f(∙) | Probability density function of the stochastic demand variable |

F(∙) | Cumulative distribution function of the stochastic demand variable |

π_{i}^{c} | The expected revenue function of retailer i under competition, i = 1, 2 |

π^{m} | The expected revenue function of two retailers under monopoly |

## References

- Huang, S.; Fan, Z.P.; Wang, N.N. Green subsidy modes and pricing strategy in a capital-constrained supply chain. Transp. Res. E-Log.
**2020**, 136, 101885. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Tang, C.S.; Zhou, S. Research advances in environmentally and socially sustainable operations. Eur. J. Oper. Res.
**2012**, 223, 585–594. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Nouira, I.; Frein, Y.; Hadj-Alouane, A.B. Optimization of manufacturing systems under environmental considerations for a greenness-dependent demand. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2014**, 150, 188–198. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Liu, J.; Zhou, H.; Wan, M.Y.; Liu, L. How Does Overconfidence Affect Decision Making of the Green Product Manufacturer? Math. Probl. Eng.
**2019**, 2019, 5936940. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Heydari, J.; Govindan, K.; Aslani, A. Pricing and greening decisions in a three-tier dual channel supply chain. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2019**, 217, 185–196. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wang, G.L.; Ding, P.Q.; Chen, H.R.; Mu, J. Green fresh product cost sharing contracts considering freshness-keeping effort. Soft Comput.
**2020**, 24, 2671–2691. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Liu, G.W.; Yang, H.F.; Dai, R. Which contract is more effective in improving product greenness under different power structures: Revenue sharing or cost sharing? Comput. Ind. Eng.
**2020**, 148, 106701. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Zhang, R.R.; Liu, J.J.; Qian, Y. Wholesale-price vs cost-sharing contracts in a green supply chain with reference price effect under different power structures. Kybernetes
**2022**. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Cao, Y.; Tao, L.; Wu, K.; Wan, G.Y. Coordinating joint greening efforts in an agri-food supply chain with environmentally sensitive demand. J. Clean. Prod.
**2020**, 277, 123883. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wang, W.; Zhang, Y.; Zhang, W.S.; Gao, G.; Zhang, H. Incentive mechanisms in a green supply chain under demand uncertainty. J. Clean. Prod.
**2021**, 279, 123636. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Guo, S.; Choi, T.M.; Shen, B. Green product development under competition: A study of the fashion apparel industry. Eur. J. Oper. Res.
**2020**, 280, 523–538. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Rao, P. Greening the supply chain: A new initiative in South East Asia. Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag.
**2002**, 22, 632–655. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Albino, V.; Berardi, U. Green Buildings and Organizational Changes in Italian Case Studies. Bus. Strateg. Environ.
**2012**, 21, 387–400. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ghosh, D.; Shah, J. A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2012**, 135, 568–583. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ghosh, D.; Shah, J. Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2015**, 164, 319–329. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Hong, Z.; Guo, X. Green product supply chain contracts considering environmental responsibilities. Omega
**2019**, 83, 155–166. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Xin, C.; Chen, X.; Chen, H.; Chen, S.; Zhang, M. Green Product Supply Chain Coordination Under Demand Uncertainty. IEEE Access
**2020**, 8, 25877–25891. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Adhikari, A.; Bisi, A. Collaboration, bargaining, and fairness concern for a green apparel supply chain: An emerging economy perspective. Transport. Res. Part E Logist. Transp. Rev.
**2020**, 135, 101863. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Li, G.; Wu, H.; Sethi, S.P.; Zhang, X. Contracting green product supply chains considering marketing efforts in the circular economy era. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2021**, 234, 108041. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Liu, Z.G.; Anderson, T.D.; Cruz, J.M. Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains. Eur. J. Oper. Res.
**2012**, 218, 602–613. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Galbreth, M.R.; Ghosh, B. Competition and Sustainability: The Impact of Consumer Awareness. Decis. Sci.
**2013**, 44, 127–159. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Du, S.; Tang, W.; Zhao, J.; Nie, T. Sell to whom? Firm’s green production in competition facing market segmentation. Ann. Oper. Res.
**2016**, 270, 125–154. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Zhu, W.; He, Y. Green product design in supply chains under competition. Eur. J. Oper. Res.
**2017**, 258, 165–180. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Chen, S.; Wang, X.; Ni, L.; Wu, Y. Pricing Policies in Green Supply Chains with Vertical and Horizontal Competition. Sustainability
**2017**, 9, 2359. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Hong, Z.; Wang, H.; Yu, Y. Green product pricing with non-green product reference. Transp. Res. Part E Logist. Transp. Rev.
**2018**, 115, 1–15. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Yang, S.; Ding, P.; Wang, G.; Wu, X. Green investment in a supply chain based on price and quality competition. Soft Comput.
**2019**, 24, 2589–2608. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Aslani, A.; Heydari, J. Transshipment contract for coordination of a green dual-channel supply chain under channel disruption. J. Clean. Prod.
**2019**, 223, 596–609. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Jamali, M.B.; Gorji, M.A.; Iranpoor, M. Pricing policy on a dual competitive channel for a green product under fuzzy conditions. Neural Comput. Appl.
**2021**, 33, 11189–11201. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Khorshidvand, B.; Soleimani, H.; Sibdari, S.; Esfahani, M.M.S. Revenue management in a multi-level multi-channel supply chain considering pricing, greening, and advertising decisions. J. Retail. Consum. Serv.
**2021**, 59, 102425. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Gao, J.Z.; Xiao, Z.D.; Wei, H.X.; Zhou, G.H. Dual-channel green supply chain management with eco-label policy: A perspective of two types of green products. Comput. Ind. Eng.
**2020**, 146, 106613. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Gao, J.; Xiao, Z.; Wei, H. Competition and coordination in a dual-channel green supply chain with an eco-label policy. Comput. Ind. Eng.
**2021**, 153, 107057. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Yin, X.; Chen, X.L.; Xu, X.L.; Zhang, L.M. Tax or Subsidy? Optimal Carbon Emission Policy: A Supply Chain Perspective. Sustainability
**2020**, 12, 1548. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Zhang, G.; Cheng, P.; Sun, H.; Shi, Y.; Zhang, G.; Kadiane, A. Carbon reduction decisions under progressive carbon tax regulations: A new dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model. Sustain. Prod. Consum.
**2021**, 27, 1077–1092. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Meng, Q.; Li, M.; Liu, W.; Li, Z.; Zhang, J. Pricing policies of dual-channel green supply chain: Considering government subsidies and consumers’ dual preferences. Sustain. Prod. Consum.
**2021**, 26, 1021–1030. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Su, X.M. Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag.
**2009**, 11, 595–612. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Shulman, J.D.; Coughlan, A.T.; Savaskan, R.C. Managing Consumer Returns in a Competitive Environment. Manag. Sci.
**2011**, 57, 347–362. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Shang, G.Z.; Ghosh, B.P.; Galbreth, M.R. Optimal Retail Return Policies with Wardrobing. Prod. Oper. Manag.
**2017**, 26, 1315–1332. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Phadnis, S.S.; Fine, C.H. End-To-End Supply Chain Strategies: A Parametric Study of the Apparel Industry. Prod. Oper. Manag.
**2017**, 26, 2305–2322. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ulku, M.A.; Hsuan, J. Towards sustainable consumption and production: Competitive pricing of modular products for green consumers. J. Clean. Prod.
**2017**, 142, 4230–4242. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wang, J.; Huang, X. The Optimal Carbon Reduction and Return Strategies under Carbon Tax Policy. Sustainability
**2018**, 10, 2471. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Wang, D.; Wang, K.; Chen, Y. Optimal Return Policies and Micro-Plastics Prevention Based on Environmental Quality Improvement Efforts and Consumer Environmental Awareness. Water
**2021**, 13, 1537. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Zhang, H.; Xu, H.; Pu, X. A Cross-Channel Return Policy in a Green Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Spillover Effect. Sustainability
**2020**, 12, 2171. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Tang, S.; Wang, W.; Zhou, G. Remanufacturing in a competitive market: A closed-loop supply chain in a Stackelberg game framework. Expert Syst. Appl.
**2020**, 161, 113655. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Lu, X.; Shang, J.; Wu, S.Y.; Hegde, G.G.; Vargas, L.; Zhao, D.Z. Impacts of supplier hubris on inventory decisions and green manufacturing endeavors. Eur. J. Oper. Res.
**2015**, 245, 121–132. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Raza, S.A.; Rathinam, S.; Turiac, M.; Kerbache, L. An integrated revenue management framework for a firm’s greening, pricing and inventory decisions. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2018**, 195, 373–390. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Raza, S.A.; Govindaluri, S.M. Greening and price differentiation coordination in a supply chain with partial demand information and cannibalization. J. Clean. Prod.
**2019**, 229, 706–726. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wang, L.Y.; Ye, M.H.; Ma, S.S.; Sha, Y.P. Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer. Math. Probl. Eng.
**2019**, 2019, 7482080. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Qu, S.; Zhou, Y.; Zhang, Y.; Wahab, M.I.M.; Zhang, G.; Ye, Y. Optimal strategy for a green supply chain considering shipping policy and default risk. Comput. Ind. Eng.
**2019**, 131, 172–186. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Al-e-Hashem, S.M.J.M.; Rekik, Y.; Hoseinhajlou, E.M. A hybrid L-shaped method to solve a bi-objective stochastic transshipment-enabled inventory routing problem. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
**2019**, 209, 381–398. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wang, S.Y.; Choi, S.H. Pareto-efficient coordination of the contract-based MTO supply chain under flexible cap-and-trade emission constraint. J. Clean. Prod.
**2020**, 250, 119571. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - He, H. Integration of manufacturing and pricing for downward substitution products decision-making. Complex Intell. Syst.
**2021**. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Petruzzi, N.C.; Dada, M. Pricing and the newsvendor problem: A review with extensions. Oper. Res.
**1999**, 47, 183–194. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Zhao, X.; Atkins, D.R. Newsvendors under simultaneous price and inventory competition. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag.
**2008**, 10, 539–546. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]

**Figure 4.**The impact of the greenness R&D investment cost coefficient ξ on retailer i’s decisions and revenues.

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. |

© 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

## Share and Cite

**MDPI and ACS Style**

Zhu, C.; Yue, J.; Chen, J.
Green Product Development and Order Strategies for Retailers. *Sustainability* **2022**, *14*, 9556.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su14159556

**AMA Style**

Zhu C, Yue J, Chen J.
Green Product Development and Order Strategies for Retailers. *Sustainability*. 2022; 14(15):9556.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su14159556

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Zhu, Chenbo, Juntian Yue, and Jing Chen.
2022. "Green Product Development and Order Strategies for Retailers" *Sustainability* 14, no. 15: 9556.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su14159556