Minor coarse cereals (MCC) is a collective term for small grains and legume crops. It also generally indicates short growing period crops, small planting area, strong regionalism, and a variety of special grain cultivation methods [
1]. MCC mainly includes buckwheat, oats, sorghum, broad beans, mung beans, peas, lentils, millet, etc. [
1]. In recent times, MCC is becoming more and more popular due to high nutritional value and perceived health benefits, especially in the current situation of general over-nutrition [
2]. However, the price is often highly volatile, e.g., the mung bean price fluctuated between 5 Chinese Renminbi (RMB) and 12 RMB in 2016, creating misperceptions and uncertainty for growers [
2]. Due to the unavailability of a futures market for MCC, it is impossible to suppress the risk of price volatility for farmers, MCC processing enterprises, and consumers [
2]. This creates hurdles in the cultivation process: if the MCC price is high, then it is planted in large amounts [
3]. As a result, the price plummets in the harvest season, resulting in an increase in quantity but no increase in income; when the price drops, farmers give up planting the grains, so the price rises in the next year, but farmers still do not make money themselves [
3]. However, grain processing enterprises often face a higher degree of price volatility with miscellaneous grains and cannot stabilize the expected (raw material) costs. Consumers also often face excessive prices of small grains, which causes them to change the consumption patterns.
Crowdfunding an Internet finance model for e-commerce, is growing fast [
4]. Product crowdfunding refers to a crowdfunding method in which the crowdfunders pay to develop a certain product (or service) and wait until the product (or service) begins to sell; or, if it is ready for external sale, the fundraiser will provide the product (or service) to the investor at no cost or less than the cost. Lambert et al. [
5] conducted an empirical analysis of crowdfunding. The technical definition of product crowdfunding is a model in which the product is released first and then the consumers pay to purchase it. If this model is applied to MCC, growers can receive a partial deposit from consumers at the current price in advance, and then sell to them at the current price after harvesting. To a certain extent, price fluctuations of MCC can be suppressed. However, the overall risk is that if the harvest-period price is higher than the original price, the growers will have losses and there is a possibility of breach of contract [
6]. If the harvest price is lower than the original price, the consumer or crowdfunder will have losses and may default [
6]. This paper aims to conduct an analysis from the perspective of an evolutionary game. According to the game situation, the product crowdfunding system is designed so that the advantages of the two can be used to suppress possible risks and further achieve sustainable development [
7,
8]
At present, product crowdfunding research mainly focuses on four aspects: (1) the concept and significance of crowdfunding; (2) the characteristics and classification of crowdfunding; (3) the influencing factors of crowdfunding success; and (4) the application of crowdfunding.
1.4. The Application of Crowdfunding:
Zvilichovsky et al. [
28] discussed the project quality matching model of a crowdfunding platform with the two-sided market theory, and mainly analyzed the threshold of project quality and the efficiency of the crowdfunding platform. A crowdfunding platform is used by for-profit, arts, and cultural companies to raise funds [
29]. Another study [
30] considered the problem of the initial financing of creative projects and conducted crowdfunding system design. Based on incentives and constraints of investment and financing, the paper took into account the rational development of crowdfunding platforms in the early stages of development to maximize the transaction volume of creative projects and maximize the average transaction value of both parties on the platform [
31,
32]. The design of a crowdfunding self-feedback mechanism can effectively represent the heterogeneous incentives of three parties in the crowdfunding process [
28].
Zhang et al. [
13] studied the origin, characteristics, and future of agricultural crowdfunding, and proposed that agricultural crowdfunding refers to the use of Internet platforms to publish agricultural projects, raise funds for the public to help agricultural projects, and give returns to the crowdfunders; they also stated that agricultural crowdfunding has the characteristics of pooling funds and popularity and can accommodate all kinds of crowdfunding objects [
14,
15]. Xiao et al. [
16] studied the optimal selection of platforms involving agricultural crowdfunding and concluded that both investment and financing parties prefer large-scale comprehensive agricultural crowdfunding platforms.
The research on product crowdfunding has helped with the establishment of a crowdfunding platform for small grains. However, previous research was aimed at a single crowdfunding study, while this platform requires repeated crowdfunding. Success to start with may not guarantee success in the future. Since crowdfunding is repetitive, it can be regarded as a game of interests between two parties and can be analyzed by game theory. One party is a farmer group and the other is a crowdfunding group; both parties are regarded as having limited rationality. Each group can learn from the other and play the evolutionary games in mutual learning, so evolutionary game theory is used for analysis [
33]. Crowdfunding can be used as a form of financing [
26]. However, due to information asymmetry, a long cycle, and uncertain returns, equity crowdfunding has limited the development of equity crowdfunding to a certain extent. At the same time, due to the restrictions imposed by Chinese law on illegal fund-raising, there is no specific law to clarify the relationship between the two parties. Restricted to 200 people, equity crowdfunding is relatively slow, so China’s equity crowdfunding development after the upsurge has been almost stagnant [
31]. In the field of product crowdfunding and public welfare donation, the development is relatively good, so it is a relatively good financing method, especially in the field of public welfare donations. At present, in the Chinese market, equity crowdfunding is developing slowly. The mainstream is product crowdfunding and public welfare donation crowdfunding [
6].
Specialized financial institutions can also purchase product crowdfunding platforms, and their needs can guide the supply of small grain products in advance [
32]. Because they analyze and raise funds from the entire industrial chain, when the price of small grains skyrockets and crowdfunding purchases are made in advance, growers can increase the planting area and thus the supply, thereby transmitting the demand to the supply side in advance, which can stabilize the price fluctuation. Industry fluctuations and financial institutions use their own expertise and part of the funds to earn money, while growers increase their output [
30]. Therefore, the participation of financial institutions is more conducive to MCC crowdfunding.
China already has crowdfunding for new products and product crowdfunding for charitable donations. The agricultural product network provides pre-sale of agricultural products. It is possible to carry out product crowdfunding with small grains. However, the specific small grain products are not yet raised. The specific agricultural product crowdfunding is based on the crowdfunding platform. Of course, it is also possible to operate it on its own. Since the platform economy is characterized by winners, it is more inclined to use well-known platforms such as Jingdong, Taobao, etc., to carry out product crowdfunding system design [
32].
The evolutionary game analysis originated from the study of biological evolution. Smith (1974) and Smith et al. (1973) [
34,
35] applied evolutionary game analysis to study the evolution of species. Of course, the evolutionary game theory has also begun to be widely applied. Friedman [
36] theorized that evolutionary games have greater potential for simulating real economic problems. He proposed a one-dimensional and two-dimensional asymptotic game model of evolutionary games and proposed many norms. Evolutionary game dynamics is an important framework for the study of biology and economics. A common method used by many researchers is the replicator dynamics equation, which ignores time and space. Roca discusses the effects of time and space. Evolutionary game theory believes that, in a series of contexts, the actors will (eventuall
y) reach the Nash equilibrium [
37]. In addition, the evolutionary model reveals the relative rationality of different Nash equilibria. Evolutionary game theory suggests that game participants do follow a Nash equilibrium [
38]. Moreover, evolutionary modelling has revealed the relative rationality of different Nash equilibriums. Dong et al. [
39] used the evolutionary game model to study the evolutionary game of migrant workers returning to their hometowns and the local government, and discussed the equilibrium point and its stability under certain conditions. The results showed that the evolutionary game equilibrium will change significantly when the relevant parameters change. Then, the local government can change certain practices, which is equivalent to adjusting relevant parameters. In this way, the entrepreneurial decisions of migrant workers returning home can be optimized and the evolutionary game can evolve in the expected direction. Ozkan-Canbolat et al. [
40] studied the application of evolutionary games in strategic innovation. Kuechle [
41] used evolutionary games to examine persistence and heterogeneity in entrepreneurship. The authors of [
42] studied corporate power by evolutionary game theory and mainstream economics and also used evolutionary game theory to compare corporate power with mainstream economics. Liu et al. [
43] used evolutionary games to research the sustainability of collaborative innovation in strategic emerging industries. Now evolutionary games theory has been widely used in the fields of economy, management, and supervision [
33,
44]. This theory, based on the premise of bounded rationality, aims to achieve stable and balanced evolution of a system by mutual learning between group members, random and repeated game-playing, and constantly adjusting the strategy [
8]. The growers within the grower group learn from each other; it is the same for the crowdfunder group, which also depicts the certain bounded rationality, and then they coincide with the evolutionary game to a certain degree.
Therefore, the evolutionary game can be applied to analyze the behaviors between these two groups [
7]. According to our best knowledge, no one has yet studied the combination of evolutionary games with product crowdfunding platforms. The aspiration of the study is to design MCC crowdfunding based on evolutionary game equilibrium by replicator dynamic equations. The replicator dynamic approach can more clearly reflect the equilibrium of the evolutionary game between the two groups under the corresponding utility function [
34,
35]. Since the two groups are bounded rational, members can learn from each other and have a similar analytical framework, so they can be analyzed mathematically. The specific results are clearer than the direct language description, and it is difficult to know whether they will balance the equilibrium points without mathematical calculations [
36]. The current study also integrates the equilibrium analysis of evolutionary game and design of crowdfunding platform system. The aims of this paper are to explore the evolutionary game between growers and crowdfunders, construct a suitable evolutionary game model, and design a crowdfunding platform for MCC. In this study, crowdfunders are future buyers, not charitable donations or financial subsidies [
36]. It is the producer or the grower who gets the money [
36]. Buyers can be of any type, including individuals, small grain processing enterprises, and large wholesalers. For small grain processing enterprises, the cost fluctuation of raw materials is reduced, and the expected cost is stable; for individuals, it is also possible to adapt personal shopping habits in advance, setting a small amount of money aside for small grains. For large wholesalers, crowdfunding creates strong bargaining power because a small amount of deposits can cover a lot of small grains, leading to stable prices in operation, which is more conducive to growers. The growers are also very different in China. There are family-style and farm-style growers, and information from both sides is communicated via the crowdfunding platform [
32].
This research is of great significance to the three rural issues [
29]. Farmers not only face the problem of agricultural product price fluctuations, but also the difficulty of selling agricultural products. The research on agricultural product crowdfunding not only solves the problem of agricultural product price fluctuation but also the problem of agricultural product sales, so it has practical significance. Moreover, crowdfunding of MCC products is a supplement to the crowdfunding of existing products and has certain policy or theoretical significance [
32].
The ethical hazard is more in the crowdfunding of small grain products [
13]. This article considers ethical issues. To guard against dishonest dealings, crowdfunders must be made to pay a certain percentage of the margin to dissuade them from changing their minds. To prevent the growers from fulfilling the contract, the crowdfunding platform will receive a certain amount of credit. If the contract is broken, the crowdfunding platform will advance the payment to complete the performance. If, after the harvest is completed, the planter lets the funders down in some way, the crowdfunders can comment or complain to the crowdfunding platform, which builds up knowledge of operational information asymmetry and post-platform supervision [
19].
This paper consists of four sections. The first section gives the introduction and literature review;
Section 2 presents the MCC product crowdfunding platform and construction of game model, while the use of evolutionary game model to make a steady-state analysis, and the system design, are discussed in
Section 3,
Section 4 and
Section 5.