A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- How does collection competition between the retailer and the third-party recycler affect the decisions and profits of CLSC members under information asymmetry?
- (2)
- Can the manufacturer design a valid information screening contract to obtain the real collection effort levels of the two competitive collection agents with and without RPM?
- (3)
- Can the RPM improve the collection rates and the profits of CLSC members with collection competition and asymmetric information?
2. Notations and Assumptions
Assumptions
- (1)
- (2)
- represents that unit production cost is more than unit remanufacturing cost [2,20,21]. We also assume that the unit cost of remanufacturing used products is fixed regardless of their different quality levels, which can avoid complex calculations without changing the major conclusions of the CLSC model.
- (3)
- (4)
- In this model, we assume that all CLSC members are risk-neutral, without regard to risk preference or risk aversion. Their targets are to earn the maximum profits.
- (5)
- (6)
- We assume the retailer’s collection quantity and the third-party recycler’s collection quantity are both collection-effort-sensitive and collection-price-sensitive. Specifically, in this paper the linear functions of and are employed by and respectively [23,38]. That is, for either party, collection quantity increases as the own collection effort level or collection price increases, but decreases as the competitor’s collection price increases.
3. CLSC Model without the RPM (Case 1)
3.1. Model Description
3.2. Numerical Examples
4. CLSC Model with the RPM (Case 2)
4.1. Model Description
4.2. Numerical Example
5. Conclusions and Future Research
- (1)
- The information screening contract can help the manufacturer acquire the real collection effort levels effectively because the two collection agents are induced to choose the same type of contract as their collection effort type for profit maximization. That is, the screening contract can prevent them from lying and improve the efficiency of the CLSC system.
- (2)
- The retailer and the third-party recycler will earn more profit by choosing a high level collection effort when competing against each other. The collection competition reduces the total collection quantity and the expected profit of the manufacturer, while the expected profits of both two collection agents first increase and then decrease as the competition intensity increases. In addition, the more intense the collection competition is, the more losses they will suffer. Therefore, the CLSC channel members should make efforts to come to a cooperation agreement for mitigating the negative effect of the competition.
- (3)
- The RPM has a positive effect on CLSC with collection competition. First, RPM increases the collection price, buyback price, franchise fee, and total collection quantity; secondly, it can encourage initiatives of the collectors in collecting WEEEs, and then the environmental benefits to society will improve. What is more, the RPM can ensure that the profits of all the CLSC members are superior to without RPM.
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
, | |||||
0.1 | 16.870 | 16.890 | 16.910 | 16.920 | 16.940 |
0.2 | 16.390 | 16.420 | 16.450 | 16.480 | 16.510 |
0.3 | 15.820 | 15.860 | 15.890 | 15.930 | 15.960 |
0.4 | 15.120 | 15.140 | 15.170 | 15.190 | 15.210 |
0.5 | 14.170 | 14.160 | 14.150 | 14.130 | 14.120 |
, | |||||
0.1 | 18.510 | 18.250 | 17.920 | 17.470 | 16.830 |
0.2 | 18.150 | 17.860 | 17.490 | 17.000 | 16.300 |
0.3 | 17.660 | 17.330 | 16.910 | 16.360 | 15.590 |
0.4 | 16.960 | 16.580 | 16.100 | 15.470 | 14.620 |
0.5 | 15.940 | 15.480 | 14.910 | 14.190 | 13.230 |
0.1 | 64.070 | 64.090 | 64.120 | 64.150 | 64.180 |
0.2 | 65.120 | 65.160 | 65.190 | 65.230 | 65.260 |
0.3 | 66.320 | 66.370 | 66.410 | 66.450 | 66.480 |
0.4 | 67.700 | 67.760 | 67.810 | 67.850 | 67.890 |
0.5 | 69.300 | 69.380 | 69.440 | 69.500 | 69.540 |
0.1 | 65.260 | 65.450 | 65.680 | 65.990 | 66.400 |
0.2 | 66.550 | 66.760 | 67.000 | 67.300 | 67.720 |
0.3 | 68.030 | 68.240 | 68.490 | 68.790 | 69.190 |
0.4 | 69.710 | 69.930 | 70.180 | 70.480 | 70.860 |
0.5 | 71.660 | 71.880 | 72.130 | 72.410 | 72.770 |
0.1 | 3.726 | 3.718 | 3.711 | 3.698 | 3.691 |
0.2 | 3.788 | 3.764 | 3.740 | 3.717 | 3.694 |
0.3 | 3.808 | 3.763 | 3.713 | 3.670 | 3.622 |
0.4 | 3.744 | 3.656 | 3.575 | 3.490 | 3.407 |
0.5 | 3.496 | 3.349 | 3.205 | 3.059 | 2.922 |
0.1 | 6.046 | 5.898 | 5.716 | 5.473 | 5.136 |
0.2 | 6.168 | 5.984 | 5.760 | 5.477 | 5.089 |
0.3 | 6.228 | 5.998 | 5.723 | 5.385 | 4.937 |
0.4 | 6.164 | 5.876 | 5.540 | 5.130 | 4.612 |
0.5 | 5.880 | 5.509 | 5.085 | 4.589 | 3.978 |
0.1 | 3.726 | 3.718 | 3.711 | 3.698 | 3.691 |
0.2 | 3.788 | 3.764 | 3.740 | 3.717 | 3.694 |
0.3 | 3.808 | 3.763 | 3.713 | 3.670 | 3.622 |
0.4 | 3.744 | 3.656 | 3.575 | 3.490 | 3.407 |
0.5 | 3.496 | 3.349 | 3.205 | 3.059 | 2.922 |
0.1 | 6.046 | 5.898 | 5.716 | 5.473 | 5.136 |
0.2 | 6.168 | 5.984 | 5.760 | 5.477 | 5.089 |
0.3 | 6.228 | 5.998 | 5.723 | 5.385 | 4.937 |
0.4 | 6.164 | 5.876 | 5.540 | 5.130 | 4.612 |
0.5 | 5.880 | 5.509 | 5.085 | 4.589 | 3.978 |
0.1 | 93.035 | 93.045 | 93.060 | 93.080 | 93.090 |
0.2 | 93.560 | 93.580 | 93.600 | 93.620 | 93.630 |
0.3 | 94.160 | 94.180 | 94.200 | 94.220 | 94.240 |
0.4 | 94.850 | 94.880 | 94.900 | 94.920 | 94.940 |
0.5 | 95.650 | 95.690 | 95.720 | 95.750 | 95.770 |
0.1 | 93.630 | 93.720 | 93.840 | 94.000 | 94.200 |
0.2 | 94.280 | 94.380 | 94.500 | 94.650 | 94.860 |
0.3 | 95.020 | 95.120 | 95.240 | 95.400 | 95.600 |
0.4 | 95.860 | 95.960 | 96.090 | 96.240 | 96.430 |
0.5 | 96.830 | 96.940 | 97.060 | 97.200 | 97.380 |
0.1 | 60.880 | 61.943 | 63.108 | 64.326 | 65.961 |
0.2 | 48.364 | 50.046 | 51.846 | 53.819 | 56.113 |
0.3 | 35.494 | 37.849 | 40.218 | 42.886 | 45.769 |
0.4 | 22.517 | 25.262 | 28.262 | 31.374 | 34.789 |
0.5 | 9.269 | 12.460 | 15.814 | 19.259 | 23.127 |
0.1 | 83.109 | 80.319 | 76.694 | 71.674 | 64.507 |
0.2 | 71.318 | 68.789 | 65.334 | 60.523 | 53.433 |
0.3 | 58.443 | 56.172 | 52.899 | 48.204 | 41.238 |
0.4 | 44.295 | 42.317 | 39.261 | 34.670 | 27.912 |
0.5 | 28.946 | 27.166 | 24.276 | 19.924 | 13.359 |
0.1 | 659.860 | 660.340 | 660.630 | 660.980 | 661.750 |
0.2 | 617.190 | 617.740 | 618.690 | 619.530 | 620.970 |
0.3 | 570.560 | 571.530 | 572.780 | 574.340 | 576.380 |
0.4 | 519.640 | 520.760 | 522.400 | 524.430 | 526.760 |
0.5 | 463.590 | 464.680 | 466.450 | 468.330 | 471.140 |
0.1 | 647.970 | 639.800 | 629.680 | 615.950 | 597.350 |
0.2 | 599.990 | 591.650 | 581.580 | 568.550 | 550.010 |
0.3 | 546.630 | 538.710 | 528.730 | 516.030 | 498.460 |
0.4 | 487.860 | 480.140 | 470.590 | 458.250 | 441.740 |
0.5 | 422.470 | 415.170 | 406.030 | 394.720 | 379.260 |
, | |||||
0.1 | 13.353 | 13.346 | 13.340 | 13.330 | 13.320 |
0.2 | 13.030 | 13.011 | 12.992 | 12.974 | 12.955 |
0.3 | 12.666 | 12.634 | 12.599 | 12.569 | 12.535 |
0.4 | 12.246 | 12.194 | 12.145 | 12.094 | 12.044 |
0.5 | 11.748 | 11.674 | 11.602 | 11.530 | 11.461 |
, | |||||
0.1 | 13.120 | 13.130 | 13.140 | 13.150 | 13.180 |
0.2 | 12.550 | 12.570 | 12.590 | 12.620 | 12.680 |
0.3 | 11.940 | 11.960 | 12.000 | 12.050 | 12.140 |
0.4 | 11.280 | 11.310 | 11.360 | 11.440 | 11.560 |
0.5 | 10.560 | 10.590 | 10.660 | 10.760 | 10.930 |
, | |||||
0.1 | 12.670 | 12.530 | 12.340 | 12.100 | 11.770 |
0.2 | 12.410 | 12.230 | 12.010 | 11.730 | 11.350 |
0.3 | 12.090 | 11.870 | 11.610 | 11.280 | 10.850 |
0.4 | 11.670 | 11.410 | 11.110 | 10.730 | 10.250 |
0.5 | 11.130 | 10.830 | 10.480 | 10.060 | 9.517 |
, | |||||
0.1 | 12.440 | 12.310 | 12.140 | 11.930 | 11.620 |
0.2 | 11.930 | 11.790 | 11.610 | 11.380 | 11.070 |
0.3 | 11.360 | 11.200 | 11.010 | 10.770 | 10.460 |
0.4 | 10.700 | 10.530 | 10.320 | 10.080 | 9.767 |
0.5 | 9.940 | 9.754 | 9.542 | 9.294 | 8.989 |
+ | |||||
0.1 | 26.710 | 26.690 | 26.680 | 26.660 | 26.640 |
0.2 | 26.060 | 26.020 | 25.980 | 25.950 | 25.910 |
0.3 | 25.330 | 25.270 | 25.200 | 25.140 | 25.070 |
0.4 | 24.490 | 24.390 | 24.290 | 24.190 | 24.090 |
0.5 | 23.500 | 23.350 | 23.200 | 23.060 | 22.920 |
+, + | |||||
0.1 | 25.790 | 25.650 | 25.480 | 25.250 | 24.940 |
0.2 | 24.960 | 24.800 | 24.600 | 24.360 | 24.030 |
0.3 | 24.030 | 23.830 | 23.610 | 23.340 | 22.990 |
0.4 | 22.940 | 22.720 | 22.470 | 22.170 | 21.810 |
0.5 | 21.690 | 21.430 | 21.140 | 20.820 | 20.450 |
+ | |||||
0.1 | 24.880 | 24.620 | 24.290 | 23.850 | 23.240 |
0.2 | 23.870 | 23.570 | 23.220 | 22.760 | 22.140 |
0.3 | 22.720 | 22.400 | 22.010 | 21.540 | 20.910 |
0.4 | 21.400 | 21.050 | 20.650 | 20.160 | 19.530 |
0.5 | 19.880 | 19.510 | 19.080 | 18.590 | 17.980 |
0.1 | 788.550 | 790.150 | 791.890 | 794.010 | 796.730 |
0.2 | 774.670 | 777.180 | 779.930 | 783.020 | 786.790 |
0.3 | 760.750 | 764.290 | 768.090 | 772.260 | 777.080 |
0.4 | 747.460 | 752.050 | 756.950 | 762.290 | 768.220 |
0.5 | 736.050 | 741.810 | 747.900 | 754.370 | 761.460 |
0.1 | 788.440 | 789.610 | 790.740 | 791.810 | 792.760 |
0.2 | 772.310 | 774.310 | 776.240 | 778.020 | 779.420 |
0.3 | 755.130 | 758.050 | 760.790 | 763.190 | 765.070 |
0.4 | 737.300 | 741.090 | 744.570 | 747.640 | 749.890 |
0.5 | 719.400 | 724.050 | 728.330 | 731.940 | 734.420 |
0.1 | 789.270 | 790.390 | 791.440 | 792.320 | 792.760 |
0.2 | 773.500 | 775.420 | 777.180 | 778.650 | 779.430 |
0.3 | 756.840 | 759.570 | 761.990 | 763.990 | 765.070 |
0.4 | 739.650 | 743.100 | 746.180 | 748.600 | 749.850 |
0.5 | 722.600 | 726.770 | 730.390 | 733.130 | 734.410 |
0.1 | 788.820 | 789.050 | 788.830 | 787.780 | 785.000 |
0.2 | 771.260 | 771.880 | 771.820 | 770.650 | 767.330 |
0.3 | 751.710 | 752.630 | 752.620 | 751.190 | 747.160 |
0.4 | 729.930 | 731.020 | 730.950 | 729.060 | 724.230 |
0.5 | 705.920 | 707.040 | 706.680 | 704.220 | 698.430 |
0.1 | 86.893 | 86.556 | 86.113 | 85.491 | 84.584 |
0.2 | 85.446 | 85.128 | 84.688 | 84.068 | 83.133 |
0.3 | 83.797 | 83.497 | 83.061 | 82.425 | 81.459 |
0.4 | 81.887 | 81.611 | 81.180 | 80.521 | 79.524 |
0.5 | 79.678 | 79.412 | 78.974 | 78.303 | 77.257 |
0.1 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
0.2 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
0.3 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
0.4 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
0.5 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
0.1 | 326.880 | 326.550 | 326.110 | 325.490 | 324.580 |
0.2 | 325.450 | 325.130 | 324.690 | 324.060 | 323.130 |
0.3 | 323.800 | 323.490 | 323.060 | 322.420 | 321.470 |
0.4 | 321.890 | 321.610 | 321.180 | 320.520 | 319.530 |
0.5 | 319.680 | 319.410 | 318.980 | 318.290 | 317.260 |
0.1 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
0.2 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
0.3 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
0.4 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
0.5 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
Appendix B
0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
, | |||||
10 | 21.310 | 20.920 | 20.400 | 19.700 | 18.660 |
20 | 25.680 | 25.320 | 24.850 | 24.180 | 23.190 |
30 | 30.050 | 29.730 | 29.290 | 28.670 | 27.730 |
40 | 34.420 | 34.130 | 33.730 | 33.160 | 32.270 |
, | |||||
10 | 21.200 | 20.700 | 20.030 | 19.100 | 17.770 |
20 | 25.570 | 25.110 | 24.480 | 23.590 | 22.310 |
30 | 29.940 | 29.510 | 28.920 | 28.080 | 26.850 |
40 | 34.310 | 33.920 | 33.360 | 32.570 | 31.390 |
10 | 58.780 | 60.150 | 61.710 | 63.500 | 65.590 |
20 | 53.380 | 55.040 | 56.940 | 59.110 | 61.650 |
30 | 47.980 | 49.940 | 52.160 | 54.720 | 57.700 |
40 | 42.580 | 44.830 | 47.390 | 50.330 | 53.750 |
10 | 61.000 | 62.610 | 64.420 | 66.470 | 68.820 |
20 | 55.600 | 57.500 | 59.650 | 62.080 | 64.870 |
30 | 50.200 | 52.400 | 54.880 | 57.690 | 60.920 |
40 | 44.800 | 47.290 | 50.100 | 53.300 | 56.980 |
10 | 5.991 | 6.144 | 6.234 | 6.212 | 5.949 |
20 | 8.291 | 8.589 | 8.851 | 9.013 | 8.970 |
30 | 10.590 | 11.040 | 11.460 | 11.820 | 12.000 |
40 | 12.890 | 13.480 | 14.070 | 14.630 | 15.020 |
10 | 7.436 | 7.534 | 7.549 | 7.412 | 7.004 |
20 | 9.736 | 9.984 | 10.170 | 10.220 | 10.030 |
30 | 12.040 | 12.430 | 12.780 | 13.020 | 13.060 |
40 | 14.340 | 14.880 | 15.390 | 15.830 | 16.080 |
10 | 5.991 | 6.144 | 6.234 | 6.212 | 5.949 |
20 | 8.291 | 8.589 | 8.851 | 9.013 | 8.970 |
30 | 10.590 | 11.040 | 11.460 | 11.820 | 12.000 |
40 | 12.890 | 13.480 | 14.070 | 14.630 | 15.020 |
10 | 7.436 | 7.534 | 7.549 | 7.412 | 7.004 |
20 | 9.736 | 9.984 | 10.170 | 10.220 | 10.030 |
30 | 12.040 | 12.430 | 12.780 | 13.020 | 13.060 |
40 | 14.340 | 14.880 | 15.390 | 15.830 | 16.080 |
10 | 90.390 | 91.080 | 91.860 | 92.750 | 93.800 |
20 | 87.690 | 88.520 | 89.470 | 90.560 | 91.820 |
30 | 84.990 | 85.970 | 87.080 | 88.360 | 89.850 |
40 | 82.290 | 83.420 | 84.700 | 86.160 | 87.880 |
10 | 91.500 | 92.300 | 93.210 | 94.240 | 95.410 |
20 | 88.800 | 89.750 | 90.820 | 92.040 | 93.440 |
30 | 86.100 | 87.200 | 88.440 | 89.840 | 91.460 |
40 | 83.400 | 84.640 | 86.050 | 87.650 | 89.490 |
10 | 118.890 | 104.340 | 88.739 | 72.353 | 54.769 |
20 | 180.390 | 160.060 | 138.510 | 115.410 | 90.868 |
30 | 250.450 | 223.630 | 194.870 | 164.290 | 131.630 |
40 | 329.090 | 294.670 | 257.930 | 218.790 | 177.050 |
10 | 117.210 | 101.100 | 83.532 | 64.350 | 43.654 |
20 | 178.480 | 156.560 | 132.620 | 106.550 | 78.548 |
30 | 248.310 | 219.530 | 188.310 | 154.430 | 117.980 |
40 | 326.720 | 290.350 | 250.690 | 207.940 | 162.070 |
10 | 878.080 | 820.690 | 757.460 | 687.920 | 610.290 |
20 | 1117.500 | 1041.000 | 956.710 | 864.200 | 761.400 |
30 | 1380.200 | 1281.800 | 1174.300 | 1055.900 | 925.250 |
40 | 1666.000 | 1543.400 | 1409.600 | 1263.000 | 1101.600 |
10 | 807.460 | 742.890 | 672.400 | 595.250 | 510.680 |
20 | 1040.700 | 956.620 | 864.500 | 764.150 | 654.510 |
30 | 1297.100 | 1190.600 | 1074.600 | 948.380 | 810.670 |
40 | 1576.700 | 1445.700 | 1303.100 | 1147.900 | 978.970 |
, | |||||
10 | 15.392 | 14.915 | 14.364 | 13.727 | 12.974 |
20 | 17.462 | 16.871 | 16.196 | 15.408 | 14.485 |
30 | 19.531 | 18.832 | 18.022 | 17.092 | 16.000 |
40 | 21.601 | 20.784 | 19.849 | 18.778 | 17.510 |
, | |||||
10 | 15.250 | 14.640 | 13.970 | 13.250 | 12.450 |
20 | 17.320 | 16.590 | 15.800 | 14.920 | 13.960 |
30 | 19.390 | 18.550 | 17.630 | 16.610 | 15.470 |
40 | 21.460 | 20.500 | 19.450 | 18.300 | 16.980 |
, | |||||
10 | 13.840 | 13.310 | 12.680 | 11.930 | 11.030 |
20 | 15.910 | 15.270 | 14.510 | 13.610 | 12.540 |
30 | 17.980 | 17.220 | 16.340 | 15.290 | 14.060 |
40 | 20.050 | 19.180 | 18.170 | 16.980 | 15.570 |
, | |||||
10 | 13.690 | 13.030 | 12.280 | 11.450 | 10.500 |
20 | 15.760 | 14.990 | 14.120 | 13.130 | 12.020 |
30 | 17.840 | 16.940 | 15.950 | 14.810 | 13.530 |
40 | 19.910 | 18.900 | 17.770 | 16.500 | 15.040 |
+ | |||||
10 | 30.780 | 29.830 | 28.730 | 27.450 | 25.950 |
20 | 34.920 | 33.740 | 32.390 | 30.820 | 28.970 |
30 | 39.060 | 37.660 | 36.040 | 34.180 | 32.000 |
40 | 43.200 | 41.570 | 39.700 | 37.560 | 35.020 |
+,+ | |||||
10 | 29.080 | 27.940 | 26.650 | 25.170 | 23.480 |
20 | 33.220 | 31.860 | 30.310 | 28.540 | 26.500 |
30 | 37.370 | 35.780 | 33.970 | 31.900 | 29.530 |
40 | 41.510 | 39.690 | 37.620 | 35.280 | 32.550 |
+ | |||||
10 | 27.380 | 26.050 | 24.570 | 22.890 | 21.000 |
20 | 31.520 | 29.970 | 28.240 | 26.260 | 24.030 |
30 | 35.670 | 33.890 | 31.890 | 29.620 | 27.060 |
40 | 39.810 | 37.810 | 35.550 | 33.000 | 30.080 |
10 | 749.410 | 729.820 | 709.240 | 688.080 | 667.100 |
20 | 743.440 | 712.030 | 677.950 | 641.510 | 603.030 |
30 | 778.980 | 733.340 | 683.350 | 628.660 | 569.160 |
40 | 855.890 | 793.690 | 725.290 | 649.550 | 565.640 |
10 | 745.050 | 721.570 | 695.630 | 667.150 | 636.310 |
20 | 738.730 | 702.800 | 662.750 | 618.080 | 568.460 |
30 | 773.810 | 723.230 | 666.450 | 602.690 | 530.920 |
40 | 850.340 | 782.720 | 706.790 | 620.940 | 523.600 |
10 | 745.050 | 721.570 | 695.630 | 667.150 | 636.330 |
20 | 738.680 | 702.830 | 662.770 | 618.080 | 568.460 |
30 | 773.850 | 723.240 | 666.460 | 602.590 | 530.920 |
40 | 850.360 | 782.700 | 706.770 | 620.950 | 523.640 |
10 | 736.900 | 708.460 | 676.040 | 638.890 | 596.610 |
20 | 730.180 | 688.860 | 641.610 | 587.300 | 525.080 |
30 | 764.920 | 708.360 | 643.700 | 569.220 | 483.780 |
40 | 841.070 | 766.960 | 682.320 | 585.010 | 472.700 |
10 | 90.792 | 88.993 | 86.944 | 84.562 | 81.797 |
20 | 96.999 | 94.878 | 92.440 | 89.619 | 86.340 |
30 | 103.210 | 100.740 | 97.932 | 94.666 | 90.882 |
40 | 109.420 | 106.630 | 103.410 | 99.719 | 95.426 |
10 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
20 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
30 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
40 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 | 60.000 |
10 | 330.790 | 329.000 | 326.940 | 324.560 | 321.800 |
20 | 337.060 | 334.850 | 332.440 | 329.620 | 326.340 |
30 | 343.200 | 340.730 | 337.910 | 334.710 | 330.880 |
40 | 349.390 | 346.700 | 343.400 | 339.660 | 335.390 |
10 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
20 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
30 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
40 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 | 300.000 |
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Symbol | Description |
---|---|
Model parameters | |
The cost of manufacturing one product with new materials. | |
The cost of remanufacturing one product with recycling components. | |
Unit cost savings from remanufacturing, . | |
Competition intensity. It represents the degree of competition between the retailer and the third-party recycler when they collect WEEEs. . | |
Collection effort level of the retailer. , . | |
Collection effort level of the third-party recycler. , . | |
The franchise fee that the manufacturer charges the retailer when she chooses contract , . | |
The franchise fee that the manufacturer charges the third-party recycler when she chooses contract , . | |
Collection quantity of the retailer when she chooses contract under her real collection effort level , while the third-party recycler chooses contract under her real collection effort level . | |
Collection quantity of the third-party recycler when she chooses contract under her real collection effort level , while the retailer chooses contract under her real collection effort level . | |
Reward–penalty intensity decided by government. | |
Target collection quantity set by government. | |
Probability of the retailer or the third-party recycler adopting collection effort level, which is available to both collection agents. | |
Decision variables | |
Wholesale price of the manufacturer when the retailer chooses contract , . | |
Retail price of the retailer with the choice of contract when her real collection effort level is , . | |
Unit collection price of the retailer with the choice of contract when her real collection effort level is , . | |
Unit collection price of the third-party recycler with the choice of contract when her real collection effort level is , . | |
Buyback price paid by the manufacturer to the retailer for each collected WEEE with her choice of contract , . | |
Buyback price paid by the manufacturer to the third-party recycler for each collected WEEE with her choice of contract , . | |
Other notations | |
Information screening contract designed for the manufacturer, which means the retailer opts for buy-back price , wholesale price and gives franchise fee , . | |
Information screening contract designed for the manufacturer, which means the third-party recycler opts for buy-back price , wholesale price and gives franchise fee , . | |
Expected profit of the manufacturer with the third-party recycler’s choice of contract and the retailer’s choice of contract , . | |
Expected profit of the retailer with her choice of contract under her real collection effort level , . | |
Expected profit of the third-party recycler with her choice of contract under her real collection effort level , . | |
Reserved profit of the retailer without contract. | |
Reserved profit of the third-party recycler without contract. |
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Wang, W.; Zhou, S.; Zhang, M.; Sun, H.; He, L. A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism. Sustainability 2018, 10, 2131. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072131
Wang W, Zhou S, Zhang M, Sun H, He L. A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism. Sustainability. 2018; 10(7):2131. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072131
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Wenbin, Shuya Zhou, Meng Zhang, Hao Sun, and Lingyun He. 2018. "A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competitive Dual Collection Channel under Asymmetric Information and Reward–Penalty Mechanism" Sustainability 10, no. 7: 2131. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072131