Smart-Grid Technologies and Climate Change: How to Use Smart Sensors and Data Processing to Enhance Grid Resilience in High-Impact High-Frequency Events
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- 1.
- Historical meteorological data (collected from 2020 to 2024) to assess the frequency and severity of weather-related threats;
- 2.
- Machine learning algorithms (specifically Gradient Boosting) to model and predict regional vulnerability patterns;
- 3.
- Multi-criteria decision-making tools (notably ELECTRE) to prioritize resilience-enhancing actions based on local risk profiles.
2. Greek Electricity Distribution Network: Risks and Challenges
- 1.
- Medium Voltage (MV) networks, mainly operating at 20 kV (though 15 kV and 22 kV also exist in Greece), which transmit energy from HV/MV substations to MV/LV substations.
- 2.
- Low Voltage (LV) networks, operating at 230 V (phase voltage) or 400 V (line voltage), which deliver power from MV/LV substations to end consumers.
2.1. Climate Risks—Extreme Weather Events and Power Systems’ Sensitivity
- 1.
- Thunderstorms: Lightning, high winds, and flooding can damage lines, transformers and substations. Mitigation strategies include lightning arresters, grounding systems, guy wires, reinforced concrete poles, and burying lines in storm-prone areas [19]. Flood-related protection involves elevating substations, enhancing drainage, and using watertight enclosures.
- 2.
- Hurricanes and typhoons: These events can cause transmission towers and poles to collapse, salt corrosion, and inundation of substations. Solutions include underground grids, concrete poles—which are more wind-resistant than wooden, waterproofed equipment, anti-corrosive coatings, elevation of the substations, removal of salt deposits, and preemptive shutdowns in high-risk zones [2].
- 3.
- 4.
- Blizzards and ice storms: Ice accumulation and heavy snow can cause electrical infrastructure failure and stress the grid due to high demand. Measures include ice-resistant cables, de-icing technologies, robust towers, demand–response strategies, enhanced backup generation, and proactive vegetation management [2].
- 5.
- Heatwaves: High temperatures increase electricity demand and reduce transformer and line efficiency. Droughts can impair hydroelectric power. Solutions include enhanced cooling systems, distribution upgrades, renewable integration, and demand-side management through dynamic pricing and efficiency programs [20].
- 6.
- Floods: Water damage to underground infrastructure and erosion of pole foundations are major risks. Protective strategies include waterproof materials, improved drainage systems, and elevating critical infrastructure in flood-prone regions [2].
- 7.
- Wildfires: Fires destroy power lines and poles, while smoke and heat damage insulation. Fire-resistant materials and vegetation management zones help mitigate these effects. Preemptive shutdowns are sometimes necessary to prevent fire spread [21].
- 8.
- Hailstorms: Large hailstones can damage exposed equipment. Using hail-resistant materials, such as protective coatings or shields, can reduce vulnerability [19].
- 9.
- Geomagnetic storms: Caused by solar activity, these storms induce currents in long conductors, overloading transformers and causing blackouts. Countermeasures include geomagnetic shielding, improved grounding, and real-time monitoring to allow preemptive equipment shutdowns [22].
2.2. Extreme Weather Events in Greece (2020–2024)
- Windstorms, cyclones, and hurricanes
- Cyclone Daniel (September 2023): This severely impacted Larisa, Karditsa, Magnesia, Sporades, Corfu, and Central Athens. Intense weather conditions and floods caused extensive damage to the power grid. In Magnesia, 12 MV lines and around 750 substations were affected, disrupting power in Volos and nearby settlements. Karditsa experienced damage to about 25 substations, causing extensive power supply issues [23].
- Snowfall and ice storms
- Snowstorm Barbara, (February 2023): This affected West and East Attica with 30 MV line faults. Evia, Magnesia, Voeotia, and Larissa were also impacted. Over 800 technicians in Attica and 150 in Evia worked with specialized equipment to restore power [23].
- Thundersnow Elpis, 2022: Extreme snowfall caused extended widespread outages in North and Central Athens, East Attica, Evia, and Voeotia, and islands like Crete, Naxos, Rhodes, and Kos. Utility poles broke, and both LV and MV conductors were severed [24].
- Snowfall Medea, 2021: Trees fell on two of the three MV lines supplying the Sporades island, cutting power to Skiathos. Widespread MV and LV damage occurred in mountainous regions of Central Greece, Epirus, and Peloponnese, and mountainous parts of regions like Karditsa, Lamia, Volos, Trikala, Thiva, Amfissa, Ioannina, Arta etc., as well as the North Aegean islands. Restoration was hindered by road access difficulties [24].
- Heatwaves and wildfires
- Varibobi, North Evia, and the Peloponese Wildfires (July, 2021): A 10-day heatwave with temperatures up to 44 °C stressed the power grid, causing a series of faults. Wildfires destroyed poles, overhead LV and MV lines, and substations. Load shedding in Attica was implemented to stabilize the grid. Workforce expansion was a key mitigation effort [24].
- Heatwave Cleon, July 2023: This lasted 15 days and affected areas in North, Central, and South Athens, as well as West Attica. Outages occurred in Ilioupoli, Argyroupoli, Elliniko, Ano Liosia, Agioi Anargyroi, and Kamatero. Restoration efforts were extensive and time-consuming [19].
- Wildfire in Evros and Samothraki, August 2023: Fires in Alexandroupoli damaged two main MV lines supplying the underwater cables that interconnected Samothraki to Alexandroupoli. Power was restored using generators installed on the island of Samothraki [23].
2.3. Grid Resilience
- Resilience: The network’s ability to operate through multiple failures (N-k criterion) and recover quickly from extreme events.
- Robustness: The system’s ability to resist operational stress using existing infrastructure without collapsing. However, it does not ensure the system’s recovery after a collapse, which is a core feature of resilience. Although increasing robustness may contribute to enhanced resilience, complete equipment replacement is often economically and practically unfeasible, especially during crisis conditions [26].
- Security: Security, especially cybersecurity, is a top priority in the design of modern Electric Power Systems (EPSs), as digitalization and internet connectivity make them vulnerable to cyberattacks. Security strategies focus on preventing and deterring malicious attacks [25,29]. Unlike resilience, security focuses on prevention rather than recovery.
3. Weather Events and Risk Analysis in Power Distribution Networks
3.1. Weather Risk Analysis Based on HILF Events
- 1.
- Hazard assessment: This stage estimates the likelihood of HILF event occurrence, using historical data, meteorological records, General Circulation Models (GCMs) [40], and climate change scenarios.
- 2.
- Vulnerability assessment: This evaluates how susceptible populations, infrastructure, and ecosystems are to adverse effects. It considers the structural resilience of buildings, power grids, drainage systems, and more. Socioeconomic and demographic factors—such as age, income, or health—are also assessed (e.g., elderly individuals are more vulnerable to heatwaves).
- 3.
- Impact assessment: This involves assessing the severity of an event’s effects on humans, infrastructure, and the environment. It includes analysis of economic damage (e.g., property loss and insurance claims), public health consequences, and environmental degradation (e.g., soil pollution and biodiversity loss).
- 4.
- Risk quantification: Risk is calculated as a function of likelihood (frequency of occurrence) and severity (impacts). Quantitative models use probabilistic tools and statistical data to produce numerical results and risk maps, identifying areas with high exposure to extreme events.
- 5.
- Resilience and adaptation analysis: This final step evaluates a region’s ability to withstand and recover from disasters. It considers adaptation strategies such as improved infrastructure, early warning systems, afforestation, and sustainable water management.
3.2. Tools and Strategies for Efficient Risk Management
- Meteorological and climate models: General Circulation Models (GCMs) are used to study climate change on a global scale. They simulate large-scale atmospheric and oceanic processes, predicting changes in temperature, humidity, and storm patterns [41]. Regional Climate Models (RCMs) offer more localized insights [40], improving risk assessments. Specialized weather simulation tools also support disaster preparedness.
- Geographic Information Systems (GISs): GIS tools generate visual maps identifying regions frequently affected by specific extreme events, enhancing spatial analysis of vulnerabilities.
- Statistical models: Techniques like Monte Carlo simulations and Extreme Value Analysis (EVA) [42] estimate the probability and intensity of rare weather events. The EVA method creates probability curves from historical data, while Monte Carlo method simulations model a variety of risk scenarios.
- Satellites and radars: These tools facilitate real-time monitoring of weather conditions and detection of affected areas, enhancing situational awareness and response capabilities.
3.3. Case Study: Weather Risk Analysis in Greece
- 1.
- Hazard assessment: The occurrence of this phenomenon can be attributed to a combination of natural and anthropogenic factors. From a natural standpoint, climate change has resulted in rising global temperatures and elevated atmospheric humidity, both of which contribute to the increased intensity and frequency of heavy rainfall events. Greece’s geographical location within the Mediterranean basin further heightens its exposure to sudden and severe precipitation, often leading to flash floods. The country’s complex geomorphology—characterized by mountainous terrain—facilitates the rapid runoff of rainwater into low-lying areas, exacerbating flood risks. Anthropogenic factors also play a significant role. Unregulated urban expansion and the degradation of natural watersheds have diminished the soil’s capacity to absorb excess water. Moreover, existing drainage infrastructure is frequently insufficient to accommodate the volume of water generated during extreme weather events, thereby increasing the likelihood and severity of flooding.
- 2.
- Vulnerability assessment: In several regions of Greece—particularly those located near rivers and in low-lying areas—flood protection infrastructure is either insufficient or deteriorating. This includes aging dams and underdeveloped or poorly maintained drainage systems. A prominent example is the region of Thessaly, where inadequate management of the Pinios River has significantly exacerbated flooding events. Moreover, socioeconomically disadvantaged or geographically isolated populations are disproportionately vulnerable, as they often lack access to early warning systems and the financial or logistical means necessary for effective disaster response and recovery [43]. Environmental degradation further intensifies vulnerability; widespread deforestation, frequently resulting from wildfires, reduces the soil’s water retention capacity, while the loss of wetlands eliminates crucial natural flood buffers. Collectively, these structural, social, and ecological factors contribute to the heightened vulnerability of the affected regions.
- 3.
- Impact assessment: The 2023 floods in Thessaly resulted in extensive damage, with economic losses estimated in billions of euros. This includes the widespread destruction of agricultural land, residential buildings, and critical infrastructure [43]. These losses have enduring economic repercussions, particularly in rural areas that rely heavily on agriculture and local production. In addition to economic damage, the social impact has been significant: entire communities were displaced, and affected individuals endured both physical harm and psychological distress, with some incidents resulting in loss of life. The environmental consequences were also severe, as floodwaters carried debris, sewage, and industrial chemicals, leading to the contamination of rivers and soils. These pollutants contributed to the degradation of ecosystems and the loss of biodiversity, underscoring the multifaceted and far-reaching effects of such extreme weather events.
- 4.
- Risk quantification: Building upon the preceding assessments, the calculated risk level for disruptions to the electricity distribution network in both the flood events mentioned above (Mandra (2017) and Thessaly (phenomenon named Daniel, 2023)) is found to be significantly high.
- 5.
- Resilience and adaptation analysis: The response to these events revealed a lack of adequate pre-disaster planning and adaptation measures. Specifically, emergency action plans and resilience-enhancing interventions were not effectively implemented prior to the flooding events. This suggests a low level of preparedness and adaptive capacity within the electricity distribution infrastructure in the affected regions. Strengthening the resilience of the distribution network requires the adoption of both structural and non-structural strategies.
4. The HIHF (High Impact High Frequency) Model
4.1. Application Advantages and Challenges of the HIHF Model
4.2. HIHF Model Applications in Electricity Distribution Networks
4.3. Comparison and Distinctions Between HILF and HIHF Events
4.4. Proposed Algorithm for Weather Risk Analysis Based on the HIHF Model
- 1.
- Data collection and processing: Effective implementation of the HIHF model requires the collection and processing of diverse data sources. These include historical weather data (e.g., precipitation, wind speed, and temperature), records of power outages and their causes (e.g., vegetation-related faults and overloading), and geospatial data detailing the locations of poles, substations, and transmission lines. Accurate network load data is also essential. This information constitutes the input for the proposed algorithm and must be appropriately pre-processed. In addition, data acquired from Internet of Things (IoT) sensors—measuring variables such as temperature, voltage, and humidity—can facilitate real-time monitoring. In high-risk regions, sensor deployment enables effective real-time analysis and rapid detection of anomalies.
- 2.
- Application of machine learning models: Machine learning techniques are employed to estimate the probability of damage to specific network components based on weather conditions and equipment status. Predictive models such as Random Forests and Gradient Boosting are suggested for classification and regression tasks. For time-series forecasting of network load and the frequency of weather phenomena, Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) or Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks are appropriate. Additionally, unsupervised learning techniques—such as Autoencoders or Isolation Forests—can be used to detect operational anomalies indicative of potential faults or overloads [45,46,47].
- 3.
- Optimization models for maintenance planning: To ensure the optimal allocation of maintenance resources and personnel, optimization methods such as Linear Programming (LP) are proposed. These can support efficient scheduling and resource distribution. Moreover, heuristic algorithms such as Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing are suitable for identifying critical maintenance points based on cost-effectiveness, event frequency, and damage severity. Maintenance strategies should be informed by comprehensive risk forecasting frameworks [48].
- 4.
- Real-time decision making: Given the inherent unpredictability of weather conditions, dynamic and adaptive decision-making mechanisms are essential. Capabilities such as fault isolation, power flow reconfiguration, and service restoration must be supported in real time to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the network. Intelligent Decision Support Systems (DSSs) offer significant potential in this regard, enabling rapid responses to evolving conditions [6,49,50].
- 5.
- Identification of preventive and corrective actions: In the final stage of the algorithm, actionable measures are proposed to mitigate the impact of extreme weather events. These include early warnings for severe weather, preventive isolation of vulnerable network segments, automatic activation of energy reclosers, and timely notifications to maintenance crews. Furthermore, long-term resilience can be enhanced through infrastructure upgrades, cable undergrounding, and equipment reinforcement in vulnerable zones, as identified through GIS analysis.
4.5. Application of the HIHF Model in Greece
4.6. Gradient Boosting for Risk Assessment
4.7. Application of Gradient Boosting Algorithm for HEDNO
- a.
- Historical failure data: includes failure types, location, timing, causes, restoration time, and maintenance actions taken.
- b.
- Meteorological data: sourced from meteorological stations or in situ sensors, and include wind speeds, temperature extremes, rainfall intensity (mm/h or mm/24 h), lightning density, and frost characteristics.
- c.
- Network infrastructure data: such as location and specifications of distribution lines (i.e., MV/LV), location of substations, technical characteristics of conductors and poles (e.g., material, diameter, and length), and installation dates.
- d.
- Geospatial data: encompassing terrain features, land use classification (urban, forest, rural), and proximity to natural hazards such as rivers or dense vegetation.
- e.
- Real-time operational data: gathered via installed IoT sensors to monitor line temperature, voltage, current, load, and short-term weather forecasts.
5. Description and Objective of the Study
- 1.
- Classify the need for resilience restoration into High, Medium, or Low categories, based on the combination of event impact and frequency—categorized as HIHF, HILF, LIHF (Low Impact High Frequency), or LILF (Low Impact Low Frequency). Risk levels are calculated based on the type, duration, intensity, and consequences of each event.
- 2.
- Select suitable categories of reinforcement projects for both overhead and underground networks.
5.1. Results of the Weather Risk Analysis Using MATLAB
5.1.1. Data Collection (2020–2024)
- Event occurrence dates.
- Affected regional units (by each extreme weather event).
- Named events (where applicable).
- Event duration (in days).
- Intensity classification (Very strong–Strong–Medium).
- Impact severity (Limited–Several–Extended).
- Event type (e.g., tornado, rainfall, storm, wind, snow, lightning, hail, heatwave, drought, or frost).
- Description of effects on the power distribution network.
5.1.2. Analysis and Results
5.2. Suggested Actions Using the ELECTRE Method
- C1—Cyclone: High-impact weather event involving strong winds and flooding. While it minimally affects underground cables, it can flood underground substations and significantly damage overhead lines, poles, and transformers due to wind and debris.
- C2—Frost: Ice formation on power lines adds weight, while the mechanical stress on power lines increases, causing sagging and breakage. It can also impair the insulation of electrical components.
- C3—Hail: Hail causes mechanical damage to transformers, substations, and overhead lines, potentially resulting in outages.
- C4—Heatwave: Elevated temperatures lead to increased energy demand (for cooling), often overloading transformers and causing thermal expansion and sagging of power lines.
- C5—Lightning: Direct strikes can destroy transformers, substations, and distribution lines, causing surges, fires, and widespread blackouts.
- C6—Rainfall: Heavy rain can result in flooding, damaging both overhead and underground infrastructure. It may compromise utility pole stability and cause insulator flashovers and short circuits due to excessive moisture. Often, technical crews find difficulties in accessing the network to perform operations and restore power.
- C7—Snow: Snow accumulation can cause line breakage due to extra weight and tree collapse onto lines, resulting in outages. Accessibility to the network is extremely difficult during this event.
- C8—Wind: Strong winds can damage overhead networks through falling trees and debris. Poles may be uprooted, and lines snapped. There is minimal impact on underground systems.
- A1—Undergrounding overhead power lines: Conversion to underground systems in high-risk regions (e.g., those affected by cyclones, snow, or strong winds) can significantly improve network reliability. Partial undergrounding, where feasible, offers a cost-effective compromise. However, this method is less effective against phenomena such as heatwaves or heavy rainfall.
- A2—Cable/conductor replacement: Deploying insulated or covered conductors reduces the risk of short circuits caused by falling debris, particularly during lightning, heatwaves, or high winds. It demonstrates moderate effectiveness for other weather events.
- A3—Vegetation management: Regular trimming of trees near power lines minimizes the likelihood of outages due to falling branches during storms, snow, or wind events.
- A4—Concrete poles: Replacing wooden poles with concrete alternatives enhances resilience to high winds, cyclones, snow, and fire.
- A5—Compact line design: Implementing compact configurations helps reduce line sag and sway during wind, hail, or rainfall events, thereby enhancing network stability.
- A6—Substation design improvements: In flood-prone areas, elevating substations and installing waterproof equipment is critical. Fire-resistant equipment is also mandatory in areas with dense vegetation. Modern designs can incorporate fire-resistant coatings and improved structural resilience.
- A7—Smart-grid technologies: The integration of smart technologies is vital to the ongoing digitalization of the Greek electricity distribution network. Accelerating the deployment of smart systems can enable more effective inspection, control, and real-time monitoring.
- A8—Proactive inspections (using drones and satellites): Routine inspections using aerial and satellite technologies can identify system vulnerabilities and enable rapid responses. Drones are especially effective in post-event assessments, reducing fault detection times and aiding in system restoration.
- B1—Installation of pumps and flood control systems: Installing drainage pumps and flood mitigation infrastructure in vulnerable areas allows rapid water removal during heavy rainfall or cyclonic events. These systems help protect underground assets from flooding, reducing the likelihood of short circuits, equipment failure, and prolonged outages.
- B2—Water-resistant insulation and sealed cables: Using cables with water-resistant insulation and sealed joints enhances network resilience to moisture and submersion. This is particularly important in areas exposed to flooding caused by rainfall or cyclones.
- B3—Elevation of substations and critical infrastructure in flood-prone areas: Raising substations and vital electrical equipment above flood levels mitigates water damage and ensures operational continuity. This proactive approach supports rapid recovery during and after extreme weather events and enhances grid resilience to climate-induced challenges.
- B4—Heat-resistant cable insulation: Deploying thermally resilient insulation materials prevents overheating and cable degradation in high-temperature environments. This reduces the risk of thermal failure, prolongs equipment life, and ensures uninterrupted power delivery during heatwaves and high-demand periods.
- B5—Use of high-quality, resilient cables (XLPE): Cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) cables exhibit high resistance to electrical stress, moisture, and corrosion. They improve network durability and reliability, especially in harsh conditions. While widely deployed in Greece, some regions require upgrades to their existing underground cabling.
- B6—Underground sensors and active cooling systems: Integrating sensors to monitor temperature, moisture, and insulation integrity in real time, combined with active cooling systems, enhances early fault detection and operational efficiency. These systems are instrumental in regulating the underground environment and preventing thermal-induced failures.
- B7—Regular inspections: Employing advanced inspection technologies, such as drones for aerial monitoring, cable fault detection vans (for underground cables), thermal imaging (to detect overheating), and partial discharge systems (to detect insulation breakdown), facilitates the early identification of issues. This comprehensive inspection regime is effective across all weather conditions, regardless of geomorphology, significantly reducing outage risk.
- B8—Smart-grid technologies: Incorporating smart-grid solutions enables automated fault detection, system reconfiguration, real-time monitoring, and load balancing. These technologies expedite outage recovery, maintain grid stability, and enhance the overall responsiveness to disruptions. For example, smart sensors and automated switches detect and isolate the faults quickly, supporting faster restoration and minimizing outage duration. Additionally, these systems can swiftly reroute power and optimize load distribution to maintain grid stability during disruptions.
- Substation design improvement;
- Proactive inspections (drones and satellites);
- Undergrounding;
- Concrete poles;
- Compact line design;
- Smart-grid technologies;
- Vegetation management;
- Cable/conductor replacement.
- 1.
- Smart-grid technologies;
- 2.
- Water-resistant insulation and sealed cables;
- 3.
- Using high-quality resilient cables (XLPE);
- 4.
- Regular inspections;
- 5.
- Installation of pumps and flood control systems;
- 6.
- Heat-resistant cable insulation;
- 7.
- Underground sensors and active cooling systems;
- 8.
- Elevation of substations and critical infrastructure in flood-prone areas.
- Low resilience restoration: risk rate of 0–33%;
- Moderate resilience restoration: risk rate of 34–66%;
- High resilience restoration: risk rate of 67–100%.
5.3. Discussion of ELECTRE’s Output
6. International Applications of HIHF-Type Frameworks
7. Conclusions—Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
HILF | High Impact Low Frequency |
HIHF | High Impact High Frequency |
HEDNO | Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator |
LV | Low Voltage |
MV | Medium Voltage |
Appendix A
Date | Regions Affected | Intensity | Implications | Type of Weather Event | Network Influence |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
6 January | West and East Attica, North Athens, Veotia, Lesbos, Attica Islands, Andros, Tinos, Chania | Very strong | Extended | Snow, frost, wind, rainfall | Damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines |
15 February | Rhodes | Very strong | Several | Storm | Damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines, power outage, network damages |
2 April | Imathia, Chalkidiki, Serres, Xanthi | Very strong | Extended | Snow, wind | Network damages |
6 April | Xanthi, Kavala, Evia | Very strong | Extended | Wind, rainfall | Network damages |
22 May | Thessaloniki | Strong | Several | Storm, lightning | Power outage |
28 June | Larissa | Strong | Limited | Rainfall | Tree falling on overhead lines, damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines |
5 July | Larissa | Medium | Limited | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
6 August | Pieria | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
9 August | Evia | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall | Power outage, dropped poles |
20 September | Kefalonia, Ithaca, Zakynthos, Magnesia, Karditsa | Very strong | Extended | Storm, wind | Network damages, substation damages, power outage |
23 September | Corfu | Very strong | Several | Storm, wind, hail | Tree falling on overhead lines |
24 September | Elis | Very strong | Several | Tornado, storm | Tree falling on overhead lines, dropped poles |
29 September | Lesbos | Strong | Several | Wind, rainfall, hail | Network damages |
13 October | North and South Athens | Very strong | Several | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
21 October | Heraklion | Very strong | Extended | Lightning | Network damages |
22 October | Chania | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall | Power outage |
28 October | Chania | Very strong | Limited | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
7 December | Thessaloniki | Very strong | Several | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
Date | Regions Affected | Intensity | Implications | Type of Weather Event | Network Influence |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 February | Evros | Very strong | Extended | Storm | Power outage |
8 February | Serres | Very strong | Limited | Tornado, rainfall | Power outage, cable damages |
13 February | Trikala, Karditsa, Evia, Voeotia, Sporades, Magnesia, North, Central and West Athens, East Attica, Fokida, Ioannina, Arta, Fthiotida | Very strong | Extended | Snow, frost | Tree falling on poles, power outage, pole damages |
5 April | Ikaria | Strong | Limited | Wind | Power outage, tree branch falling on poles |
21 May | Thessaloniki | Very strong | Several | Wind | Tree falling on poles, power outage |
21 June | Karditsa | Strong | Limited | Hail, rainfall | Tree falling on poles, power outage |
18 July | Karditsa | Medium | Limited | Hail, rainfall | Power outage, dropped poles |
1 August | Rhodes | Strong | Extended | Heatwave, drought | Damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines, power outage |
3 August | Kos, East Attica, Arcadia, Laconia, Aetoloacarnania, Messenia, Elis, Fokida, Evia | Very strong | Extended | Heatwave | Power outage, damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines, pole damages, substation damages |
8 October | Corfu | Very strong | Extended | Wind, rainfall | Power outage |
14 October | Rethymno | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall | Power outage |
26 November | Corfu | Very strong | Extended | Storm | Tree falling on poles, dropped poles |
28 November | Elis, Messenia | Very strong | Extended | Tornado, rainfall | Network damages, tree falling on poles, power outage |
3 December | Aetoloacarnania | Strong | Several | Storm | Power outage |
12 December | Serres, South Athens, East Attica | Very strong | Extended | Wind | Power outage, tree branch falling on poles, tree falling on poles, dropped poles |
Date | Regions Affected | Intensity | Implications | Type of Weather Event | Network Influence |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
11 January | Magnesia | Very strong | Several | Wind, frost | Power outage |
12 January | Chalkidiki | Very strong | Several | Wind, frost | Tree falling on poles, power outage |
24 January | Kos | Very strong | Extended | Snow, frost | Power outage, line faults, network damages |
25 January | East Attica, North and Central Athens, Naxos, Veotia, Evia, Rhodes | Very strong | Extended | Snow, frost | Power outage |
26 January | Chania | Very strong | Several | Snow, frost | Power outage |
2 April | Chania | Strong | Several | Wind | Power outage |
19 May | East Attica, Central Athens | Very strong | Several | Wind | Power outage |
10 June | Aetoloacarnania, Achaea | Very strong | Extended | Wind, storm, hail | Power outage, substation damages |
11 June | Kavala | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall | Power outage, streetlight damage |
18 June | Larissa | Strong | Limited | Tornado, hail, rainfall | Power outage, tree falling on poles |
26 June | Serres | Strong | Limited | Wind, rainfall | Tree falling on poles, power outage, dropped poles |
9 July | Rethymno | Very strong | Extended | Storm, wind | Power outage |
20 July | West Attica, North Athens | Very strong | Extended | Wind, drought, heatwave | Power outage, substation damages, line faults, network damages |
21 August | Kozani | Very strong | Extended | Storm | Power outage |
22 August | Chalkidiki | Very strong | Extended | Storm | Power outage |
23 August | Trikala | Very strong | Extended | Storm | Power outage |
5 September | Thessaloniki | Very strong | Several | Storm | Power outage |
29 November | Rhodes | Very strong | Limited | Rainfall | Power outage |
1 December | Thessaloniki | Strong | Several | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
11 December | Thesprotia, Corfu | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall, wind | Power outage |
12 December | Lesvos | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall | Power outage, tree falling on poles |
Date | Regions Affected | Intensity | Implications | Type of Weather Event | Network Influence |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
20 January | Thesprotia | Very strong | Several | Tornado | Power outage, dropped poles |
26 January | Zakynthos | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall, wind | Power outage, dropped poles |
5 February | Evia, Magnesia, Veotia, Fthiotida, West and East Attica, Larissa | Strong | Extended | Snow, frost | Power outage, damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines |
24 June | Kozani | Strong | Limited | Rainfall, wind, lightning | Tree falling on poles, power outage, Medium Voltage lines cut, fire on pole from lightning |
25 June | Achaea | Strong | Several | Hail, rainfall | Power outage |
14 July | North, Central and South Athens, West Attica | Very strong | Extended | Heatwave | Power outage |
22 August | Evros | Very strong | Extended | Heatwave, drought, wind | Power outage, damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines |
5 September | Magnesia, Larissa, Corfu, Central Athens, Sporades, Karditsa | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall, wind, tornado, lightning | Power outage, damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines, voltage drop, substation damages |
28 September | Magnesia | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall | Power outage |
4 November | Trikala, Karditsa, Chalkidiki | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall, tornado, wind, hail | Power outage, fire on poles, dropped poles |
10 November | Arkadia | Strong | Limited | Wind | Tree falling on poles, power outage, Medium Voltage lines cut, fire on pole from lightning |
22 November | Rhodes | Very strong | Several | Rainfall | Power outage |
25 November | Chania | Very strong | Several | Rainfall | Power outage |
17 December | East Attica | Very strong | Limited | Tornado | Damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines |
Date | Regions Affected | Intensity | Implications | Type of Weather Event | Network Influence |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
7 January | Elis, North Athens | Very strong | Extended | Tornado, rainfall | Power outage, tree falling on poles |
12 February | Limnos | Very strong | Extended | Hail, rainfall | Tree falling on poles |
5 March | Thessaloniki | Medium | Several | Hail, rainfall | Power outage |
23 April | Sporades | Very strong | Several | Wind, storm | Pole damages |
14 June | Imathia | Strong | Limited | Rainfall | Power outage, tree falling on poles |
4 July | Evia | Very strong | Extended | Storm, lightning | Power outage |
20 July | Piraeus, West central and South Athens | Very strong | Extended | Heatwave | Power outage, damages to underground Medium Voltage lines |
11 August | North and East Athens | Very strong | Extended | Drought, wind | Power outage, damages to overhead Medium Voltage lines |
21 August | Larissa, Magnesia | Strong | Several | Wind, rainfall | Power outage, dropped power cables, tree falling on poles |
11 September | Chios | Very strong | Several | Storm | Streetlight damage, network damages |
5 October | Corfu | Strong | Extended | Storm, lightning | Power outage |
15 November | Aetoloacarnania | Strong | Several | Storm | Power outage |
23 November | Trikala, Preveza | Very strong | Several | Storm, wind | Power outage, tree falling on poles |
1 December | Kozani, Pieria, Chalkidiki, Thessaloniki | Very strong | Extended | Rainfall, storm, wind | Power outage, network damages |
27 December | Chania | Very strong | Several | Lightning | Network damages |
Appendix B
Region | Risk Score | Need of Resilience Enhancement | HIHF Events (Times Occurred) | Suggested Actions (in Priority Order) for Enhancing Overhead Power Systems | Suggested Actions (in Priority Order) for Enhancing Underground Power Systems |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Achaea | 42.29 | Medium | Hail (1) Rainfall (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Aetoloacarnania | 50.21 | Medium | Cyclone (3) Hail (1) Heatwave (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Andros | 53.33 | Medium | Wind (1) Rainfall (1) |
|
|
Arcadia | 43.13 | Medium | Wind (1) |
| - |
Arta | 56.67 | Medium | Frost (1) Snow(1) |
|
|
Attica Islands | 53.33 | Medium | Wind (1) Rainfall (1) |
|
|
Central Athens | 71.04 | High | Frost (2) Heatwave (2) Rainfall (1) Snow (2) Wind (1) |
|
|
Chalkidiki | 62.00 | Medium | Cyclone (3) Frost (1) Hail (1) Snow (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Chania | 59.94 | Medium | Frost (1) Lightning (1) Rainfall (2) Snow (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Chios | 39.17 | Medium | Cyclone (1) |
|
|
Corfu | 67.80 | High | Cyclone (4) Hail (1) Lightning (1) Rainfall (3) Wind (5) |
|
|
East Attica | 73.98 | High | Cyclone (1) Frost (3) Heatwave (2) Rainfall (1) Snow (3) Wind (4) |
|
|
Elis | 55.97 | Medium | Cyclone (3) Heatwave (1) Rainfall (1) |
|
|
Evia | 67.43 | High | Cyclone (2) Frost (3) Heatwave (2) Lightning (1) Rainfall (1) Snow (3) Wind (1) |
|
|
Evros | 55.63 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Heatwave (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Fokida | 58.96 | Medium | Frost (1) Heatwave (1) Snow (1) |
|
|
Fthiotida | 52.71 | Medium | Frost (2) Snow (2) |
|
|
Heraklion | 53.33 | Medium | Lightning (1) |
|
|
Ikaria | 14.17 | Low | Wind (1) |
| - |
Imathia | 50.00 | Medium | Rainfall (1) Snow (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Ioannina | 56.67 | Medium | Frost (1) Snow (1) |
|
|
Ithaca | 55.00 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Karditsa | 48.33 | Medium | Cyclone (2) Frost (1) Hail (2) Lightning (1) Rainfall (3) Snow (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Kavala | 54.79 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Rainfall (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Kefalonia | 55.00 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Kos | 58.13 | Medium | Frost (1) Heatwave (1) Snow (1) |
|
|
Kozani | 50.69 | Medium | Cyclone (2) Lightning (1) Rainfall (2) Wind (1) |
|
|
Laconia | 55.00 | Medium | Heatwave (1) |
|
|
Larissa | 40.21 | Medium | Cyclone (2) Frost (1) Hail (1) Lightning (1) Rainfall (3) Snow (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Lesvos | 49.58 | Medium | Hail (1) Rainfall (2) Wind (1) |
|
|
Magnesia | 65.65 | Medium | Cyclone (2) Frost (2) Lightning (2) Rainfall (6) Snow (1) Wind (5) |
|
|
Messenia | 58.96 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Heatwave (1) Rainfall (1) |
|
|
Naxos | 53.33 | Medium | Frost (1) Snow (1) |
|
|
North Athens | 68.51 | High | Cyclone (1) Frost (1) Heatwave (3) Rainfall (3) Snow (1) Wind (4) |
|
|
Pieria | 58.13 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Rainfall (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Piraeus | 75.00 | High | Heatwave (1) |
|
|
Preveza | 37.50 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Rethymno | 55.63 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Rainfall (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Rhodes | 51.00 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Frost (1) Heatwave (1) Rainfall (2) Snow (1) |
|
|
Serres | 44.58 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Rainfall (2) Snow (1) Wind (3) |
|
|
South Athens | 63.75 | Medium | Heatwave (2) Rainfall (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Sporades | 58.96 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Frost (1) Lightning (1) Rainfall (2) Snow (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Thesprotia | 49.38 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Rainfall (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Thessaloniki | 51.88 | Medium | Cyclone (3) Hail (1) Lightning (1) Rainfall (2) Wind (3) |
|
|
Tinos | 53.33 | Medium | Rainfall (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Trikala | 59.17 | Medium | Cyclone (2) Frost (1) Rainfall (1) Snow (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
Voeotia | 60.83 | Medium | Frost (3) Rainfall (1) Snow (3) Wind (1) |
|
|
West Athens | 68.96 | High | Frost (1) Heatwave (1) Snow (1) Wind (1) |
|
|
West Attica | 59.58 | Medium | Frost (2) Heatwave (2) Snow (2) Wind (1) |
|
|
Xanthi | 53.13 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Snow (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Zakynthos | 57.29 | Medium | Cyclone (1) Rainfall (1) Wind (2) |
|
|
Appendix C
A1 | A2 | A3 | A4 | A5 | A6 | A7 | A8 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A1 | 0 | 0.59 | 0.64 | 0.73 | 0.64 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.5 |
A2 | 0.5 | 0 | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.56 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.56 |
A3 | 0.62 | 0.58 | 0 | 0.74 | 0.37 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 |
A4 | 0.88 | 0.58 | 0.8 | 0 | 0.52 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.38 |
A5 | 0.5 | 0.44 | 0.63 | 0.62 | 0 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.44 |
A6 | 0.62 | 0.6 | 0.65 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 0 | 0.72 | 0.39 |
A7 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 0.54 | 0.53 | 0.79 | 0.68 | 0 | 0.51 |
A8 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.63 | 0.62 | 0.91 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0 |
A1 | A2 | A3 | A4 | A5 | A6 | A7 | A8 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A1 | A2 | A3 | A4 | A5 | A6 | A7 | A8 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
A2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
A4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
A5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
A6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
A7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
A8 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | B5 | B6 | B7 | B8 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B1 | 0 | 0.28 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.28 | 0.6 | 0.28 | 0.38 |
B2 | 0.72 | 0 | 0.72 | 0.73 | 0.6 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.52 |
B3 | 0.55 | 0.28 | 0 | 0.38 | 0.28 | 0.38 | 0.28 | 0.28 |
B4 | 0.62 | 0.4 | 0.72 | 0 | 0.27 | 0.72 | 0.4 | 0.27 |
B5 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.73 | 0 | 0.73 | 0.64 | 0.45 |
B6 | 0.62 | 0.4 | 0.72 | 1 | 0.35 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.27 |
B7 | 0.72 | 0.67 | 0.72 | 0.6 | 0.87 | 0.6 | 0 | 0.32 |
B8 | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.72 | 1 | 0.69 | 1 | 0.68 | 0 |
B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | B5 | B6 | B7 | B8 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | B5 | B6 | B7 | B8 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
B1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
B2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
B3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
B5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
B6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
B7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
B8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
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Characteristic | HILF | HIHF |
---|---|---|
Main difference | Low frequency of extreme weather events (they rarely occur) | High frequency of extreme weather events (they often occur) |
Impact size | Moderate to severe effects | Disastrous impact |
Management | Long-term planning, resilient infrastructure | Preventive maintenance, regular monitoring, short-term plans |
Strategies | Management of large-scale damages | Optimizing resilience on a daily basis |
Planning | Long-term | Short-term and medium-term |
Actions | Power System Resilience Criteria | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 | C7 | C8 | |
A1 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 7 |
A2 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
A3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
A4 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 7 |
A5 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 6 |
A6 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 5 |
A7 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 5 |
A8 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
Weights | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.12 |
Actions | Power System Resilience Criteria | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 | C7 | C8 | |
B1 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 3 |
B2 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
B3 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 2 |
B4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
B5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
B6 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
B7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
B8 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 5 |
Weights | 0.08 | 0.21 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 0 |
Greek Regions Whose Grid Is Affected by HILF Events | Best Method for Enhancing Overhead Power Systems | Greek Regions Whose Grid Is Affected by HILF Events | Best Method for Enhancing Underground Power Systems |
---|---|---|---|
Corfu, Elis, Kozani, Rhodes | Substation design improvement | Aetoloacarnania, Corfu, Evros, North Athens | Smart-grid technologies |
Central Athens, Evia | Proactive inspections (drones, satellites) | Arta, Central Athens, Chania, East Attica, Evia, Fokida, Fthiotida, Imathia, Ioannina, Karditsa, Kefalonia, Kos, Naxos, Rhodes, Sporades, Voeotia, West Athens, West Attica | Water-resistant insulation and sealed cables |
Aetoloacarnania, Arcadia, Arta, Chalkidiki, Chania, Chios, Evros, Fthiotida, Heraklion, Ikaria, Imathia, Ioannina, Ithaca, Karditsa, Kavala, Kefalonia, Larissa, Naxos, North Athens, Pieria, Preveza, Rethymno, Serres, Sporades, Thesprotia, Thessaloniki, Trikala, West Athens, Xanthi, Zakynthos | Undergrounding | Achaea, Heraklion | High-quality resilient cables (XLPE) |
East Attica | Concrete poles | Chalkidiki, Trikala | Regular inspections |
- | Compact line design | Andros, Attica islands, Chios, Elis, Ithaca, Kavala, Kozani, Larissa, Lesvos, Magnesia, Pieria, Preveza, Rethymno, Serres, Thesprotia, Thessaloniki, Tinos, Xanthi, Zakynthos | Installation of pumps and flood control systems |
Laconia, Piraeus | Smart-grid technologies | Laconia, Piraeus, South Athens | Heat-resistant cable insulation |
Achaea, Andros, Attica islands, Lesvos, Magnesia, South Athens, Tinos, Voeotia | Vegetation management | - | Underground sensors and active cooling systems |
Fokida, Kos, West Attica | Cable/conductor replacement | - | Elevation of substations and critical infrastructure in flood-prone areas |
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Goulioti, E.G.; Nikou, T.Μ.; Kontargyri, V.T.; Christodoulou, C.A. Smart-Grid Technologies and Climate Change: How to Use Smart Sensors and Data Processing to Enhance Grid Resilience in High-Impact High-Frequency Events. Energies 2025, 18, 2793. https://doi.org/10.3390/en18112793
Goulioti EG, Nikou TΜ, Kontargyri VT, Christodoulou CA. Smart-Grid Technologies and Climate Change: How to Use Smart Sensors and Data Processing to Enhance Grid Resilience in High-Impact High-Frequency Events. Energies. 2025; 18(11):2793. https://doi.org/10.3390/en18112793
Chicago/Turabian StyleGoulioti, Eleni G., Theodora Μ. Nikou, Vassiliki T. Kontargyri, and Christos A. Christodoulou. 2025. "Smart-Grid Technologies and Climate Change: How to Use Smart Sensors and Data Processing to Enhance Grid Resilience in High-Impact High-Frequency Events" Energies 18, no. 11: 2793. https://doi.org/10.3390/en18112793
APA StyleGoulioti, E. G., Nikou, T. Μ., Kontargyri, V. T., & Christodoulou, C. A. (2025). Smart-Grid Technologies and Climate Change: How to Use Smart Sensors and Data Processing to Enhance Grid Resilience in High-Impact High-Frequency Events. Energies, 18(11), 2793. https://doi.org/10.3390/en18112793