Search Results (23)

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence has driven a surge in demand for computing power. As the core computing infrastructure, data centers have expanded in scale, escalating electricity consumption and magnifying a regional mismatch between computing capacity and energy resources: facilities are concentrated in the energy-constrained East, while the renewable-rich West possesses vast, untapped hosting capacity. Focusing on cross-regional data-center migration under the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” initiative, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the Eastern Local Government, the Western Local Government, and data-center enterprises. The central government is modeled as an external regulator that indirectly shapes players’ strategies through policies such as energy-efficiency constraints and carbon-quota mechanisms. First, we introduce key parameters—including energy efficiency, carbon costs, green revenues, coordination subsidies, and migration losses—and analyze the system’s evolutionary stability using replicator-dynamics equations. Second, we conduct numerical simulations in MATLAB 2024a and perform sensitivity analyses with respect to energy and green constraints, central rewards and penalties, regional coordination incentives, and migration losses. The results show the following: (1) Multiple equilibria can arise, including coordinated optima, policy-failure states, and coordination-impeded outcomes. These coordinated optima do not emerge spontaneously but rather depend on a precise alignment of payoff structures across central government, local governments, and enterprises. (2) The eastern regulatory push—centered on energy efficiency and carbon emissions—is generally more effective than western fiscal subsidies or stand-alone energy advantages at reshaping firm payoffs and inducing relocation. Central penalties and coordination subsidies serve complementary and constraining roles. (3) Commercial risks associated with full migration, such as service interruption and customer attrition, remain among the key barriers to shifting from partial to full migration. These risks are closely linked to practical relocation and connectivity constraints—such as logistics and commissioning effort, and cross-regional network latency/bandwidth—thereby potentially trapping firms in a suboptimal partial-migration equilibrium. This study provides theoretical support for refining the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” policy mix and offers generalized insights for other economies facing similar spatial energy–demand asymmetries. Full article

The integration of renewable energy into the grid has led to problems such as low utilization rate of energy storage resources (“underutilization after construction”) and insufficient system stability. This paper studied the co-evolution mechanism of power market entities empowered by shared energy storage. Based on the interaction among power generation enterprises, power grid operators, and government regulatory agencies, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model. The model introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism as well as a random interference mechanism, which makes it more in line with the actual situation. The stability conditions of the game players were analyzed by using stochastic differential equations, and the influences of key parameters and incentive mechanisms on the stability of the game players were investigated through numerical simulation. The main research results showed the following: (1) The benefits of shared energy storage and opportunistic gains had a significant impact on the strategic choices of power generation companies and grid operators. (2) The regulatory efficiency had significantly promoted the long-term stable maintenance of the system. (3) Dynamic incentives were superior to static incentives in promoting cooperation, while the deterrent effect of static penalties is stronger than that of dynamic penalties. (4) The increase in the intensity of random disturbances led to strategy oscillation. This study suggested that the government implement gradient-based dynamic incentives, maintain strict static penalties to curb opportunism, and enhance regulatory robustness against uncertainty. This research provided theoretical and practical inspirations for optimizing energy storage incentive policies and promoting multi-subject coordination in the power market. Full article

With the large-scale power batteries approaching their retirement phase, efforts are being made to advance the recycling and cascade utilization of power batteries for electric vehicles (EVs). This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of power batteries led by the battery manufacturer (BM) and composed of the electric vehicle manufacturer (EVM) and third-party recycler (TPR). The study investigates the optimal pricing strategies of this CLSC with the consideration of recycling competition under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. This paper establishes five recycling modes, namely independent recycling and cooperative recycling, under dual-channel recycling, and further discusses the effects of the government reward–penalty mechanism and recycling competition on the recycling rate, profits, and recycling pricing of the CLSC in each recycling mode. The following conclusions are found: (1) An increase in the reward–penalty intensity will increase the recycling rate, sales price of EVs, wholesale price, transfer price, recycling price, and the profit of each recycler in the CLSC. (2) An increase in the recycling competition will result in the reduction of the profit of each enterprise, and will also lead to the reduction of the recycling rate. (3) Cooperation between enterprises can inhibit the recycling volume of other enterprises to a certain extent. The cooperation between the EVM and BM can increase the recycling volume and the sales volume of EVs. (4) The leadership of the BM in the supply chain is embodied in the recycling and profit. For other members of the supply chain, it is very important to strive for cooperation with the leaders in the supply chain. These research conclusions can provide theoretical support for optimizing the power battery recycling system, formulating relevant policies, and improving the efficiency of resource recycling, thereby promoting the sustainable development of the new energy industry. Full article

Under the “Dual Carbon” strategy, collaborative governance of port atmospheric pollutants and carbon emissions is critical for low-carbon transformation. Focusing on Ningbo-Zhoushan Port (48% regional ship emissions), this study examines government, port enterprises, and public interactions. A tripartite evolutionary game model with numerical simulation reveals dynamic patterns and key factors. The results show the following: (1) A substitution effect exists between government incentive costs and penalty intensity—increased environmental governance budgets reduce the probability of government incentives, whereas higher public reporting rewards accelerate corporate emission reduction convergence. (2) Public supervision exhibits cyclical fluctuations due to conflicts between individual rationality and collective interests, with excessive reporting rewards potentially triggering free-rider behavior. (3) The system exhibits two stable equilibria: a low-efficiency equilibrium (0,0,0) and a high-efficiency equilibrium (1,1,1). The latter requires policy cost compensation, corporate emission reduction gains exceeding investments, and a supervision benefit–cost ratio greater than 1. Accordingly, the study proposes a three-dimensional “Incentive–Constraint–Collaboration” governance strategy, recommending floating penalty mechanisms, green financial instrument innovation, and community supervision network optimization to balance environmental benefits with fiscal sustainability. This research provides a dynamic decision-making framework for multi-agent collaborative emission reduction in ports, offering both methodological innovation and practical guidance value. Full article

More and more attention has been paid to the environmental problems brought about by the development of the global economy. Based on the principal–agent theory, this paper constructs an incentive model for the government and polluting enterprises and explores the incentive problem of the government and polluting enterprises in undertaking environmental responsibility. At present, the research on the incentive of polluting enterprises focuses on the hypothesis of ‘rational man’, and less on the fairness preference of polluting enterprises. However, in other research fields, it has been proved that fairness preference has a great influence on the incentive mechanism. Fairness preference is introduced into the incentive model, and the incentive effect of polluting enterprises before and after considering fairness preference is compared and analyzed. This study found that the reward and punishment mechanism considering fairness preference can increase the behavior of polluting enterprises to assume environmental responsibility and limit the behavior of not assuming environmental responsibility. The stronger the fairness preference of polluting enterprises, the stronger the role of incentive mechanism; after considering the fairness preference, the government’s subsidies and penalties for polluting enterprises will increase with the increase in the fairness preference of polluting enterprises, and the expected benefits of polluting enterprises and the government will also increase; under the same incentive mechanism, the income of polluting enterprises with strong fairness preference is higher, but the government’s income is lower. Adopting the same incentive mechanism for different polluting enterprises will cause the loss of social benefits. After considering the fairness preference, the incentive strategy set up to a certain extent promotes the polluting enterprises to assume environmental responsibility and realize the coordinated development of the economy and the environment. Therefore, the government should set reasonable subsidy and punishment policies according to the fairness preference of polluting enterprises to encourage enterprises to fulfill their environmental responsibilities, improve environmental quality and reduce pollution. Full article

Work safety governance is a critical component of corporate ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) performance, particularly in high-risk industries. Effective safety supervision systems not only protect workers’ wellbeing, a key social metric in ESG frameworks, but also enhance corporate governance through improved risk management and regulatory compliance. The supervisory system represents a major institutional innovation in China’s approach to addressing increasingly complex work safety governance challenges. This study constructs an evolutionary game model involving the central government, local government, and high-risk enterprises to analyze the evolutionary characteristics of stakeholder behaviors. Through system simulation, we examine how key parameter changes affect the stability of system equilibrium points. Our findings reveal that (1) the current supervisory system effectively incentivizes both local governments to conduct safety supervision and high-risk enterprises to comply with safety investment requirements. (2) While government penalty levels do not affect strategy combinations, both insufficient and excessive penalties slow the system’s evolution toward optimal states. (3) Local governments tend to choose non-regulatory strategies when transfer payments and enterprise subsidies are inadequate. (4) Insufficient supervision intensity from the central government leads to local government non-regulation, and although this can be addressed by increasing supervision intensity, excessive supervision reduces the system’s evolution speed toward ideal states. Based on these findings, we propose policy recommendations for rational supervision intensity control, scientific reward–punishment mechanisms, and enhanced safety information transparency. This framework provides insights into the relationship between governance mechanisms and corporate long-term sustainability, which has been shown to improve ESG standards. Full article

The promotion of energy conservation and emission reduction involves a multi-party game among governments, enterprises, and other stakeholders. To explore the game relationships among governments, the public, and coal-fired power enterprises under the “dual carbon targets”, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for energy conservation and emission reduction involving three parties: the government, coal-fired power enterprises, and the public. Through a theoretical analysis and simulation analysis of the case study involving a central Hebei energy enterprise in China, the impact of parameter variations on the strategic choices of all parties and the evolutionarily stable strategies of the system is thoroughly discussed. The research findings indicate that reducing public supervision costs, increasing government rewards, subsidies, and penalties, and enhancing government regulatory capabilities are crucial factors in promoting energy-saving and emission-reduction efforts by coal-fired power enterprises. After multiple evolutionary iterations, the tripartite evolutionary game system ultimately reaches an evolutionarily stable state of government regulation, public supervision, and energy-saving and emission-reduction by coal-fired power enterprises at the point $E_8(\mathrm{1,1},1)$. Based on these findings, we propose a series of policy recommendations aimed at providing theoretical support for the Chinese government to achieve its energy-saving and emission-reduction strategies under the dual-carbon targets. These recommendations also offer practical guidance for the government in formulating emission reduction policies, for enterprises in optimizing their operational strategies, and for the public in participating in emission reduction efforts. Full article

In the context of China’s ambitious dual carbon goals, this study introduces an innovative reward–penalty incentive mechanism, grounded in evolutionary game theory, to develop a tripartite evolutionary game model concerning the construction of passive rural housing. This research meticulously analyzes the equilibrium and stability strategies of all involved parties and employs data simulation to examine the influence of varying parameters on the game dynamics. Our findings reveal that the government’s cost–benefit calculations significantly influence its decisions regarding passive housing initiatives. The study identifies optimal cost and benefit strategies for various developmental phases. Furthermore, the level of governmental rewards and penalties plays a crucial role in determining whether enterprises and farmers opt for passive housing solutions. The study establishes the efficacy of different incentive schemes at various stages. Importantly, the economic interests of enterprises and farmers are pivotal in their decision-making process regarding passive housing. The study advocates for a comprehensive set of measures to safeguard these interests, with a special emphasis on protecting farmers. In conclusion, this research offers substantial guidance for policy decisions aimed at transforming existing rural housing into passive housing, thereby aligning with China’s environmental and sustainability objectives. Full article

The widespread use of traditional packaging materials poses significant environmental challenges. Adopting green packaging is essential for reducing pollution and conserving natural resources. This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of government incentives and penalties in promoting the adoption of green packaging by logistics companies. We developed an evolutionary game theory model that involves governments and logistics companies, comparing the impacts of static and dynamic reward and penalty policies. The results indicate that (1) static policies often lead to oscillatory adoption rates of green packaging without achieving a stable equilibrium, while dynamic policies generally promote steadier adoption of sustainable practices. (2) Different combinations of dynamic policies have varying influences on logistics companies’ propensity to adopt green packaging solutions. Specifically, dynamic rewards and static penalties are particularly effective at encouraging logistics companies to adopt green packaging. (3) A combination of dynamic rewards and penalties tends to facilitate more rapid and consistent adoption of green packaging by logistics companies. (4) An increase in government supervision costs is associated with reduced regulatory actions and a lower prevalence of green packaging. These insights are critical for policymakers aiming to craft regulations that successfully encourage sustainability within logistics operations. Full article

The sustainable development of power construction projects (PCPs) is of great significance in solving the issue of high carbon emissions in the power industry. However, the profit-seeking nature of stakeholders’ strategic choices and other conflicts have seriously hindered this process. This study constructs a tripartite game evolution model for the government, grid companies and the public, and determines the factors and range of values that affect the behavioral and strategic choices of stakeholders based on the literature analysis method and case study method. Numerical simulations are conducted with the help of MATLAB R2021a software to explore the changes in decision-making behavior of stakeholders and system stabilization strategies in different stages of the industry life cycle and the influencing mechanisms. The results show that in the initial stage, the government lays the foundation for the development of PCPs through policy guidance under the government-led mechanism. As PCPs move into the development stage, stakeholders’ benefits increase, creating a collaborative participation situation. As PCPs mature, the role of market guidance comes to the fore, and the interventionist role of government diminishes to a guardian role. In terms of sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters, low government rewards and penalties are not conducive to the adoption of low-carbon sustainable construction programs by power grid companies. The public influences the sustainable behavior of the government and power grid companies through public opinion. In addition, reasonable cost inputs from all stakeholders are critical to effectively promote the steady growth of PCPs. Based on the results, a sustainable development promotion mechanism for PCPs is constructed based on multiple dimensions, with a view to providing decision-making services for stakeholders and thus contributing to the sustainable development of PCPs. Full article

The organized system of emergency resources with the participation of social subjects features a network, which puts forward new requirements for mobilization policies for public health emergencies. Considering the “mobilization–participation” action of the relationship between the government and social resource subjects and revealing the mechanism of governance measures represent the foundation of developing effective mobilization strategies. To analyze the behavior of subjects in an emergency resource network, this study proposes a framework for the emergency actions of government and social resource subjects, as well as clarifies the functions of relational mechanisms and interorganizational learning in decision making. The game model and its rules of evolution in the network were developed by considering the interventions of rewards and penalties. An emergency resource network was constructed on the basis of a response to the COVID-19 epidemic in a city in China, and a simulation of the “mobilization–participation” game was designed and conducted. We propose a path to promote emergency resource actions by analyzing the initial situations and the interventions’ effects. This article suggests that guiding and improving the initial selection of subjects under a certain reward system would be an effective path to facilitate resource support actions during public health emergencies. Full article

Green buildings (GBs) can effectively reduce building energy consumption and alleviate energy problems. However, as green building projects swell, the development process of GBs in China has gradually exposed many problems, among which the greenwashing behavior of construction enterprises is the more serious. The government needs to adopt some appropriate policies to prevent problems in GBs. This paper uses the evolutionary game theory to construct models and proposes four policy combinations: static reward and static punishment, static reward and dynamic punishment, dynamic reward and static punishment, dynamic reward and dynamic punishment. We compare the impact of four combinations on construction strategy and analyze the inner mechanisms of the behavior evolution of government departments and construction enterprises. Our results revealed no evolutionary stabilization strategy in the game system under the static reward and punishment policy. Under the combination of dynamic subsidies and static penalty policy, the green construction effect of construction enterprises is the best. Furthermore, dynamic reward policy has a more obvious restraining effect on construction enterprises. The government should dynamically adjust rewards and punishments according to the construction quality and determine the appropriate upper limit of rewards and punishments to improve the policies’ applicability and effectiveness. This study provides theoretical support for the healthy development of green buildings. Full article

It is important to investigate the influence of incentives and penalties on farmers’ willingness and behavior towards domestic waste separation and the mechanism of influence. It is helpful for the government to formulate policies to guide farmers to actively participate in domestic waste separation, solve the problem of rural domestic waste pollution, and improve the effectiveness of rural waste separation management. By using the public data of 2020CLES, we analyzed the influence of incentives and penalties on farmers’ willingness and behavior towards domestic waste separation by using the Probit model, based on the technology acceptance model, using a chain of multiple mediating effects. The results are as follows. Firstly, the net effect of incentives and penalties on farmers’ willingness and behavior to separate household waste was 6.86%, and the net effect of separation behavior was 33.37%. Relatively speaking, the strengthening effect of incentives and penalties on farmers’ domestic waste sorting behavior is stronger than the promotion effect on farmers’ domestic waste sorting intention. Secondly, perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness had significant chain mediating effects, with perceived ease of use having the strongest mediating effect. Thirdly, the incentives and penalties have a stronger effect on promoting the willingness of female farmers, elderly farmers, and farmers with low education to separate domestic waste. Finally, the influence of individual and household characteristics of farmers on their willingness and behavior to separate household waste varies. Accordingly, suggestions for improving the willingness and behavior of farmers to separate domestic waste are proposed in the following aspects: improving the reward and punishment system, making good use of market instruments, and increasing farmers’ awareness level and value recognition of domestic waste separation. Full article

Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has become one of the fastest growing waste streams around the world, putting tremendous pressure on the environment, resources, and public health. A practically driven question about how to promote the development of the WEEE recycling industry plagues many countries, especially in developing economies such as China. This study uses an expert decision-making system based on the fuzzy Delphi technique and improved Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method to identify the critical barriers and their cause–effect relationships in the Chinese WEEE recycling industry. First, using the fuzzy Delphi technique, we find that nine barriers significantly impact the development of the Chinese WEEE recycling industry. Then, three critical barriers which include the implementation of policies and regulations, qualified disassembly, and unqualified disassembly are identified by employing the improved DEMATEL method. Furthermore, implementation of policies and regulations belong to the cause group, and the other two barriers belong to the effect group. Finally, some practical implications are proposed to promote the sustainable development of the Chinese WEEE recycling industry. To be specific, the Chinese government should optimize the implementation details of the e-waste take-back legislation, establish a flexible reward–supervision–penalty mechanism to support the formal collector, and improve the collection efficiency. The results of this paper are of value to firms that participate in WEEE recycling and to the government that aims to promote the sustainable development of the WEEE recycling industry. Full article

The subsidies provided by the local government to real estate developers are an important and common practice to promote the development of prefabricated buildings worldwide. However, there is a lack of current research on how government subsidies affect the decision-making of real estate developers with respect to adopting prefabricated construction methods. This study developed a fuzzy game model integrating classical game theory with the triangular fuzzy number approach between the local government and a real estate developer, with different behavioral strategies regarding whether or not to develop prefabricated buildings. It analyzed the Nash equilibriums under the circumstances of pure and mixed strategies and probed the influencing factors of the game equilibrium results via numerical simulation. The research conclusions are as follows: (1) the government should encourage real estate developers to actively participate in prefabricated building by using financial subsidies, fund rewards, process supervision and economic penalties comprehensively; (2) the pure strategy (no manufacturing process supervision, active development) between the government and real estate developers is feasible when the benefit of “active development” for real estate developers is larger than that of “passive development”; (3) positive incentives, such as offering financial subsidies, reducing the cost of prefabricated building development and improving the popularity of prefabricated construction in the building market, should be taken to motivate real estate developers; and (4) negative incentives, such as increasing economic punishment and enhancing manufacturing process supervision, can also facilitate real estate developers to actively participate in the development of prefabricated buildings. Incentives are more effective when the economic penalties are greater than the incremental costs of developing prefabricated buildings. Some policy implications are given to guide prefabricated building market development. Finally, the main problems that need further study in the future are highlighted. Full article