Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Current Status and Challenges of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction in the Coal-Fired Power Industry
2.2. Game Studies Between Coal-Fired Power Enterprises and Governments
2.3. The Role of the Public in Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction
2.4. Deficiencies and Extensions in Tripartite Evolutionary Game Research
2.5. The Application of Evolutionary Game Theory in Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction
3. Model Construction
3.1. Problem Description
3.2. Model Assumptions
3.3. Construction of Replication Dynamic Equations
3.4. Analysis of System Equilibrium Points and Stability
4. Numerical Simulation
4.1. Case Selection and Parameters Allocation
4.2. Simulation Analysis of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies for Jizhong Energy, the Public, and the Government
4.3. Simulation Analysis of Tripartite Evolutionary Stability in the Process of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis of Public Supervision Cost () on Public Strategic Choice
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis of Variations in Rewards (E) and Penalties (H) on the Strategic Choices of Jizhong Energy
4.6. Sensitivity Analysis of Variations in Government Regulation Costs () on Government Strategic Choices
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions, Suggestions, and Limitations
6.1. Conclusions
6.2. Suggestions
6.3. Limitations
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Coal-Fired Power Enterprise | Government | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
supervised | energy saving and emission reduction | | ||
The public | No energy saving or emission reduction | |||
non-supervised | energy saving and emission reduction | |||
no energy saving or emission reduction |
Equilibrium Points | Eigenvalue 1 | Eigenvalue 2 | Eigenvalue 3 | Eigenvalue Symbol | Stability |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
() | unstable | ||||
() | unstable | ||||
() | ESS | ||||
(+) | unstable | ||||
() | unstable | ||||
() | unstable | ||||
(+) | unstable | ||||
() | ESS |
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Gao, J.; Tan, Q.; Cui, B. Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory. Sustainability 2024, 16, 10550. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310550
Gao J, Tan Q, Cui B. Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory. Sustainability. 2024; 16(23):10550. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310550
Chicago/Turabian StyleGao, Jie, Qingmei Tan, and Bo Cui. 2024. "Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory" Sustainability 16, no. 23: 10550. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310550
APA StyleGao, J., Tan, Q., & Cui, B. (2024). Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory. Sustainability, 16(23), 10550. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310550