Behavioral Strategies between Government and Real Estate Developers on Prefabricated Buildings Based on Triangular Fuzzy Matrix Game
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. The Influence of Government Policy on Enterprise Decision-Making
2.2. Government Policy in Prefabricated Building Promotion
2.3. Knowledge Gaps
3. Methodology
3.1. Model Assumption
3.2. Triangular Fuzzy Game Matrix
3.3. Triangular Fuzzy Game Equilibrium Analysis
3.3.1. Nash Equilibrium Analysis of Pure Strategy
- (a)
- If , then . This means that the profit of the “active development” strategy adopted by the real estate developer is less than the increased cost, and the government adopts the strategy of “without process supervision”, so the game has a unique Nash equilibrium solution, and the strategy combination is (without process supervision, passive development).
- (b)
- If , then . This indicates that a real estate developer taking the “active development” strategy can gain more than increased cost. At this time, the government adopts the strategy of “without process supervision”, so the game has the only Nash equilibrium solution, and the strategy combination is (without process supervision, active development). This situation is the most ideal case, in which the real estate developer will adopt the strategy of “active development” driven by benefit pursuit, and the government does not need to carry out process supervision, with no payment of the corresponding supervision cost and the lowest total social cost.
- (a)
- If , the game has a unique Nash equilibrium solution. The strategy combination is (without process supervision, active development).
- (b)
- If and , then . The game has a unique Nash equilibrium solution, and the strategy combination is (without process supervision, passive development).
- (c)
- If , and , then . At this time, the game has no unique Nash equilibrium solution, and the two parties will adopt a mixed strategy.
3.3.2. Nash Equilibrium Analysis of Mixed Strategy
3.4. Model Analysis
3.4.1. Analysis on the Influencing Factor
3.4.2. Analysis on the Influencing Factor
3.4.3. Analysis of Equilibrium Results under Two Strategies
4. Numerical Simulation and Discussion
4.1. Equilibrium Solution of Pure Strategy Game
4.2. Equilibrium Solution of Mixed Strategy Game
4.3. Analysis of Equilibrium Solution under Two Strategies
4.4. Prospects, Challenges and Limitations
4.5. Policy Implications
- The government should make comprehensive use of financial subsidies, capital rewards, process supervision, economic punishment and other positive and negative incentive measures to effectively improve the actual income of real estate developers, in order to offset the cost increment of prefabricated building and to increase the cost of the violation of mandatory regulations by real estate developers. Otherwise, real estate developers could passively deal with the government’s mandatory policy on prefabricated building implementation.
- When the government carries on with the positive incentives, it should consider how to expand the income of real estate developers developing prefabricated buildings actively, and take measures such as increasing financial subsidies, reducing tax and widely publicizing the advantages of prefabricated building to obtain consumers’ market recognition.
- When the government carries on with negative incentives, increasing economic punishment and strengthening process supervision will prompt real estate developers to actively develop prefabricated buildings. In particular, when the economic penalty is greater than the cost increment of developing prefabricated buildings, the policy effect is more obvious.
5. Conclusions
5.1. Summary
5.2. Contribution
5.3. Future Research Directions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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Real Estate Developer | Active Development | Passive Development | |
---|---|---|---|
Government | |||
With process supervision | |||
Without process supervision |
Real Estate Developer | Active Development | Passive Development | |
---|---|---|---|
Government | |||
With process supervision () | |||
Without process supervision () |
Real Estate Developer | Active Development | Passive Development | |
---|---|---|---|
Government | |||
With process supervision | |||
Without process supervision |
Real Estate Developer | Active Development | Passive Development | |
---|---|---|---|
Government | |||
With Process supervision () | |||
Without process supervision () |
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Han, Y.; Song, S.; Zhuang, W. Behavioral Strategies between Government and Real Estate Developers on Prefabricated Buildings Based on Triangular Fuzzy Matrix Game. Buildings 2022, 12, 2102. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12122102
Han Y, Song S, Zhuang W. Behavioral Strategies between Government and Real Estate Developers on Prefabricated Buildings Based on Triangular Fuzzy Matrix Game. Buildings. 2022; 12(12):2102. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12122102
Chicago/Turabian StyleHan, Yanhu, Siyuan Song, and Weiling Zhuang. 2022. "Behavioral Strategies between Government and Real Estate Developers on Prefabricated Buildings Based on Triangular Fuzzy Matrix Game" Buildings 12, no. 12: 2102. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12122102