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Keywords = Nash bargaining game

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28 pages, 2701 KiB  
Article
Optimal Scheduling of Hybrid Games Considering Renewable Energy Uncertainty
by Haihong Bian, Kai Ji, Yifan Zhang, Xin Tang, Yongqing Xie and Cheng Chen
World Electr. Veh. J. 2025, 16(7), 401; https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj16070401 - 17 Jul 2025
Viewed by 192
Abstract
As the integration of renewable energy sources into microgrid operations deepens, their inherent uncertainty poses significant challenges for dispatch scheduling. This paper proposes a hybrid game-theoretic optimization strategy to address the uncertainty of renewable energy in microgrid scheduling. An energy trading framework is [...] Read more.
As the integration of renewable energy sources into microgrid operations deepens, their inherent uncertainty poses significant challenges for dispatch scheduling. This paper proposes a hybrid game-theoretic optimization strategy to address the uncertainty of renewable energy in microgrid scheduling. An energy trading framework is developed, involving integrated energy microgrids (IEMS), shared energy storage operators (ESOS), and user aggregators (UAS). A mixed game model combining master–slave and cooperative game theory is constructed in which the ESO acts as the leader by setting electricity prices to maximize its own profit, while guiding the IEMs and UAs—as followers—to optimize their respective operations. Cooperative decisions within the IEM coalition are coordinated using Nash bargaining theory. To enhance the generality of the user aggregator model, both electric vehicle (EV) users and demand response (DR) users are considered. Additionally, the model incorporates renewable energy output uncertainty through distributionally robust chance constraints (DRCCs). The resulting two-level optimization problem is solved using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions and the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM). Simulation results verify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed model in enhancing operational efficiency under conditions of uncertainty. Full article
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20 pages, 1092 KiB  
Article
Optimal Energy Management and Trading Strategy for Multi-Distribution Networks with Shared Energy Storage Based on Nash Bargaining Game
by Yuan Hu, Zhijun Wu, Yudi Ding, Kai Yuan, Feng Zhao and Tiancheng Shi
Processes 2025, 13(7), 2022; https://doi.org/10.3390/pr13072022 - 26 Jun 2025
Viewed by 355
Abstract
In distribution networks, energy storage serves as a crucial means to mitigate power fluctuations from renewable energy sources. However, due to its high cost, energy storage remains a resource whose large-scale adoption in power systems faces significant challenges. In recent years, the emergence [...] Read more.
In distribution networks, energy storage serves as a crucial means to mitigate power fluctuations from renewable energy sources. However, due to its high cost, energy storage remains a resource whose large-scale adoption in power systems faces significant challenges. In recent years, the emergence of shared energy storage business models has provided new opportunities for the efficient operation of multi-distribution networks. Nevertheless, distribution network operators and shared energy storage operators belong to different stakeholders, and traditional centralized scheduling strategies suffer from issues such as privacy leakage and overly conservative decision-making. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a Nash bargaining game-based optimal energy management and trading strategy for multi-distribution networks with shared energy storage. First, we establish optimal scheduling models for active distribution networks (ADNs) and shared energy storage operators, respectively, and then develop a cooperative scheduling model aimed at maximizing collaborative benefits. The interactive variables—power exchange and electricity prices between distribution networks and shared energy storage operators—are iteratively solved using the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM). Finally, case studies based on modified IEEE-33 test systems validate the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed method. The results demonstrate that the presented approach significantly outperforms conventional centralized optimization and distributed robust techniques, achieving a maximum improvement of 3.6% in renewable energy utilization efficiency and an 11.2% reduction in operational expenses. While maintaining computational performance on par with centralized methods, it effectively addresses data privacy concerns. Furthermore, the proposed strategy enables a substantial decrease in load curtailment, with reductions reaching as high as 63.7%. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Smart Microgrids in Renewable Energy Development)
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25 pages, 7829 KiB  
Article
Consider Demand Response and Power-Sharing Source-Storage-Load Three-Level Game Models
by Fuyi Zou, Hui He, Xiang Liao, Ke Liu, Shuo Ouyang, Li Mo and Wei Huang
Sustainability 2025, 17(10), 4270; https://doi.org/10.3390/su17104270 - 8 May 2025
Viewed by 404
Abstract
With the increasing connection between integrated natural gas, thermal energy, and electric power systems, the integrated energy system (IES) needs to coordinate the internal unit scheduling and meet the different load demands of customers. However, when the energy subjects involved in scheduling are [...] Read more.
With the increasing connection between integrated natural gas, thermal energy, and electric power systems, the integrated energy system (IES) needs to coordinate the internal unit scheduling and meet the different load demands of customers. However, when the energy subjects involved in scheduling are engaged in conflicts of interest, aspects such as hierarchical status relationships and cooperative and competitive relationships must be considered. Therefore, this paper studies the problem of achieving optimal energy scheduling for multiple subjects of source, storage, and load under the same distribution network while ensuring that their benefits are not impaired. First, this paper establishes a dual master-slave game model with a shared energy storage system (SESS), IES, and the alliance of prosumers (APs) as the main subjects. Second, based on the Nash negotiation theory and considering the sharing of electric energy among prosumers, the APs model is equated into two sub-problems of coalition cost minimization and cooperative benefit distribution to ensure that the coalition members distribute the cooperative benefits equitably. Further, the Stackelberg-Stackelberg-Nash three-layer game model is established, and the dichotomous distributed optimization algorithm combined with the alternating direction multiplier method (ADMM) is used to solve this three-layer game model. Finally, in the simulation results of the arithmetic example, the natural gas consumption is reduced by 9.32%, the economic efficiency of IES is improved by 3.95%, and the comprehensive energy purchase cost of APs is reduced by 12.16%, the proposed model verifies the sustainability co-optimization and mutual benefits of source, storage and load multi-interested subjects. Full article
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26 pages, 1186 KiB  
Article
Enhancing Greenness and Performance of Agricultural Supply Chains with Nash Bargaining Contract Under Consumer Environmental Awareness
by Guangxing Wei, Xinyue Zhang and Binta Bary
Systems 2025, 13(5), 337; https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13050337 - 1 May 2025
Viewed by 319
Abstract
To enhance product greenness and operational performance, this study designs a Nash bargaining contract incorporating consumer environmental awareness in an agricultural supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer shares partial green costs [...] Read more.
To enhance product greenness and operational performance, this study designs a Nash bargaining contract incorporating consumer environmental awareness in an agricultural supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer shares partial green costs to improve greenness and efficiency. Using game theory, theoretical models for competitive scenario without Nash bargaining, local cooperative scenario with given ratio, and global cooperative scenario with Nash bargaining are constructed. Through comparison and sensitivity analysis, the enhancements from Nash bargaining are explored, and the effects of consumer environmental awareness on these enhancements are examined. The findings reveal several key insights. First, the process of bargaining determines the optimal contract ratio, which also depends on the magnitude of price sensitivity, marginal green costs, and consumer environmental awareness. Second, the Nash bargaining contract significantly improves product greenness, increases retail prices, and boosts profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, consumer environmental awareness amplifies the effectiveness of the Nash bargaining contract, leading to greener products, higher prices, and greater overall supply chain profits. This research contributes to agricultural supply chain management by providing a theoretically rigorous Nash bargaining mechanism alongside a real-world case study, which harmonizes environmental stewardship and economic viability in agricultural supply chains. The findings offer actionable insights for supply chain managers and policymakers seeking to promote green innovation while maintaining profitability. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Supply Chain Management)
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36 pages, 1390 KiB  
Article
Adaptive Real-Time Transmission in Large-Scale Satellite Networks Through Software-Defined-Networking-Based Domain Clustering and Random Linear Network Coding
by Shangpeng Wang, Chenyuan Zhang, Yuchen Wu, Limin Liu and Jun Long
Mathematics 2025, 13(7), 1069; https://doi.org/10.3390/math13071069 - 25 Mar 2025
Viewed by 567
Abstract
Network flow task management involves the efficient allocation and scheduling of data flow tasks within dynamic satellite networks, aiming to effectively address frequent changes in network topology and dynamic traffic fluctuations. Existing research primarily emphasizes traffic prediction and scheduling using spatiotemporal models and [...] Read more.
Network flow task management involves the efficient allocation and scheduling of data flow tasks within dynamic satellite networks, aiming to effectively address frequent changes in network topology and dynamic traffic fluctuations. Existing research primarily emphasizes traffic prediction and scheduling using spatiotemporal models and machine learning. However, these approaches often depend on extensive historical data for training, making real-time adaptation to rapidly changing network topologies and traffic patterns challenging in dynamic satellite environments. Additionally, their high computational complexity and slow convergence rates hinder their efficiency in large-scale networks. To address these issues, this paper proposes a collaborative optimization framework based on Coding Multi-Path Theory (CMPT). The framework utilizes a Nash bargaining game model to simulate resource competition among the different participants, ensuring fair resource distribution and load balancing. It also integrates real-time network state monitoring with optimization algorithms, within a multi-path scheduling strategy, enabling the dynamic selection of optimal transmission paths to accommodate frequent network topology changes and traffic variations. Experimental results indicate that the proposed method reduced resource allocation task execution time by at least 18.03% compared to traditional methods and enhanced task scheduling efficiency by at least 14.01%. Although CMPT exhibited a slightly higher task latency on certain small-scale datasets compared to some baseline algorithms, its performance remains exceptional in large-scale and high-dimensional scenarios. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Advances in Network and Edge Computing)
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20 pages, 2487 KiB  
Article
Sustainable Supply Chains for Poverty Alleviation: Considering Branding and Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns
by Yuting Yan, Wenjie Bi, Mengzhuo Wang and Bing Wang
Systems 2025, 13(3), 182; https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13030182 - 6 Mar 2025
Viewed by 730
Abstract
With economic development and shifting consumption trends, branding has become an important way to improve the efficiency of poverty alleviation supply chains (PASCs) in practice. However, academic research on this topic is limited. To fill this gap in the literature, we constructed a [...] Read more.
With economic development and shifting consumption trends, branding has become an important way to improve the efficiency of poverty alleviation supply chains (PASCs) in practice. However, academic research on this topic is limited. To fill this gap in the literature, we constructed a differential game of a PASC that examines how to build a sustainable poverty reduction model through branding, considering government subsidies and supplier’s Nash bargaining fairness concerns. Our findings show the following: (1) Government subsidies can improve the decision-making level and channel efficiency of leading enterprises (E) and poor suppliers (F). Government subsidies are necessary for a PASC to establish a sustainable poverty alleviation mechanism. (2) F’s Nash bargaining fairness concerns only reduce their level of production effort but do not affect the brand construction and corporate social responsibility levels of E. (3) As F’s bargaining power increases, Nash bargaining fairness concerns have a more significant effect on the PASC’s performance. While F’s fairness concerns can enhance their utility to some extent, it ultimately leads to more significant profit losses for both parties. (4) The proposed mixed cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract can effectively align members’ incentives, enhancing profitability for both parties. Full article
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16 pages, 1763 KiB  
Article
Optimal Dispatch for Electric-Heat-Gas Coupling Multi-Park Integrated Energy Systems via Nash Bargaining Game
by Xuesong Shao, Yixuan Huang, Meimei Duan, Kaijie Fang and Xing He
Processes 2025, 13(2), 534; https://doi.org/10.3390/pr13020534 - 14 Feb 2025
Viewed by 562
Abstract
To improve the energy utilization rate and realize the low-carbon emission of a park integrated energy system (PIES), this paper proposes an optimal operation strategy for multiple PIESs. Firstly, the electrical power cooperative trading framework of multiple PIESs is constructed. Secondly, the hydrogen [...] Read more.
To improve the energy utilization rate and realize the low-carbon emission of a park integrated energy system (PIES), this paper proposes an optimal operation strategy for multiple PIESs. Firstly, the electrical power cooperative trading framework of multiple PIESs is constructed. Secondly, the hydrogen blending mechanism and carbon capture system and power-to-gas system joint operation model are introduced to establish the model of each PIES. Then, based on the Nash bargaining game theory, a multi-PIES cooperative trading and operation model with electrical power cooperative trading is constructed. Then, the alternating direction method of multipliers algorithm is used to solve the two subproblems. Finally, case studies analysis based on scene analysis is performed. The results show that the cooperative operation model reduces the total cost of a PIES more effectively compared with independent operation. Meanwhile, the efficient utilization and production of hydrogen are the keys to achieve carbon reduction and an efficiency increase in a PIES. Full article
(This article belongs to the Topic Advances in Power Science and Technology, 2nd Edition)
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18 pages, 2057 KiB  
Article
Cooperative Game Enabled Low-Carbon Energy Dispatching of Multi-Regional Integrated Energy Systems Considering Carbon Market
by Peiran Liang, Honghang Zhang and Rui Liang
Energies 2025, 18(4), 759; https://doi.org/10.3390/en18040759 - 7 Feb 2025
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 915
Abstract
With the growing global environmental concerns and the push for carbon neutrality, rural multi-regional integrated energy systems (IESs) face challenges related to low energy efficiency, high carbon emissions, and the transition to cleaner energy sources. This paper proposes a cooperative game-based low-carbon economic [...] Read more.
With the growing global environmental concerns and the push for carbon neutrality, rural multi-regional integrated energy systems (IESs) face challenges related to low energy efficiency, high carbon emissions, and the transition to cleaner energy sources. This paper proposes a cooperative game-based low-carbon economic dispatch strategy for rural IESs, integrating carbon trading mechanisms. A novel multi-regional IESs architecture is developed to exploit the synergy between photovoltaic (PV) and biomass energy systems. The proposed model described the anaerobic fermentation heat loads, incorporates variable-temperature fermentation, and employs a Nash bargaining model solved via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) to optimize cooperation while preserving stakeholder privacy. Simulation results show that the proposed strategy reduces total operating costs by 16.9% and carbon emissions by 7.5%, validating its effectiveness in enhancing efficiency and sustainability in rural energy systems. Full article
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22 pages, 5372 KiB  
Article
A Bargaining with Negotiation Cost for Water Use and Pollution Conflict Management
by Zhipeng Fan, Xiang Fu and Xiaodan Zhao
Sustainability 2025, 17(1), 119; https://doi.org/10.3390/su17010119 - 27 Dec 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 898
Abstract
The intensifying overexploitation of water resources and the increasing pollution discharge have exacerbated conflicts in water resource utilization, making it urgent to effectively reconcile the contradiction between water resource utilization and environmental protection. This study developed a Cost-Inclusive Multi-Objective Bargaining Methodology (CIMB), coupled [...] Read more.
The intensifying overexploitation of water resources and the increasing pollution discharge have exacerbated conflicts in water resource utilization, making it urgent to effectively reconcile the contradiction between water resource utilization and environmental protection. This study developed a Cost-Inclusive Multi-Objective Bargaining Methodology (CIMB), coupled with a Compromise Programming (CP) method, to address conflicts between water use and pollution discharge, considering the economic benefits and the sustainable development of water resources. A deterministic multi-objective bargaining approach was employed, with two players representing the maximization of water use benefits and the minimization of total pollution discharge. This study takes the middle and lower reaches of the Han River region as an example to optimize water resource allocation in ten cities in this area. Using the CIMB-CP model, the water use and pollution discharge for different cities were obtained, and the impact of various factors on the game outcomes was analyzed. The model results indicate that negotiation cost have a significant impact on the Nash equilibrium solution. Compared to the Cost-Exclusive Multi-Objective Bargaining Methodology (CEMB) model, the Nash equilibrium solution of the CIMB-CP model shows an approximately 0.1% decrease in economic benefits and an approximately 0.3% decrease in pollution discharge. The risk attitudes of the participants have a significant impact on the game outcomes, and decision-makers need to formulate corresponding negotiation strategies based on their own risk preferences. Full article
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19 pages, 2670 KiB  
Article
Distributed Dispatch and Profit Allocation for Parks Using Co-Operative Game Theory and the Generalized Nash Bargaining Approach
by Hanwen Wang, Xiang Li, Haojun Hu and Yizhou Zhou
Energies 2024, 17(23), 6143; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17236143 - 5 Dec 2024
Viewed by 717
Abstract
To improve the regulatory capacity of distributed resources within the park and enhance the flexibility of market transactions, this paper introduces a distributed dispatch and profit allocation method grounded in cooperative game theory and the generalized Nash bargaining framework. Initially, models for individual [...] Read more.
To improve the regulatory capacity of distributed resources within the park and enhance the flexibility of market transactions, this paper introduces a distributed dispatch and profit allocation method grounded in cooperative game theory and the generalized Nash bargaining framework. Initially, models for individual park equipment are established. Subsequently, a distributed dispatch model is constructed, followed by the development of a profit allocation strategy based on contribution levels, using the generalized Nash bargaining method. The model is solved using the alternating direction method of multipliers. The results show that the proposed approach achieves fast convergence, optimizes resource sharing and mutual support within the park, lowers operational costs, ensures a fairer distribution of profits, and promotes increased cooperation among park entities. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section C: Energy Economics and Policy)
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22 pages, 1195 KiB  
Article
Optimized Profit Allocation Model for Service Alliance Transactions Considering Risk
by Wei Liu, Mengxing Huang and Wenlong Feng
Electronics 2024, 13(23), 4648; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234648 - 25 Nov 2024
Viewed by 920
Abstract
In service alliances, where multiple service providers collaborate to complete service transactions, the equitable allocation of profits based on their respective contributions and risk-bearing capacities is paramount. This paper introduces an optimized profit allocation game model that integrates risk considerations into the Nash [...] Read more.
In service alliances, where multiple service providers collaborate to complete service transactions, the equitable allocation of profits based on their respective contributions and risk-bearing capacities is paramount. This paper introduces an optimized profit allocation game model that integrates risk considerations into the Nash bargaining framework. Initially, the study established a service alliance transaction model that considered the interactions among multiple participants, providing a robust theoretical foundation for cooperation. Subsequently, the concept of marginal risk was introduced, and a unique calculation method based on the Shapley value was devised to quantify risk contributions. Finally, an improved Nash bargaining model was proposed, which introduced a risk adjustment factor, explicitly addressing the impact of each participant’s risk on profit allocation. Through computational cases and result analyses, this model demonstrated its ability to balance profit and risk and to optimize outcomes for all participants, and it validated the fairness and rationality of the proposed allocation method. Full article
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26 pages, 2544 KiB  
Article
Two-Stage, Three-Layer Stochastic Robust Model and Solution for Multi-Energy Access System Based on Hybrid Game Theory
by Guodong Wu, Xiaohu Li, Jianhui Wang, Ruixiao Zhang and Guangqing Bao
Processes 2024, 12(12), 2656; https://doi.org/10.3390/pr12122656 - 25 Nov 2024
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1194
Abstract
This paper proposes a two-stage, three-layer stochastic robust model and its solution method for a multi-energy access system (MEAS) considering different weather scenarios which are described through scenario probabilities and output uncertainties. In the first stage, based on the principle of the master–slave [...] Read more.
This paper proposes a two-stage, three-layer stochastic robust model and its solution method for a multi-energy access system (MEAS) considering different weather scenarios which are described through scenario probabilities and output uncertainties. In the first stage, based on the principle of the master–slave game, the master–slave relationship between the grid dispatch department (GDD) and the MEAS is constructed and the master–slave game transaction mechanism is analyzed. The GDD establishes a stochastic pricing model that takes into account the uncertainty of wind power scenario probabilities. In the second stage, considering the impacts of wind power and photovoltaic scenario probability uncertainties and output uncertainties, a max–max–min three-layer structured stochastic robust model for the MEAS is established and its cooperation model is constructed based on the Nash bargaining principle. A variable alternating iteration algorithm combining Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KKT) is proposed to solve the stochastic robust model of the MEAS. The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is used to solve the cooperation model of the MEAS and a particle swarm algorithm (PSO) is employed to solve the non-convex two-stage model. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed model and method is verified through case studies. Full article
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30 pages, 4747 KiB  
Article
Optimizing Forest Management: Balancing Environmental and Economic Goals Using Game Theory and Multi-Objective Approaches
by Neda Amiri and Soleiman Mohammadi Limaei
Forests 2024, 15(11), 2044; https://doi.org/10.3390/f15112044 - 19 Nov 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1450
Abstract
Forests are complex ecosystems that require integrated management to balance economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Conflicting objectives among stakeholders make optimal decision-making particularly challenging. This study seeks to balance the economic gains of forest harvesting with the goals of environmental conservation, with a [...] Read more.
Forests are complex ecosystems that require integrated management to balance economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Conflicting objectives among stakeholders make optimal decision-making particularly challenging. This study seeks to balance the economic gains of forest harvesting with the goals of environmental conservation, with a focus on the Shafarood forest in Northern Iran. We applied multi-objective optimization and game theory to maximize the net present value (NPV) of forest harvesting while enhancing carbon sequestration. The research utilized data on stumpage prices, harvesting costs, tree density, volume per ha, growth rates, interest rates, carbon sequestration, and labour costs. Applying the epsilon-constraint method, we derived Pareto optimal solutions for a bi-objective model, and game theory was applied to negotiate between economic and environmental stakeholders. In the fifth round of bargaining, a Nash equilibrium was achieved between the two players. At this equilibrium point, the economic player achieved NPV from forest harvesting of 9001.884 (IRR 10,000/ha) and amount of carbon sequestration of 159.9383 tons/ha. Meanwhile, the environmental player achieved NPV from forest harvesting of 7861.248 (IRR 10,000/ha), along with a carbon sequestration of 159.9731 tons/ha. Results indicate significant trade-offs but reveal potential gains for both economic and environmental goals. These findings provide a robust framework for sustainable forest management and offer practical tools to support informed decision-making for diverse stakeholders. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Optimization of Forestry and Forest Supply Chain)
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27 pages, 7784 KiB  
Article
Nash Bargaining-Based Coordinated Frequency-Constrained Dispatch for Distribution Networks and Microgrids
by Ziming Zhou, Zihao Wang, Yanan Zhang and Xiaoxue Wang
Energies 2024, 17(22), 5661; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225661 - 13 Nov 2024
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 888
Abstract
As the penetration of distributed renewable energy continues to increase in distribution networks, the traditional scheduling model that the inertia and primary frequency support of distribution networks are completely dependent on the transmission grid will place enormous regulatory pressure on the transmission grid [...] Read more.
As the penetration of distributed renewable energy continues to increase in distribution networks, the traditional scheduling model that the inertia and primary frequency support of distribution networks are completely dependent on the transmission grid will place enormous regulatory pressure on the transmission grid and hinder the active regulation capabilities of distribution networks. To address this issue, this paper proposes a coordinated optimization method for distribution networks and microgrid clusters considering frequency constraints. First, the confidence interval of disturbances was determined based on historical forecast deviation data. On this basis, a second-order cone programming model for distribution networks with embedded frequency security constraints was established. Then, microgrids performed economic dispatch considering the reserves requirement to provide inertia and primary frequency support, and a stochastic optimization model with conditional value-at-risk was built to address uncertainties. Finally, a cooperative game between the distribution network and microgrid clusters was established, determining the reserve capacity provided by each microgrid and the corresponding prices through Nash bargaining. The model was further transformed into two sub-problems, which were solved in a distributed manner using the ADMM algorithm. The effectiveness of the proposed method in enhancing the operational security and economic efficiency of the distribution networks is validated through simulation analysis. Full article
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33 pages, 3567 KiB  
Article
Supply Chain Coordination of New Energy Vehicles under a Novel Shareholding Strategy
by Zijia Liu and Guoliang Liu
Sustainability 2024, 16(18), 8046; https://doi.org/10.3390/su16188046 - 14 Sep 2024
Viewed by 1105
Abstract
As important methods of ecofriendly transportation, the supply chain coordination of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is an important issue in the field of sustainability. This study constructs a Stackelberg game composed of a power battery supplier and an NEV manufacturer. To better describe [...] Read more.
As important methods of ecofriendly transportation, the supply chain coordination of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is an important issue in the field of sustainability. This study constructs a Stackelberg game composed of a power battery supplier and an NEV manufacturer. To better describe the coordination relationship in the NEV supply chain, we introduce the Nash bargaining framework into the fairness concern preference utility function. Through a comprehensive discussion of shareholding ratios and external environment factors, we discover that the traditional shareholding strategy fails to coordinate the NEV supply chain effectively, as enterprises seek to avoid losing management control, which occurs when excessive shares are held by others. In this context, this study proposes a novel industry–university–research (IUR) shareholding strategy, which can more easily achieve supply chain coordination and improve social welfare. In particular, this study reveals the superiority of the novel strategy in eliminating the double-marginal effect caused by high fairness concern preference among NEV enterprises. Based on these facts, we provide enterprises with optimal strategies under different conditions and offer a government-optimal subsidy to maximize the social welfare function. Full article
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