Search Results (263)

Machine-to-machine and Internet of Things endpoints operate in physically accessible environments, motivating decapsulation-path hardening against an adversary with full code access. We present PQ-WB-KEM, a feasibility study that is, to our knowledge, the first systematic exploration of the table-based white-box design space for a NIST-standardized lattice key-encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM-768, FIPS 203); prior white-box post-quantum work targets hash-based SPHINCS+ and multivariate hidden field equations (HFE; 256 GB), while the only earlier lattice-based white-box is custom and non-standardized. Because the base multiply runs in the number-theoretic transform (NTT) domain, where the secret operand $\widehat{s}=\mathrm{NTT}\left(s\right)$ is full-range over ${\mathbb{Z}}_q$, coefficient smallness does not shrink the tables. We map the design space with two verified lookup-only constructions: a shared full multiply table (Construction A, a measured 22.16 MB base, 25.57 MB core) and per-component tables with the secret baked in (Construction B, 7.67 MB base, 11.08 MB core), with the base tables being about 11,600× (A) and 33,400× (B) smaller than the 2022 256 GB HFE white box. Three-share arithmetic masking drives the measured first-order differential computation analysis (DCA) correlation to near the noise floor (${\rho }_{\max }=0.011$, versus $0.85$ unmasked). The projected deployment overhead is ≈47×, anchored on the native-C protected primitive measured with its mask-generation random number generator (RNG) randomness included ($4.30\times$, times an ≈11× embedded cache factor); the RNG-excluded harness yields the $17\times$ lower bound. We delimit scope honestly: against the full white-box adversary this construction does not achieve key confidentiality because the base multiply forms the clear product coordinates $p_0,p_1$ before masking and these yield linear equations for the secret; every positive result holds only against strictly weaker adversaries, and the work maps the lattice white-box design space rather than delivering a fully white-box key-encapsulation mechanism. Full article

Integrated nutrient management reduces reliance on chemical fertilizers by combining organic and inorganic inputs. A field experiment was conducted under rainfed conditions in Hungary from 2022 to 2024 to evaluate organic, inorganic and biological fertilizers applied to the high-oleic sunflower hybrid ES Emeric. Seven treatments were compared, namely, an unfertilized control, potassium (K), combined organic and inorganic nitrogen (GOIM), effective microorganisms (EM-1), and the combinations K+GOIM, K+EM-1 and GOIM+EM-1. Seed oil, crude protein and moisture content were determined, together with the fatty acid profile of the oil. Growing season influenced every measured variable far more strongly than fertilization, and all treatment responses were expressed as year-by-treatment interactions. Mean oleic acid content was 69.9% in the dry season of 2022 and 85.3% in 2024, but only 28.9% in the cooler and wetter season of 2023, when linoleic acid reached 59.8%. In 2022, K and K+EM-1 gave the numerically highest oil contents, 48.7% and 48.0%, less than one percentage point above the control, while GOIM+EM-1, GOIM and K+GOIM gave significantly higher protein contents than the remaining treatments. In the same season, EM-1 and K+GOIM raised linoleic and alpha-linolenic acids and, therefore, total polyunsaturated fatty acids, whereas GOIM+EM-1 and K increased oleic acid and total monounsaturated fatty acids. Integrated fertilization can therefore be used to shift the balance between monounsaturated and polyunsaturated fatty acids in sunflower oil, but the size and direction of the shift are governed by the conditions of the growing season. Full article

Fingertrap is a network encryption and authentication protocol that extends the X3DH and Double Ratchet frameworks with three novel mechanisms inspired by the Chinese finger trap (zhĭ wăng): a friction ratchet that exponentially increases computational cost for each failed authentication attempt; a recursive annihilation protocol that irreversibly destroys all cryptographic state after a configurable failure threshold; and a commit-then-challenge handshake that requires a counterintuitive “inward” action for legitimate authentication. A bidirectional weave hash extends the Double Ratchet’s transcript binding to cover every message in both directions. Together, these mechanisms provide per-message forward secrecy, post-compromise security (self-healing), clock-free operation, and a self-destruct capability. The individual ingredients-client puzzles, key erasure, and ratcheting-each build on established lines of work; their combination into a single stateful protocol, in which failed authentication attempts cryptographically tighten the session state and ultimately destroy it, is not to our knowledge offered by deployed transport protocols such as TLS 1.3, Signal, or WireGuard. The design targets deployments in which interception or capture of a device implies endpoint compromise, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) telemetry links and body-worn sensors, where denial of exploitation requires guaranteed loss of past and future session material. We describe the full protocol, provide game-based security arguments under an explicit adversarial model, give analytic cost estimates for the friction mechanism, analyse the denial-of-service surface and a two-layer mitigation strategy, and specify a post-quantum extension using hybrid $\mathsf{X25519}\text{/}\mathsf{ML}\text{-}\mathsf{KEM}\text{-}\mathsf{768}$ ratcheting. Full article

This paper provides a narrative review on the role of artificial intelligence in cryptography, with a substantial focus on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and, where the distinction matters, on AES with 256-bit keys (AES-256), at the intersection of cryptanalysis, encrypted-traffic analysis, and post-quantum computing. Deep learning side-channel analysis has been evolving into a general-purpose attack tool; neural distinguishers have entered classical cryptanalysis; and encrypted-traffic analysis shows that payload confidentiality does not imply metadata privacy. We distinguish throughout between the security of the primitive, the security of a concrete implementation, and metadata privacy at the protocol level, since the results surveyed here bear on the latter two rather than on the first. AES-256 remains structurally robust, including against the Grover bound in an idealized quantum model, but should be deployed alongside hardened implementations, post-quantum key establishment such as ML-KEM, and protocol-level countermeasures, rather than treated as sufficient on its own. Full article

The standardised Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism uses coefficient compression, yet an abstract residue map has no unique Boolean cube spectrum until a binary representation, domain extension, and input measure are fixed. We analyse these maps under an explicit twelve-bit reduction-based lift. Exact interval character sums yield a general high-modulus theorem for quarter-threshold indicators and show that message decoding has a uniquely dominant high-bit parity. The argument also clarifies the connection among Walsh coefficients, affine approximation, Hamming distance, nonlinearity, agreement probability, and sign correlation. A vectorial extension exhaustively certifies every nonzero scalar component of the standardised compression widths by deterministic integer Walsh–Hadamard transforms. A representation comparison then separates full-cube coefficients from centred, distribution-dependent correlations and delineates how canonical, centred, Montgomery, Barrett, shared, or compiler-generated intermediates require distinct models. Reproduction scripts regenerate the complete certificates and the spectral-gap visualisation without sampling, random choices, physical traces, floating-point decisions in the core certificates, or network access. The results identify mathematically distinguished affine predictors for later implementation-specific validation; they do not establish measured leakage, attack success, or implementation resistance. Full article

With Q-day approaching, the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has begun, with governments across the US, UK and EU mandating migration to quantum-resistant standards. This paper benchmarks the three NIST-standardised PQC algorithms—FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)—across key generation, signing and verification operations, measuring both computational performance and energy consumption on a range of constrained IoT-class devices, from the 32-bit Raspberry Pi 1 and Zero to the 64-bit Raspberry Pi 4, as well as commodity laptop hardware. Using the FNIRSI FNB58 USB power meter and OpenSSL 3.5, results show that ML-KEM and ML-DSA achieve energy and speed efficiency comparable to classical elliptic-curve cryptography across all tested architectures. However, SLH-DSA signing is inadvisable on constrained hardware: energy costs for SLH-DSA signing on 32-bit devices were up to 243% higher than on equivalent 64-bit hardware, making it impractical for resource-limited IoT deployments. These findings have direct implications for IoT security practitioners planning PQC migration. Full article

The transition from post-quantum cryptographic standardization to operational deployment requires more than the selection of a quantum-resistant algorithm. It requires traceability from the mathematical assumptions of the primitive to implementation requirements, protocol composition, migration controls, and runtime governance. This paper develops a cross-layer assurance framework for deploying the NIST-standardized Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) within crypto-agile Zero Trust architectures. The paper presents a simplified algebraic model of the public-key encryption operations underlying ML-KEM, emphasizing quotient-ring arithmetic, module operations, controlled noise, and cancellation of the principal bilinear term. It then distinguishes this explanatory model from the complete mechanism specified in FIPS 203, including standardized sampling, encoding, compression, hashing, key derivation, ciphertext consistency checking through re-encryption and comparison, implicit rejection, and prescribed decapsulation behavior. The principal contribution is an assurance framework connecting three levels: algebraic assurance, implementation assurance, and cryptographic governance. A deployment architecture, threat model, crypto-agility lifecycle, and bounded AI-assisted monitoring model are presented to show how ML-KEM profiles can be inventoried, approved, negotiated, observed, migrated, rolled back, and audited without altering the underlying cryptographic guarantees. The resulting framework provides a technically grounded bridge between ML-KEM mathematics and practical post-quantum migration in Zero Trust systems. Full article

Outsourcing Internet-of-Things (IoT) data and computation to cloud and fog infrastructure exposes both the data and the access-control process to integrity, confidentiality, and privacy risks. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) provides fine-grained access control but, as deployed today, suffers from single-authority bottlenecks, expensive policy updates, weak auditability, and exposure to secret-key leakage, classical primitives are additionally threatened by future quantum adversaries. This paper does not propose a new cryptographic scheme. Instead, it contributes a conceptual reference architecture that systematizes how a set of existing, standardized primitives can be composed into a single access-control framework for IoT outsourcing, and it makes the resulting design precise enough to reason about. Concretely, we (i) define a system model and a threat model covering passive, active, colluding, bounded-leakage, and harvest-now-decrypt-later quantum adversaries; (ii) instantiate each layer with a named construction decentralized multi-authority ABE, attribute-based proxy re-encryption for policy updates, a bounded leakage resilient key model, ASCON lightweight AEAD, and ML-KEM/ML-DSA post-quantum primitives, together with a permissioned, on-chain digest/off-chain payload logging layer; (iii) specify the end-to-end data flow and module interfaces; and (iv) give a goal-by-goal security rationale and an analytical evaluation based only on standardized parameter sizes and asymptotic complexity. We are explicit about what is inherited from prior work, what remains to be proven for the composed system, and that a measured prototype evaluation remains future work. The intended value of this paper is to provide a clear, composable, and honestly scoped design that subsequent implementation studies can build upon. Full article

The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) underpins Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) by establishing secure associations and negotiating cryptographic keys. Its reliance on classical public-key primitives such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) renders it vulnerable to quantum attacks, as Shor’s algorithm can break these schemes once large-scale quantum computers become available. To address this challenge, we integrate post-quantum cryptography into IKEv2 using a hybrid key exchange combining ECDH over P-384 with the ML-KEM-768 parameter set of the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), following Request for Comments (RFC) 9370 and RFC 9242. We present a Fragmentation Boundary Model that identifies when post-quantum payloads approach or exceed the non-fragmenting IKE_SA_INIT payload budget across ML-KEM parameter sets, Internet Protocol (IP) versions, and effective path maximum transmission units (PMTUs). We implemented the hybrid design on a Texas Instruments TM4C1294 microcontroller running FreeRTOS and CycloneTCP, and measured its execution time, memory footprint, and network overhead. Across 150 successful handshakes per configuration, mean Security Association establishment time increased from 3390.4 to 3488.6 ms, an overhead of 98.2 ms (2.9%). Flash use increased by 8%, random-access memory (RAM) use by 5%, and total IKEv2 traffic size by 42%, while no IP fragmentation was observed under the evaluated Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) conditions. These findings establish the feasibility of the evaluated hybrid configuration on the TM4C1294 platform and provide a platform-specific baseline for further evaluation of quantum-resilient IPsec on embedded automotive architectures. Full article

Embedded Subscriber Identity Modules (eSIMs) enable consumer devices to install mobile subscriptions remotely under the GSMA SGP.22 standard for Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP). Because RSP sessions rely on classical elliptic-curve cryptography and eSIM profiles can remain active for 5 to 20 years, recorded provisioning traffic faces a concrete Harvest-Now–Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat. Upgrading the network transport to post-quantum Transport Layer Security (TLS) is often assumed to be sufficient. However, SGP.22 exchanges the keys that protect the profile across the local host-to-chip interface, beneath the transport layer. This paper presents a systematic post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration framework for consumer RSP. We model four configurations of the SGP.22 on-card key-agreement step and determine, under a quantum key-recovery adversary, which configurations resist HNDL and what resources they require. We combine symbolic verification in ProVerif with a device-grounded evaluation that pairs provisioning and memory observations from a sysmocom C2T research embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) with strict-instruction-set PQC measurements on an STM32 Nucleo-F446RE development board with an ARM Cortex-M4F core. Among the configurations studied, hybrid classical and post-quantum key exchange is the minimum configuration that resists HNDL, whereas a fully post-quantum configuration also protects authentication against signature forgery. Under the tested platform and resource assumptions, volatile Random Access Memory (RAM), rather than computation, is the binding deployment constraint. We therefore propose a capability-negotiation mechanism that would match a migration configuration to the memory advertised by each card. Full article

Image encryption schemes based on chaotic maps offer strong statistical properties but are vulnerable to quantum attacks, and their integration with post-quantum cryptography has not been sufficiently explored. This paper presents a post-quantum secure image encryption framework integrating ML-KEM (FIPS 203), standardized by NIST in 2024, with a two-dimensional Sinh-Logistic chaotic map, HKDF-SHA256 nonce-based key derivation, feedback diffusion, and a novel Seismic Wave Permutation (SWP). The scheme derives channel-specific encryption keys from ML-KEM shared secrets using random, channel-specific nonces via HKDF-SHA256, ensuring plaintext independence and avoiding metadata-based leakage. The proposed SWP effectively breaks spatial correlations by displacing pixels according to a chaotic SWP model. RGB images are processed with independent ML-KEM encapsulation and HKDF-derived key material per channel, enabling multi-channel encryption without cross-channel leakage. Experiments on 512 × 512 test images have demonstrated Shannon entropy exceeding 7.999 bits per pixel across all channels, NPCR of at least 99.59%, UACI between 33.41% and 33.53%, and near-zero pixel correlations, further validated across 14 standard SIPI test images. An IND-CPA game simulation using four independent distinguishers, including a learned classifier trained via chosen-plaintext oracle access, over 5000 rounds per image, showed a maximum adversary advantage of 0.0186, consistent with random prediction. ML-KEM encapsulation contributes between 3.9% (ML-KEM-512) and 8.0% (ML-KEM-1024) of total encryption latency at 512 × 512 resolution, remaining a minority cost across all security levels while keeping the total encryption time within a narrow 227–258 ms range. The proposed architecture bridges standardized post-quantum cryptography with chaos-based image security for privacy-preserving image transmission. Full article

The NIST standardisation process for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has nominated the CRYSTALS-Kyber Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme as the primary key establishment method. The algorithm was renamed as the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM). This work proposes an efficient design for ML-KEM on FPGA with built-in side-channel attack (SCA) protection. The design is based on combining two methodologies: the Residue Number System (RNS) arithmetic and the look-up tables implementation. At the arithmetic level in the number-theoretic transform (NTT) computation of the polynomial multiplication, the operations are spread across the RNS channels, and these computations are implemented using look-up tables. The use of look-up tables resulted in low-latency RNS implementation and higher performance. The proposed design, implemented on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA, shows higher performance with a reasonable increase in area, whilst the experimental TVLA results demonstrate the design’s SCA protection advantages. Full article

With the development of quantum computing, classical cryptosystems (RSA, ECDSA) that ensure the security of distributed ledgers face an existential threat. This paper examines protocols for protecting personal data (PD) in blockchain, taking into account the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” strategy. We propose and formalize a family of protocols designed for storing and exchanging personal data in blockchain systems. The article describes in detail approaches to software implementations of smart contracts for the Ethereum (using ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme) and Keccak-256) and Hyperledger Fabric 2.5 (integrating NIST post-quantum standards: ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism) and ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm)) platforms based on the developed protocols. For all developed protocols, a Threat Agent Model (TAM) is presented, threat scenarios are examined, and resilience to typical attack scenarios is demonstrated. A comparative analysis of computational efficiency and overhead is conducted. The results show that using lattice cryptography provides high performance, but the 50-fold increase in signature size makes direct implementation of PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) in Layer 1 public networks economically unfeasible. A hybrid model and the use of Layer 2 to ensure quantum resistance are proposed. Full article

Blockchain-based sensor networks rely on public-key cryptography for transaction verification, auditability, and data integrity. However, widely used public-key mechanisms are quantum-vulnerable in the presence of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), requiring sensor-to-blockchain transactions to address both post-quantum security and exposure control. This paper proposes a post-quantum sensor-to-blockchain transaction framework that minimizes CRQC-aware exposure while preserving low-cost auditability. It defines a transaction workflow that represents sensor data through hash-based commitments instead of storing raw measurements on-chain. The workflow combines Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)-based authentication, threshold-based authorization, Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)-protected relay communication, and an event-based smart contract (EBSC) for compact audit recording. A Quantum Exposure Score (QES) is introduced as a transaction-level metric to quantify CRQC-induced exposure across cryptographic, relay, key-lifecycle, migration-readiness, and authorization dimensions. The framework is evaluated using differential pulse voltammetry (DPV) electrochemical sensor data, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) communication, and a Ganache-based blockchain, with scalability runs of up to 10,000 sensor transactions and ablation baselines. Compared with full on-chain storage, EBSC reduces gas consumption by approximately 80%, while QES decreases from 100 in the classical open scenario to 4 in the full framework. These results demonstrate that the proposed design provides a practical path for post-quantum secure sensor-to-blockchain transactions. Full article

The effects of weather conditions on modified asphalt mixtures were investigated in this study. Acrylonitrile Styrene Acrylate (ASA) polymer was used as a modifier with concentrations of 3, 5, and 7%. The viscosity test was performed to determine the blending and compaction temperatures for the base and modified mixtures, while Field Emission Scanning Electron Microscopy (FE-SEM) was utilized to explore the dispersion of the polymer in the asphalt binder matrix. Moreover, mechanical tests were applied to observe the changes in the modified asphalt binders. The highest improvements were obtained for a 5% ASA concentration. The resilient modulus increased by 78%, while resistance to dynamic creep improved by 74% compared with the base asphalt mixture. The wheel tracking and moisture susceptibility results further illustrated that the modified asphalt mixtures were less susceptible to moisture than the base asphalt mixture. The aging index results showed that the modifier can mitigate the effects of weather conditions, and the 5% ASA showed the best performance among the mixtures. Full article