Game Theory and Industrial Organization

A special issue of Mathematics (ISSN 2227-7390). This special issue belongs to the section "Financial Mathematics".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 June 2024 | Viewed by 2235

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali ed Economiche, Sapienza Università di Roma, Piazzale Aldo Moro 5, 00185 Roma, Italy
Interests: microeconomics; game theory; public economics; industrial organization; development economics

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Guest Editor
Department of Organisation, Strategy and Entrepreneurship, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
Interests: oligopoly theory; antitrust; industrial organization; philosophy of (law and) economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Nobel Prize laureate Eric Maskin recently stated that [1]industrial organization and game theory together led a revolution in economics”, (2018, p. xi), given that “industrial organization (IO)—the study of how firms in a given market behave—was game theory’s first systematic application to economics, and the success of that application had much to do with giving game-theoretic ideas the prominent place they now have in the economics profession more generally.”  (2018, p. ix)

This Special Issue aims to collect original, high-quality applications of game-theoretic methods to the broad field of industrial economics. A non-exhaustive list of topics includes: collusion, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertical differentiation, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games, models with myopic, adaptive and farsighted players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning, network and information sharing games, et cetera. Emphasis will be put on some important and promising recent developments within the discipline, such as lattice theory and supermodular and aggregative games applied to address novel as well as more classic industrial organizational issues.

[1] Maskin, E. (2018) “Foreword”, pag ixxi in Corchon L. C. and Marini, M. A. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, Edward Elgar.

Prof. Dr. Marco A. Marini
Prof. Dr. Iwan Bos
Guest Editors

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Keywords

  • game theory
  • industrial organization
  • microeconomic analysis
  • mathematical economics
  • oligopoly theory
  • strategic decision making

Published Papers (1 paper)

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6 pages, 219 KiB  
Article
A Buyer-Based Measure of Seller Concentration
by Iwan Bos
Mathematics 2022, 10(14), 2474; https://doi.org/10.3390/math10142474 - 15 Jul 2022
Viewed by 1142
Abstract
In most markets, buyers differ in their ability or willingness to switch supplier. This note proposes a novel industry concentration measure that takes this heterogeneity into account. The index increases in the share of captive sales, coincides with the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index when none [...] Read more.
In most markets, buyers differ in their ability or willingness to switch supplier. This note proposes a novel industry concentration measure that takes this heterogeneity into account. The index increases in the share of captive sales, coincides with the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index when none of the buyers are captive, and takes the “pure monopoly” value of 1 when all are captive. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Industrial Organization)
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