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Games
Special Issues
Social Dilemmas and Other-Regarding Preferences
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Social Dilemmas and Other-Regarding Preferences

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (10 April 2021) | Viewed by 7776

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Giuseppe Attanasi

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Université Côte d'Azur, Nice, France
Interests: decision theory; game theory; experimental economics; environmental economics
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Prof. Dr. Pierpaolo Battigalli

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Università Bocconi, Dept. Decision Sciences and IGIER
Interests: game theory, microeconomic theory
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Dr. Elena Manzoni

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Università degli Studi di Verona, Verona, Italy
Interests: political economy; psychological game theory; gender and politics
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Social dilemmas are interactive situations in which behavior resulting from individual material payoff maximization is not socially optimal. Examples of social dilemmas include the prisoners' dilemma, trust games, and the public good games. While theoretical analysis of social dilemmas when agents are material payoff maximizers predicts the absence of cooperation, experiments show that a significant fraction of subjects cooperate, both in the lab and in the field.

Given such findings, and due to their simple structure, social dilemmas have been widely used in the literature to study—theoretically and/or experimentally—several types of social preferences, including distributional preferences such as inequity aversion or revealed altruism, and belief-dependent preferences such as guilt aversion, reciprocity, shame aversion, and other image concerns.

Games will publish a Special Issue which aims to gather theoretical and experimental work on social preferences in social dilemmas.

Relevant topics include (but are not limited to):

  • Distributional preferences;
  • Belief-dependent preferences;
  • Evolution of social preferences through repeated interaction social dilemmas;
  • Prisoners’ dilemma;
  • Trust games;
  • Public good games;
  • Social preferences.

Prof. Dr. Pierpaolo Battigalli
Prof. Dr. Giuseppe Attanasi
Dr. Elena Manzoni
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Social dilemmas
  • Prisoners' dilemma
  • Trust games
  • Public good games
  • Social preferences

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Further information on MDPI's Special Issue polices can be found here.

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

28 pages, 349 KiB  
Article
An Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting
by Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt, Katri K. Sieberg and Beth A. Freeborn
Games 2022, 13(2), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020026 - 30 Mar 2022
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2939
Abstract
In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a unanimity [...] Read more.
In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a unanimity rule than under majority rule. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that those unintuitive predictions also hold with sequential voting. In this paper, we report paired experiments with sequential and simultaneous voting under unanimity and majority rule. Observed behavior varies significantly depending on whether juries vote simultaneously or in sequence. We also find evidence that subjects use information inferred from prior votes in making their sequential voting decisions, but that information implied by being pivotal in simultaneous votes does not seem to be reliably processed. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Dilemmas and Other-Regarding Preferences)
19 pages, 8598 KiB  
Article
Repeated Interaction and Its Impact on Cooperation and Surplus Allocation—An Experimental Analysis
by Sibilla Di Guida, The Anh Han, Georg Kirchsteiger, Tom Lenaerts and Ioannis Zisis
Games 2021, 12(1), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010025 - 4 Mar 2021
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3940
Abstract
This paper investigates how the possibility of affecting group composition combined with the possibility of repeated interaction impacts cooperation within groups and surplus distribution. We developed and tested experimentally a Surplus Allocation Game where cooperation of four agents is needed to produce surplus, [...] Read more.
This paper investigates how the possibility of affecting group composition combined with the possibility of repeated interaction impacts cooperation within groups and surplus distribution. We developed and tested experimentally a Surplus Allocation Game where cooperation of four agents is needed to produce surplus, but only two have the power to allocate it among the group members. Three matching procedures (corresponding to three separate experimental treatments) were used to test the impact of the variables of interest. A total of 400 subjects participated in our research, which was computer-based and conducted in a laboratory. Our results show that allowing for repeated interaction with the same partners leads to a self-selection of agents into groups with different life spans, whose duration is correlated with the behavior of both distributors and receivers. While behavior at the group level is diverse for surplus allocation and amount of cooperation, aggregate behavior is instead similar when repeated interaction is allowed or not allowed. We developed a behavioral model that captures the dynamics observed in the experimental data and sheds light into the rationales that drive the agents’ individual behavior, suggesting that the most generous distributors are those acting for fear of rejection, not for true generosity, while the groups lasting the longest are those composed by this type of distributors and “undemanding” receivers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Dilemmas and Other-Regarding Preferences)
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