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Games
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Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American...
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Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind)

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 February 2014) | Viewed by 42425

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Wolfram Elsner

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Guest Editor
Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Wilhelm-Herbst-Strasse 5, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Interests: evolutionary and institutional economics; evolutionary game theory; complexity economics; history of economic thought; 'meso'-economics; sectoral and regional cooperation and networks; theory of economic policy
Dr. Torsten Heinrich

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Co-Guest Editor
Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Dr. Henning Schwardt

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Co-Guest Editor
Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany
Dr. Claudius Gräbner

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Co-Guest Editor
Structural Research and Policy Division, iino Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany

Special Issue Information

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Published Papers (5 papers)

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Editorial

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133 KiB  
Editorial
Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics
by Wolfram Elsner, Torsten Heinrich, Henning Schwardt and Claudius Gräbner
Games 2014, 5(3), 188-190; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5030188 - 4 Sep 2014
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5954
Abstract
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence [...] Read more.
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence Ayres. In their writings, direct interdependence, interactions (or transactions) among agents, with all beneficial and with all problematic consequences, took center stage in economic analysis. Why, for instance, do people adhere to a particular new fashion or trend? Because others do, after eminent people, wealthy people, the “leisure class” (T. Veblen), have made it a symbol for status. The new fashion, however, ceases to serve as such a symbol once too many people follow it. The constant effort put into following trends and adopting fashion turns out to be a social dilemma, driven by Veblenian instincts, such as invidious distinction in predatory societies, conspicuous consumption and emulation. [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))

Research

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10260 KiB  
Article
An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles
by Manuel Wäckerle, Bernhard Rengs and Wolfgang Radax
Games 2014, 5(3), 160-187; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5030160 - 18 Aug 2014
Cited by 11 | Viewed by 7888
Abstract
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show [...] Read more.
We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show how endogenized trust and exogenously given leader authority influences institutional change, i.e., diversity in institutional life-cycles. It turns out that these governed institutions (de)structure in cyclical patterns dependent on the overall evolution of trust in the artificial society, while at the same time, influencing this evolution by supporting social learning. Simulation results indicate three scenarios of institutional life-cycles. Institutions may, (1) build up very fast and freeze the artificial society in a stable but fearful pattern (ordered system); (2) exist only for a short time, leading to a very trusty society (highly fluctuating system); and (3) structure in cyclical patterns over time and support social learning due to cumulative causation of societal trust (complex system). Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))
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735 KiB  
Article
Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur
by Alexander J. Field
Games 2014, 5(1), 53-89; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5010053 - 25 Feb 2014
Cited by 9 | Viewed by 14768
Abstract
Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main [...] Read more.
Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))
538 KiB  
Article
Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results
by Tassos Patokos
Games 2014, 5(1), 1-25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5010001 - 30 Jan 2014
Viewed by 6224
Abstract
The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a [...] Read more.
The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and ‘satisficers’. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))
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355 KiB  
Article
Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment
by Jürgen Fleiß and Stefan Palan
Games 2013, 4(4), 584-607; https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040584 - 10 Oct 2013
Cited by 11 | Viewed by 6635
Abstract
We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. [...] Read more.
We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the allocator mechanism differs between two treatments. In the coordinator treatment, the randomly selected allocator can set a uniform contribution for all group members, including herself. In the dictator treatment, the allocator can choose different contributions for herself and all other group members. We find that subjects willingly submit to authority in both treatments, even when competing with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The allocator groups achieve high contribution levels in both treatments. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Institutional Economics (incl. Evolutionary Games and American Evolutionary Institutionalism of the Veblen-ian Kind))
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