Political Game Theory: Coalition Formation and Dynamic Aspects of Collective Decision Making

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (25 November 2022) | Viewed by 4456

Special Issue Editor


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Guest Editor
Department of Economics and Management, University of Luxembourg, 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi L-1359, Luxembourg
Interests: collective decision making; political economic theory; electoral accountability; legislative bargaining

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Understanding the connection between individuals’ preferences within groups of agents (such as legislatures, electorates, households, international organizations, etc.) and the collective decisions of those groups has become a fundamental research topic in economics and political science. There is a rapidly growing, but yet far from comprehensive, game-theoretical literature on the dynamic aspects of this relationship. Articles are invited that further explore the interaction between individual preferences, strategic incentives, and collective decisions induced by political institutions in dynamic collective decision-making problems. Contributing authors are invited to approach the topic from either a noncooperative strategic vantage point or a more cooperative game-theoretic perspective. Topics welcomed include but are not restricted to committees and cabinets, legislative bargaining, collective learning, dynamic stability, repeated elections, bureaucratic policy making, and coalition formation.

Prof. Dr. Vincent Anesi
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • voting
  • stability
  • coalitions
  • elections
  • collective decision making
  • legislative bargaining

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Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

17 pages, 842 KiB  
Article
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Mandar Oak
Games 2022, 13(4), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13040048 - 21 Jun 2022
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2870
Abstract
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of [...] Read more.
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be ‘disconnected’. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. In particular, we show that when the rents from office are low, the median citizen stands unopposed, and when rents are high, there is more political entry. For intermediate rents, we show that strategic dropouts can happen to influence the final policy. We show that the incentives for strategic dropout can be higher under proportional representation than plurality voting, contrary to Duverger’s law. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining. Full article
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