Special Issue "Industrial Organization: Theory and Experimental Evidence"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 10 October 2022 | Viewed by 436

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Todd R. Kaplan
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
1. Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
2. Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
Interests: microeconomic theory; auctions; innovation contests; cooperation
Dr. Miguel A. Fonseca
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
Interests: experimental economics; communication; cartels; collusion

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

To study industrial organization is to study one of the core elements of economics: markets. In turn, game theory has established itself as the language of contemporary industrial organization. Over the last 40 years, we have witnessed an explosion of theoretical research that has established the game-theoretic foundations for firm behavior.

More recently, experimental methods have been used by economists to test the predictions of these models. Starting with tests of equilibrium concepts, the attention of experimental work expanded to testing assumptions concerning players’ preferences and bounded rationality. Out of the behavioral economics revolution, a new wave of theoretical models emerged that incorporate boundedly rational consumers and firms.

This Special Issue welcomes the submission of papers on theoretical or experimental industrial organization. Papers may focus on any topic within industrial organization, such as interfirm competition (price, quantity or nonprice competition); cartel formation; two-sided platforms; innovation; and R&D races, to highlight but a few. We also welcome papers that address issues pertaining to consumer behavior, such as information asymmetries, search costs and price dispersion, among others. Finally, we welcome papers on behavioral industrial organization that address the effect of boundedly rational consumers on market outcomes.

Prof. Dr. Todd R. Kaplan
Dr. Miguel A. Fonseca
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • cartels
  • competition
  • two-sided markets
  • collusion
  • price discrimination
  • innovation
  • behavioral industrial organization

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

Article
Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs
Games 2022, 13(5), 62; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13050062 - 19 Sep 2022
Viewed by 242
Abstract
We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of [...] Read more.
We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Industrial Organization: Theory and Experimental Evidence)
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