Social and Economic Networks

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 June 2021) | Viewed by 11938

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
College of Business and Analytics, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, USA
Interests: microeconomics; game theory; law and economics

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Guest Editor
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
Interests: network economics; market design; learning in games

Special Issue Information

Dear colleagues,

The study of network structure and its applications as well as the study of how networks form and change over time is important to understanding various human behaviors and economic outcomes. Social and economic networks play a vital role in many economic activities such as transmitting information and news, coordinating behavior, transferring financial assets, and the trading of various goods and services. This Special Issue of Games will gather research regarding network applications as well as theoretical network research such as on network formation. Relevant topics include but are not limited to:

  • Production networks;
  • Trade networks;
  • Financial networks;
  • Labor networks;
  • Social networks;
  • Information learning and networks;
  • Models of network formation;
  • Games played on networks.

Prof. Alison Watts
Prof. Dr. Randall A Berry
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • social networks
  • economic networks
  • information learning
  • network formation
  • endogenous networks
  • network games

Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

34 pages, 527 KiB  
Article
Mechanism Design for Demand Management in Energy Communities
by Xupeng Wei and Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Games 2021, 12(3), 61; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030061 - 31 Jul 2021
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2446
Abstract
We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of [...] Read more.
We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of energy as well as a separate price for peak demand. Since users’ utilities are their private information, which they may not be willing to share, a mediator, known as the planner, is introduced to help optimize the overall satisfaction of the community (total utility minus total payments) by mechanism design. A mechanism consists of a message space, a tax/subsidy, and an allocation function for each user. Each user reports a message chosen from her own message space, then receives some amount of energy determined by the allocation function, and pays the tax specified by the tax function. A desirable mechanism induces a game, the Nash equilibria (NE), of which results in an allocation that coincides with the optimal allocation for the community. As a starting point, we design a mechanism for the energy community with desirable properties such as full implementation, strong budget balance and individual rationality for both users and the planner. We then modify this baseline mechanism for communities where message exchanges are allowed only within neighborhoods, and consequently, the tax/subsidy and allocation functions of each user are only determined by the messages from their neighbors. All of the desirable properties of the baseline mechanism are preserved in the distributed mechanism. Finally, we present a learning algorithm for the baseline mechanism, based on projected gradient descent, that is guaranteed to converge to the NE of the induced game. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social and Economic Networks)
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11 pages, 262 KiB  
Article
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Advertising Mechanisms
by Alison Watts
Games 2021, 12(2), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020036 - 15 Apr 2021
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2558
Abstract
Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive different [...] Read more.
Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive different payoffs. Results show that such ascending bid auctions may result in unfair treatment and additionally that uncertainty regarding an ad’s value can result in inefficiency. An alternative way to assign ads to consumers is presented called the random assignment mechanism. Results show that the random assignment can improve fairness while improving efficiency in some circumstances. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social and Economic Networks)
29 pages, 1149 KiB  
Article
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics
by Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Games 2020, 11(4), 65; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040065 - 17 Dec 2020
Cited by 18 | Viewed by 4143
Abstract
The paper presents a survey on selected models of opinion dynamics. Both discrete (more precisely, binary) opinion models as well as continuous opinion models are discussed. We focus on frameworks that assume non-Bayesian updating of opinions. In the survey, a special attention is [...] Read more.
The paper presents a survey on selected models of opinion dynamics. Both discrete (more precisely, binary) opinion models as well as continuous opinion models are discussed. We focus on frameworks that assume non-Bayesian updating of opinions. In the survey, a special attention is paid to modeling nonconformity (in particular, anticonformity) behavior. For the case of opinions represented by a binary variable, we recall the threshold model, the voter and q-voter models, the majority rule model, and the aggregation framework. For the case of continuous opinions, we present the DeGroot model and some of its variations, time-varying models, and bounded confidence models. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social and Economic Networks)
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10 pages, 248 KiB  
Article
A Note on Connectivity and Stability in Dynamic Network Formation
by Tackseung Jun and Jeong-Yoo Kim
Games 2020, 11(4), 49; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040049 - 29 Oct 2020
Viewed by 1825
Abstract
We consider the dynamic network formation problem under the requirement that the whole network be connected and remain connected after q nodes are destroyed. We propose the concept of dynamic Cq-stability and characterize dynamic Cq-stable networks for any [...] Read more.
We consider the dynamic network formation problem under the requirement that the whole network be connected and remain connected after q nodes are destroyed. We propose the concept of dynamic Cq-stability and characterize dynamic Cq-stable networks for any q0. Comparison with the outcome in the static model is also discussed. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social and Economic Networks)
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