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Axioms
Special Issues
Strategic Decision Models and Applications
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Strategic Decision Models and Applications

A special issue of Axioms (ISSN 2075-1680).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 June 2022) | Viewed by 12666

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Ana Meca

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Center of Operations Research and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Information Technology, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Avda. de la Universidad s/n, Alicante, 03202 Elche, Spain
Interests: game theory; strategic behavior in machine learning; models of cooperation in operational research; cost sharing problems; game-theoretic network centrality; decision analysis; mathematical programming and optimization; optimization methods
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Dr. Carlos Gutierrez-Hita

E-Mail Website
Co-Guest Editor
Economic and Financial Studies, Miguel Hernández University of Elche, Elche, Spain
Interests: industrial organization; energy economics; energy markets
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Strategic decision models study situations of competition and cooperation by using mathematical methods where several agents are involved. This discipline has many applications, including strategic behavior in conflicts, the study of economic competition, socioeconomic problems of fair distribution, and behavior of agents in networks.

We are pleased to invite you to contribute, with some of your most recent research, to this Special Issue, “Strategic Decision Models and Applications”.

This Special Issue aims to put forward relevant experimental and theoretical results in different research areas where strategic interaction between agents can be modeled by using mathematical models for decision making. This may include questions and applications of strategic behavior, mathematical programming, and game theory. We also encourage the submission of articles dealing with technological change, market structure, productivity analysis, and decision processes, among others. It is our pleasure to include a diversity of perspectives and research styles in order to enhance scientific interaction.

In this Special Issue, original research articles and reviews are welcome. Research areas may include (but are not limited to) the following topics:

  • Strategic behavior;
  • Cooperative models;
  • Cost-sharing problems;
  • Game-theoretic network centrality;
  • Decision-making procedures and their applications;
  • Environmental sustainability and general equilibrium models.

We look forward to receiving your contribution.

Prof. Dr. Ana Meca

Prof. Dr. Carlos Gutierrez-Hita
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Axioms is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 2400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Strategic behavior
  • Cooperation in operational research
  • Cost-sharing models
  • Game-theoretic network centrality
  • Anticompetitive practices
  • Social choice
  • Decision-making procedures
  • Optimization methods and applications

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Further information on MDPI's Special Issue polices can be found here.

Published Papers (5 papers)

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21 pages, 366 KiB  
Article
Strong Players and Stable Coalition Structures in PMAS Profit Game
by Ana Meca and Greys Sošić
Axioms 2022, 11(11), 635; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms11110635 - 10 Nov 2022
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2687
Abstract
In a non-negative profit game that possesses a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme (PMAS), being a member of a larger coalition implies that your profit cannot decrease. In this paper, we refer to such games as PMAS profit games. As population monotonicity is a [...] Read more.
In a non-negative profit game that possesses a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme (PMAS), being a member of a larger coalition implies that your profit cannot decrease. In this paper, we refer to such games as PMAS profit games. As population monotonicity is a nice and desirable property that encourages formation of larger coalitions and implies stability of the grand coalition, we explore if this special feature of PMAS games can help in identifying additional stable coalition structures under different stability concepts in cooperative games—namely, core partitions, the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable set, the largest consistent set, and the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF)—and in developing relationships between coalition structures that are stable under these different stability concepts. We first define two special classes of players for PMAS profit games—extreme and strong players—and use them to develop an algorithm for construction of stable (core) partitions. We also use extreme players to identify absorbing states for equilibrium processes of coalition formation with high level of farsightedness. We then explore the impact of population monotonicity on the relationship between stable coalition structures under abovementioned stability concepts. While we are able to obtain some results related to stability of the grand coalition and to establish relationships between stable coalition structures under different stability notions that are consistent with the existing body of knowledge, population monotonicity in general does not add enough for strengthening of the existing results. However, we are able to show a couple of more general result that hold for arbitrary cooperative TU profit games. That is, we show that the members of vNM farsighted stable sets are core partitions, and that core partitions are members of a vNM stable sets. Moreover, we show that the members of vNM farsighted stable sets are EPCF-stable partitions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategic Decision Models and Applications)
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15 pages, 801 KiB  
Article
Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation Games
by Nikolaos Georgantzis, Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita and Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano
Axioms 2022, 11(8), 397; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms11080397 - 11 Aug 2022
Viewed by 1471
Abstract
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type of bargaining followed and its correspondence with [...] Read more.
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type of bargaining followed and its correspondence with cooperative game theory concepts. Explicit coalitions were rather scarce (17%), although coalition stability was implied by 47.8% of the agreements. Efficiency was achieved in the vast majority (82%) of cases, whereas in 34.8% of the agreements, students used a lexicographic ordering of multiple solutions before choosing among them. Regarding the bargaining procedure, in 40% of the agreements, quantities traded were decided before profit sharing rules were negotiated, whereas in 16% of the cases they were simultaneously agreed upon. Our findings suggest that bargaining procedures often do not imply explicit coalitions. Moreover, efficiency can be achieved even in the absence of bargaining processes. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategic Decision Models and Applications)
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17 pages, 1572 KiB  
Article
Multi-Layered Blockchain Governance Game
by Song-Kyoo (Amang) Kim
Axioms 2022, 11(1), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms11010027 - 9 Jan 2022
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2760
Abstract
The research designs a new integrated system for the security enhancement of a decentralized network by preventing damages from attackers, particularly for the 51 percent attack. The concept of multiple layered design based on Blockchain Governance Games frameworks could handle multiple number of [...] Read more.
The research designs a new integrated system for the security enhancement of a decentralized network by preventing damages from attackers, particularly for the 51 percent attack. The concept of multiple layered design based on Blockchain Governance Games frameworks could handle multiple number of networks analytically. The Multi-Layered Blockchain Governance Game is an innovative analytical model to find the best strategies for executing a safety operation to protect whole multiple layered network systems from attackers. This research fully analyzes a complex network with the compact mathematical forms and theoretically tractable results for predicting the moment of a safety operation execution are fully obtained. Additionally, simulation results are demonstrated to obtain the optimal values of configuring parameters of a blockchain-based security network. The Matlab codes for the simulations are publicly available to help those whom are constructing an enhanced decentralized security network architecture through this proposed integrated theoretical framework. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategic Decision Models and Applications)
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18 pages, 823 KiB  
Article
Effective Decision Making: Data Envelopment Analysis for Efficiency Evaluation in the Cloud Computing Marketplaces
by Chia-Nan Wang, Minh-Nhat Nguyen, Thi-Duong Nguyen, Hsien-Pin Hsu and Thi-Hai-Yen Nguyen
Axioms 2021, 10(4), 309; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms10040309 - 18 Nov 2021
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 2696
Abstract
Assessing business performance is a critical issue for practicing managers, and business performance has always been of interest to managers and researchers. In recent years, the world has experienced a rapid growth in the cloud computing service sector thanks to its benefits to [...] Read more.
Assessing business performance is a critical issue for practicing managers, and business performance has always been of interest to managers and researchers. In recent years, the world has experienced a rapid growth in the cloud computing service sector thanks to its benefits to business organizations and economic development. Therefore, the performance efficiency of this sector has been concerned as one of the keys in today’s economic environment. This study aimed to assess the performance efficiency of cloud computing service providers in the United States of America, one of the biggest global markets in terms of cloud computing, by applying the data envelopment analysis models. The efficiency of cloud computing providers was evaluated based on the assumption of the non-cooperative game among cloud computing providers in which providers selfishly choose the best strategy to maximize their payoff with three stages. In the first stage, the performance of these providers over the past period was measured by a super slack-based measure. In the second stage, the performance in the future period was predicted by the new data envelopment analysis model: the past–present–future model based on resampling. In the last stage, the efficiency improvement was investigated by adopting the Malmquist productivity index. The findings of this study indicated that the percentage of inefficient providers would increase from 10% in the period from 2017 to 2020 to 20% for 2021 and 2024. Moreover, 30% of providers showed a regress in performance efficiency over the research period of 2017 to 2024. The results of this study provide an insight picture to the decision-makers, and this research will fill the gap in the literature as the first study that measures and predicts the performance efficiency of cloud computing service providers, which will provide a helpful reference for future studies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategic Decision Models and Applications)
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14 pages, 781 KiB  
Article
Axiomatic Characterizations of a Proportional Influence Measure for Sequential Projects with Imperfect Reliability
by Andries van Beek, Peter Borm and Marieke Quant
Axioms 2021, 10(4), 247; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms10040247 - 30 Sep 2021
Viewed by 1344
Abstract
We define and axiomatically characterize a new proportional influence measure for sequential projects with imperfect reliability. We consider a model in which a finite set of players aims to complete a project, consisting of a finite number of tasks, which can only be [...] Read more.
We define and axiomatically characterize a new proportional influence measure for sequential projects with imperfect reliability. We consider a model in which a finite set of players aims to complete a project, consisting of a finite number of tasks, which can only be carried out by certain specific players. Moreover, we assume the players to be imperfectly reliable, i.e., players are not guaranteed to carry out a task successfully. To determine which players are most important for the completion of a project, we use a proportional influence measure. This paper provides two characterizations of this influence measure. The most prominent property in the first characterization is task decomposability. This property describes the relationship between the influence measure of a project and the measures of influence one would obtain if one divides the tasks of the project over multiple independent smaller projects. Invariance under replacement is the most prominent property of the second characterization. If, in a certain task group, a specific player is replaced by a new player who was not in the original player set, this property states that this should have no effect on the allocated measure of influence of any other original player. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Strategic Decision Models and Applications)
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