Navigating the Indus Waters Treaty and Peacebuilding: The Growing Case of Strategic Militarization in Pakistan’s Indus Basin Region

Abstract

Scholars and policymakers have recognized that collaborating on transboundary water resources is a significant way to promote peace and stability in conflict-prone areas. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 between India and Pakistan remains one of the few enduring agreements on water management between the two countries. It has persisted through numerous wars and periods of political hostility. However, the treaty’s resilience and relevance are increasingly challenged by growing water shortages, changing weather patterns, and varying development plans. Besides these challenges, the militarization of Pakistan’s Indus Basin region also exemplifies significant resource challenges in South Asia. This paper examines the IWT both as a growing case of militarization in Pakistan’s Indus Basin Region and as a potential source of the broader environmental peacebuilding framework. Using a qualitative and conceptualization of the issue based on an environmental peacebuilding framework, the paper concludes that strengthening the IWT requires collaborative environmental peacebuilding strategies to transform the Indus Basin from a zone of militarization into a foundation for sustainable water peace and regional water security stability in South Asia.

1. Introduction

South Asia is a region marked by historical complexities, geopolitical tensions, and resource-based economic challenges. The roots of many of these challenges can be traced back to the colonial past, where resource extraction served as a primary mechanism for wealth transfer to imperial powers. The partition of British India in 1947 exacerbated these resource-related conflicts by disrupting established patterns of resource distribution. Rivers, forests, and mineral-rich territories were divided along newly drawn borders, particularly affecting India and Pakistan. The division of the Indus River system (IRS) epitomized these challenges, creating tensions that culminated in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) 1960 (United Nations, 1960). While the treaty was a diplomatic achievement, its limitations highlight the enduring struggle to manage shared resources in a region grappling with the rising population and the effects of climate change.

These resource disputes are intricately linked to South Asia’s broader geopolitical landscape, which is shaped by historical animosities, strategic alliances, and regional competition. The India–Pakistan conflict, for instance, represents the intersection of ideological differences and resource disputes, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. This water-rich region holds strategic geopolitical importance for both countries, as its rivers flow into Pakistan (Michel, 2025). India’s making of hydroelectric projects on rivers such as the Chenab and Jhelum has been criticised by Pakistan as violations of the IWT, further intensifying geopolitical tensions and underscoring the centrality of resources in regional conflicts (Mahla, 2025b).

At the core of these geopolitical dynamics lies the issue of resource economics and environmental peacebuilding (EP), which examines the allocation and sustainable utilization of natural resources (Bruch et al., 2016). South Asia is endowed with significant resources such as water and fertile agricultural land, but their management often fuels rather than mitigating conflict (Rasul, 2014). The challenges of resource management are further multiplied by the perpetual impacts of climate change. Glacial melting in the Himalayas threatens the water supply for millions, amplifying the risks of resource scarcity. The perpetual loss of the Himalayan glaciers is the cause of major flooding and drainage issues, particularly in the basin’s lower reaches. For instance, “the unprecedented floods in Pakistan in 2022 are a major example of the severe impact of climate change. Pakistan ranks among the top 10 countries worldwide most affected by climate change” (Eckstein et al., 2021). These environmental changes not only intensify existing conflicts but also introduce new economic and security challenges, necessitating adaptive EP policies that integrate resource conservation with development needs.

Besides climate change, resource conflicts in South Asia extend to the militarization of waterways, highlighting the strategic importance of hydro resources. The region’s dependence on rivers and its geopolitical rivalries make control over these waters a critical focus. In the context of the India–Pakistan conflict, rivers have become militarized zones, with control over water resources linked to national security. Peter Gleick introduced the concept of “water wars,” emphasizing that rivers in water-scarce regions can become flashpoints for conflict (Gleick, 1993). The IRS, vital to both India and Pakistan, exemplifies how hydro resources are intertwined with broader geopolitical and security concerns.

Consequently, South Asia’s resource conflicts are deeply rooted in its historical, geopolitical, and economic complexities. The militarization of Pakistan’s Indus Basin region is among the significant geopolitical complexities and is the centerpiece explanation of this paper. However, these very complexities also highlight opportunities for cooperation. It is vital to explore these complexities to assess the need for a multifaceted EP approach that integrates collaborative governance mechanisms, equitable resource distribution, and sustainable development policies to transform South Asia’s abundant resources into a foundation for stability and prosperity.

To navigate the case of EP in the IWT context, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the methodological framework; Section 3 presents the triangular analysis of hydro resources and security through the EP approach; Section 4 discusses the findings; and Section 5 offers concluding reflections and policy implications.

2. Materials and Methods

To examine the IWT both as a growing case of militarization in Pakistan’s Indus Basin Region and as a potential source of the broader EP, I adopted a theoretical framework of EP and resource economics to discuss the IWT that requires collaborative EP strategies to transform the Indus Basin from a zone of militarization into a foundation for sustainable peace and regional stability in South Asia.

2.1. Methodology, Data Collection, and Analysis

This study adopted a qualitative methodological approach based on the analysis of policy documents, historical treaties, and secondary data to provide a comprehensive sense of the militarization of Pakistan’s Indus Basin region. Policy documents include state government reports, treaty documents (Indus Waters Treaty), Pakistan military cantonments documents and hydro infrastructure statistics. When examining observable trends through secondary data, it is useful to have a deeper analysis of the case of the militarization of the waterways to assess the geopolitical challenges caused by the militarization in the region, especially Pakistan’s Indus Basin region. For the proper representation of data, ArcGIS Pro 3.6 software (Esri, Redlands, CA, USA) was used to represent the military presence near the major hydropower infrastructure.

By conceptualizing an EP and resource economic framework, this study navigates how the militarization of waterways influences the India–Pakistan hydro-relations. In this context, a case study of the Indus Waters Treaty was used as a priori knowledge to get a holistic overview of the militarization in Pakistan’s Indus Basin region. Moreover, an EP framework was used to frame directions for policy recommendations aimed at the mitigation of militarization in the Indus Basin region.

2.2. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960

Water is a versatile substance that can be harnessed for a variety of purposes, but its potential for creating negative consequences at both domestic and international levels is high. The economic outlook of a nation can be seriously impacted by water-related issues, thereby compromising its global standing. Consequently, the primary question is how to effectively manage water within the intricate web of political, economic, and social considerations. Historically, water has been a source of contention, leading to conflicts at provincial, state, and international levels. For instance, the Indus waters dispute was resolved through a comprehensive treaty that contained detailed technical provisions, resulting in substantial benefits for both nations (Gulhati, 1973).

The IWT, facilitated by the World Bank, is a water-sharing agreement that regulates the utilization of the Indus River and its tributaries by both nations. The treaty establishes a framework for collaboration and dispute resolution between the two countries. By the treaty’s terms, India exercises control over the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) while Pakistan has authority over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). The objective of the treaty is to ensure a fair allocation of water resources while preserving both countries’ rights to use the IRS’s waters for their respective territories.

The negotiations towards the treaty began in May 1959, and after 15 months of meetings in London and Washington, the IWT was signed on 19 September 1960 (see Figure 1). The Treaty consists of an introductory statement, twelve provisions, and eight technical appendices (A to H).

2.3. Study Area: Pakistan’s Indus Basin Region

The Indus Basin encompasses an area of 1,165,500 square kilometers across China (Tibet), India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Figure 2). The Himalayas demarcate the eastern boundary of the basin, while the northern border is defined by the Karakoram and Haramosh ranges. The western boundary is marked by the Sulaiman and Kirthar ranges, while the southern border is formed by the Arabian Sea. The basin is home to six primary rivers, including the Indus, Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Beas, and Satluj.

Pakistan’s eastern front (Indus Basin region) holds a significant place within South Asia. It shares a large border with India, making it one of the longest land borders in the world. It holds immense geopolitical importance due to its strategic location and rivalry with India, particularly issues related to water resources. The ongoing rivalry between Pakistan and India has been a defining feature of the eastern front’s geopolitical landscape (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2010, 2011, 2013). The two nations have a history of territorial disputes, military conflicts, and deep-rooted animosities, including the contentious issue of POJK (Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir) (see

Table 1. History of India–Pakistan Conflicts.

Conflict Periodization	Major Conflicts/Crises
October 1947	First Kashmir War begins
August 1965	Second Kashmir War begins
December 1971	Indo-Pakistani War 1971
July 1989	Kashmir Insurgency begins
May 1999	Kargil War begins
2001–2008	December 2001: Indian Parliament Attack February 2007: Shamjhauta Express Bombings November 2008: Mumbai Terrorist Attack
2019	February 2019: Pulwama Attack August 2019: Abrogation of Article 370
2025	22 April 2025: Pahalgam Terrorist Attack 23 April 2025: Abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty 7 May 2025: India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’

Source: (Pokraka & Rostker, 2025).

).

Besides the interplay of issues, the region grapples with the complexities of managing shared rivers. Amidst the diverse cultural and political milieu, the issue of water resources is a critical geopolitical factor between India and Pakistan that an EP framework can help us understand.

3. Understanding Environmental Peacebuilding Framework

Environmental peacebuilding has been a long-discussed concept. Several perspectives have been given on this approach, which ultimately broaden its conceptual scope (Dresse et al., 2019). First, peacebuilding structures and formalizes engagement among interdependent states and non-state actors to support nonviolent conflict resolution and transformation (Galtung, 1996). Second, transformative peacebuilding takes place before and after peace accords or agreements. It focuses on building relationships and infrastructure to achieve long-lasting reconciliation at all levels of leadership, from the top down to the grassroots (Lederach, 1997). Third, post-conflict peacebuilding is more time-limited (about the first two years after the end of the conflict) and focuses on building states, security, and political processes to bring about stability and ‘peace dividends’. States and humanitarian/development agencies are the main players (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Fourth, environmental peacemaking can commence at any moment; it depends on reciprocal benefits and institutional transformation to foster fair resource allocation and enhanced transnational relations among both state and non-state entities (Conca & Dabelko, 2002). Fifth, hybrid peacebuilding emphasizes the existence and response of local agency to external interventions via regular interactions, empathy, and resistance, resulting in hybrid governance that aligns with local norms amidst international–local disparities (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Lastly, EP occurs during low-intensity conflict periods, employing technical cooperation, shared spaces, and joint management to mitigate scarcity, promote dialogue, and facilitate sustainable development while involving policymakers (Maas et al., 2013).

Amid all these perspectives, it is clear that EP has no particular set of defined criteria. Therefore, in the paper, the idea behind adopting an EP framework is to understand the interdependent relationship between water peace, water security and sustainable management, which helps us navigate hydro resource competition (particularly militarization) and how environmental cooperation takes place between India and Pakistan to sustain water peace and security (Figure 3). It states that sustainable water management can help alleviate tensions over hydro resource competition and security by ensuring they are fairly distributed, providing incentives for people to use them wisely, and managing them effectively. It helps people in conflict trust each other by getting them to work together on shared ecosystems, like transboundary rivers. This analysis showcases that long-term water peace depends on the efforts made towards integrating EP into policy frameworks.

The intricate relationship between natural resources and security has long been a focal point of academic and policy discussions. In regions like South Asia, where resource abundance and scarcity coexist, these dynamics are further intensified. Natural resources, such as water, are the backbone of economic stability and national development. These resources often become strategic assets, critical for energy security, food security, and industrial growth. For instance, countries like India and Pakistan prioritize securing water from shared river systems to sustain agricultural productivity and hydropower generation. This interdependence links resource stability directly to national security and underscores the potential for conflict in resource-scarce regions.

Building on the link between resources and national security, environmental factors such as degradation, overexploitation, and climate change further amplify tensions. Research describes environmental scarcity as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates existing grievances and fuels disputes (Homer-Dixon, 1994). In South Asia, the uneven distribution of vital resources, such as water and energy, often triggers interstate tensions. The Indus River system and the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna basin exemplify transboundary resources that necessitate cooperative management but often spark geopolitical rivalries.

Control over these critical resources enhances a nation’s geopolitical influence, creating a direct connection between resource competition and strategic dominance. In this context, waterways serve as crucial conduits for resource distribution and national security. Rivers like the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra are lifelines for irrigation, drinking water, and energy production in South Asia. However, their transboundary nature often leads to disputes over water allocation. The IWT, while successful in preventing direct conflict, has faced challenges due to hydroelectric dam projects and rising water demands. These challenges underline the need for cooperative frameworks to ensure equitable resource sharing.

Understanding the nexus between resources and security requires a multidisciplinary approach that integrates insights from geopolitics, resource economics, and security studies. Geopolitics examines how geography influences power dynamics, revealing how resource-rich regions like Kashmir become hotspots for geopolitical competition. Hydropolitics between India and Pakistan is a clear example of how infrastructure investments reshape regional alliances and power equations. Resource economics, meanwhile, focuses on the sustainable management of natural resources. South Asia’s reliance on water for energy production, for instance, has significant implications for both economic growth and environmental sustainability. Cooperative agreements are vital for optimizing shared resources like transboundary rivers. However, political tensions often undermine such cooperation, as seen in the prolonged disputes over the Indus Waters Treaty.

Security studies further illuminate how resource conflicts affect regional stability (Klare, 2002). Militarization of resources, such as dam construction and armed forces involvement in water management, reflects the securitization of resource management. In South Asia, this approach often prioritizes national interests over regional collaboration, escalating tensions. For instance, Pakistan’s military deployments in the Indus Basin region underscore how resource security drives military strategies. To contextualize these challenges, the Indus Waters Treaty offers a valuable case study. While it remains a landmark example of resource sharing in a conflict-prone region, its limitations in addressing militarization in Pakistan’s Indus Basin region reveal the need for an EP approach. Strengthening such an approach is crucial for fostering long-term stability.

An EP is the process of governing and managing natural resources and the environment to support durable peace (Bruch et al., 2021). While the field of an EP emerged in several distinct stages, the field transitioned from a focus on conflict causation to an emphasis on peace opportunities. In particular, this work emphasizes that environmental and development projects must account for the conflict context to avoid generating or renewing conflicts (Krampe et al., 2021; Bruch et al., 2021; Ide et al., 2021). The fact that the Pakistan’s Indus Basin region is currently described as a growing “zone of militarization” implies that the existing cooperative structure (the IWT) is insufficient to achieve ‘sustainable peace and regional stability’. This echoes the finding that even a well-functioning environmental governance institution, like the Permanent Indus Commission, was not immensely used by decision-makers to communicate in the face of a growing militarization of the Indus Basin. Therefore, the approach seeks to enhance cooperation beyond mere conflict prevention toward EP.

4. Results and Discussion

The geopolitical landscape in South Asia is a dynamic and intricate tapestry shaped by historical legacies, regional rivalries, and global power politics. As the world undergoes rapid transformations, South Asia stands at a crossroads, grappling with a myriad of challenges that have far-reaching implications for regional stability. To understand the current geopolitical landscape in South Asia, one must appreciate the historical underpinnings that have shaped the region. The partition of British India in 1947 resulted in the creation of India and Pakistan, marking the beginning of complex inter-state relations. The Kashmir dispute, a longstanding territorial conflict between India and Pakistan, has been a persistent flashpoint, namely in 1965 and 1998, influencing regional dynamics for decades (see Table 1). India, as the largest and most populous country in South Asia, plays a pivotal role in shaping the regional geopolitical landscape. With a growing economy and military capabilities, India seeks to assert itself as a major player not only in South Asia but also on the global stage. However, its relations with neighboring countries, especially Pakistan and China, remain complex.

Pakistan, on the other hand, grapples with internal challenges while actively engaging in regional diplomacy. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has strengthened the Sino-Pak alliance, altering the balance of power in the region (CPEC, n.d.). China’s expanding influence in South Asia is a significant factor in the evolving geopolitical landscape. Beyond its close ties with Pakistan since the 1950s, China has sought to enhance its economic and strategic footprint in other South Asian countries through infrastructure projects, economic partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. This has raised concerns among regional and global actors about China’s intentions and the potential implications for the existing balance of power.

Apart from China, other external factors, such as the United States and Russia, play crucial roles in shaping the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia. The U.S. has strategic interests in the region, particularly in countering terrorism and ensuring stability. Its relationships with India and Afghanistan have evolved, while its interactions with Pakistan remain complex, including both cooperation and concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Moreover, Russia, with historical ties to India, continues to maintain a strategic partnership, particularly in defense and energy cooperation. The evolving dynamics in Afghanistan, with the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s resurgence in 2020–21, have drawn the attention of regional and global powers, further complicating South Asia’s geopolitical landscape (US Department of State, 2022).

The geopolitical landscape of South Asia has undergone profound transformations in recent years, shaping the regional dynamics and influencing global affairs. Among the key players in this intricate tapestry, Pakistan stands as a pivotal nation, experiencing both challenges and opportunities. Pakistan, situated at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, holds immense geostrategic significance. Its geopolitical importance stems from its proximity to key players like China, India, Afghanistan, and Iran. Specifically, the geopolitical importance of Pakistan’s eastern front, which primarily encompasses its eastern border with India, has long been a focal point of geopolitical dynamics, owing to its strategic location, historical conflicts, and the presence of two nuclear-armed neighbors. Amid all these concerns, it is necessary to get familiar with Pakistan’s own hydrological challenges in its eastern region, i.e., the Indus Basin region.

4.1. Pakistan’s Eastern Region and Hydrological Challenges

Pakistan’s eastern front is home to several major rivers, including the Indus, which is a vital source of water for both India and Pakistan. Water disputes and the management of shared river resources are key issues that have a direct impact on the energy security and overall well-being of the region. The Indus River spans a total length of 2900 km, encompassing a drainage area of approximately 966,000 square kilometers. Its eastern side receives contributions from five principal tributaries, namely the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, in addition to three minor tributaries—Soan, Harow, and Siran—that originate from mountainous regions. It is noteworthy that the Indus River singularly accounts for 65 per cent of the aggregate river flows, while the Jhelum and Chenab contribute 17 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively (Kahlown & Majeed, 2003). The primary source of surface water resources in Pakistan emanates from the discharge of the Indus River and its associated tributaries. Within the overall water inventory of Pakistan, a quantity of 180 billion cubic meters (bcm) is attributed to the IRS, with approximately 128 bcm being redirected towards the distribution infrastructure (Basharat, 2019).

The IRS includes “3 major reservoirs (Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma), 19 barrages/headworks, 12 link canals, 45 canal commands and some 99,000 watercourses. The total length of the canal system is 58,450 km, with 88,600 watercourses, farm channels and field ditches running another 160,000 km in length” (Kahlown & Majeed, 2003). Furthermore, “most of the groundwater resources of Pakistan exist in the Indus Plain, extending from Himalayan foothills to the Arabian Sea, and are stored in alluvial deposits. The Plain is about 1600 km long and covers an area of 21 million hectares (Mha) and is blessed with an extensive unconfined aquifer, which is fast becoming a supplemental source of water for irrigation. The aquifer has been built due to direct recharge from natural precipitation, river flow, and the continued seepage from the conveyance system of canals, distributaries, watercourses and application losses in the irrigated lands during the last 90 years. This aquifer, with a potential of about 50 million acre feet (MAF), is being exploited to an extent of about 38 MAF by over 562,000 private tube wells and about 10,000 public tube wells” (Kahlown & Majeed, 2003).

However, Pakistan, an agrarian economy heavily reliant on water resources, faces significant challenges in managing its water supply. Several factors contribute to water scarcity in Pakistan, creating a complex web of challenges. The foremost issue is the perpetual demand for water due to population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. As of the year 2023, the demographic landscape of Pakistan encompasses a population of approximately 242,523,680 individuals. Notably, the nation’s demographic significance is underscored by its representation of 2.99 per cent of the global population. In a comparative context, Pakistan holds the fifth position among countries and dependencies in terms of population size. Furthermore, the population density within the country is quantified at 312 individuals per square kilometer. An urbanization rate of 34.7 per cent is observed, encompassing 83,500,516 urban inhabitants as of the same year (Worldometer, n.d.). Rapid urban expansion puts tremendous pressure on water resources, leading to over-extraction and depletion of aquifers. Thus, these demographic indicators collectively provide a comprehensive understanding of Pakistan’s population dynamics, emphasizing its substantial presence on the global stage.

Moreover, the water sector emerges as an exceptionally vulnerable domain to the repercussions of climate change, with Pakistan hosting the world’s largest continuous Indus Basin Irrigation System, predominantly reliant on precipitation, glacier and snow melt, and groundwater extraction. Presently, water allocation is distributed among agriculture (92 per cent), industries (3 per cent), and domestic and infrastructural uses (5 per cent) (Asian Development Bank, 2017). The adverse effects of diminishing glacier mass, a consequence of climate change, will be notably pronounced in the Indus basin due to the substantial contribution of melted water to river discharge. This phenomenon is anticipated to induce significant fluctuations in future water availability within the Indus River System (IRS). Projections suggest an initial augmentation of Indus River flows as Himalayan glaciers retreat over the next five decades, followed by a subsequent decline of flows by up to 30 per cent to 40 per cent as the glacier reservoirs deplete. Survey data from 1997 to 2002 indicate noteworthy thickening, ranging from 5 to 15 m, in certain extensive Karakoram glaciers, spanning 40 to 70 km in length, particularly within sizable ablation zone areas (Asian Development Bank, 2017). Thus, climate change is a significant contributor to water scarcity in Pakistan. Changes in precipitation patterns, rising temperatures, and the melting of glaciers impact the country’s water supply. The reliance on the Indus River Basin, which is fed by glacial meltwater, makes Pakistan vulnerable to the consequences of climate change.

Consequently, the Pakistani government has implemented various water management strategies to address the challenges posed by water scarcity (Ashraf, 2021). The Indus River Basin Authority (IRSA) plays a stellar role in regulating water distribution among provinces and ensuring equitable access. Large-scale infrastructure projects, such as dams and reservoirs, aim to enhance water storage capacity and mitigate the impact of water shortages. To mitigate this storage dilemma, Pakistan started militarized conservation of water resources, especially in the eastern region of Pakistan.

4.2. Militarization of the Indus Basin

Militarization refers to the process of using military and security forces to control resources and maintain security in any region. Militarization is a process where there are several changes which are generally militaristic. In the case of Pakistan, a country situated in a region prone to water scarcity, the role of the military in managing and securing water resources has become increasingly vital.

The militarization of resources in the eastern region of Pakistan has been a complex and contentious issue that has far-reaching implications for the socio-economic and political landscape of the region. Pakistan’s history has been marked by its dependence on the Indus River system, a critical water source for the country. The Indus Basin region, the eastern region of Pakistan, shares a large border with India, which has long been a source of geopolitical tension. The historical animosity between India and Pakistan, coupled with territorial disputes, has led to a significant military presence in the region (Figure 4). The ongoing strategic competition has fueled the militarization of resources as both nations strive to assert their dominance and secure strategic advantages. The militarization, therefore, is not solely an internal matter but is intricately linked to the broader geopolitical dynamics of South Asia.

Securing water infrastructure is paramount to ensuring water security, and the military plays a pivotal role in safeguarding critical installations. Dams, barrages, and other water-related facilities are potential targets for both internal and external threats. The military’s involvement in the protection of these assets is essential for maintaining the integrity of the water supply chain. The Pakistan military has a significant presence in the form of Military Headquarters, Military Lands & Cantonments (ML&C) and military estate (ME) in its eastern region. In Pakistan, ML&C has jurisdiction over six regional directorates, namely Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Karachi and Quetta. Through regional directorates, it manages 11 MEs circles and 44 Cantonment Boards (CBs) all over Pakistan (Ministry of Defence, n.d.). Among the eleven MEs, five (Hyderabad, Multan, Sargodha, Lahore, Gujranwala) are situated within the Indus Basin region. Moreover, CBs are statutory local bodies and perform several functions, such as the maintenance of green belts and civic amenities. Cantonment boards are autonomous bodies and generate their funds. For the FY 2021-22, water charges have a larger share. Within the cohort of 44 CBs, three (Karachi, Multan, Lahore) are located in the Indus Basin region (Ministry of Defence, n.d.). The role of the Pakistan military in ensuring water security is multifaceted and indispensable. The military plays a pivotal role in safeguarding Pakistan’s water resources and infrastructure.

Moreover, the creation of riverine police forces in Pakistan, especially in the Indus Basin region, is also a major type of militarization of waterways. These police forces are tasked with maintaining law and order on inland waterways. For instance, the Punjab riverine police have been created in Pakistan (See

Table 2. Riverine Police Posts in Pakistan.

Area (District)	Riverine Police Posts
Attock	Riverine Fomile Riverine BaghNelab Riverine Jaba Riverine Makhad Riverine Shahdipurpatan
Dera Ghazi Khan	Riverine Post Nutkani Riverine Post Pull 22000 Riverine Post Bhati Maitla Riverine Post Indus Bypass Riverine Post Bait Biat Wala Riverine Post Bait Cheen Wala. Riverine Post Sheroo Riverine Post Khanpur Riverine Post Choti Bala
Mianwali	Shahbaz Khel (Sadar) Katcha Pakka Morr (Kundian) Musi Wali (Piplan) Alu Wali (Piplan) Sharif Wali (Mochh) Kukranwala (Kalabagh) Kundal (Essa Khel)
Rajanpur	Mouza Sonmani Katcha Area of Indus River. Police Station Sonmani. Sub Division Bangla Iccha. City Area Rojhan Raidar Station Ozman Katcha Area of Indus River. Police Station Rojhan. Sub Division circle Rojhan. Kot Mithan City Area Union Council Wang Union Council Noorpur Union Council Murghai Kacha area of Indus River. Police Station Kot Mithan. Sub-Division circle Saddar Rajanpur.

Source: (Punjab Police, Government of Pakistan, n.d.).

). Additional Inspector General (AIG) Punjab, Sultan Ahmad Chaudhry, said that the riverine check posts of Punjab Police play a crucial role in combating terrorists, miscreants, and criminals, and relief & rescue activities (Punjab Police, Government of Pakistan, 2024). Several of the latest surveillance gadgets were provided to the Attock police to patrol the Indus River (Punjab Police, Government of Pakistan, 2013). In 2017, Punjab Police IG Mushtaq Ahmad Sukhera had ordered the completion of recruitment for riverine posts (Punjab Police, Government of Pakistan, 2017). Moreover, the chairman of the District Council Sukkur, Syed Kamail Hyder Shah, had also inaugurated 13 police check posts in the riverine area on the embankment of the River Indus (The Nation, 2024).

However, this may be all show, no substance. These posts can inadvertently become significant threats to the neighboring country in transboundary river conflicts. Integrating water security into the military’s broader responsibilities reflects the interconnected nature of national security and sustainable development. As Pakistan continues to face evolving water challenges, the military’s proactive and adaptive approach will remain crucial in securing a sustainable and resilient water future for the nation. Consequently, it becomes evident that Pakistan is currently experiencing a trajectory of militarization, within the context of safeguarding the inland water resources, extending not only within its eastern domain but also manifesting in contested regions within this geographical sphere.

4.3. Assessing the Consequences of Waterways’ Militarization

The militarization of inland waterways can have far-reaching consequences, affecting geopolitical stability, economic activities, environmental sustainability, and social well-being. One of the most significant risks is the rise in geopolitical tensions and conflicts, particularly in regions where major rivers, canals, or lakes are shared by multiple nations. Military control over strategic waterways can exacerbate regional rivalries, as countries may use access to these vital routes as a means of coercion or leverage against their adversaries. This can lead to confrontations, blockades, or even direct military engagements, especially in disputed areas. The strategic importance of waterways in geopolitical contexts has been a longstanding factor in shaping the destinies of nations. In recent years, the eastern region of Pakistan has witnessed a notable shift in focus towards the militarization of its waterways. This phenomenon, driven by a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and security considerations, has far-reaching consequences that demand careful analysis. The immediate consequences of waterways’ militarization in the eastern region of Pakistan are manifold. It exacerbates existing tensions between India and Pakistan, potentially escalating into conflicts that could have severe humanitarian implications. The militarization of waterways increases the likelihood of skirmishes and conflicts over disputed territories, posing a threat to regional stability.

Moreover, external dynamics also play a pivotal role in this evolving landscape. China’s involvement in the Indus Basin region has gained prominence in recent years, with the construction of dams on the Indus River by China and its economic investments in Pakistan’s water infrastructure. For instance, “the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Diamer-Bhasha dam had been signed between the Chinese state-run firm China Power and the Pakistan army’s commercial wing Frontier Works Organization and is expected to be completed by 2028” (Sehgal, 2020). Pakistan and China’s increasing military presence in Gilgit-Baltistan through large-scale infrastructure projects, particularly the construction of the Diamer Bhasha Dam, reflects their strategic efforts to consolidate control over the region and counter India’s influence. China perceives Gilgit-Baltistan as legally part of India and seeks to assert its territorial claim by supporting Pakistan in the dam’s construction. However, this project poses significant ecological risks, including seismic instability and the displacement of local communities. The Diamer Basha Dam Project presents two major ecological risks: seismic instability and the displacement of local communities. The project area is located in a high seismic zone within the Karakoram Mountain range, where past geological surveys have confirmed the presence of active fault lines. The 2005 earthquake, which occurred 150 km south of the dam site, underscores the region’s vulnerability to seismic activity (Gilgit-Baltistan Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). There are concerns that the weight of the dam, excavation activities, and reservoir filling could potentially trigger landslides and rockslides. Such consequences threaten not only biodiversity but also agriculture and drinking water supplies for local populations. Any change in the flow of the water hampers the neighboring countries. Moreover, the second significant risk is the displacement of local communities due to reservoir impoundment. Approximately 31 villages, with a population of around 29,000 people, will be submerged, leading to the destruction of over 3100 traditional stone and mud houses. The affected communities, primarily belonging to the Sheen, Yashkun, and Soniwal tribes, face forced resettlement, with many preferring cash compensation over relocation (Gilgit-Baltistan Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). The displacement will result in the loss of agricultural land, livelihoods, and cultural heritage. Some communities have opposed the relocation, forming an Anti-Dam Committee in Chilas to voice their concerns (Gilgit-Baltistan Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). While the project aims to mitigate these risks through engineering safety measures and social compensation plans, concerns persist regarding the long-term stability of the dam and the effectiveness of resettlement efforts. Continuous monitoring, seismic safety assessments, and community engagement will be essential to addressing these challenges effectively.

Furthermore, China is upgrading the Skardu Air Base and expanding road networks, which could facilitate the movement of Chinese military forces in the region (ANI, 2020). Pakistan has also planned the Skardu Dam project, located on the Indus River (Water and Power Development Authority [WAPDA], n.d.; see Figure 2). The project was identified for water storage during an inventory and ranking study of major hydropower projects conducted under a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1984 (Water and Power Development Authority [WAPDA], n.d.). Skardu, the capital of Baltistan or Little Tibet, “houses the military command and control hub for protection of the critical Pakistan-China road link, and maintenance of status quo in Gultari, Ladakh and Siachen sectors” (Sridhar, 2005). Consequently, China’s involvement in the air base, along with Pakistan’s dam project—a potential militarization of the Skardu dam—raises concerns and may be perceived as a potential threat to India’s national security. The presence of armed forces along rivers and lakes may increase the likelihood of these areas becoming hotspots for conflicts, insurgencies, or piracy. Ultimately, while controlling inland waterways may offer short-term strategic advantages to certain nations, the broader implications often include instability, economic disruptions, and environmental harm in neighboring countries like India.

The evolving collaboration between Pakistan and China on water security has direct security implications for India. The construction of dams in POJK adds a new dimension to the already complex India–Pakistan conflict. India has raised objections to Chinese involvement in projects in disputed territories, asserting that it violates its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The heightened strategic significance of water resources in the region exacerbates existing tensions between India and Pakistan. Water scarcity, amplified by climate change, further intensifies competition for shared water resources. As a result, India faces the challenge of managing its water security concerns within the context of a complex geopolitical environment.

The social and humanitarian impact is equally concerning. Communities residing along militarized waterways may face forced displacement, restricted access to essential resources, and heightened security risks due to the potential for armed conflicts or violent activities. For instance, since 2014, more than 21,000 people have been internally displaced in Pakistan as a result of military operations in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC], n.d.). Based on this instance, it can be inferred that any conflict or violence in the eastern region of Pakistan, the internationally disputed region and the Indus Basin region may lead to more militarization, ultimately resulting in forced displacement and severe social and humanitarian consequences for the affected communities.

Moreover, militarization raises significant legal and diplomatic challenges, as it can violate international water agreements and create disputes over sovereignty and usage rights. This legal uncertainty can further strain diplomatic relations between neighboring nations, complicating efforts to maintain regional stability. The IWT is one of the best examples among us. Pakistan tends to politicize river water issues, and there has been an increase in statements portraying Pakistan as a disadvantaged lower riparian state. In a 2009 article in the Washington Post, “President Asif Ali Zardari stated that the water crisis in Pakistan is linked to relations with India and that resolving it could prevent an environmental disaster in South Asia” (Khan, 1959). However, failure to do so could fuel extremist and terrorist sentiments. Similarly, Sardar Aseff Ali, a former foreign minister, “warned in 2010 that if India continues to deny Pakistan its fair share of water, it could lead to war between the two countries” (Sinha, 2010). This sentiment was echoed by Shujaat Hussain, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) chief and former premier, who warned in 2008 that “the water crisis could become more serious than terrorism and could result in war” (Sinha, 2010). This mistrust could lead to the militarization of the Indus Basin region, which ultimately hampers both India and Pakistan in this contemporary water insecurity era.

Furthermore, the activities of riverine police can escalate tensions between neighboring countries. One major issue arises when riverine police overstep jurisdictional boundaries, patrolling or entering contested areas of the river claimed by another nation. Such actions are frequently perceived as violations of sovereignty, leading to diplomatic disputes or even military confrontations. Furthermore, when these police units are heavily armed or operate with military-style tactics, they contribute to the militarization of waterways that might otherwise be venues for peaceful resource sharing or commerce. This aggressive presence can transform minor disputes over environmental concerns into larger conflicts.

In some cases, riverine police serve broader nationalist or governmental agendas, enforcing domestic laws beyond internationally recognized borders as a way to assert territorial claims. This is particularly dangerous in contested regions, as it reinforces grievances and provokes defensive measures from the neighboring state. Environmental concerns complicate matters, as riverine police may either be accused of facilitating environmentally harmful activities—such as illegal dumping or unregulated dam operations—or of selectively enforcing regulations in ways that benefit their nation to the detriment of others.

Ultimately, the presence and actions of riverine police on transboundary rivers can act as triggers for larger geopolitical disputes. Even isolated incidents, such as the use of force during patrols, can spark wider diplomatic crises or military escalations. This has been observed in areas like the India–Bangladesh border along the Teesta River, where patrol disputes occasionally flare, or in regions like the Nile River between Sudan and Egypt, where water rights tensions make any security activity particularly sensitive. The management of riverine police forces, therefore, requires careful bilateral coordination to prevent minor confrontations from spiraling into full-blown conflicts over shared water resources and national sovereignty.

To prevent these negative outcomes, efforts should focus on promoting cooperation, ensuring adherence to EP principles, and preserving inland waterways as shared resources rather than militarized zones of contention.

4.4. Environmental Peacebuilding: An Answer to the Militarization

The militarization of waterways in the eastern region of Pakistan has emerged as a critical concern with far-reaching implications for regional stability and security. Historically rooted tensions, geopolitical considerations, and economic interests have contributed to the militarization of the Indus waters, creating a volatile environment that jeopardizes peace and stability in the eastern region of Pakistan.

Resolving this issue of militarization necessitates a holistic EP approach that addresses its root causes and mitigates the risks associated with it. Environmental collaboration is very important for building long-lasting peace because it connects positive efforts that change relationships, improve governance systems, and ensure that everyone has fair access to natural resources. There are a number of interconnected processes that show how this kind of cooperation can lead to lasting peace.

First, environmental issues, which are often called “low politics” or non-traditional security issues, go beyond political borders and are usually less sensitive than territorial or ideological disputes, which makes them good places for countries to get involved (Ide et al., 2021; Hardt & Scheffran, 2019; Dresse et al., 2019). These common worries lead to talks and negotiations, which help build trust, understanding, and respect towards each other (Dresse et al., 2019).

Second, working together to solve common environmental problems often leads to the formation of formal or informal groups, like water user associations (Ide, 2019). These groups help people talk to each other and give them a way to settle disagreements about environmental issues in a structured way (Ide, 2019). For instance, in the context of India and Nepal hydro cooperation, groups like ‘Kosi Victims Society’ and the ‘Kosi High Dam Struggle Committee (KHDSC)’ have been formed to advocate for the rights of people affected by the Kosi project (Mahla, 2025a). These frameworks help keep relationships stable and lower the chance of violent conflict by making rules, making things more predictable, and setting shared norms (Dresse et al., 2019).

Third, making sure that everyone has fair access to and use of natural resources is one of the main causes of conflict. In this context, countries need to work together to manage common-pool resources well and keep the power balance among stakeholders (Dresse et al., 2019). This kind of cooperation changes violent or unequal social structures into peaceful and cooperative ones. This helps countries grow and reach the bigger goals of sustainable peacebuilding.

How well environmental cooperation works depends a lot on the situation, such as low levels of political hostility, stability in domestic politics, and feelings of fairness and reciprocity in cooperation (Ide, 2019). In the context of India and Pakistan, diplomatic efforts should be intensified to foster open communication channels between the nations involved. Confidence-building measures, such as collaborative environmental initiatives, can contribute to creating a conducive atmosphere for dialogue. In addition, international mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms, like the IWT, should be explored to facilitate peaceful negotiations. International mediation remains a critical avenue for resolving water disputes in South Asia. Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank, which historically facilitated the IWT, can provide a platform for renegotiating water-sharing agreements that account for contemporary challenges. Confidence-building measures, including joint water monitoring programs, data-sharing mechanisms, and cooperative infrastructure projects, can enhance transparency and trust between India and Pakistan. For instance, the Mekong River Commission’s riparian states run a basin-wide network to keep an eye on the amount and quality of water. The “Procedure for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing” makes it possible for the Lower Mekong to share the data that comes from this process. This helps with sustainable development in the area (Mekong River Commission, n.d.). Such initiatives can help de-escalate tensions and reframe water security as a catalyst for regional environmental cooperation rather than a source of conflict.

5. Conclusions

The militarization of the Indus Basin along Pakistan’s eastern front is a direct consequence of resource insecurity. Pakistan’s eastern region, encompassing the Indus Basin, has witnessed increasing military involvement in water resource management, with strategic installations and cantonments reinforcing state control over critical water infrastructures. The expansion of military jurisdiction over water-related assets reflects a broader trend of securitizing natural resources, where access to water is perceived as a matter of national defense. While such measures may provide short-term stability, they also risk escalating conflicts by framing water disputes within a security paradigm rather than a framework of cooperative governance.

The militarization presents a complex and multifaceted challenge that has significant implications for regional stability, security, and sustainability. It is significant to underscore the intersection of historical grievances, geopolitical rivalries, resource scarcity, and environmental vulnerabilities, which collectively shape the contemporary landscape of South Asia’s water conflicts. The IWT, while historically effective in regulating water-sharing between India and Pakistan, is increasingly strained under the pressures of climate change, demographic expansion, and infrastructural developments. The securitization of water resources, manifesting in dam disputes, military deployments, and competing national interests, has transformed shared waterways into potential flashpoints for conflict, reinforcing long-standing tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbors.

The historical context of water disputes in South Asia reveals a pattern of contested sovereignty and economic interdependence that complicates diplomatic efforts. The division of the Indus River system post-Partition laid the foundation for persistent disagreements, as Pakistan remains heavily reliant on upstream water flows controlled by India. While the IWT provides a legal framework for water allocation, its provisions have been increasingly challenged by India’s hydroelectric projects, which Pakistan perceives as threats to its water security. Arbitration mechanisms, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s rulings on the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project, have attempted to mediate these disputes, but their effectiveness remains limited by political constraints and strategic mistrust. Moreover, climate change exacerbates these tensions by intensifying water scarcity and increasing the unpredictability of river flows. The accelerated melting of Himalayan glaciers, a critical source of the Indus River’s water supply, threatens both agricultural sustainability and hydroelectric power generation in Pakistan.

Addressing the militarization of the Indus Basin requires a shift towards sustainable and cooperative water management policies. By prioritizing environmental peacebuilding and cooperative frameworks over militarized strategies, the region can transform its shared water resources into a foundation for peace and prosperity rather than a battleground for geopolitical contestation.