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Entry

Vibocracy and the Collapse of Shared Reality

JB Say Institute for Entrepreneurship, ESCP Business School, 75011 Paris, France
Encyclopedia 2025, 5(4), 163; https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5040163 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 29 July 2025 / Revised: 16 September 2025 / Accepted: 28 September 2025 / Published: 11 October 2025
(This article belongs to the Collection Encyclopedia of Social Sciences)

Definition

Vibocracy refers to societal conditions in which public life and decision-making are shaped by affective resonance, performative legitimacy, and unstable epistemic frames, often amplified by algorithmic media and neo-oral communication environments. Unlike wicked problems, which presuppose shared intelligibility, and post-truth politics, which emphasize the erosion of factual authority, vibocracy designates contexts where problems themselves are enacted and sustained through affective circulation. Recent years have seen the emergence of societal challenges where public life and decision-making are shaped less by shared evidence and deliberative reasoning than by affective resonance and performative legitimacy. This entry introduces the concept of vibocracy to describe these conditions and distinguishes it from existing categories such as wicked problems and messes. The analysis is based on a conceptual synthesis of scholarship from planning, organizational studies, media theory, and political science, combined with illustrative examples from recent societal controversies. The main finding is that vibocratic problems resist not only solutions but stable framing itself, creating volatile, performative arenas where legitimacy is enacted rather than negotiated. The entry concludes by proposing vibocracy as a distinct conceptual lens for understanding emerging societal challenges and outlines methodological implications for researchers and practitioners.

Graphical Abstract

1. Introduction: Why We Need a New Category

1.1. Wicked Problems and Shared Intelligibility

When Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber coined wicked problems in 1973, they provided planners, policymakers, and designers with a vocabulary for a new class of societal challenges [1]. Wicked problems were not simply complex technical puzzles that could be solved with additional data or sharper analytics. They were open-ended, interconnected, and value-laden situations in which problem definition and solution co-evolved. Every intervention carried irreversible consequences, and no single actor held decisive authority. Russell Ackoff described these conditions as “messes,” highlighting the systems-level interdependence and the futility of optimizing isolated parts without engaging the whole [2]. Donald Schön emphasized that professional practice depends on framing and “reflection-in-action,” underscoring that solving complex problems is inseparable from how they are conceptualized [3].
For decades, this vocabulary has shaped work in urban planning [4], environmental policy [5], and organizational strategy [6]. Yet the notion of wickedness presupposed at least a minimal common ground. Actors might disagree on values or priorities, but they still inhabited overlapping epistemic worlds. They could argue about what counted as evidence, engage in debate, and recognize shared facts [7]. Wicked problems thus assumed shared intelligibility.

1.2. From Post-Truth to Vibocracy

Today, that presupposition is increasingly fragile. Digital platforms, affect-driven politics, and algorithmic information systems have fractured the public sphere [8,9]. Instead of a common arena for contesting values, proliferating micro-publics have emerged, often insulated from one another and driven more by performative resonance than by deliberative reasoning [10,11]. In such contexts, problems may not only resist solutions but also appear to resist framing itself. Competing groups inhabit parallel narrative universes: climate change may appear as existential emergency to some and elite conspiracy to others; vaccination may be framed as solidarity or as authoritarian overreach. Scholars of post-truth describe this as a crisis of epistemic authority, in which facts lose traction not only through manipulation but also through indifference to common standards of justification [12,13,14,15].

1.3. Defining Vibocratic Problems

These dynamics suggest the emergence of a different category of societal challenge—one that mutates in real time, circulates as affective atmospheres rather than stable facts, and mobilizes loyalty rather than dialog. These can be described as vibocratic problems: issues that derive their power and volatility from affective charge, performative enactment, and epistemic fugacity. By epistemic fugacity, we mean the fleeting and unstable character of knowledge claims, the validity of which dissipates as quickly as it circulates, making shared understanding difficult to sustain. Vibocracy can be defined as a condition in which legitimacy and problem recognition depend less on empirical verification or deliberative reasoning than on the intensity of circulating signals. Unlike post-truth, which emphasizes the erosion of factual authority, vibocracy highlights how resonance, virality, and shared atmospheres organize attention [16]. Unlike wicked problems, which presuppose overlapping epistemic arenas, vibocracy denotes contexts in which even the minimal baseline of intelligibility collapses [17]. Some scholars might argue that wicked problem theory remains sufficient if adapted to digital and affective conditions, viewing vibocracy as an intensification of existing dynamics [5,18]. This entry suggests instead that vibocracy represents a distinct category, since it describes contexts where even minimal shared intelligibility dissolves and problems are enacted primarily through affective resonance.
Where wicked problems were plural and value-charged [1,19], vibocratic problems appear unstable and performative. Their ontology is ephemeral, enacted through vibe rather than verified through evidence [14,20]. They emerge in fragmented publics [18], where even basic problem recognition can become partisan or tribal. Climate change may be narrated either as existential threat or elaborate hoax [19]; pandemic response as either social solidarity or authoritarian overreach [20]. Corruption can appear as scandal in one setting and spectacle in another—and increasingly as the latter [21].

1.4. An Order by Affect

Vibocracy does not necessarily represent accidental chaos. Some evidence suggests that it may instead constitute an order organized through affect. Attention is captured and coordinated by neo-oral media forms—short-form video, livestream performance, and meme logic—that bypass deliberative reasoning and activate shared emotional states [22,23]. Leaders who once feared scandal now sometimes weaponize it, turning impropriety into a signal of authenticity and dominance [24]. Corruption has become genre [25], with conventions instantly legible: performative transgression, ironic defiance, memetic circulation, and the collapse of shame as a cultural brake [26,27,28,29].

2. Media Infrastructure and Neo-Orality

2.1. From Orality to Neo-Orality

The epistemic instability of vibocracy is closely tied to its media ecology. Walter Ong showed that oral and literate cultures cultivate distinct cognitive habits: orality privileges immediacy, performance, and memory, while literacy encourages abstraction and critical distance [24]. Contemporary digital platforms have nurtured what scholars call neo-orality: a return of oral logics, now algorithmically amplified and globally networked [10,11,30,31,32]. Alongside platform logics, generational practices matter: youth cultures’ everyday sociality on networked platforms normalized always-on sharing and publicness long before these habits became mainstream [33]. Platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, and Twitch reward emotional resonance and esthetic spectacle, often compressing complex realities into shareable, memetic fragments [22,34]. These fragments circulate like stories—but at unprecedented speed and scale.

2.2. Infrastructures of Attention

These infrastructures are not neutral. Their business models prioritize engagement—measured in clicks and watch-time—which advantages content provoking strong affective responses [20,35]. As a result, claims circulate less as verified facts and more as felt truths. This underpins what Marres describes as issue publics assembled through emotion and esthetic performance rather than discursive reasoning [36]. In such contexts, truth can function as a property of virality and vibe: if it spreads and resonates, it may be experienced as true [11,16]. Parallels can be drawn with earlier media shifts—radio’s role in shaping political rhetoric [31] or television’s esthetics of intimacy [32]—but today’s personalization and algorithmic curation intensify these tendencies. Classic work on the emotional citizen helps explain how affect becomes a routine mode of democratic engagement [37], while recent post-truth accounts frame this as a power game over epistemic authority [38].

2.3. Examples and Illustrations

Several examples demonstrate these dynamics. Hashtag activism can mobilize millions around powerful symbols (e.g., #MeToo or #FridaysForFuture), yet it can also splinter into polarized echo chambers or be co-opted for disinformation [35]. Memetic frames around cryptocurrency, AI, or vaccine hesitancy often spread faster than careful policy analyses, influencing markets and public health choices alike [15]. Design-inflected citizen action further blurs expertise and participation, as publics use lightweight tools to make and remix issues in highly legible, viral forms [39].

2.4. Implications for Institutions

Two consequences follow. First, the speed and volatility of vibocratic issues can outpace deliberative institutions—from parliaments to corporate boards—forcing reactive rather than proactive strategies. Second, epistemic authority shifts: traditional gatekeepers (universities, professional associations, legacy media) must now compete with influencers, micro-celebrities, and algorithmic feeds for legitimacy [8,40]. These legitimacy battles connect to governance and corruption studies: reputations and authority are renegotiated in real time, often outside formal oversight [29,41].

2.5. Vibocracy as Mediated Condition

Vibocracy can therefore be viewed both as a symptom and a product of contemporary media infrastructures: an evolving social order in which affective connection, spectacle, and instantaneous circulation reshape how societies perceive problems and imagine solutions. Rather than treating these dynamics as aberrations, scholars and practitioners may need to explore how they structure public reasoning itself, and how institutional practices might adapt to sustain thoughtful, inclusive dialog amid such powerful currents [16,36]. At the same time, the emotional and moral dimensions of public life—shame, pride, and belonging—remain central to how legitimacy is performed and perceived under scrutiny [42]. Others will note that these are cyclical shifts in media rather than a fundamentally new order, echoing earlier historical disruptions and re-equilibrations [22].

3. Corruption as Genre and the Collapse of Shame

3.1. From Scandal to Genre

Perhaps nowhere is vibocracy more visible than in the realm of political corruption. Historically, corruption often operated as scandal: it required concealment, plausible deniability, and at least a performative nod to shared ethical norms [43]. Exposure was expected to trigger accountability, if not through legal sanction, then at least through reputational damage. Today, however, corruption increasingly functions as genre: its exposure does not necessarily signal deviance but, paradoxically, can affirm loyalty and power [44,45,46,47]. Leaders implicated in questionable dealings sometimes convert accusations into political capital, reframing scrutiny as persecution and transforming transgression into authenticity [11,20]. In some contexts, the very act of being attacked is displayed as evidence of disruptive honesty or anti-elite credentials.

3.2. The Collapse of Shame

This transformation reflects a broader cultural shift often described as the collapse of shame [48,49,50]. Shame once functioned as a soft infrastructure of accountability, binding individuals and institutions to social expectations even when formal enforcement mechanisms were weak [51]. In vibocracy, that infrastructure erodes. Brazen acts—whether flaunting conflicts of interest, disregarding disclosure rules, or mocking transparency requirements—no longer threaten legitimacy but can amplify a leader’s aura of untouchability. As Heywood argues, the performative repetition of impropriety may consolidate rather than destabilize power, particularly when aligned with populist narratives of elite persecution [24,52,53]. Recent work on authoritarian resilience underscores that such performances often blur the boundary between corruption and governance, embedding spectacle into the exercise of power itself [40].

3.3. Global Illustrations

Examples of this dynamic are visible across regions. In the United States, controversies once considered career-ending—such as conflicts of interest or inflammatory statements—are often reframed by supporters as evidence of authenticity or political courage [24]. In Brazil, corruption scandals involving high-ranking officials have at times fueled rather than hindered electoral support, with accusations framed as attacks by rival elites [54]. In parts of Eastern Europe, anti-corruption protests coexist with leaders who openly challenge judicial independence, using defiance of oversight institutions to build populist legitimacy [55]. Even in emerging economies, from Southeast Asia to parts of Africa, impropriety is sometimes recast as proof of strength or national pride in resisting foreign influence [32,44].

3.4. Beyond Politics: Organizational Performance

This pattern is not confined to politics. It extends into organizational fields, where corporations and even non-profits increasingly mimic political performance strategies. “Post-truth branding” privileges emotional alignment over factual claims, aligning reputational identity with charismatic leaders or cultural movements rather than with verifiable performance [42,56]. Entire sectors—from fashion to finance—experiment with what might be called reputation through resistance, in which regulatory fines or public criticism are reframed as proof of innovation or outsider authenticity. The result is a systemic normalization of opacity, spectacle, and impropriety—not as exceptional crises but as everyday governing and branding styles.

3.5. From Normative to Performative Legitimacy

Scholars of organizational culture and governance [54,55] interpret this shift as one from normative to performative legitimacy: adherence to shared rules matters less than the ability to project confidence, loyalty, and power under conditions of scrutiny [15]. In vibocracy, corruption ceases to function as deviation from norms; it becomes one of the norms—packaged and performed as proof of dominance and sovereignty. Impropriety itself becomes a resource for identity building and group cohesion. This invites further exploration: What occurs when the very signals meant to enforce accountability are repurposed as badges of credibility? How might institutions, civil society, and scholarship respond when shame no longer constrains power but instead becomes a tool of rule [16,45,52]? Yet corruption still provokes civic backlash in many settings, suggesting that the collapse of shame is uneven and that norms of accountability retain force in certain cultural and institutional contexts [57].

4. Epistemological Consequences: Knowing, Writing, Acting

4.1. Limits of Traditional Models

Traditional problem-solving models falter under vibocratic conditions. Linear planning assumes stable problem definitions [58]. Evidence-based policymaking assumes shared criteria of validity [59]. Even classical deliberative democracy assumes publics who can engage in reasoned argument [60]. Vibocracy disrupts these assumptions, suggesting that researchers and practitioners may need to explore new ways of knowing, writing, and acting.

4.2. Knowing: Perspective and Orientation

To work in vibocratic environments, scholars and practitioners may adopt perspectives attuned to complexity, holism, and flux. Rather than treating problems as bounded technical puzzles, they can be understood as dynamic social systems [61,62]. This stance involves cultivating epistemic humility [16,63], reflexivity [57], and sensitivity to emergent patterns [64,65]. It may also require engagement with multiple knowledge traditions, including indigenous and practice-based epistemologies that emphasize relationality and change [66,67]. Knowing, in this sense, is less about fixed truths and more about navigating shifting terrains of meaning while remaining alert to power and affective resonance [68]. As Scannell reminds us, the very condition of “liveness” in media communication structures how presence and authority are experienced, foregrounding immediacy as a dimension of knowing [69]. Recent work on post-normal science reinforces this orientation, highlighting the need for plural expertise, extended peer communities, and deliberation under conditions of uncertainty [70].

4.3. Writing: Research as Inquiry and Intervention

In vibocracy, writing cannot be treated solely as neutral reporting. It also functions as part of how knowledge is produced, circulated, and contested. Following Richardson and St. Pierre [71] and Lather [72], writing can be approached as a method of inquiry—a means of thinking, experimenting, and connecting with audiences. Stylized, situated, and voice-rich writing may resist epistemic conformity and engage readers affectively without compromising rigor [73,74]. Such approaches can include forms that invite dialog, transparency about positionality, and narrative or esthetic devices when appropriate [67,75]. Writing thus becomes not only a way of reporting what is known but also a way of performing knowing in a world where resonance competes with veracity [11].

4.4. Acting: Methods for a Vibocratic World

If knowing and writing shift, so too must acting. Research and practice may benefit from methods suited to volatility and ambiguity. Abductive reasoning [76] offers one path, beginning with puzzling observations and iteratively generating and testing explanations rather than seeking linear causal proof. Design-informed approaches [77,78] encourage treating interventions as prototypes—temporary, experimental, and open to revision. Participatory and collaborative methods, including co-creation with stakeholders, living labs, and field experiments, allow researchers to iterate alongside practitioners [63,79].
Examples include ethnographies of platform-mediated publics [40], network analyses of affective contagion [10], and experimental interventions designed not merely to implement solutions but to examine how problems are framed and reframed in real time [3,79]. Such methods emphasize agility, reflexivity, and ethical engagement, recognizing that in vibocracy, interventions may reshape the very problem space they seek to address [68]. Work on “situated intervention” in organizational studies suggests similar orientations, treating research as a collaborative, generative practice rather than detached observation [80]. Additional guidance on qualitative rigor and ethics can support these choices [71].

4.5. A Dynamic Methodological Stance

In sum, vibocracy seems to invite a methodological stance that is dynamic, participatory, and explicitly performative: knowing as relational navigation, writing as inquiry and intervention, and acting as iterative, design-informed experimentation [16,63,67].

5. Implications and Pathways Forward

5.1. From Wickedness to Vibocracy

This entry began with the recognition that the classical idea of wicked problems—for decades a touchstone in planning, organizational science, and public policy [1,2,3]—no longer suffices to capture the character of contemporary challenges. Wickedness assumed shared intelligibility: a common, if contested, space where facts could be debated, values negotiated, and trade-offs accepted. Our argument, building on insights from media studies, political science, and organizational research, is that a distinct form of problem has emerged: vibocratic problems. These are not simply “harder” wicked problems; they are qualitatively different. They exist in a public sphere where epistemic fragmentation, algorithmic amplification, and affective politics conspire to unmoor truth from deliberation and performance from accountability [10,14].

5.2. Intertwined Dynamics

Across the sections, we traced how vibocratic problems arise from three intertwined dynamics: media infrastructures that privilege affect over evidence [10,16,25,34], political cultures that aestheticize transgression and normalize impunity [29,48,52], and organizational environments that must navigate legitimacy in real time under conditions of epistemic volatility [6,38,58]. These dynamics interact to produce an environment where even the recognition of a problem becomes performative, contested, and unstable. In vibocracy, corruption is not hidden but flaunted as proof of sovereignty; policy controversies do not resolve but morph into identity rituals; and knowledge claims must compete not only on their merits but on their memetic appeal [20,21].

5.3. Contribution: A New Conceptual Lens

The concept of vibocracy contributes to social and organizational science in several ways. First, it advances a new analytical category for understanding societal challenges. By distinguishing vibocratic problems from wicked problems, attention shifts from static complexity to dynamic epistemic fugacity—the speed, affect, and instability of problem framing itself. Although this entry advances vibocracy as a distinct category, it is possible to interpret these dynamics as extensions or intensifications of wickedness [18]. The position taken here, however, is that vibocracy designates a qualitatively different mode of challenge. This move aligns with emerging work in epistemology and political philosophy that emphasizes the performativity of knowledge [74] and the role of digital infrastructures in shaping epistemic agency [16,38]. It also resonates with recent recent work in political theory on how democracies sustain meaning-making amid pervasive uncertainty [81].
Second, vibocracy links media studies and organizational science in an innovative way. While affective publics and platform logics have been studied in communication [10,33,69], their implications for organizational legitimacy, knowledge work, and strategic action remain underdeveloped. Vibocracy provides a conceptual bridge, encouraging organizational scholars to consider how algorithms, attention economies, and cultural affect reshape governance and management [15].
Third, vibocracy invites methodological innovation. We suggested a shift in orientation (Knowing), in research and academic voice (Writing), and in practical method (Acting), moving toward abductive, participatory, and design-informed approaches. This resonates with long-standing philosophical calls for experimental and reflexive modes of inquiry [16,67,72] and with contemporary efforts in science and technology studies to treat research as situated, relational, and interventionist [80].

5.4. Implications for Scholarship and Practice

If vibocracy continues to capture a distinct empirical pattern—as emerging evidence suggests—it has wide implications. Scholars may wish to revisit normative assumptions about deliberation [64], expertise [82], and institutional trust [77]. Practitioners might experiment with forms of engagement that are resilient not only to conflicting interests but also to competing realities. This could include cultivating organizational literacies around digital virality, affective alignment, and epistemic humility [11], while investing in practices that stabilize shared meaning without reverting to technocratic elitism. As Holt argues in his work on post-truth branding, commercial logics increasingly converge with political communication, amplifying affective alignment as a mode of legitimacy [83]. There is room here for practical wisdom (phronesis) [84], dialogical ethics, and what philosopher Paul Ricoeur called “narrative identity”—the weaving of coherence amid discord [78].

6. Closing: A Humble Invitation

To name vibocracy is not to fix it in stone but to offer a tentative handle—a concept to think with rather than to think for. Concepts are social tools: they orient inquiry, open possibilities, and sometimes close them. Vibocracy is proposed as one such tool, provisional and fallible. The problems it names will evolve, and so must our language, our methods, and our courage to face uncomfortable truths about public life.
As John Dewey reminded us, democracy is not a finished system but an ongoing experiment in communication and association [79]. Vibocracy, unsettling as it is, may be an invitation to renew that experiment under new conditions. Scholars might see in it a call to cultivate epistemic humility and to foster collective practices that can endure volatility without collapsing into cynicism [67,85]. We may write, know, and act not with the false security of certainty but with the persistence of those willing to learn while the world is still in motion [16,72].

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data was created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Fendt, J. Vibocracy and the Collapse of Shared Reality. Encyclopedia 2025, 5, 163. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5040163

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Fendt J. Vibocracy and the Collapse of Shared Reality. Encyclopedia. 2025; 5(4):163. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5040163

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Fendt, Jacqueline. 2025. "Vibocracy and the Collapse of Shared Reality" Encyclopedia 5, no. 4: 163. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5040163

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Fendt, J. (2025). Vibocracy and the Collapse of Shared Reality. Encyclopedia, 5(4), 163. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5040163

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