The Sociology of Hope

Abstract

This paper attempts to clarify some of the aspects and dynamics that appear particularly significant when embarking on a path that can lay the foundation for a broader reflection on the “sociology of hope”. This path will be outlined starting from the development of the concept of hope in the social sciences through an analysis of the existing literature within a specific field of study. It will continue with a systematic synthesis of those sociological studies that have led to a “dialogue” with the concept of hope and that, most often directly or indirectly, have considered hope as a force that mobilizes individuals and social groups to action. The final stage of this path will be reserved for presenting the debate that has opened in recent years around the sociology of hope, both critically and constructively, to provide recommendations for future research that, in line with this perspective, aims to study how to improve the world.

1. Introduction

“Sociology has experienced its crises of interpretation in the crises of each society it proposes to study. The debate about sociological knowledge, the diversity of its theoretical orientations and the antagonisms that oppose one another is a debate about perspectives, ways of seeing that express ways of being. But that express also what society could supposedly be and is not. It is in this frame of reference that sociology is, in the broad sense, a science of hope that gets lost in the growing option of the sociology of the here and now, the sociology of societies where there is no longer a place for historical creation and social transformation”

[1] (pp. 188, 189).

This statement can be considered valid since sociology is the science capable of indicating what is historically possible. Recalling the essential elements of the concept of hope, which are linked precisely to what is possible, sociology can be a sociology of hope because it is a science capable of orienting and guiding change.

If it is well-known what sociology is, what is meant by hope beyond the idea of common sense is less well-known. Before delving, therefore, into this path of systematic reflection on the “sociology of hope”—something that sociologists until a few years ago had not even attempted to develop [2], despite the notion that “hope has been and still is an essential element of human existence” [3] (p. 7)—it is necessary to discuss some of the more peculiar characteristics of hope through some stages of human history that will quickly take us from mythology to our contemporary times, highlighting those aspects and dynamics common to it.

In Greek mythology, hope is conceived both as a “longing for good” and a “counteraction to the evils of the world”, while also looking to the future. According to the story told by Hesiod in his works “The Theogony” and “Works and Days” (dating back to the 8th century BC), after Prometheus stole fire to give it to mankind (a source of ingenuity and innovation), Zeus unleashed his vengeance on all mankind. To carry out his plan, he gave Pandora (Πανδωρα)—etymologically, from the Greek, and from the roots παν (pan, “all”) and δωρον (doron, “gift”)—wife of the brother of Prometheus (Epimetheus), a píthos (large earthenware jar)—generally translated into English with the word box [4]—in which all the evils of the world were locked. He recommended not opening it until the end of her days. Pandora, curious and prompted by the gods, opened the box, and all the evils were spread throughout the world. According to the myth, this was when the problems for men began. Pandora managed to put the lid back on the jar by the will of Zeus. At the bottom, there remained only Elpís (ἐλπίς, literally, the personification of hope) who was unable to escape. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, however, hope, for individuals, is considered a positive and active expectation (motivation to act positively), placing trust in the success of a project’s objective or having confidence in the successful outcome of a project. With the sacred aura of the Middle Ages, on the gates of Hell—in Dante’s most important work—we read, “Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch’intrate” (Abandon all hope, ye who enter!) [5] (Vol. 1, Canto III, 9). This exemplifies the condition that awaits the damned, which is characterized by the absolute denial of the expectation of good (salvation). Considering the latest pontificates, this perspective is confirmed; Benedict XVI [6] dedicates an entire encyclical (Spe Salvi) to hope, which is considered almost interchangeable with the virtue of faith so much so as to describe it as a performative process, capable of producing facts and changing life. Pope Francis for the Jubilee of 2025 chose “Pilgrims of Hope” as its motto [7], given that it was a Jubilee Year proclaimed to foster the restoration of a climate of trust after the COVID−19 pandemic since, in absolute terms, hope translates into the “confident expectation of something good”. Finally, moving from faith to earthly aspects, there is also the motto of the World Social Forum (WSF), “Another world is possible” [8], which “embodied” hope very well since it makes human action fall within the “logic of the possible”—“Not-Yet-Conscious” but “being-in-possibility”. As Bloch [9] argued by overcoming the logic of the hic et nunc, hope is no longer just a social construct but rather a complex personal and social experience.

The elements common to all the ideas of hope (Figure 1) that have spread throughout human history are visible and can be summarized as (A) the temporal dimension projected towards a future perspective; (B) the presence of something that is the object of hope and which pushes individuals to take action to achieve it even knowing that it might not be achieved; and (C) the confident expectation of the successful achievement of the good.

But why talk about the “sociology of hope” in the 21st century? Because, if it is true, as we shall see, that hope is an ontological need of human beings, there are moments in history when the need to hope appears even stronger, and never more so than in today’s society, which seems to be moving from the economic crisis of 2008 and its consequences to the pandemic caused by the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, from the ecological and migration crisis to recent conflicts and to the challenges and threats of the development of artificial intelligence. Fears of the destruction of humanity and the universe have regained strength, and depression and pessimism have become salient features of the social character of our time. For this reason, perhaps today it is useful to revisit the theme of hope and, in particular, a ‘sociology of hope’, since in recent years this discipline has focused too much on the idea of permanent crisis, on the weakness and fragmentation of social bonds, the fluidity of relationships, and the contingency and reversibility of all values. Sociology must “go beyond”—without renouncing its component of analysis and social criticism—and seek out social and cultural experiences that are experiences of solidarity, reciprocity, social creativity, and planning, in other words, of hope. That hope is a complex personal and social experience in terms of the category of “possibility” and, therefore, of the idea that “Another world is possible”.

2. Hope Between the Social Sciences and Human Sciences

In the history of human thought, the value of hope has not always been appreciated. It has, however, always been discussed, with the most intense debates having been proposed in the fields of political philosophy and psychological sciences, especially in the last century. The changes in society that have taken place in the last century and, in particular, in the aftermath of the Second World War have pushed some thinkers to imagine a philosophical anthropology centered on the concept of hope that would combine the aspects discussed above. Starting from very different perspectives, authors such as Hannah Arendt [10,11], Ernst Bloch [9], and Jacques Maritain [12] have understood that hope profoundly has to do with the condition and destiny of humankind. In this context, the temporal dimension of human existence in its dual form of chronos (χρόνος), consisting of a measurable triadic conception (past, present, and future), and kairos (καιρός), an opportunity that can present itself at a given moment, the so-called “due time, the time for”, assumes a primary role in the relationship between the individual and society, as well as in the understanding of the past and the present from a future perspective, which is what characterizes hope.

Beyond the different theoretical approaches of these thinkers, their common goal was to promote a praxis that would allow for an escape from conditions of oppression due to conflicts, dictatorships, or, much more simply, inequality gaps in societies between classes [13,14]. The common thread that binds them is hope (as action, praxis), which becomes the unifying element of another series of concepts (for example, the historicity and the future dimension of time) necessary for us to be able to think of a society founded on humankind and which is, above all, positively different (another possible world). If these are the reflections that have developed in political philosophy in a historical moment that was also very particular for the history of humanity, in the psychological field the debate has been almost completely absorbed by the question of whether or not hope was an emotion or a cognitive aspect.

The idea of hope does not stray far from that expressed by some Enlightenment thinkers and which can be labeled as a “standard definition” and presents itself in the following formula: “a person P hopes that X if P desires X and believes X to be possible but not certain” [15] (p. 62). This leads us to argue that the structure of hope is based on two elements, one desiderative and the other estimative. According to Searle, “hope requires uncertainty about whether the hoped for state actually obtains” [16] (p. 32), and similarly Day states that, if we consider A to be the subject of hope and a proposition P to be the object of hope, “‘A hopes in some degree that P’ entails (1) ‘A wishes in some degree that P’ and (2) ‘A thinks that P is in some degree probable.’ These two tests or conditions of the truth of ‘A hopes that P’ are severally necessary and, it is submitted, jointly sufficient. They may conveniently be called the desiderative and the estimative tests respectively” [17] (p. 98). Going beyond the definitional problem, hope has always been present in human experience and has been considered a motivational drive for positive action by individuals (“I would see in hope another aspect of the life instinct, the creative drive which wars against dissolution and destructiveness” [18] (p. 483)), as well as a positive expectation, the confidence in a good outcome of a project/proposition. In line with this perspective, there is also the work of Erich Fromm according to whom.

“Hope is paradoxical. It is neither passive waiting nor is it unrealistic forcing of circumstances that cannot occur. It is like the crouched tiger, which will jump only when the moment for jumping has come. Neither tired reformism nor pseudo-radical adventurism is an expression of hope. To hope means to be ready at every moment for that which is not yet born, and yet not become desperate if there is no birth in our lifetime. There is no sense in hoping for that which already exists or for that which cannot be. Those whose hope is weak settle down for comfort or for violence; those whose hope is strong see and cherish all signs of new life and are ready every moment to help the birth of that which is ready to be born”

[19] (p. 22).

Fromm analyzes hope as a developmental enabler, clearly distinguishing desire (an element of projection) from hope. The latter is seen as a dynamic force that engages all of an individual’s abilities to plan and achieve goals, not only in terms of goal creation but also, and above all, in their potential for achievement.

A significant theoretical and empirical contribution to psychology, however, was made by Charles R. Snyder and his collaborators. Since the end of the last century, they have developed patterns of concepts and research constructs that are recognized as essential in the analysis and reflection on hope (this applies to psychological studies). For these scholars, “Hope is a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed energy), and (b) pathways (planning to meet goals)” [20] (p. 287). This is how hope theory developed, which represents hope as a cognitive model. It is based on goals, which are the abstract mental objectives that guide human actions; on pathways thinking, which is the ability to generate multiple paths toward desired goals; and, finally, on agency thinking, which implies the ability to initiate and sustain movement along a path. According to Snyder, every individual is intrinsically oriented toward purpose in the future. This openness to purpose can be the element that allows for the recognition of one’s attitude toward life. Thus, hope is not simply a positive expectation (based on the evaluation of positive and negative variables in a given situation and therefore the expectation of realizing the positive ones) because it allows us to live with even the most negative situations and allows us to identify positive and redeeming goals that are highly motivating and therefore capable of success. In other words, hope is a motivational component that represents the mental energy needed to initiate, use, and sustain the implementation of strategies toward intended goals. It is the element that directs action toward the goal, persevering toward its achievement, controlling other factors that might distract from this effort. The fact that hope is the element that directs and drives action is further reinforced by Paolo Freire’s admonition that hope is an existential necessity, if not an imperative, “hope, as an ontological need, demands an anchoring in practice. As ontological need, hope needs in practice in order to become historical concreteness” [21] (p. 9). This is because hope is the root of a method based on denouncing conditions of oppression and the resulting political organization to overcome them. For Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator, the constant reference to the verb “Esperançar” (to place hope) and not the verb “Esperar” (to wait) is significant because the former refers to the practice of hope, to action rather than to desire per se. In his pedagogy of hope, dialogue is the foundational element. Individuals must regain the ability to question in order to overcome the historical model he himself defined as “custodian pedagogy”, which is not only dominant but has also been strengthened by capitalism, pushing individuals into a profound crisis generated by the passive acceptance of a reality impoverished by a lack of interest in other points of view and a future perspective. “Indeed, whenever the future is considered as a pregiven—whether this be as the pure, mechanical repetition of the present or simply because it ‘is what it has to be’—there is no room for utopia, nor therefore for the dream, the option, the decision, or expectancy in the struggle, which is the only way hope exists. There is no room for education. Only for training” [21] (p. 91). The alternative, according to Freire, is therefore constituted by an education that is critical, problematizing, and dialogic. For the Brazilian scholar, education is a “process of consciousness-raising”, which consists of the development of awareness [22]—on the part of the subject—of his own relationship with the world; learning to read and write is not, therefore, the simple acquisition of this ability but the opportunity to face the world in a problematic way.

3. The Idea of Hope in Sociological Studies

We now turn to sociology, which is a discipline that has not paid the necessary attention to the concept of hope (except in the field of sociology of religions, as we will see later), and when it has done so, it has been fragmented (unlike, for example, psychology or political philosophy). With respect to the position taken by sociology, it is easy to agree with the fact that “Sociologists have paid very little attention to hope, and what they have said is fragmentary in nature. It would seem that the classics were more interested in hope than modem sociologists have been, even if it never was at the centre of their attention. It is also clear that sociologists have mostly seen hope in an empirical rather than a normative way” [2] (p. 37). This condition of the discipline has not, however, deterred some sociologists in the last decade from attempting to systematize some studies that have directly or indirectly had hope as their object, as we will see in the next part of this contribution.

Among the masters and classics of sociology, the first place goes to Émile Durkheim who, in his work, The Division of Labor in Society [23], presents one of his many opposing dichotomies and does so by placing optimism and pessimism in a problematic relationship with reference to the role of happiness in the evolution of society. Durkheim, however, fails to clarify the status of hope in relation to the question of human happiness [24], even if hope is strenuously defended against the despair of pessimism. Durkheim’s most interesting argument, however, regards the origin of hope, which is considered a social product of a normative nature. According to Durkheim, it is the belief that things will go well that makes individuals hope:

“The only experimental fact proving that life is generally good is that the great mass of men prefer it to death. To be so, in the average life, happiness must prevail over unhappiness. If the relations were reversed, neither the attachment of men to life, nor its continuance jostled by the facts at each moment, could be understood. Pessimists, it is true, explain the persistence of this phenomenon by the illusions of hope. According to them, if, in spite of the deceptions of experience, we hold on to life, it is because we are wrongly hoping that the future will make up for the past. But even admitting that hope is sufficient to explain the love of life, it does not explain itself. It has not miraculously descended from heaven into our hearts, but it has had to be formed, as all sentiments, within the action of the facts. If, then, men have learned to hope, if, under a blow of misfortune, they have acquired the habit of turning their eyes toward the future, and of awaiting compensations for their present sufferings, it is because they see that these compensations are frequent, that the human organism is at once too supple and too resistant to be easily beaten into despondency, that the moments won by misfortune were exceptional, and that, generally, the balance ended by returning to its former state”

[23] (pp. 245, 246).

Basically, the French sociologist does not exclude the possibility that there is a link between hope and the instinct of self-preservation, even if this is not stated with great force, and, therefore, hope would prevent an individual from committing suicide. Hope, according to Durkheim, represents a collective sentiment learned over time and experience and, as such, something to be cultivated. Hope is an existential resource that can be drawn upon at those particular moments in life that challenge individuals.

References to hope are also found in Max Weber’s political sociology and sociology of religion. On the basis of the first, he argues that Marx’s idea, that socialism will one day be born through the collapse of capitalism, is based on hope [25], while for the second, the reference to hope is found when he analyses the relationship between the poor and religion considering it a “robust motive” that leads those who are “negatively privileged” to turn to religious practice, so much so that he speaks of “hope for compensation” and “hope for salvation” [26] as the motivation that leads the members of the lower class society.

Similarly to classical sociology, which boasts relatively few notable authors on the subject of hope, modern sociology in this century and the last, includes few scholars worthy of note for their studies on hope and still appears fragmented, dealing with concepts that are directly or indirectly linked to the concept of hope (utopia, trust, love, imagination, solidarity, etc.). In the remainder of this paper, we will attempt, in strict chronological order of the original works referenced, to systematize some studies that have directly or indirectly addressed the concept of hope.

The Russian-American sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin, for example, refers to love, which is considered a human energy, hypothesizing that “If love can be viewed as one of the highest energies known, then theoretically, at least, we can talk about the production or generation, the accumulation (or loss), the channeling, transmission, and distribution of this particular energy” [27] (p. 36). Sorokin describes the benefits of the power of love which he defines as altruistic creative love [28,29]. In fact, he asserts—using a medical metaphor—that sick humanity can find a cure in the affirmation of universal altruism, and he does so by presenting numerous examples drawn from the daily lives of human beings: “Love acted as an antidote. Its force created little islands of health amid great sickness. It is this that gives me hope for today […]. Some day—perhaps soon—mankind will learn what individuals have always known: that love is the only truly creative force in the world” [30] (p. 17). He describes the need to move from “tribal altruism or tribal egoism” (altruism that is expressed exclusively in-group, making people indifferent if not aggressive towards other groups or out-groups) to “universal altruism” (altruism that extends beyond belonging to one’s own group to embrace all of humanity, without exception) and concludes by posing a dilemma for all of humanity that has yet to be resolved: “By the mysterious forces of destiny mankind is confronted with a stern dilemma: either to continue its predatory policies of individual and tribal selfishness that lead it to its inevitable doom, or to embark upon the policies of universal solidarity that brings humanity to the aspired for heaven on the earth. It is up to everyone of us which of the two roads we prefer to choose” [27] (p. 489). Sorokin argues that, to justify the idea that the “grace of love” [31] is one of the three highest forces (together with truth and beauty) known to humankind, it is sufficient to know that it exists even if we do not know well the ways in which it is produced and used. The Russian-American sociologist was the precursor of that “positive sociology” [32,33,34]—in analogy with “positive psychology” [35,36]—or of the “humanistic sociology” that some scholars promoted between the end of the last century and the beginning of the third millennium [37,38,39,40] and which could make possible a sociology of hope founded on the centrality of the human being.

As mentioned above, some of the sociological studies that refer to the concept of hope fall within the scope of sociology of religions. One of these is the “provocative and controversial” [41] work by Peter L. Berger [42]. Berger’s work, defined through what he calls “prototypical human gestures” of human experience, attempts to recover the supernatural aspect of the latter since they function as “signals of transcendence”. These prototypes are part of the human experience of everyday life and, therefore, present themselves as universal and, as such, are signals of transcendence that aim to impose order on the chaotic world of human experience (for Berger, a supernatural order). Berger, in his book, presents five gestures as signals of transcendence, albeit by no means exhaustively: (1) the propensity for order, because the human propensity toward order or trust in reality is evident; (2) play, which establishes a temporal structure—be it joyful or painful—that allows us to exit one time and enter another; (3) hope, which represents the quality of the “futurity” of human existence; (4) damnation, which pushes human beings toward different forms of reasoning; and, finally, (5) humor, which allows for the recognition of the discrepancy between humans and the world by relativizing it and implying the apparent overcoming of the finitude of being.

The quality of “futurity” in human existence is expressed through hope since it is capable of transcending the limitations of the present.

“Human existence is always oriented toward the future. Man exists by constantly extending his being into the future, both in his consciousness and in his activity. Put differently, man realizes himself in projects. An essential dimension of this “futurity” of man is hope. It is through hope that men overcome the difficulties of any given here and now. And it is through hope that men find meaning in the face of extreme suffering. A key ingredient of most (but not all) theodicies is hope. The specific content of such hope varies. In earlier periods of human history, when the concept of the individual and his unique worth was not as yet so sharply defined, this hope was commonly invested in the future of the group. […]. Under the impact of secularization, ideologies of this worldly hope have come to the fore as theodicies (the Marxist one being the most important of late). In any case, human hope has always asserted itself most intensely in the face of experiences that seemed to spell utter defeat, most intensely of all in the face of the final defeat of death”

[42] (p. 66).

Hope, therefore, is for Berger a sign of transcendence because, in whatever form it presents itself—provided it is personal—it implies the ultimate rejection of death (even if this is merely an illusion based on human nature), translating it into the passion for life and extending it into the future. The central point of Berger’s argument is the idea of the potential benefits (moral and political) that can be achieved by placing human existence in a perspective that transcends the era in which human beings live. “The ability to de-absolutize the present and view it in proportion is a safeguard against any contemporary fanaticism and, at the same time, a vindication of the courage to do what must be done in a given moment” [43] (p. 58). This work is significant in that it focuses on the need for individuals to realize the true proportions of their experience in the world.

Remaining on the subject of the sociology of religions, the former Dominican Henri Desroche saw utopia and hope as “twin sisters” [44]. Hope is the collective dream-hope of religious utopia, the hope for a different society, and is not the physical utopia of socialism. The millenarian Desroche describes hope through a metaphor known as the miracle of the rope: “In this rite, the officiant throws a rope like a lasso in the air. The rope rises higher and higher in the air. It should fall down. But the officiant assures us that it has mysteriously anchored itself somewhere and to prove it, he or his disciple climbs up the rope. The rope does not give way. It holds. And it carries the weight of the man as he climbs” [44] (p. 1). A little further on, Desroche clarifies that gravity is identified with social determinism. The rope is like a revelation. “To the observer, it seems that there is nothing to keep it up, except for the impalpable and inconsistent words of fantasy, wandering and absurdity. And yet this rope is anchored. It holds. And when humans grab hold of it and pull themselves up, it takes the strain, it maintains its rigidity. If an imagination is thus constituted, it is no less a constitutive imagination, the constructor of social reality” [44] (p. 3). Hope, therefore, is not an abstract concept. For this reason, it must be studied taking into account the contexts and conditions from which it emerges, as well as the ways and meanings it assumes for different subjects. In the first chapter of his book, Desroche distinguishes—always within a sort of theology (hope is one of the theological virtues)—four forms of hope (“peaks of hope”) with their relative limits (“troughs of hope”): as a waking dream (failed hope); as a collective ideation (empty hope); as exuberant expectation (trapped hope); and, finally, as a generalized utopia (unhoped-for hope).

Ancient theology viewed hope as a sociopsychological strategy for the alliance between humanity and God. This idea has remained true (at least for Desroche, who uses it as the basis for all his reasoning), even though not all religions can be perceived as religions of hope. To better understand the aspects outlined by Desroche, this typology is briefly presented.

If hope is like a waking dream—as Aristotle and Plato wanted—then this dream is one of the peaks of hope which, according to Desroche, must be illuminated by sociology in the same way and for the same reasons that the dream illuminates the social. For hope as a collective ideation, the reference is to Durkheim [45], who considers religion not only a system of ideas but also a system of forces that moves the consciences of individuals. As exuberant expectation, it is the form of hope that presents a sort of balance between the aspiration or desirable and desired ideal and the will—here the main reference is to Mauss [46]—and the expectation of the possible realization which is linked to the individual’s capacity. In this way, a sort of balance is created between the subjective demand and the external objective condition. While hope as a generalized utopia—derived from Gramsci [47]—sets the imagination in motion, and is typical of a creative imagination, it generates “creators of creativity”. If these are the sociological concepts of hope identified by Desroche, the “troughs of hope” describe the dark sides of every hope caused by the fact that we may not obtain what we hoped for. This, although presenting some ambiguities, is useful to Desroche in allowing him to no longer consider hope as an illusion but as a mobilizing force of imagined futures that lead to the reconstruction of society. Leaving the sociology of religions, we move towards sociological studies concerning the change in society. An important reference in this sense is a lecture by Ralf Dahrendorf, the 23rd Eleanor Rathbone Memorial Lectures, held on 24 February 1976 at the University of Manchester, entitled Inequality, Hope, and Progress [48]. It constitutes an attempt to transform hope into a useful empirical concept. To be able to achieve this change, he distinguishes the “utopian hope”—deriving it from Marx and the Frankfurt School (in particular from Marcuse and Habermas)—which can be a powerful factor of change even if it does not specify or define one in particular—from “realistic hope”, which is based on the experience of “realizing” (what is possible) the condition to which an individual aspires (hence also the name “effective hope” provided by Swedberg [2]). As a conflictual sociologist, the German scholar maintains that the reawakening of realistic or effective hope is motivated by the awareness of individuals who want to improve their condition of social inequality. These two hopes (“realistic hope” and “effective hope”) coincide because the realistic hope constitutes a very practical type of hope which translates into concrete (“effective hope”). It “motivates people to change their conditions, or their lives, in a variety of ways. It may be a stimulus for the individual to move, either geographically, or in the scales of social status. It may be a challenge for solitary action, in associations, trade unions, political groups, in order to gain shorter working hours for all members. It may be international action, the demand for more voting rights in the International Monetary Fund, or membership in OECD. […] Whether every change brought about under social conditions in which action is sparked off by realistic hope is progress, may be open to doubt; but if there is to be any progress at all, such hope is one of its ingredients” [48] (p. 14).

These last aspects were reiterated by Dahrendorf himself even some years later. “Inequality can be a source of hope and progress in an environment which is sufficiently open to enable people to make good and improve their life chances by their own efforts” [49] (p. 9). Dahrendorf is perhaps the only scholar who has attempted to provide a working definition of hope, even if he does not actually provide a precise definition in this sense.

Remaining in a dimension of sociology that presents itself as a critique of society, there is Bauman, who not only considered hope as the “third camp” of left-wing politics, clarifying that, “If an optimist is someone who believes that we live in the best of all possible worlds, and the pessimist someone who suspects that the optimist may be right, the left places itself in the third camp: that of hope” [50] (p. 10). He had previously also argued that “hope is valid and real even if groundless, that hope needs no proof—it is the world that needs to prove (and will not!) that it is beyond redemption and salvation. Hope is stronger than all imaginable ‘testimony of reality’. Hope is the destiny of humanity, one feature that cannot be defeated” [51] (p. 67). A “sociology of hope in the best sense”, this is what Lyon [52] (p. 296) claims about Bauman’s sociology, whose writings would have offered hope. Bauman’s sociology recognizes many difficult realities of contemporary society, but at the same time these same realities are seen as possibilities for change. For Bauman, subjects in power are at the same time subjects of power. Sociology in these conditions is configured as the tool to discern the conditions of possibility through a dialogue, which also becomes a tool for promoting an active role of every individual (and not only of politicians) in the creation of an integrated and reconciled society.

Temporally closer to us, there are the reflections of Giraud [53], who considers hope as a category of action that assumes different forms within rationality (hope is inherent in every action) even if hope seems to be a sign of the abandonment of rationality, despite the fact that it derives from a projection in time, which requires the definition of means and the identification of an objective, a goal, a purpose, the capacity for commitment and investment in an object. Wherever the action takes place and whatever the interactions between individuals, according to Giraud, hope is the force that mobilizes individuals and social groups to action: “Interrogating hope means questioning behavioral incentives and the production of models of rationality […] modes of cultural appropriation and forms of investment in action” [53] (p. 16). This is independent of the forms that hope takes, which the French scholar himself has identified as an expectation, as an if/then modality, as a projection of oneself and others into the future, as risk-taking, as a consequence and expectation of a future event or as a collective project, and, finally, as a social capacity to postpone the realization of one’s desires. Reflecting on the hope–action relationship therefore also means focusing on social bonds and on what mobilizes individuals and makes them believe in a possible future.

If up to this point the “dialogue” between sociology and hope has been emphasized, the moment in which we begin to speak of a “sociology of hope”, opening up a specific interest and debate, arrives with the publication of an article by two Italian sociologists [54] in the journal The American Sociologist in an issue entitled “Towards a Sociology of Hope” with guest editor Adrian Scribano. In their article, the two scholars ask whether a sociology of hope is possible, seeking to lessen the fragmentation of the theoretical framework and outlining the essential features of what can be defined as a “sociology of hope”, understood as a critical perspective for interpreting today’s society and the processes of change that traverse it.

4. The Sociology of Hope

With the publication of the article Is a Sociology of Hope Possible? An Attempt to Recompose a Theoretical Framework and a Research Programme [54], a debate has opened within a part of sociology about the possibility of speaking or imagining a “sociology of hope”. Gili and Mangone in this article try to do this, and, to do so, rather than giving answers, they pose theoretically founded questions. They do not reconstruct and/or discuss the various definitions of hope that have been proposed over the decades but limit themselves to indicating some suggestions to outline a research program that can develop a sociology of hope through the identification of fundamental forms and dimensions that help to better understand hope through the analysis of some aspects of the human condition. The contribution that this article has made to the sociology of hope has been to represent its dynamics through a grid of five pairs of dichotomous categories (

Table 1. Dynamics of hope through five pairs of dichotomous categories. Author’s summary [54] (pp. 23–29).

Pairs of Dichotomous Categories	Explanation and Meaning
Individual Hope and Collective Hope	Hope is not only individual; nations, social classes, and groups also thrive on hope. This means recognizing that within them, relationships develop that strengthen (or weaken) individual hope.
Hope for the Future or the Past	Hope is directed toward the future, but it can also look to the past. It can, in fact, point toward a new situation or look to a previous condition considered ideal.
Hope and Fear	Objects of hope may be viewed with fear by some because hoping presupposes taking risks. The same object, therefore, can be observed and experienced as a hope or a threat by different individuals.
Realistic Hope and Illusory (or Utopian) Hope	The distinction between realistic and illusory hopes (it is not absolute) is useful because it indicates a polarity in the perspectives of human intention and action. Realism is determined by the correspondence between ends and means, but hope is often measured not by these parameters but by the value and desirability of ends (individuals are only able to say in hindsight whether something was realistic).
Short-Range and Long-Range Hope	Hope is intrinsically linked to the theme of waiting (more or less active and industrious) which can refer to a very near and identifiable future, or to a more distant and indeterminate future.

), which collect and synthesize some aspects of the debate that has opened in the humanities and social sciences on this topic.

A program of sociological analysis of hope, in fact, starting from the idea that sociology as a discipline deals with general phenomena in their various conditions and forms, can only be achieved by identifying some general concepts (closely connected to each other) that can help to understand many different historical phenomena, which, in the case of hope, can be social actors (individual and collective) who are bearers and promoters of hope, the forms of hope, and the historical/social conditions that favor or depress it.

From this first article a debate was started and is still open. The resonance has been such as to also have aroused the interest of the Philippine Sociological Society (PSS), which opened the 2023 annual conference (The Sociology of Hope. Ecologies, Embodiments, and Everyday lives) with a keynote speech entitled “For a Sociology of Hope. Future Horizon and Possible Worlds” [3,55], which in summary argues that hope (in the social sciences) can be considered the lever for overcoming the interregnum—that social condition of crisis in which what is “old dies” but the “new” cannot be born [47]. The dialectic between sociology and hope, in fact, is based on values that do not consider human beings as simple instruments of social systems but as designers capable of improving the very social systems that often fail to meet their needs.

Following this interest, sociologists Gili and Mangone decided to further the reflections opened with the 2023 article [54] by publishing two books a few years later, one in English [56] and one in Italian [57], in which, with a different style (the first more academic/scientific, the second more popular), the two scholars highlight how the theme of hope is at the center of a semantic field in which we find many objects and concepts relevant in and for social theory and sociological research. Without abdicating its constitutive critical nature, which is an essential dimension, bringing hope (the actors, the objects, the dimensions, the conditions of hope) back to the center of sociology’s attention also means reorienting the gaze, redefining the interest of sociology, starting from the idea that it is worth seeking, analyzing, discovering, valorizing what “there is good in this world”. Sociology can and must research social experiences of construction, invention, creativity, small and large, in which hope is reborn and contributes to “imagining” the social world. For this reason, in contemporary society, it makes sense to re-propose the great category of “possibility”, of the imagination of new “possible worlds”, at the center of sociological research. With these two books, Italian sociologists have wanted to put hope back at the center of attention of sociology (but also of the social sciences) as the “driving force of the world”. This in itself is an innovative aspect in the field of specialist literature since sociology (but also the other social sciences) for years, if not decades, has been more oriented towards studying negative aspects of society (crises, conflicts, etc.)—a “negativist” perspective [58]—rather than positive aspects (solidarity, altruism, etc.). In summary, “The sociology of hope is characterised not only by a specific object of analysis—the hopes of human beings—but also by a specific perspective. To say that it is a perspective does not mean that the sociology of hope is a particular sociological approach or paradigm alongside others, but rather that it is a gaze and a sensibility for the human life that, in our opinion, should underlie any sociological reading of society, especially the society of our time” [56] (p. 132). The perspective of the sociology of hope, therefore, places the human being and their daily life at the center, since hope transcends sociocultural, economic, and political divides and, therefore, can be understood as that set of elements that allows both the community and individual members of society to consciously and satisfactorily achieve their own completeness and fulfillment. Before proceeding with the presentation and reflection on the sociology of hope, it is important to clarify two concepts that will be used from now on: perspective and theory. The first does not indicate a particular sociological approach or paradigm alongside others (for example, functionalism or phenomenology) but rather a “lens” for the sociological reading of contemporary society. The second (theory) indicates a particular sociological approach or paradigm.

If Gili & Mangone [54,56] insist on the fact that the sociology of hope is a perspective and not a particular sociological approach or paradigm (or theory), but rather a sensitive observation point on human and social events, at the same time Adrian Scribano [59] ultimately argues that it is a theory, taking no account of what was previously published by the two Italian sociologists. The Argentine scholar, in order to outline “his” sociology of hope, begins by reconstructing the notion of hope through the vision of the women who gave rise to the sociological theory and then presents “some exploratory lines to characterize the central components of a sociology of hope as a practice of feeling and its impact on the process of social structuring” [60] (p. 50) through a long list of components that would characterize hope and, therefore, the sociology of hope. These same components are taken up again (in a less fragmented way) in an article published in a Special Issue (Hope in Difficult Time) of the journal Society in which the guest editor is always Scribano [61], who aims to draw the attention of sociologists to the need to consider hope an important object of study for sociology in this third millennium, and he does so by identifying what he considers to be the central axes for a sociology of hope [61] (pp. 6, 7), so much so as to affirm that the sociology of hope is “a specific field of inquiry. The sociology of hope in its near future has challenges, questions, and urgency, all of which constitute a guide for development, criticism, and possible deconstruction of what has been done and to be done” [61] (pp. 6, 7) and then concludes that “Around hope, a critical sociology can be elaborated that harbors the postcolonial and the intersectional, and also sinks its roots in the old task of the discipline of thinking/making flourishing societies with respect for human beings and all living beings” [61] (p. 8). As readers will be able to notice, the Argentine scholar has developed his idea of sociology of hope, moving from “a sociology of hope as a practice of feeling” to a sociology of hope as a “specific field of inquiry” and then arriving at the statement that the sociology of hope is “a new theory”, or at least this is the subtitle of the book [59], in which on both the blurb of the front matter and on the cover page we can read, “This book explores the sociology of hope. It presents an overview of the “state of the art” of hope in sociology and proposes a new basic theory of hope linked to the classical theoretical traditions of sociology, to the perspective of its founding women, and to the reconstruction of the contributions of the theories of revolution, utopia, social change, and collective action. In an attempt to understand the sociology of hope as a critical theory and a science of life, this book proposes the central elements in theoretical and epistemic terms for establishing connections between ethics, aesthetics, politics of knowledge, and their current strong modifications in the study of society”. Regardless of who writes, any sociology scholar reading these lines will realize that there is a conceptual contradiction that the Argentine scholar does not resolve (and often confuses), namely, that the sociology of hope is different from hope in sociology and that, therefore, if we can indeed speak of “a new basic theory”, it is not a new sociological theory but at most a new theory of hope (but this too remains to be verified). This statement, in reality, is confirmed by the author himself, who writes in the introduction to the book, “is not a ‘simple’ study on hope, but the presentation of a subdisciplinarity field of sociology that is inscribed in a theoretical/empirical geometry coming from: (a) the intersection between the sociology of bodies, emotions and sensations; (b) an epistemic gaze resulting from the articulation between dialectical critical realism, critical theory and critical hermeneutics; and (c) a post-empiricist, post-intersectional, post-colonial, and post-speciesism perspective” [59] (p. 7). In short, Scribano argues about the sociology of hope, considering it a subdiscipline of sociology that is underrecognized within the academic world. In reality, while claiming that the text is about the sociology of hope, it actually addresses the concept of hope by starting from how it has been treated within the classical theoretical framework of sociology, with insights into women sociologists considered founders of the discipline and Latin American studies, alongside other concepts such as utopia, love, and revolution.

5. Concluding Remarks

As can be seen, the debate is open and lively, given the diversity of positions and visions it presents. We hope it will continue, because only through debate can knowledge evolve.

Beyond this, this literature review has highlighted the reasons why it is not only possible but also necessary to develop a sociology of hope. This begins with what was stated in the introduction: that hope, with its key characteristics (the future temporal dimension; the presence of something that is the object of hope and that drives individuals to action to achieve it even though they know it is uncertain; and the confident expectation of the successful achievement of the good) can constitute the impetus for action oriented toward a “new possible world”. This, however, places the individual, as the bearer of universal rights and duties, back at the center of sociological studies. The sociology of hope, therefore, can be achieved by placing human beings and the “relationships and sociocultural phenomena” that involve them at the center, orienting itself toward the rediscovery of human positive values. It is in this that sociology is also seen as a guide, as it goes beyond strictly positivist models of knowledge (the principle of causality).

Gili and Mangone [56] strongly underline that in contemporary society it makes sense to propose a sociology of hope (as a perspective), to try to construct, at least in broad terms, the features of a sociology of hope, highlighting very well what the task of sociology itself is as a discipline that theorizes the social; sociology does not indicate the solutions to problems, but it can do its part and cannot be neutral with respect to the interest that moves research and the orientation of its attention, which pushes its gaze in one direction or another, and which pushes researchers to question themselves on some historical/social phenomena and processes rather than on others. The perspective of the sociology of hope calls into question the reading capabilities of classical representations based on concepts such as role, function, system, and methods based on the analysis of individual attributes, highlighting at the same time the weaknesses of explanations that, while focusing on different elements (the actors, their intentionality) have excluded crucial factors for the understanding of the phenomena in their multidimensionality. This is where the need to develop a sociology of hope arises, in order to find a key to understanding and possible responses to the effects of crises that inevitably impact all the areas of society (economic, political, sociocultural, and environmental) and all its members, fostering bonds of interdependence and conditioning in social relations.