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Entry

Political Communication in the Age of Platforms

by
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos
* and
Iliana Giannouli
Department of Communication and Media Studies, School of Economics and Political Sciences, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 10559 Athens, Greece
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Encyclopedia 2025, 5(2), 77; https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5020077
Submission received: 29 April 2025 / Revised: 24 May 2025 / Accepted: 29 May 2025 / Published: 3 June 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Social Sciences)

Definition

:
Political communication has been extensively studied through both the broader context of societal and political systems, as well as through the lens of mediatization, which emphasizes the intersection of political and media logics. Within this framework, scholars originally identified three distinct stages or eras of political communication. However, recent scholarship has increasingly focused on the transition to a “fourth” era, characterized by the growing impact of digital and social media. This shift, from the “television age” to the “social media age”, has not only introduced new media channels for conveying political messages but has also fundamentally transformed the nature of political communication itself—shifting from top-down, centralized models to more horizontal, decentralized forms of interaction. Current research on the role of social media in political communication reveals a complex landscape. These platforms appear to both enhance and undermine established processes of political deliberation. On the one hand, they provide new avenues for civic engagement and political discourse, while on the other, they contribute to issues such as disinformation, polarization, and the erosion of privacy. This entry aims to offer a comprehensive review of how social media platforms have reshaped the dynamics of political communication and civic participation. It further explores the challenges that accompany these transformations, such as the spread of disinformation, rising political polarization, increasing incivility, and privacy concerns stemming from advanced digital marketing techniques in political contexts.

1. History

Political communication has been widely examined though various approaches. For instance, the notion of mediatization, which highlights the interplay between political and media logic, has been widely used to analyze political communication [1]. According to this approach, media are not merely seen as passive conduits or “windows into the world of politics”, but as influential political actors, capable of shaping the processes of political deliberation [2] (p. 2). The mediatization of politics is often considered through three key developments: the growing importance of media visibility for political actors, the increasing professionalization of political communication, and the personalization of politics [3] (p. 80).
The development of political communication has been categorized by scholars into phases or “ages.” According to Blumler and Kavanagh [4], there are three primary stages. The first, known as the “golden age of parties”, featured substantive political messaging, relatively equal access to mass media, and a voter response shaped by selective exposure and reinforcement [4] (p. 212). The second phase, beginning in the 1960s, coincided with the rise of television as the dominant medium for political messaging. The third phase, spanning from the 1990s to around 2008, introduced greater complexity due to a fragmented audience spread across a diverse media landscape. This era was defined by five key trends: the heightened professionalization of political communication, increased competitive pressure, the rise of populist and anti-elite rhetoric, the diversification of communication tools and formats, and changes in audience behavior and political engagement.
An alternative framework is proposed by Norris (2000) [5], who outlines a typology of campaign styles: pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. The pre-modern campaign era featured stable party–voter relationships and direct interaction. The modern era centers on television as the main medium of communication, marking a shift from party-driven messaging to mass media mediation. The post-modern campaign is shaped by digital innovations and tools such as direct mail, party websites, and the extensive use of public opinion research, including polls and focus groups [6] (p. 427). This era is also marked by a growing reliance on consultants, media strategists, and public relations professionals, emphasizing a more calculated and strategic approach to messaging [7] (p. 144). Similarly, Gibson and Römmele [8] identify three corresponding campaign styles—pre-modern, modern, and professional.
These typologies reflect a broader academic effort to trace the progression of political communication, often emphasizing modernization, professionalization, and the Americanization of campaign strategies [9], [10] (p. 4), [11] (p. 80). Most researchers agree that post-modern campaigns are shaped by two intersecting forces: the societal shift from industrial to post-industrial structures, and the emergence of a new campaign style characterized by strategic professionalism and technologically sophisticated practices.
From this perspective, the professionalization of election campaigns represents a strategic adaptation by political actors to changes in society, political institutions, and the media environment [12]. Scammell [2] (pp. 3–4) defines this professionalization through characteristics such as intensified news management—often referred to as “spin”—and the adoption of a marketing-oriented campaign logic, or what she calls the “rationalization of the campaign”. Similarly, Strömbäck [13] (p. 54) identifies key features of professionalized campaigning: its permanent yet variable nature, centralized campaign operations, expert analysis to engage voters and stakeholders, and effective news management strategies.
However, these phases of political communication should not be viewed as strictly linear or mutually exclusive. Rather, they function as ideal types that capture the dominant characteristics of a given era’s political and media systems [14,15]. In practice, contemporary campaigns often draw on elements from multiple stages, blending legacy methods with modern technologies to meet evolving communication goals.
This entry aims to offer a comprehensive overview of how social media platforms have transformed political discourse, election campaigning, and civic engagement. It further explores the challenges that accompany these transformations—such as the spread of disinformation, rising political polarization, increasing incivility, and privacy concerns stemming from advanced digital marketing techniques in political contexts.

2. Toward the ‘Fourth Era’ of Political Communication

The notion that political campaigns have entered a “fourth” era has gained significant traction. Central to this evolution is the growing influence of data-driven strategies and the convergence of digital platforms [6,16,17]. In this technologically driven landscape, data have become not only the “new currency of society” but a fundamental component of political activity [17] (p. 1). Campaigns are increasingly built around data infrastructures—described as the new “DNA” or “operating system” of modern electoral strategies—enabling sophisticated microtargeting techniques such as psychometric profiling, personality testing, and propensity scoring. These tools allow campaigners to anticipate voter behavior, sometimes even before preferences are fully formed [16] (p. 602). Magin et al. [15] argue that this fourth era marks a shift from group-based targeting to individually tailored campaigning. The Internet enables political actors to bypass traditional media and engage directly with constituents, fostering more personalized communication.
This era is also marked by intensified mediatization and professionalization, with attention becoming the most valuable political commodity [18]. In a fragmented and substantially competitive public sphere, visibility is paramount. Politicians must now operate in an evolving media ecosystem where social media are central. As Strömbäck notes [19] (p. 240), if the third phase of political communication adapted to media logic, the fourth fully adopts it. This shift has restructured political communication around networked platforms, where mediatization is increasingly interactive and participatory [18]. In this new “platform age”, the public is no longer seen as a passive audience but as active participants in the political process. Voters contribute to the dissemination of campaign messages and can exert more influence over their social networks than political actors themselves. In this sense, they function as strategic partners in campaign efforts [11] (p. 82). Digital technopolitics has redefined political deliberation, fostering participatory innovations and a co-authored model of communication, where messages are collaboratively shaped by engaged “prosumers” [20] (p. 433).
However, the interactive promise of social media is not fully realized. As Magin et al. [15] and Casero-Ripollés [21] (p. 966) highlight, political actors often limit genuine engagement, favoring “controlled interactivity”—using platforms primarily to disseminate pre-packaged content with limited responsiveness.
Mediatization in the fourth era reflects deeper symbolic and hegemonic power dynamics. Political elites, media institutions, and citizens engage in political performativity “through, by and on the hegemonic media stage” [22] (pp. 274–275).
This transformation is also evident in the style of political discourse. Substantive debate has declined, giving way to a focus on personal narratives and emotional appeals [11] (p. 81). While candidates have always played a prominent role in campaigns, in the fourth era they are viewed more explicitly “branded”. As Scammell notes [23] (p. 188), branding is now the defining logic of the permanent campaign: the candidate is not merely the messenger, but the message itself. This branding fosters emotional resonance with voters [6] (p. 433).
A defining hallmark of this fourth era is its increasing internationalization. Electoral processes are now influenced by a wider array of actors, both human and automated, some operating across national borders and outside legal or ethical norms. As Roemmele and Gibson observe [16] (p. 597), “both ‘real’ and automated external factors now seek to influence [campaigns], through both orthodox and illegitimate ways”.

3. Social Media Reshape the Dynamics of Political Discourse

Social media platforms—mainly Twitter (now X), Facebook, Instagram, and more recently, TikTok—have become central to modern election campaigns, increasingly overshadowing traditional media as the primary arenas for political discourse. While television retains some influence, digital platforms have transformed political engagement by offering interactive avenues for outreach and mobilization. These platforms are effective in promoting political campaigns, shaping agendas, and influencing public perception [24].
Social networks also enhance political awareness and encourage dialogue between citizens and government representatives [25] (p. 46). E-participation emphasizes the Internet’s potential to enable direct communication between elected officials and their constituents. In this context, Karpf [26] (p. 67) introduces the concept of “politics 2.0”, defined as “the harnessing of the Internet’s lowered transaction costs and condition of information abundance toward the goal of building more participatory, interactive political institutions”.
Research on social media use and voter turnout underscores its democratic potential. Baek [27] find that social media engagement significantly increases voting intentions among previously disengaged individuals, especially when messages come from peers. Moreover, social media help bridge the “information gap” for demographic groups less likely to rely on traditional media, namely women, youth, and the less educated, especially during election campaign periods [28]. Utz’s study [29] on the 2006 Dutch elections highlights how social media allow politicians to reach typically politically inactive individuals. Viewing a candidate’s profile often reinforces existing opinions, yet politicians who actively respond to user comments tend to be viewed more favorably. During elections, politicians are especially motivated to use social media to build direct connections with voters [30,31].
Beyond communication, social media serve a strategic monitoring function. These platforms enable politicians to track their public image, gauge audience sentiment, and respond proactively to potential crises [32]. The adaptability of party messaging based on user engagement has also been documented; parties increasingly tailor their issue strategies in response to online interactions [33]. Furthermore, political communication is shaped by each platform’s unique socio-technical affordances. Twitter (X), for instance, facilitates rapid information dissemination, often supporting a candidate’s personal brand [34,35] (p. 414).
The growing relevance of digital media is particularly evident among younger, digitally native generations. Social media platforms have largely supplanted traditional media as their primary source of political information, acting as equalizers of political interest and participation [36]. These platforms have proved to display a significant function in mobilizing first-time voters who are more inclined to engage politically through direct communication with candidates online than through conventional media channels [37]. This trend—termed the “de-mediation” of politics—reflects broader shifts in media consumption and is further supported by Marquart, Ohme, and Möller’s research [38], who note the waning influence of legacy media as intermediaries. By allowing politicians to bypass journalists and speak directly to constituents, social media have fundamentally altered the power dynamics of political communication [39]. This process directly alters the enduring conventional relationship that exists between journalism and political communication by bringing an end to the established patterns of mutual negotiation between politicians and journalists as elite actors [40] (p. 3).
Nevertheless, recent studies provide evidence against the disintermediation of social media thesis, especially regarding governmental officials’ Facebook public profiles/ pages, which appear to be managed by press officers. These pages are primarily used for the personal branding of politicians rather than promoting the participatory potential of the platforms, which are mainly restricted to emotional feedback through likes and reactions [41]. Indeed, social media have set up new criteria upon which the success of political communication is being evaluated.
Overall, “digital neointermediaries” delegate key decisions about the flow of digital information to developers and algorithms, which apply filtering mechanisms that prioritize content with particular attributes. This indicates that gatekeeping has not disappeared but has instead shifted—from the editorial judgments traditionally performed by journalists and media institutions to algorithmically driven choices on digital platforms [42] (p. 259). Thus, these network gatekeepers exert great influence on “what goes viral” [43] (p. 1252). As Keller and Kleinen-von Königslöw observe [44], in the social media era success is measured less by substantive debate and more by quantifiable engagement—follower counts, likes, and retweets. This has motivated politicians to adopt communication strategies that align with the logic of social media: highly personalized, emotionally charged, and often conflict-driven narratives [45], frequently at the expense of more traditional, policy-focused discourse.

Social Media as a New Arena for the Personalization of Politics

The visual nature of social media platforms has fostered a trend toward personalization in political communication. Van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer [46] (p. 206) identify two aspects of personalization: “individualization”—where media coverage focuses more on individual politicians than on political parties—and “privatization”, which shifts attention from the politician’s public responsibilities to their private life [46] (p. 214).
John Corner offers a systemic model to better understand the complex relationship between media, politics, and the private lives of politicians. According to Corner [47] (pp. 391–395), politicians tend to operate within three overlapping spheres: (a) the sphere of political institutions and processes, in which political decisions are made and political careers are constructed; (b) the sphere of the public and the popular, where politicians are seen as “public figures”; and (c) the private sphere, which has become increasingly important in shaping political identities.
Hermans and Vergeer [48] analyzed 738 candidate websites from 17 countries amidst the European Parliament elections and identified three dimensions of the personalization strategies employed by politicians. The professional dimension emphasizes a candidate’s vocational background to establish credibility and qualifications. The home and family dimension highlights the candidate’s personal life, aiming to foster relatability. The less commonly used personal preference dimension reflects individual interests and hobbies, offering glimpses into the private sphere. In his analysis of politician’s visual portrayals on Instagram, Peng [49] finds that different personalization strategies lead to varying levels of audience engagement. Specifically, images depicting politicians in informal settings, showing their faces, and displaying emotions are more likely to boost engagement. Despite this, many politicians still adhere to a “politics-as-usual” approach, predominantly sharing content and images related to professional activities.
Similarly, Metz, Kruikemeier, and Lecheler [50] argue that impression management on Facebook enhances audience engagement when politicians present themselves in a more emotional and intimate manner. However, other studies highlight that personalization strategies often vary across platforms. Politicians adapt their messaging to align the logic and audience expectations of each platform [51].
It is suggested that the greater emphasis on the privatization of politics reflects the shift from television to the dominance of social media, where audiences prioritize personal attributes over administrative competence. As Battista notes [52] (p. 120), the public today is more interested in characteristics that make politicians seem relatable in everyday life. Twitter (X), by design, is a personalized platform, typically controlled by the individual candidates and oriented around their private personas [53] (p. 132). Golbeck et al. support this view, observing that politicians primarily use Twitter (X) for self-promotion—sharing news articles about themselves and updating followers on their daily routines [54].
Newer platforms like TikTok have further accelerated this trend, with their emphasis on visual content enabling politicians to showcase their personal lives and everyday activities [55]. In today’s landscape of social-media-driven political communication, politicians curate “visual flows”—blending personal and professional elements through photos and videos—to forge visual connections with users [56]. These platforms also democratize political visibility, providing both nationally prominent and local politicians with opportunities to build their personal brand and engage directly with constituents [57].

4. Risks and Challenges in the Platform Era of Political Communication

Social media platforms are not neutral conduits for political communication; rather, they function as dynamic political and social spaces with profound consequences for democracy [21] (p. 970). The unique technological affordances of each platform favor particular content characteristics, often valuing messages based on reach and engagement metrics. This emphasis on virality can overshadow the promotion of substantive political debate. As a result, there is growing concern about a decline in the norms of discursive citizenship, manifested in users’ diminished commitment to individual information care, discourse care, and considered contribution [58] (p. 414). Instead of fostering informed, respectful, and reasoned dialogue, today’s digital environment frequently cultivates division, the spread of disinformation, and hostility. This transformation poses a significant threat to the quality of democratic discourse, as genuine political engagement risks being replaced by superficial interactions and increasing polarization.

4.1. Echo Chambers and the Rise of Polarization

Pfetsch [59] contends that modern political campaigning occurs within a hybrid media landscape, characterized by a complex interaction between traditional media and digital platforms. This evolving media environment has led to the emergence of dissonant public spheres, defined by increasing polarization, fragmented political discourse, and a deterioration of shared democratic values. Consequently, political campaign strategies unfolding in these dissonant public spheres—amid a broader democratic crisis—must adapt to effectively navigate the complexities of modern communication. Common approaches include the use of populist and divisive rhetoric aimed at emotionally engaged audiences, along with the application of data-driven targeting techniques—practices that may further entrench societal divisions. These developments, according to Pfetsch, challenge the normative foundations of liberal democratic practice by weakening deliberation, which is increasingly shaped by the dynamics of the digital attention economy.
Algorithmic feeds, by prioritizing content similar to users’ past engagement [60] (pp. 2–3), might exacerbate polarization within the digital public sphere [61]. A common concern is the creation of online political echo chambers, which selectively expose individuals to like-minded communities, thereby affirming and reinforcing their pre-existing beliefs [62]. Additionally, political expression on social media has been shown to further entrench individuals’ prior political preferences [63].
Focusing on the socio-psychological roots of the echo chambers, Stegmann, Magin, and Stark [64] (p. 259) highlight two key mechanisms: selective exposure (such as the tendency to avoid information challenging one’s beliefs) and gravitation towards like-minded individuals in both online and offline networks (homophily). Through this lens, echo chambers act as incubators for affective polarization, which, coupled with identity-based polarization, fosters the formation of in-groups and out-groups based on perceived similarities and differences along identity lines [65] (p. 49). This process can lead to a significant detachment from and animosity towards external groups and their perspectives. For example, Nguyen [66] argues that non-group members are often epistemically discredited as unreliable, malicious, or dishonest, while in-group members’ epistemic credentials are amplified through heightened trust. This inclination to reinforce existing views fosters misinformation by limiting exposure to the diverse perspectives crucial for enriched debate on political issues [67] (p. 10). Notably, even exposure to ideologically diverse content on social media has paradoxically been found to worsen political polarization [68].
Stegmann, Magin, and Stark [64] (p. 265) further analyze how political actors can instrumentalize echo chambers by employing three key approaches: mobilizing members as voters and campaigners, crafting content specifically tailored to these chambers and their members, and manipulating the perception of public opinion. Similarly, Römmele and Gibson [16] (p. 602) identify a “subversive” form of political campaigning that employs a “new, more intrusive and even manipulative approach... beyond the more straightforward application of political marketing principles”. They explain that the techniques often involve using misinformation or fake news, strategically spread to incite hostility and resentment among voters toward opposing parties. In some cases, such tactics are also used to demobilize or suppress voter turnout in support of political competitors [16] (p. 603).
However, it is worth noting that the issues discussed in this section, such as disinformation, fragmentation, and affective polarization, may not be inherently driven by technological advancements and their capabilities. Instead, these challenges arise in a context where traditional institutional intermediaries, particularly the legacy press, have experienced a significant decline in their influence [69] (p. 258).

4.2. Incivility as a Driver of Polarization

Social media platforms have also contributed to the escalation of behaviors and dynamics collectively referred to as “online toxicity” [70,71,72,73]. This term encompasses a range of harmful interactions, including online harassment [74], hate speech [75], abusive language [76], and incivility [77], all of which have become increasingly prevalent in digital political communication environments. Research on online toxicity indicates that a considerable portion of hostile commentary is directed at topics rather than specific individuals or groups, with toxicity levels varying markedly depending on the issue discussed [78]. Notably, topics with political connotations tend to be particularly divisive within online communities. Key characteristics of online communication—such as the absence of face-to-face interaction, perceived anonymity, and physical distance—are found to be the driving forces behind the escalation of toxicity. These factors foster a communication environment in which individuals feel less restrained, a phenomenon known as the “online disinhibition effect” [79], wherein users express themselves more freely—and often more aggressively—than they would in offline settings. Closely related to this is the phenomenon of toxicity contagion, or the spread of harmful discourse across platforms. In this context, Kim et al. [80] identify three interrelated mechanisms that drive what they term “spirals of toxicity”: amplification, mimicry, and normativity, all of which reinforce and perpetuate hostile communication patterns.
In political communication research, incivility is generally conceptualized in two main ways. First, as a breach of interactional norms, characterized by violations of politeness through rude, disparaging, or profane language. Second, as a rejection of deliberative norms, defined by a lack of respect for opposing viewpoints and an unwillingness to engage constructively with political adversaries [81] (p. 428). However, research has shown that incivility is strategically employed by political actors, as it can produce positive political outcomes. For instance, it can mobilize citizens and heighten interest in political affairs [82,83,84], with incivility often perceived as more entertaining [85]. For example, Mutz and Reeves finds that participants who watch uncivil political debates report higher levels of enjoyment and show increased physiological arousal compared to those who view civil debates [86]. Similarly, uncivil posts by politicians tend to generate higher levels of engagement on social media, suggesting that such tactics, when paired with divisive issues, could mobilize voters and reinforce partisan identities [87].
Skytte (2022) [88] further examine how varying “degrees” of incivility influence electoral responses, particularly among a candidate’s supporters. His findings suggest that partisans are unlikely to penalize incivility—except in extreme cases. Another study finds that exposure to incivility from partisan media aligned with the opposing political party heightens affective polarization among individuals, whereas incivility from media aligned with one’s own party could have a depolarizing effect [89]. Overall, the relationship between political incivility and polarization is inherently two-dimensional. On the one hand, there is a strong preference among partisans for politicians who remain uncompromising, rather than seeking consensus. This dynamic suggests that political elites often engage in uncivil behavior because they are, in effect, encouraged to do so by their supporters [81] (p. 432).

4.3. Microtargeting

The term “surveillance capitalism” coined by Shoshana Zuboff [90] describes a process in which users’ online behaviors are continuously monitored, turning human experience itself into a primary raw material. This phenomenon has enabled a concentration of power in the hands of a few dominant technology firms, raising concerns about privacy erosion, autonomy, and asymmetries of information and influence. In politics, data-driven campaigning is a hallmark of the so-called fourth era of political communication, compelling parties to employ sophisticated techniques for analyzing voter profiles to achieve personalized targeting. However, these practices raise serious concerns about voter privacy and their ability to exercise autonomous, manipulation-free choices [91].
Political microtargeting involves crafting highly tailored messages aimed at narrowly defined voter segments, based on a complex analysis of demographic, consumer, and lifestyle data [92] (p. 62). According to van Dalen [93] (p. 129), political microtargeting as a strategic political communication practice consists of three elements: (a) segmentation (dividing the electorate based on data), (b) tailoring (creating customized messages aimed at specific voter segments), and (c) targeting (delivering messages to these voter segments through communication channels).
Political microtargeting is perceived as a “manipulation machine” [94], designed to maximize voter engagement through the dissemination of customized political messaging [95] (p. 87). Furthermore, through the implementation of microtargeting, political parties may project differed priorities tailored to the specific demographics of the targeted voter, resulting in each voter perceiving a distinct one-issue party [95] (p. 87). Such practices erode the foundations of democratic deliberation, replacing a shared public sphere with the fragmentation of the marketplace of ideas, resulting in a “pseudo-public” form of political discourse [96] (p. 431). As Howard and Kriess argue [97], pervasive voter surveillance threatens associational freedom, democratic debate, and electoral competitiveness. They also note that the continuous monitoring of individuals’ political activities, attitudes, and behaviors can create a chilling effect, discouraging open political expression and active participation in democratic processes.
Financial costs and reliance on digital intermediaries pose additional challenges for political parties [98]. According to Bennett, in the social media landscape, the online privacy practices of political parties are heavily shaped by the corporate policies, technical standards, and default settings established by social media companies. This dependency limits their ability to control data privacy autonomously. Moreover, the high costs associated with microtargeting disproportionately benefit larger, well-funded parties, exacerbating inequalities between wealthy and resource-constrained parties. In fact, relevant research suggests that most political parties lack the resources needed to implement such practices effectively. Thus, while data-driven campaigning is not inherently undemocratic, it reflects the evolving nature of political campaigning in the platform era [99].

4.4. Disinformation

Over the past decade, growing concerns have emerged regarding the harmful aspects of online political communication, particularly due to the widespread dissemination of disinformation and propaganda. Issues such as ideological echo chambers, affective polarization, increasingly sophisticated microtargeting techniques, and emotionally manipulative content have been identified as key factors contributing to public susceptibility to disinformation in political campaigns [100] (p. 289). A variety of actors—including trolls, bots, politicians, hyper-partisan media outlets, fake news websites, and even foreign political entities—play roles in amplifying disinformation and enabling political manipulation [101] (p. 22). “Pseudo-media”, or media outlets that mimic the stylistic conventions of mainstream journalism, further undermine information quality in the digital public sphere [102]. Grounded in conspiracy narratives and distorted portrayals of reality, these outlets use sensationalist, emotionally charged headlines to attract clicks and spread ideologically biased content [103]. These practices are associated with “pseudo-information” [104] (p. 3), a term encompassing various forms of misleading content—such as misinformation and disinformation—that can produce harmful social consequences. It is important to distinguish disinformation from misinformation. While misinformation involves the unintentional spread of falsehoods, disinformation is deliberately designed to deceive. Disinformation often manifests as “adversarial narratives”—narratives that contain elements of truth but are intentionally distorted to create division and conflict among different segments of society [105] (p. 2).
Ortiz [106] (pp. 1–2) describes trolling as encompassing a range of antagonistic, antisocial, or deviant behaviors and motivations online, aimed at provoking other users. While individual trolls may act out of personal gratification, hired trolls are employed by political actors or organizations to spread fake content and comments [101] (p. 23).
Social bots—automated accounts designed to produce content and interact with users on social media—are another strategic tool used to shape online discourse and influence behavior [107]. These bots are frequently deployed by political actors to manipulate the public agenda. Woolley and Howard [108] define this practice as “computational propaganda”, which involves the use of automation, algorithms, and big data analytics to influence public opinion. Such tactics have been documented in efforts to inflate support for political candidates [109], suppress dissent [110], and manipulate debates [111].
Memes have also become a potent tool in contemporary political communication. Hyzen and Van den Bulck [112] (p. 217) describe memes as “discursive weapons” that use humor to go viral, making them effective vehicles for participatory propaganda. While campaigns may craft meme-friendly content, it is often ordinary users who disseminate and reiterate these messages, thereby participating in the propagation of propaganda [112] (pp. 223–224).
A notable shift from disinformation to broader “influence operations” has been observed in various contexts, such as the Philippines. Lanuza and Ong [113] (p. 189) describe these operations as strategic communication efforts aimed at capturing attention, mobilizing audiences, and shaping electoral outcomes. Rather than merely spreading on distorted content, politicians now use social media platforms to bypass traditional media and directly curate interactions with the public.
This practice, termed “strategic curation” by Thorson and Wells [114], involves politicians carefully guiding their followers through a constructed version of reality. Acting as gatekeepers, they emphasize issues that reinforce their image while deflecting attention from potentially damaging topics. In doing so, politicians create an information environment with limited journalistic oversight, enabling the spread of agenda-driven content that boosts their popularity [65] (pp. 45–46). Foreign interference remains a critical concern. State-backed actors have engaged in coordinated efforts to manipulate online political discourse to further geopolitical aims. Notably, claims of Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election prompted extensive research into Russian information policy and tactics [115].
Overall, the evolving landscape of political communication—often characterized as the fourth era of political communication—faces significant challenges. Chief among them is the opportunistic exploitation of algorithmically driven, automated information flows, which undermines truth, trust, and accountability, threatening the integrity of democratic processes [116] (p. 55).

5. Conclusions and Prospects

Social media have unquestionably transformed the landscape of political communication. In effect, their widespread use has acted as a catalyst for public discourse, expanding opportunities for civic engagement. However, this transformation has also compelled political actors to adapt to the logic of social media platforms, often prioritizing visibility, virality, and engagement over substance. As Lanuza and Ong have argued [113] (p. 190), the production of political content online increasingly caters to entertainment-driven metrics, a shift that reflects and reinforces the celebrified and personalistic tendencies of contemporary political culture. More critically, in what has been termed the social media era of political communication, the notion of “a healthy democracy under attack” seems to be more relevant than ever. Disinformation, propaganda, and sophisticated strategies of public opinion manipulation—employed by both domestic and foreign actors—now permeate the digital public sphere. As Sajad notes [117] (p. 8), political marketing is frequently geared toward the fabrication of narratives that actively undermine public trust in verifiable truths, thereby eroding the epistemic foundations of democratic deliberation.
Amid these challenges, content moderation has emerged as a widely discussed countermeasure to the corrosive effects of political disinformation. Yet, as Jones highlights [105], the expansion of regulatory oversight often runs up against the fundamental principles of free expression. Nonetheless, efforts aimed at increasing transparency—both in the strategies employed by platforms to mitigate the manipulation of public opinion [100] (p. 291) and in the disclosure of data practices surrounding political microtargeting [95]—offer a meaningful path forward. Such transparency is essential not only for reinforcing platform accountability but also for safeguarding democratic processes in an increasingly algorithmically mediated public sphere.
Looking ahead, the age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) may bring deeper transformations. As AI technologies permeate various sectors of society, their impact on political communication is becoming increasingly significant. AI is reshaping messaging strategies, transforming voter engagement, and accelerating the spread of both reliable and deceptive information. The integration of AI may lead to greater sophistication in political communication tactics. Algorithms, particularly on social media platforms, play a crucial role in personalizing political content, enabling politicians to tailor their messages to the preferences of specific voter demographics. This targeted approach can boost engagement and potentially enhance electoral success. At the same time, propaganda techniques are likely to become more precise—and potentially more misleading—through the use of automated systems and algorithm-driven content distribution. Overall, the growing presence of AI in political communication signals a profound paradigm shift, marked by hyper-personalized messaging, the faster dissemination of both truthful and false narratives, and new possibilities for political culture.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, S.P. and I.G.; methodology, S.P. and I.G; writing—original draft preparation, I.G.; writing—review and editing, S.P.; supervision, S.P. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Papathanassopoulos, S.; Giannouli, I. Political Communication in the Age of Platforms. Encyclopedia 2025, 5, 77. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5020077

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Papathanassopoulos S, Giannouli I. Political Communication in the Age of Platforms. Encyclopedia. 2025; 5(2):77. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5020077

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Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos, and Iliana Giannouli. 2025. "Political Communication in the Age of Platforms" Encyclopedia 5, no. 2: 77. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5020077

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Papathanassopoulos, S., & Giannouli, I. (2025). Political Communication in the Age of Platforms. Encyclopedia, 5(2), 77. https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5020077

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