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Article

Framing ASEAN in the Platform Age: Media Infrastructures and Geopolitical Narratives in East Asia

by
Seval Yurtcicek Ozaydin
Batten & Black School for International Studies, Lakeland University Japan, 1 Chome-10-5 Yokoami, Tokyo 130-0015, Japan
Journal. Media 2026, 7(1), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia7010012
Submission received: 3 December 2025 / Revised: 6 January 2026 / Accepted: 9 January 2026 / Published: 13 January 2026

Abstract

This study examines how Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is framed in Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean English-language mainstream media during four high-salience geopolitical events (2023–2025). Methodologically, it employs a qualitative comparative framing and discourse analysis of 28 systematically selected news articles from leading outlets in each media system, coded using Entman’s four framing functions (problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation) and supplemented by representational logics and explicitly stated platform-governance indicators. Drawing on framing theory, representation, platform governance, and critical geopolitics, the analysis finds that ASEAN is portrayed not as an autonomous actor but as a flexible signifier within nationally inflected narratives. Chinese media emphasize regional cooperation and developmental connectivity, Japanese outlets foreground liberal-normative order and security alignment, and South Korean coverage prioritizes technocratic and pragmatic partnership. The study argues that ASEAN’s mediated visibility is shaped by recurring editorial framing patterns and, where explicitly invoked, by infrastructural and platform-related cues, revealing ongoing narrative contestation over regional power and legitimacy in East Asia.

1. Introduction

In an era marked by shifting global power dynamics and intensifying regional rivalries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emerged as both a strategic actor and a symbolic battleground in East Asia’s discursive landscape. As China expands its influence through infrastructural initiatives like the Belt and Road, Japan reasserts its diplomatic role through normative frameworks and rule-based order narratives, and South Korea leverages technological partnerships to gain regional clout, ASEAN’s position in media narratives has become a critical site of meaning-making. No longer merely a passive subject of international coverage, ASEAN today functions as a projection screen onto which competing geopolitical visions are cast.
This paper examines how leading media outlets in China, Japan, and South Korea have discursively constructed ASEAN in their coverage of four key geopolitical events between 2023 and 2025. While ASEAN has traditionally been positioned as a neutral broker or buffer zone balancing the interests of major powers, our analysis reveals a more complex and fragmented picture: ASEAN is alternately framed as a cooperative partner, a contested zone, a normative ally, a junior developmental beneficiary, or a pragmatic peer. These representations are not random, but are systematically shaped by each country’s media systems, foreign policy logics, and infrastructural interests.
Situated at the intersection of international communication, critical geopolitics, and digital platform governance, this study argues that ASEAN’s visibility is co-produced through layered processes of media framing, symbolic representation, and infrastructural mediation. Drawing on a comparative discourse analysis of media narratives around four regional developments including trilateral trade talks, South China Sea militarization, U.S.-Philippines defense agreements, and ASEAN’s engagement with China’s digital and physical infrastructures, we explore how ASEAN is both narrated and instrumentalized.
By analyzing news discourse from prominent outlets such as Global Times, China Global Television Network (CGTN), Asahi Shimbun, Japan Times, Yomiuri Shimbun, Korea Herald, and Yonhap News, this study shows that ASEAN is not only reported on but actively constructed as a regional signifier. The differences in tone, narrative structure, and symbolic association across these outlets reveal how media systems operate as geopolitical tools; encoding alignments, anxieties, and aspirations into the representation of ASEAN. Thus, this paper contributes to emerging debates on regional order and media power by revealing how ASEAN’s role in East Asian geopolitics is as much a product of discourse as it is of diplomacy.

Research Questions and Analytic Objectives

To strengthen methodological transparency, this study is guided by the following research questions:
RQ1. How do leading English-language mainstream media outlets in China, Japan, and South Korea frame ASEAN across four high-salience geopolitical events (2023–2025), in terms of problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation?
RQ2. How is ASEAN symbolically positioned in these narratives (e.g., autonomous regional actor, normative ally, junior partner, contested zone, pragmatic peer), and what does this reveal about the representational politics through which ASEAN’s agency is constructed or constrained?
RQ3. How do differences in national media infrastructures and platform-mediated news environments shape the coherence, emphasis, and visibility of these framings across the three media systems?
Analytic objectives.
(a)
To compare cross-national framing patterns across the four events using an interpretive scheme grounded in Entman’s framing functions;
(b)
To identify recurring representational logics through which ASEAN is narrated as an object or subject of regional order;
(c)
To assess how infrastructural and platform conditions (e.g., centralized vs. pluralistic media systems) appear to structure narrative consistency and amplification.

2. Literature Review

Over the past two decades, ASEAN has garnered growing scholarly attention not only as a regional economic bloc but also as a discursive site in media, foreign policy, and public diplomacy (Stacey, 2023; Omeje, 2024; Qiao-Franco et al., 2025). While most academic treatments of ASEAN center on its institutional evolution or regional integration efforts (Acharya, 2009; Beeson, 2009), a parallel literature examines how ASEAN is represented in national and transnational media narratives, particularly in relation to major powers such as China, Japan, and the United States (Chong, 2007; Kurlantzick, 2012).
A strand of empirical scholarship, predating the recent “platform” turn, has examined how ASEAN is portrayed and framed in news coverage, showing that ASEAN’s mediated identity is often shaped through visibility patterns, issue-domain emphasis, and broader geopolitical narrative structures rather than through ASEAN’s own institutional voice. Freeman (2010), for example, analyzes The New York Times and demonstrates how ASEAN is rendered legible through a distinctly Western interpretive lens, comparing the visibility and valence of ASEAN as a regional organization against coverage of individual member states and tracing how framing patterns intersect with foreign policy concerns; this line of work highlights how external media representation can indirectly shape perceptions of ASEAN’s institutional identity and relevance. Complementing this external perspective, Intentilia and Holzhacker (2023) examine online media in Indonesia and the Philippines during ASEAN’s 50th anniversary and connect message framing to ASEAN’s soft power, showing that portrayals are not uniformly positive or negative but vary systematically by issue area (more positive on economic and socio-cultural themes and more negative or contested on political-security themes) and by actor participation (with state actors more likely to generate affirmative depictions than non-state actors), thereby underscoring how institutional legitimacy is communicatively negotiated through who speaks and what domain is emphasized.
Related work also demonstrates that regional journalistic routines and sourcing practices can structure how transnational issues are framed in ASEAN’s English-language press: Freeman (2017), in a decade-long study of climate-change coverage across ASEAN newspapers, finds patterned reliance on government sources and recurring “judgment” versus “solution” framing tendencies, suggesting that framing outcomes are shaped not only by issue content but also by institutionalized news practices that condition how responsibility, agency, and policy responses are represented. Finally, while not centered on ASEAN as an institution per se, Zhang’s (2024) comparative study of ASEAN and Western coverage of a Belt and Road infrastructure project (the Laos–China railway) shows how international news flows, sourcing asymmetries, and competing master narratives influence the frames through which major regional developments are represented—an insight that is particularly relevant for understanding how non-ASEAN media systems may position ASEAN within broader geopolitical-economic storylines, especially in infrastructure-linked contexts. Taken together, these studies establish that portrayals of ASEAN vary across media systems and issue domains and that external news ecologies, sourcing regimes, and narrative repertoires play a consequential role in how ASEAN is publicly imagined, providing a foundation that the present study extends by comparing how Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean English-language mainstream outlets frame ASEAN across high-salience geopolitical events in the contemporary platform age.
Studies in international communication have demonstrated that media framing plays a central role in constructing the perceived role of multilateral actors like ASEAN. Drawing on Entman’s (1993) foundational model, scholars have shown how framing processes operate through the selection and salience of specific aspects of reality, thereby shaping public interpretation of international affairs (de Vreese, 2005; Kim & Barnett, 1996). In this regard, ASEAN’s portrayal in East Asian media systems reveals not only editorial choices, but also deeper geopolitical alignments. Empirical analyses from the region support this view. For instance, Massey (2000), in a comparative study of how three Southeast Asian newspapers framed the 1997–98 haze crisis, found that national media emphasized domestically resonant, non-confrontational frames while avoiding politically sensitive interpretations. This suggests that regional journalism practices reflect national ideologies, even when covering transnational issues.
Existing comparative work on East Asian media, such as those by Iwabuchi (2015), highlight how national media discourses are embedded in broader foreign policy paradigms. Chinese media, for instance, often adopt a strategic narrative aligned with state diplomacy, whereas Japanese and South Korean media engage in more technocratic or development-oriented representations. However, limited attention has been paid to how these framing styles converge or diverge when ASEAN becomes a focal object of media discourse.
Recent developments in media platform studies further complicate the picture. Scholars such as Gillespie (2018), Plantin et al. (2018), and Larkin (2013) have emphasized the role of soft infrastructure and platform governance in shaping international visibility and discursive power. Media coverage of ASEAN is no longer confined to traditional news formats, but circulates through algorithmically mediated platforms like YouTube, X (formerly Twitter), and WeChat, whose infrastructures influence content visibility, engagement, and ideological reinforcement.
Meanwhile, critical geopolitics has emerged as an increasingly relevant framework for understanding how states and media systems co-produce geopolitical imaginaries (Tuathail, 1996; Dodds, 2007). Studies have shown that ASEAN often functions less as a speaking subject and more as a narrative object, its identity and agency shaped by the geopolitical needs of others (Hall, 1997). This insight aligns with Stuart Hall’s theory of symbolic representation, which underscores the asymmetry between who speaks and who is spoken about in global discourse.
In addition to framing and representation theories, broader frameworks in global communication studies provide further analytical depth for understanding ASEAN’s mediated construction. Castells (2009) emphasizes that communication is a form of power, particularly in networked societies where visibility and narrative control are unevenly distributed. This aligns with Nye’s (2004) notion of soft power, whereby states seek to influence others not through coercion but through attraction, often exercised via media and cultural diplomacy. Scholars such as Chadha and Kavoori (2015) have critiqued this dynamic through the lens of media imperialism, showing how global media flows reflect asymmetric power structures rather than equitable cultural exchange. These critiques are especially relevant to ASEAN, whose regional image is shaped by external narrative forces and not necessarily by its own media output. Meanwhile, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology of media systems and Voltmer’s (2012) comparative framework underline how national institutional settings shape not only media-state relations but also the ways in which foreign actors are represented. Couldry and Hepp (2017) extend this conversation by exploring how reality itself is constructed through media practices and infrastructures. Complementing this macro-level view, Ahn et al. (2025) provide evidence of significant cultural variability in communicative norms by analyzing how “face needs” are differently structured in China, Japan, Korea, and the U.S. Their findings underscore that cross-cultural communication in East Asia cannot be reduced to a uniform model, but must account for divergent socio-cognitive frameworks that may shape media production and interpretation.
Together, these perspectives illustrate that ASEAN’s symbolic position in East Asian discourse is not simply a matter of editorial decision-making, but is embedded within deeper structures of communicative power, infrastructural asymmetry, and geopolitical storytelling.
This study seeks to fill a critical gap by combining these theoretical strands: media framing, digital platform studies, critical geopolitics, and representation theory to analyze how ASEAN is differently positioned in the media ecosystems of China, Japan, and South Korea. By focusing on four pivotal geopolitical events between 2023 and 2025, the study provides empirical depth to ongoing discussions about regional order, discursive power, and the infrastructural mediation of international visibility.

3. Theoretical Framework

This study draws on four interrelated theoretical frameworks to interpret the discursive construction of ASEAN in Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean media systems: framing theory, platform governance, mediated geopolitics, and representation theory.

3.1. Framing Theory

Rooted in the work of Goffman (1974) and further developed by Entman (1993), framing theory explains how media construct meaning by emphasizing certain aspects of reality while omitting others. Entman’s (1993) influential model breaks framing into four core functions: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. These dimensions help identify how ASEAN is constructed differently depending on context, ranging from cooperative ally to geopolitical pawn. In our study, framing theory allows for a comparative assessment of how regional narratives shift based on national media imperatives.

3.2. Platform Governance and Digital Infrastructures

As ASEAN increasingly becomes central to regional digital development, this study engages with platform governance literature (Gillespie, 2018; Plantin et al., 2018) and soft infrastructure theory (Larkin, 2013). These perspectives reveal how digital platforms, infrastructure agreements, and algorithmic systems influence media content, distribution, and national narratives. In coverage surrounding connectivity initiatives and digital trade, ASEAN is often framed as a contested digital corridor, where regional powers compete not just for alliances but for infrastructural influence.

3.3. Operationalization in This Study

We use “platform governance” in an empirically bounded way: as the set of infrastructural and governance cues that shape how geopolitical narratives are rendered visible and circulated in digital news environments. Concretely, we operationalize platform governance through textual indicators in the sampled articles, including (a) references to platform infrastructures or digital corridors (e.g., connectivity initiatives, data/tech infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) related digital development); (b) references to platform-mediated visibility dynamics (e.g., algorithmic amplification, information operations, moderation/censorship, disinformation claims); and (c) newsroom/distribution cues that explicitly link news narratives to platform logics (e.g., social media sourcing, platform-based public diplomacy, or platform-driven legitimacy claims). Where such cues are absent, we do not infer platform mechanisms.

3.4. Critical Geopolitics and Mediated Geopolitics

Drawing from critical geopolitics (Tuathail, 1996; Dodds, 2007), this framework emphasizes that geopolitical meanings are actively constructed through discourse and representation. Mediated geopolitics expands this view by focusing on how news media serve as conduits of statecraft. In our analysis, East Asian media frame ASEAN either as a stabilizing force, a battleground for influence, or a legitimizer of strategic ambitions, thus demonstrating how media participate in the discursive construction of space, threat, and alliance.

3.5. Representation Theory

Inspired by Hall (1997), this perspective interrogates how entities like ASEAN are symbolically produced in discourse. ASEAN is not only described but is represented in ways that shape its perceived identity, agency, and role in world affairs. In Chinese media, ASEAN may be cast as deferential or manipulated; in Japanese media, as a rational rules-based actor; in South Korean coverage, as a technocratic peer. Yet across these narratives, ASEAN often appears as a “geopolitical void”, a flexible signifier filled with meaning by external powers. This concept draws attention to the asymmetrical dynamics of voice and representation in regional storytelling.

3.6. Linking Theory to Findings

To ensure analytical coherence, we map each of the four key theoretical frameworks onto the central empirical insights derived from our case analysis as shown in Table 1.
This alignment strengthens the interpretive validity of the study and demonstrates how ASEAN’s visibility is not a neutral outcome, but the result of layered narrative, institutional, and infrastructural dynamics.

4. Methodology

This study employed a qualitative comparative analysis to examine how ASEAN is framed in the English-language mainstream media of China (Global Times, CGTN), Japan (Asahi Shimbun, Japan Times, Yomiuri Shimbun), and South Korea (Korea Herald, Yonhap News, Korea Times). The analysis focused on four strategically significant geopolitical events between 2023 and 2025, selected for their transnational relevance and high media salience, listed in Table 2.
A total of 28 news articles were systematically selected according to the following criteria:
  • Direct reference to ASEAN, ASEAN member states, or their leaders.
  • Inclusion of geopolitical actors from at least two of the three East Asian countries.
  • Relevance to themes of security, economic cooperation, or regional governance.
Each article was manually coded using an interpretive framing scheme based on Entman’s (1993) four dimensions: problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. The coding further accounted for symbolic language, metaphors, and narrative tone. Representational logics such as paternalism, alliance-building, or developmentalism were also identified to highlight deeper ideological undercurrents.

4.1. Case Selection (Events)

The four events were selected purposively as analytically decisive cases because they (a) generated high-salience regional coverage in East Asia, (b) positioned ASEAN as an explicit institutional actor or organizing geopolitical signifier, and (c) vary across issue domains central to contemporary “platform-age” geopolitics, security alignment, economic/trade coordination, and infrastructure-led development. This maximum-variation design supports cross-case comparison of how ASEAN is framed under differing national media-system conditions across 2023–2025.

4.2. Outlet Selection Criteria

Outlets were selected based on
(1)
agenda-setting relevance and national reach within each media system;
(2)
stable, accessible English-language publication streams to ensure cross-national comparability;
(3)
regular coverage of foreign policy and regional affairs; and
(4)
variation in institutional positioning and media-system constraints (e.g., more centralized/state-aligned versus more pluralistic/market-oriented environments).

4.3. Corpus Construction and Screening

For each event, a structured retrieval protocol was applied within a defined time window around the focal development (announcement, diplomatic response, and immediate follow-up). Articles were located via outlet archives and site-restricted searches using keyword strings combining “ASEAN” with event-specific terms (e.g., Vietnam/Philippines/South China Sea; trilateral trade; tariffs; Belt and Road/BRI). Items were screened to retain texts in which ASEAN (or ASEAN member states explicitly framed in relation to ASEAN-relevant regional dynamics) was central rather than incidental. Exclusion rules removed duplicates, brief passing mentions, and syndicated republications. To mitigate concerns about selective sampling, the final analytic sample was constructed to capture framing variation by including both straight-news and interpretive coverage where available, and by recording and retaining disconfirming framings (negative cases) during the analytic memo process rather than excluding them.

Analytic Procedure, Reflexivity, and Reliability

All articles were coded using a codebook grounded in Entman’s framing functions (problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, treatment recommendation) and supplemented by representational logics (e.g., normative ally, cooperative beneficiary, pragmatic partner, developmental dependence). Coding proceeded iteratively in two passes: a first descriptive pass to identify frame elements and recurring narrative devices (metaphors, evaluative language, actor positioning), and a second comparative pass to refine categories and trace cross-case patterns. Because interpretive framing analysis involves judgment, analytic decisions and borderline cases were documented through memoing and negative-case analysis. To enhance reliability, a subset of articles was re-coded after a time interval to assess coding stability, and ambiguous cases were checked against codebook definitions and recorded transparently in the audit trail.
In addition to analysis, the study incorporated a platform governance lens, considering how centralized versus pluralistic media infrastructures shape narrative cohesion, editorial tone, and visibility across traditional and digital outlets. The analysis also engaged a critical geopolitics perspective to interpret how ASEAN is spatially and symbolically positioned in relation to strategic competition among major powers.
In addition to Entman’s four framing functions, we applied a supplementary coding layer for platform governance indicators:
(1)
infrastructural references (digital connectivity, data/tech infrastructure, platform ecosystems);
(2)
governance references (moderation/censorship, disinformation, regulatory or security claims about platforms); and
(3)
visibility/distribution references (algorithmic reach, online circulation, platform-based public diplomacy).
These indicators were coded only when explicitly present in the text; interpretive claims about platform governance are therefore limited to cases where such cues appear.
All media narratives were triangulated against official government press releases and public diplomatic statements to assess alignment or divergence between state discourse and media representation.

4.4. Limitations

This study focuses exclusively on English-language media, which may not fully capture the nuances of domestic-language narratives. Moreover, the degree of state influence over media varies significantly across the three countries: high in China, moderate in South Korea, and relatively low in Japan. As such, media content does not always map directly onto foreign policy intent. The small sample size limits the generalizability of findings, though it allows for in-depth, theory-informed textual analysis. Future research could expand the scope to include social media platforms or conduct longitudinal analysis across multiple administrations.

5. Findings: Comparative Media Framing of ASEAN (2023–2025)

Analytic note: To address concerns about the separation of description and inference, this section reports (i) textual indicators and framing elements present in the sampled articles (problem definitions, causal attributions, moral evaluations, and treatment recommendations) and (ii) interpretive implications derived from these recurring patterns. Interpretive claims are therefore presented as inferences grounded in the cited texts rather than as direct evidence of state intent.
The following section presents the results of our comparative media analysis, focusing on how ASEAN is represented across the mainstream English-language media outlets of China, Japan, and South Korea. Building upon Entman’s (1993) framing theory, alongside representational theory, platform governance, and critical geopolitics, the analysis investigates the problem definitions, causal attributions, moral evaluations, and treatment recommendations embedded within the sampled news narratives. By examining four major geopolitical developments between 2023 and 2025, this section identifies shifting portrayals of ASEAN, variously positioned as a normative partner, a pragmatic peer, or an object of strategic contestation, across the three media systems. Each event is analyzed thematically across the three national contexts to identify convergences, divergences, and ideological subtexts in regional discourse.

5.1. Comparative Event Analysis

In this section, we analyze how three major East Asian media systems frame ASEAN in the context of four significant geopolitical developments between 2023 and 2025. Drawing on framing theory, representation theory, platform governance, and critical geopolitics, we examine how ASEAN is discursively constructed through competing narratives that are consistent with each country’s positioning in the emerging regional order, as summarized in Table 3.
Across the sampled coverage, framing frequently aligns with a broader ideological and strategic rivalry, often articulated as a contest between a U.S.-aligned security order (foregrounded in Japanese and, to a lesser extent, South Korean reporting) and China-centered regionalism (foregrounded in Chinese reporting). At the same time, an additional layer of regional economic pragmatism is also visible. Despite their contrasting alignments, Japan, China, and South Korea converge in depicting deeper regional economic integration as a response to external disruptions such as the U.S. tariff regime associated with the Trump administration. This coexistence of ideological rivalry and economic convergence helps contextualize the shifting representations of ASEAN in East Asian media discourse.

5.2. Cross-Case Interpretation

While the comparative event analysis delineates discursive variations across China, Japan, and South Korea, the synthesis below offers interpretive implications that go beyond description. We distinguish between (i) patterns directly observable in the sampled articles’ language and coded framing functions and (ii) inferences about how those patterns resonate with broader geopolitical narratives and media-system conditions. Accordingly, claims in this subsection are framed as interpretations grounded in recurring textual indicators rather than as direct evidence of state intent.
Across the sampled cases, ASEAN is framed less as a speaking agent and more as a strategic narrative site. Its identity is frequently constructed through external positioning, appearing as a cooperative partner within China-centered developmental narratives, a normative partner within Japan’s liberal Indo-Pacific register, or a pragmatic interlocutor within South Korea’s techno-economic diplomacy. This pattern is consistent with Stuart Hall’s (1997) insight that symbolic representation can be asymmetrical: some actors speak, while others are spoken for. Interpreted through this lens, ASEAN is constructed as a geopolitical subject whose agency is mediated and often constrained within the narrative.
From a critical geopolitics perspective, these representational patterns can be interpreted as aligning with broader policy discourses. Japanese coverage that positions ASEAN as a stabilizing force within a “rule-based order” can be read as reinforcing Japan’s self-positioning as a regional stakeholder. Chinese coverage that portrays ASEAN as a beneficiary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) frames China-led infrastructure as a cooperative regional horizon, a narrative consistent with infrastructural diplomacy. South Korean coverage, which is comparatively technocratic and economically oriented, is consistent with a pragmatic register often described as hedging, balancing security alignment and economic engagement.
Moreover, the analysis highlights how media-system conditions and platform infrastructures may shape ASEAN’s mediated visibility. In the Chinese case, the sampled coverage exhibits a comparatively consistent narrative register and recurring metaphoric vocabulary, which is compatible with accounts of centralized agenda-setting and amplification. In Japan, a pluralistic news ecology allows for variation and critical inflection, even as dominant themes repeatedly foreground a rules-based order and alliance-oriented security narratives. In South Korea, commercially oriented reporting tends to prioritize trade, industry, and development cooperation, thereby downplaying overt ideological confrontation and presenting ASEAN as a practical arena for innovation and cooperation.
Notably, convergences also emerge. The coverage of trilateral trade talks in 2025 marks a relatively rare moment of narrative alignment, where ASEAN is simultaneously framed as an integrative force against Western protectionism. This convergence suggests ASEAN’s symbolic utility as a stabilizing reference point in moments of systemic disruption. Yet, such harmony appears fragile, contingent upon shared threat perceptions rather than enduring consensus.
These findings point to the broader political stakes of mediated visibility. ASEAN’s image in East Asian media is not simply a neutral reflection of events, but a projection shaped by competing visions of regional order. Whether framed as a junior partner, an equal peer, or a developmental site, ASEAN is used discursively to articulate national priorities and preferred regional futures. In this sense, media framing can be read as participating in broader practices of statecraft, with discursive constructions operating as resources for influence and alignment.
Event 1: Strategic Realignments in ASEAN-Vietnam Relations Amid Sino-Japanese Rivalry.
Japanese Framing: In two key articles from November and December 2023, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun places ASEAN and Vietnam within a security-oriented discourse that underscores Japan’s proactive regional role. Japan has framed the ASEAN-Vietnam realignment as part of a normative security alliance (Asahi Shimbun, 2023a, 2023b). The framing emphasizes heightened cooperation on defense and economic resilience in response to what is described as growing instability emanating from China. This depiction of ASEAN is not passive; it is framed as a cooperative bloc capable of jointly resisting external pressures, particularly from China. Japanese Framing of Event 1 is presented in Table 4.
The repeated emphasis on “shared values,” “maritime freedom,” and “democratic partnership” supports an interpretation that the coverage normatively aligns ASEAN with Japan and its allies. In the sampled texts, ASEAN is thereby positioned as compatible with a liberal international order, though this alignment is inferred from recurring framing cues rather than stated as an explicit strategic objective.
Chinese Framing: Chinese coverage from CGTN and Global Times reframes the same ASEAN-Vietnam developments through a discourse of regional solidarity and shared development. Chinese media emphasized solidarity and economic partnership with Vietnam (CGTN, 2023; Global Times, 2023). Xi Jinping’s diplomatic visits are cast as celebratory moments of “joint prosperity” and “win-win cooperation”. The narrative counters Japan’s security emphasis by presenting China as a benevolent economic leader rather than a geopolitical threat. Chinese Framing of Event 1 is presented in Table 5.
Crucially, ASEAN is framed less as an autonomous actor and more as a junior partner benefiting from China’s rise. This framing reinforces a developmental hierarchy and can be read as situating ASEAN within a China-centered regional narrative, rather than foregrounding ASEAN autonomy.
Korean Framing: South Korean outlets frame the event more pragmatically. South Korean media focused on economic cooperation without securitizing the event (Korea Herald, 2023; Yonhap News Agency, 2023). The Korea Herald’s coverage focuses on bilateral trade and people-to-people ties, steering away from overt geopolitical or ideological discourse. Yonhap reports highlight Korea’s diplomatic engagements with Vietnam as part of broader multilateralism. Korean Framing of Event 1 is presented in Table 6.
Here, ASEAN is framed as a market actor and a peer in economic cooperation. The relative absence of overt political or security discourse is consistent with a pragmatic register in South Korean coverage, often discussed in the regional politics literature as “hedging”, while noting that the sampled articles themselves remain primarily economic in emphasis.
Event 2: Competing Security Narratives and Strategic Partnerships in the South China Sea.
Japanese Framing: In two key articles from July 2024, Asahi Shimbun emphasizes Japan’s alignment with the U.S. in strengthening the defense capabilities of the Philippines, citing China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The coverage positions ASEAN, particularly the Philippines, as an essential partner in preserving regional security and promoting a rules-based maritime order. Japanese media emphasized alliance-building as a legitimate response to maritime tensions (Asahi Shimbun, 2024a, 2024b). Japanese Framing of Event 2 is presented in Table 7.
ASEAN is thus constructed as a key stakeholder in defending international norms, with the Philippines framed as both vulnerable and vital to regional stability. Japan’s media underscores its role as a security provider in a multilateral framework supported by U.S. policy.
Chinese Framing: Chinese state media reacts strongly against the Philippines-U.S. defense agreements, portraying them as destabilizing and provocative. Chinese outlets framed the U.S.-Philippines pact as destabilizing (Global Times, 2024a, 2024b; CGTN, 2024a, 2024b). The narrative stresses that such moves invite military confrontation and threaten regional peace. ASEAN is depicted as a region at risk of becoming a battleground due to U.S.-led militarization. Chinese Framing of Event 2 is presented in Table 8.
The Philippines is criticized as being a “pawn” in great power competition, and ASEAN is urged to avoid entanglement with Western alliances. China positions itself as the custodian of peace and regional autonomy.
Korean Framing: South Korea’s media takes a distinctive approach, centering on economic and industrial cooperation rather than military tension. South Korean media focused on defense industry cooperation and bilateral diplomacy (Korea Times, 2024a, 2024b; Yonhap News Agency, 2024). Notably, HD Hyundai’s defense contract with the U.S. Navy is framed as a breakthrough for South Korean industry. The diplomatic engagements between South Korea and the Philippines are positioned within broader development goals. Korean Framing of Event 2 is presented in Table 9.
ASEAN, particularly the Philippines, is represented as a growing defense partner and commercial ally. Rather than foregrounding ideological discourse, the sampled Korean coverage emphasizes practical cooperation and calibrated security engagement. This emphasis is consistent with a balanced approach in which ties with ASEAN are deepened alongside participation in U.S.-aligned defense structures.
Event 3: Trilateral Economic Convergence Amid U.S. Trade Pressures.
Japanese Framing: Japanese media emphasizes ASEAN’s strategic value in trilateral talks between Japan, South Korea, and China, particularly in light of looming U.S. tariffs under Trump-era trade policies. In the sampled texts, ASEAN is framed as compatible with rule-based trade integration and as a stabilizing partner in the face of U.S. protectionism (Asahi Shimbun, 2025a; Japan Times, 2025). Japan’s role is depicted as mediating between regional cooperation and liberal economic norms. Japanese Framing of Event 3 is presented in Table 10.
Chinese Framing: Chinese outlets frame the trilateral convergence as a stabilizing force against Western anti-globalization currents. Chinese outlets emphasized ASEAN’s integration into a China-led regional economic order (Global Times, 2025a; CGTN, 2025a). ASEAN is portrayed as part of a broader Chinese-led economic order that prioritizes openness, interdependence, and long-term prosperity. Chinese Framing of Event 3 is presented in Table 11.
Korean Framing: South Korean media approaches the trilateral discussions with a technocratic and logistical focus. ASEAN is positioned as an important partner in managing supply chain risks and harmonizing regional trade standards. South Korean coverage focused on technocratic cooperation and logistical resilience (Yonhap News Agency, 2025a; Korea Times, 2025). Korean Framing of Event 3 is presented in Table 12.
Event 4: ASEAN and the Belt and Road Initiative: Developmental Cooperation or Strategic Dependence?
Japanese Framing: Japanese media reporting in April 2025 frames ASEAN’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with caution and subtle skepticism. Japanese outlets highlighted ASEAN’s cautious diversification amid Chinese economic influence (Asahi Shimbun, 2025b; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2025). While acknowledging the economic potential of regional integration, the coverage emphasizes ASEAN’s strategic calculus in seeking to reduce overdependence on China amid ongoing tariff disputes with the United States. ASEAN is thus depicted as a balancing actor navigating structural asymmetries. Japanese Framing of Event 4 is presented in Table 13.
The coverage positions ASEAN as a semi-autonomous economic actor that is attentive to geopolitical risks. Japan is presented as a partner offering infrastructure investment alternatives that are framed as less politically conditional than the BRI, an interpretive contrast inferred from recurring evaluative language in the sampled articles.
Chinese Framing: In contrast, Chinese media presents the BRI as a flourishing model of mutual development and harmony. Chinese media employed metaphor-rich narratives portraying ASEAN as a partner in shared prosperity (Global Times, 2025b; CGTN, 2025b, 2025c). ASEAN is integrated into a vision of inclusive globalization in which the BRI is framed not only as an economic initiative but also as a stabilizing regional framework. The metaphoric language of “ships of friendship” and “community of destiny” reinforces a leadership-centered narrative of regional order. Chinese Framing of Event 4 is presented in Table 14.
In this framing, ASEAN’s agency is downplayed in favor of collective prosperity under Chinese leadership. Analytically, the aspirational tone can be interpreted as legitimizing a benevolent-leadership narrative in which China appears as benefactor and architect of regional order, though this reading remains an inference from framing patterns rather than a directly stated intent.
Korean Framing: South Korean media takes a technocratic and economically focused angle. South Korean media took a developmental tone, focusing on collaborative industrial initiatives (Yonhap News Agency, 2025b; Korea Herald, 2025). Coverage highlights joint industrial zones such as the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” initiative, presenting ASEAN as a platform for developmental experimentation and innovation. The discourse is notably devoid of geopolitical tension. Korean Framing of Event 4 is presented in Table 15.
ASEAN is framed as a laboratory for South Korea’s global development diplomacy. Compared to Japan’s more explicitly security- and norms-inflected register and China’s leadership-centered developmental register, Korean discourse is less ideologically explicit, emphasizing co-development and economic partnership rather than overt alignment.

6. Synthesis and Theoretical Implications

This synthesis is explicitly interpretive: it consolidates the cross-event patterns identified in Section 5 and discusses their theoretical implications. Throughout, we distinguish between what the sampled articles explicitly state and what we infer from recurring framing patterns and narrative devices.
Across the diverse events and evolving geopolitical context, ASEAN’s mediated visibility in East Asian media emerges not as a fixed identity but as a fluid construction shaped through historically situated narratives, media infrastructures, and ideological alignments. Rather than separating findings into theoretical boxes, we now synthesize the comparative framing through an integrated, interpretive discussion.
Throughout the analyzed events, Japanese media consistently framed ASEAN as a stabilizing partner and an actor capable of contributing to a rules-based regional order. Across the sampled Japanese articles, recurring references to a “rule-based order,” alliance cooperation, and maritime security position ASEAN states as relevant partners in regional stabilization. Interpreted through representation theory, ASEAN is cast as compatible with Japan’s regional identity as a “responsible stakeholder” within a liberal Indo-Pacific vision. Framing theory deepens this reading: moral evaluations and treatment recommendations frequently justify proactive roles for Japan and portray selected ASEAN states as normatively compatible partners, indicating a patterned framing logic grounded in the cited texts.
In contrast, Chinese media reconstructs ASEAN within a narrative of collective prosperity and cultural proximity. In the sampled Chinese articles, metaphors such as “ships of friendship” and “shared destiny” recur, positioning ASEAN as both a beneficiary of and witness to China-led regionalism. Analytically, this register can be interpreted as paternalistic in tone, emphasizing benevolent leadership and shared prosperity. The BRI coverage also illustrates how platform governance may shape narrative visibility in centralized media settings: the sampled articles display a relatively unified interpretive register, with limited contestation of the BRI frame, and foreground a consistent treatment recommendation oriented toward cooperation and integration. Representation theory is evident in how ASEAN is symbolically folded into China’s development imaginary as a cooperative partner whose autonomy is less foregrounded than regional harmony.
South Korean media offers a more technocratic and commercially grounded framing. ASEAN is rarely moralized or securitized; instead, it appears as a pragmatic collaborator in development, trade logistics, and industrial policy. Across the sampled Korean articles, coverage foregrounds economic cooperation and policy pragmatism while avoiding sustained ideological commitments. Interpreted through critical geopolitics, this suggests that geopolitical contestation is frequently backgrounded in favor of economic diplomacy. ASEAN is thus framed less as contested territory and more as a practical platform for investment, industrial partnerships, and innovation-oriented cooperation.
Importantly, what emerges across all three systems is not merely divergence but patterned convergence. The trilateral economic cooperation in response to U.S. tariffs produced a rare moment of narrative alignment, with all three countries portraying ASEAN as a necessary interlocutor for preserving regional stability. Here, framing theory and critical geopolitics intersect: even while geopolitical logics diverge, ASEAN can be understood as a discursive anchor: a stabilizing reference point invoked in response to shared vulnerability.
Ultimately, ASEAN’s mediated presence in East Asian media is not just reactive but generative in the sense that narratives open and close possibilities for alliance, development, or containment, depending on who is speaking and through what medium. The comparative analysis indicates that ASEAN is not simply a passive object of reporting, but a constructed geopolitical referent embedded within broader discursive contests over regional governance. This interpretation is grounded in the recurring ways the sampled articles assign agency, responsibility, and strategic salience to ASEAN across security, economic, and development contexts.
In this way, framing theory, representation theory, platform governance, and critical geopolitics are not parallel lenses but overlapping terrains. Together, they reveal the stakes of ASEAN’s visibility: not just how it is seen, but how it is made meaningful in competing visions of Asia’s future.

7. Discussion and Conclusions

7.1. Discussion: Positioning the Findings Within the Literature

This study examined how ASEAN was framed across four high-salience geopolitical events (2023–2025) in English-language coverage from leading outlets in China, Japan, and South Korea. The comparative framing analysis showed that ASEAN is not treated as a stable geopolitical subject across East Asian media environments; rather, ASEAN’s role is narratively constructed through recurring frame functions (problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation) and through patterned forms of actor-positioning. Across the corpus, ASEAN most consistently appears as
(i)
a partner and stabilizer in rules-based order narratives,
(ii)
a pragmatic site of economic and infrastructural coordination, or
(iii)
an arena in which regional order is negotiated through competing development and security imaginaries.
These findings reinforce and extend core insights from framing research: frames do not merely describe events; they actively organize interpretation by selecting aspects of reality and making them salient (Entman, 1993). In line with comparative framing scholarship, the analysis indicates that similar regional events can be rendered differently depending on national narrative repertoires and editorial conventions. The cross-country contrasts observed here are therefore best understood as differences in frame packages—recurring combinations of attribution, evaluation, and policy implication—rather than as simple differences in tone. By showing how ASEAN is alternately positioned as an autonomous institutional actor, a cooperative beneficiary, or a strategic intermediary, the study also connects to representation-oriented approaches that emphasize how geopolitical actors are constituted discursively through narrative roles, moral hierarchies, and relational dependencies.
The results also speak to long-standing debates in critical geopolitics regarding media as a site where geopolitical meaning is produced, normalized, and contested. However, the present analysis does not treat the news texts as direct evidence of state intent. Instead, it treats them as public narratives that circulate within, and sometimes align with, broader national discursive formations. From this perspective, the significance of the observed differences is not that the articles “reveal” foreign policy strategy, but that they show how ASEAN-related regional order is made intelligible to audiences through recurrent storylines—some emphasizing normative alignment and stability, others emphasizing pragmatic connectivity and economic development, and others foregrounding strategic rivalry as the organizing context.
Responding to calls in platform and infrastructure scholarship to analyze the “conditions of visibility” under contemporary media environments, the study offers a cautious contribution to platform-age geopolitics. “Platform governance” is treated here as an empirically bounded signal rather than a universal mechanism: when the coverage explicitly invokes infrastructural projects, digital connectivity, governance concerns about information operations, or platform-mediated legitimacy claims, these cues illuminate how geopolitical narratives are anchored to infrastructural imaginaries and mediated visibility dynamics. At the same time, many articles in the corpus remain conventionally geopolitical in register (diplomacy, trade, security) without explicit reference to platform mechanisms. This pattern suggests that platform governance may operate unevenly as a narrative resource—highly salient in some event contexts (e.g., infrastructure-led development narratives) and muted in others. This finding aligns with recent scholarship cautioning against assuming that “platform logics” are equally legible across all policy domains and media systems; instead, their empirical presence is contingent and must be demonstrated through observable textual indicators.
Finally, the discussion can be situated within prior comparative media research on Southeast Asia and regional institutions. Earlier work on regional framing demonstrates that ASEAN is often narrated through functional roles (stabilizer, mediator, economic bloc) that shift with crisis type and with the geopolitical interests emphasized by national media. The present study extends that insight by showing how ASEAN’s role is also shaped through infrastructural and platform-age idioms; connectivity, digital corridors, and governance concerns about information environments, when these idioms are activated in coverage. In doing so, the article contributes to scholarship on regionalism and mediated diplomacy by treating ASEAN not only as a subject of policy reporting, but also as a discursive object whose legitimacy and agency are narratively negotiated across media systems.

7.2. Moderated Conclusions and Contribution

The study’s central conclusion is that ASEAN’s mediated identity is not unitary: across the sampled outlets and events, ASEAN is framed through distinct narrative roles and evaluative logics that foreground different problems (regional stability, economic coordination, strategic rivalry), attribute different causes (normative contestation, development imperatives, security competition), and imply different policy orientations (alignment, hedging, connectivity, or balancing). These patterns suggest that ASEAN’s agency is discursively conditional: it becomes more visible and coherent as an actor in contexts where the coverage attributes initiative, responsibility, or stabilizing capacity to ASEAN, and less visible when ASEAN is primarily framed as a venue, beneficiary, or object of external projects.
At the same time, the analysis supports only qualified claims about “discursive sovereignty.” The corpus indicates that ASEAN’s agency is frequently articulated in the language of partnership, coordination, and institutional centrality, yet it is also frequently narrated through relational hierarchies that constrain autonomy. It is therefore more accurate, given the scope of the dataset, to conclude that the media texts document an ongoing struggle over ASEAN’s representational standing, rather than establishing that ASEAN has achieved discursive sovereignty as a stable outcome. Similarly, while the findings are consistent with arguments that news narratives can function as instruments of statecraft by legitimizing particular regional orderings, the present study does not claim to demonstrate a direct causal relationship between state strategy and journalistic framing. Instead, it shows that media narratives can align with and amplify broader discursive orientations that are recognizable within national political contexts.

7.3. Limitations and Future Research

Several limitations qualify the interpretation of the findings. First, the study analyzes a purposive sample of 28 English-language articles across four focal events. This design enables structured comparison across countries and events, but it does not capture the full distribution of ASEAN-related framing across all coverage, genres, and platforms. Second, because the study focuses on English-language mainstream outlets, it does not address how ASEAN is framed in vernacular-language reporting, nor how these narratives travel across social platforms, influencer ecosystems, or audience communities. Third, platform governance cues are not uniformly present across the corpus; as a result, the study treats platform governance as an empirically observable signal when explicitly invoked, rather than as a constant explanatory driver.
Future research can build on this approach by expanding the corpus within each event window, incorporating additional outlets (including vernacular-language media), and triangulating newsroom texts with platform circulation data (e.g., engagement, cross-posting patterns, or platform policy interventions) to more directly assess how visibility and governance dynamics shape geopolitical narratives. Mixed-method designs combining interpretive framing with computational text analysis could also test whether the narrative roles identified here scale across larger datasets while preserving the interpretive sensitivity of qualitative analysis.

7.4. Concluding Statement

In the platform age, geopolitical narratives about regional institutions are shaped not only by diplomatic events but also by the representational infrastructures through which those events become publicly legible. This study contributes to comparative media and political communication scholarship by showing how ASEAN’s role is narratively constructed in divergent ways across Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean English-language news coverage—and by clarifying that claims about agency, sovereignty, and media-statecraft relationships must be framed as empirically grounded inferences rather than as presumed effects. Within these boundaries, the findings underscore a central implication: ASEAN’s mediated standing is continually negotiated through framing choices that alternately foreground institutional centrality, pragmatic connectivity, or strategic rivalry, thereby shaping how “ASEAN” is imagined as an actor, and how its room for agency is narratively enabled or constrained.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Data derived from public domain resources and properly cited in the manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Table 1. Theoretical lens and reflections in findings.
Table 1. Theoretical lens and reflections in findings.
Theoretical LensReflections in Findings
Framing TheoryASEAN is portrayed variously as a normative ally (Japan), cooperative beneficiary (China), and pragmatic partner (South Korea), reflecting Entman’s functions of selection, attribution, judgment, and solution framing.
Platform GovernancePlatform governance is assessed through observed textual indicators of infrastructural contestation (digital corridors, connectivity), platform-mediated visibility (algorithms/moderation/disinformation claims), and platform-relevant distribution cues in the sampled coverage.
Critical GeopoliticsASEAN is framed as both a strategic object (in security crises and trade alignments) and a legitimizer of regional orders, with its agency shaped by the geopolitical calculations of dominant powers.
Representation TheoryASEAN is more often represented than self-representing. Its image is filled by external narratives, reinforcing its discursive position as an object of geopolitical storytelling.
Table 2. Events in consideration.
Table 2. Events in consideration.
EventTimeframeTitle
1Nov–Dec 2023Strategic Realignments in ASEAN–Vietnam Relations
Amid Sino–Japanese Rivalry
2Jul–Aug 2024ASEAN–Philippines Security Ties and U.S.–Japan Military Funding
Amid Regional Tensions
3Mar–Apr 2025Trilateral Economic Convergence Amid U.S. Trade Pressures
4Apr 2025ASEAN and the Belt and Road Initiative:
Developmental Cooperation or Strategic Dependence?
Table 3. Comparative Framing of ASEAN in East Asian Media (2023–2025), summarizing dominant coded frames (Entman, 1993) identified in the sampled articles.
Table 3. Comparative Framing of ASEAN in East Asian Media (2023–2025), summarizing dominant coded frames (Entman, 1993) identified in the sampled articles.
Event Japan China South Korea
1. ASEAN–Vietnam Realignment (2023)Problem: Regional instability from China’s maritime claims
Cause: Chinese assertiveness in South China Sea
Moral: Japan justified in supporting ASEAN
Treatment: Expand defense and economic cooperation
Representation: ASEAN as normative ally
Problem: External interference disrupts harmony
Cause: U.S. and Japanese intervention
Moral: China as rational, peaceful actor
Treatment: Deepen ASEAN-China cooperation
Representation: ASEAN as junior partner
Problem: Regional trade and diplomacy
Cause: Bilateral diplomatic engagement
Moral: South Korea as constructive actor
Treatment: Strengthen technocratic partnerships
Representation: ASEAN as equal market peer
2. Philippines–U.S. Defense Pact (2024)Problem: Maritime tensions and regional threats
Cause: Chinese expansionism
Moral: U.S.-Japan-Philippines alliance legitimate
Treatment: Increase defense funding and cooperation
Representation: ASEAN as regional stabilizer
Problem: Militarization of Asia-Pacific
Cause: U.S. influence and Philippines’ alignment
Moral: China restrained; Philippines provocative
Treatment: Reject foreign military pacts
Representation: ASEAN as manipulated region
Problem: Security-industrial transformation
Cause: Evolving regional threats
Moral: Korea as pragmatic contributor
Treatment: Combine economic and defense ties
Representation: ASEAN as development partner
3. Trilateral Trade Talks (2025)Problem: Disruption from U.S. tariffs
Cause: American protectionism
Moral: Regional economic integration is positive
Treatment: Enhance ASEAN-trilateral coordination
Representation: ASEAN as multilateral ally
Problem: Global trade fragmentation
Cause: Western isolationism
Moral: China-led integration as stabilizing
Treatment: Institutionalize ASEAN-China ties
Representation: ASEAN as economic appendage
Problem: Supply chain vulnerability
Cause: Global market shocks
Moral: Korea as stabilizing actor
Treatment: Build logistical cooperation
Representation: ASEAN as technical partner
4. ASEAN & BRI (2025)Problem: Overreliance on China
Cause: Structural trade asymmetries
Moral: ASEAN diversification is prudent
Treatment: Engage Japan, U.S. alternatives
Representation: ASEAN as semi-autonomous actor
Problem: Western-led instability
Cause: U.S. protectionism
Moral: BRI as inclusive and beneficial
Treatment: Expand BRI under China’s vision
Representation: ASEAN as collective under China
Problem: Development disparities
Cause: Infrastructure deficits
Moral: South Korea as innovation partner
Treatment: Promote joint industrial zones
Representation: ASEAN as innovation platform
Table 4. Japanese Framing of Event 1.
Table 4. Japanese Framing of Event 1.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionThe regional security environment is deteriorating due to China’s expansionist maritime and territorial claims.
Causal AttributionChina’s assertive posture in the South China Sea and its growing influence over ASEAN members.
Moral EvaluationJapan is morally justified in providing military and economic assistance to ASEAN partners as a stabilizing force.
Treatment RecommendationDeepen Japan-ASEAN strategic ties through defense agreements and economic aid.
Table 5. Chinese Framing of Event 1.
Table 5. Chinese Framing of Event 1.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionInterference by outside powers threatens regional harmony.
Causal AttributionWestern powers (especially the U.S. and its allies) are aggravating tensions.
Moral EvaluationChina is portrayed as the rational, peaceful actor.
Treatment RecommendationASEAN should deepen integration with China under a development-centered framework.
Table 6. Korean Framing of Event 1.
Table 6. Korean Framing of Event 1.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionEnhancing trade efficiency and regional diplomacy.
Causal AttributionStrengthening bilateral channels through consistent diplomatic efforts.
Moral EvaluationKorea’s role is constructive and commercially motivated.
Treatment RecommendationContinue technocratic and non-aligned diplomacy with ASEAN partners.
Table 7. Japanese Framing of Event 2.
Table 7. Japanese Framing of Event 2.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionHeightened maritime tensions and territorial conflicts in the South China Sea.
Causal AttributionChina’s expansionist maritime claims and its rejection of international arbitration.
Moral EvaluationU.S.-Japan-Philippines security cooperation is framed as legitimate and necessary.
Treatment RecommendationIncrease military funding and formal defense pacts to deter aggression.
Table 8. Chinese Framing of Event 2.
Table 8. Chinese Framing of Event 2.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionDestabilization of the Asia-Pacific due to military pacts involving external powers.
Causal AttributionU.S. influence and the Philippines’ strategic alignment with Washington.
Moral EvaluationThe Philippines is accused of undermining regional peace; China is framed as a restrained actor.
Treatment RecommendationASEAN should resist foreign manipulation and re-center Asian-led diplomacy.
Table 9. Korean Framing of Event 2.
Table 9. Korean Framing of Event 2.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionNeed for regional capacity-building and industrial modernization.
Causal AttributionEvolving security landscape requiring diversified partnerships.
Moral EvaluationSouth Korea is a pragmatic actor offering industrial and diplomatic value.
Treatment RecommendationSupport multilateral diplomacy and strengthen economic-security linkages.
Table 10. Japanese Framing of Event 3.
Table 10. Japanese Framing of Event 3.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionDisruptions to global trade due to U.S. protectionism.
Causal AttributionUnilateral American tariff policies and supply chain instability.
Moral EvaluationRegional economic cooperation is framed as a constructive counterbalance.
Treatment RecommendationStrengthen ASEAN’s participation in trilateral agreements to uphold multilateralism.
Table 11. Chinese Framing of Event 3.
Table 11. Chinese Framing of Event 3.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionWestern retreat from globalization.
Causal AttributionIsolationist trade practices by the U.S. and its allies.
Moral EvaluationTrilateral and ASEAN-inclusive economic frameworks are rational and future-oriented.
Treatment RecommendationInstitutionalize economic integration with ASEAN as a cornerstone of East Asian stability.
Table 12. Korean Framing of Event 3.
Table 12. Korean Framing of Event 3.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionEconomic uncertainty and tariff disruptions.
Causal AttributionExternal shocks from shifting global trade rules.
Moral EvaluationKorea’s engagement is framed as a logical and stabilizing force.
Treatment RecommendationDeepen ASEAN-trilateral coordination to enhance economic resilience.
Table 13. Japanese Framing of Event 4.
Table 13. Japanese Framing of Event 4.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionASEAN’s economic overreliance on China in the face of shifting global trade alliances.
Causal AttributionStructural imbalances rooted in China-centric supply chains and U.S.-China tensions.
Moral EvaluationASEAN’s cautious diversification is framed as prudent and necessary.
Treatment RecommendationEncourage ASEAN to deepen ties with Japan and the U.S. to preserve strategic autonomy.
Table 14. Chinese Framing of Event 4.
Table 14. Chinese Framing of Event 4.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionGlobal instability caused by protectionist tendencies in the West.
Causal AttributionU.S.-led trade fragmentation and unilateralism.
Moral EvaluationChina’s inclusive model is stabilizing and beneficial.
Treatment RecommendationDeepen BRI ties and embrace China-led regionalism.
Table 15. Korean Framing of Event 4.
Table 15. Korean Framing of Event 4.
Dimensions Findings
Problem DefinitionRegional development disparities and infrastructure needs.
Causal AttributionHistorical underinvestment and lack of connectivity.
Moral EvaluationASEAN-Korea partnerships are constructive and innovation-driven.
Treatment RecommendationPromote institutionalized industrial cooperation and knowledge sharing.
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Yurtcicek Ozaydin, S. Framing ASEAN in the Platform Age: Media Infrastructures and Geopolitical Narratives in East Asia. Journal. Media 2026, 7, 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia7010012

AMA Style

Yurtcicek Ozaydin S. Framing ASEAN in the Platform Age: Media Infrastructures and Geopolitical Narratives in East Asia. Journalism and Media. 2026; 7(1):12. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia7010012

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yurtcicek Ozaydin, Seval. 2026. "Framing ASEAN in the Platform Age: Media Infrastructures and Geopolitical Narratives in East Asia" Journalism and Media 7, no. 1: 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia7010012

APA Style

Yurtcicek Ozaydin, S. (2026). Framing ASEAN in the Platform Age: Media Infrastructures and Geopolitical Narratives in East Asia. Journalism and Media, 7(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia7010012

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