The Electric Vehicle Transition in Emerging Economies

Abstract

The global shift toward electric mobility represents a cornerstone of sustainable energy transitions; however, developing countries face distinct structural, economic, and infrastructural challenges that constrain their participation in this transformation. This paper examines the conditions, policy frameworks, and infrastructural requirements necessary for a successful electric vehicle (EV) transition in developing countries, with particular attention to the interplay between energy access, transportation policy, and grid readiness. Using a mixed-methods approach that integrates policy analysis, partial life-cycle assessment (LCA) with the second-hand market, and case studies across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the study evaluates the implications of limited electricity access, unreliable power grids, and the dominance of informal transport systems on EV adoption. The findings reveal that, while EVs offer significant potential for reducing emissions and improving urban air quality, their deployment depends critically on coordinated investments in renewable-based electricity generation, charging infrastructure, and supportive regulatory frameworks. Policy strategies such as fiscal incentives, public–private partnerships, and decentralized charging networks can accelerate uptake when aligned with energy-access goals. The paper argues that the EV transition in developing economies must be policy-driven and context-adapted, integrating mobility electrification with broader agendas of energy justice, rural electrification, and industrial development. Ultimately, the research provides a roadmap for aligning electric mobility policies with sustainable infrastructure development to ensure that the global EV revolution becomes both inclusive and equitable.

1. Introduction

The global transition to EVs is reshaping transport, energy systems, and climate policy. While much attention has focused on high-income markets, developing countries are increasingly important frontiers for electrified mobility: rapidly rising urbanization, large fleets of two- and three-wheelers, and cost pressures from imported fuels create strong economic and policy incentives to adopt EVs. At the same time, constrained public budgets, weaker grid infrastructure, and equity concerns mean the pathways and outcomes in lower-income settings differ fundamentally from high-income countries [1]. In fact, the global shift toward electric mobility represents one of the most transformative trends in the transport and energy sectors of the 21st century. EVs are increasingly recognized as central to decarbonizing transportation, reducing local air pollution, and enhancing energy security. However, while industrialized nations have rapidly advanced EV adoption through coordinated policy support, technological innovation, and strong consumer purchasing power, developing countries face a unique and multidimensional set of challenges that complicate their transition.

EV adoption in developing markets is already accelerating for specific vehicle classes (notably two- and three-wheelers, taxis, and buses) and, in many cases, EVs are cost-competitive when TCO is considered. Yet research gaps remain: (1) rigorous, system-level assessments that combine transport, power-sector impacts, and equity; (2) comparative evidence on which policy mixes work under constrained fiscal and grid conditions; and (3) operational strategies to manage electricity access and reliability while scaling charging infrastructure. The World Bank and UNEP analyses identify these practical entry points (buses and light commercial vehicles) and policy levers (incentives, charging planning, workforce development) but call for more localized, power-system-aware research to guide implementation [2]. Developing countries have distinctive opportunities to leapfrog to cleaner, cheaper transport through targeted EV deployment—particularly for high-use vehicle classes—while simultaneously confronting the practical constraint of electricity access and distribution reliability.

In most developing economies, purchasing power remains the primary constraint limiting EV uptake. The initial cost of EVs—often two to three times higher than comparable internal combustion engine (ICE) models—creates a prohibitive entry barrier for individual consumers and small businesses. Moreover, limited access to credit, absence of large-scale vehicle financing, and weak resale markets further exacerbate affordability challenges. These economic constraints shape a dependency on used-vehicle imports, a long-standing feature of developing-country transport markets. The influx of second-hand ICE vehicles, while providing affordable mobility, simultaneously delays the diffusion of electric alternatives and locks in fossil fuel dependence for decades.

Infrastructure deficits further constrain the EV transition. Most developing countries experience unreliable electricity supply, insufficient grid capacity, and limited availability of charging infrastructure outside major urban centers. Rural and peri-urban regions—where transport electrification could have significant developmental benefits—often lack both the physical and digital infrastructure to support EV deployment. Furthermore, the uneven development of renewable energy sources increases the risk that EV adoption could simply shift emissions upstream unless coupled with broader energy-system reforms.

Battery-related issues represent another layer of complexity. Limited local capacity for lithium-ion battery assembly, testing, recycling, or second-life applications creates dependencies on imported components and heightens exposure to global supply chain fluctuations. The absence of standardized regulations for end-of-life (EoL) management and safety, combined with weak institutional capacity for waste handling, raises environmental and social concerns regarding used batteries and informal recycling practices.

Access to technology and technical expertise remains uneven. Developing countries frequently rely on foreign manufacturers and imported EV technologies, with limited opportunities for local industry participation or technology transfer. Without localized R&D and manufacturing ecosystems, these countries risk remaining at the periphery of the global EV value chain. The promotion of local assembly, modular battery systems, and adaptable vehicle designs could help bridge this gap, yet such strategies require coherent policy frameworks and investment in skills and education.

Public perception and awareness of EV benefits also play a crucial role in adoption. Misinformation, unfamiliarity with EV maintenance, and concerns about range and reliability deter potential consumers. In markets where fuel subsidies remain entrenched, EVs are often perceived as economically unattractive despite their lower long-term operating costs.

Ultimately, the policy environment determines the pace and inclusiveness of EV transitions in developing countries. Effective policy design must go beyond incentives for vehicle imports and focus on integrated measures that strengthen charging infrastructure, standardize used-EV regulations, and promote local value creation in battery supply chains. Coordinated interventions—combining fiscal incentives, industrial policy, energy planning, and consumer education—are critical for achieving a just and sustainable transition.

The research questions guiding this study of the EV transition in developing countries span multiple interconnected domains. What factors explain the slower uptake of EVs in developing countries, and how do these barriers and drivers differ across low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income countries during the EV transition? It includes how upfront costs, financing mechanisms, total cost of ownership (TOC), and battery-replacement uncertainties shape adoption across income groups, alongside the effectiveness of fiscal instruments such as tax exemptions, subsidies, leasing schemes, and microfinancing in addressing affordability barriers. It addresses how optimal charging infrastructure strategies can be designed for contexts with unreliable grids and stark urban–rural disparities, and whether decentralized systems—such as solar minigrids, community hubs, vehicle to grid (V2G), and hybrid solar-grid–battery configurations—can provide economically viable alternatives. An important point is how technology gaps related to diagnostics, spare parts, and skilled technicians impede EV uptake and how local manufacturing, assembly, repair, and second-life battery ecosystems might bridge these limitations. It needs to be understood how consumer awareness, risk perceptions, cultural preferences, peer effects, and social norms influence attitudes and diffusion patterns, as well as which communication strategies or demonstration projects effectively enhance acceptance; how the second-hand market for both ICE and electric vehicles impacts national transition trajectories, particularly regarding accelerated depreciation arising from battery aging, climate conditions, and weak service networks; and what regulations are needed to restrict the influx of obsolete or aged EVs. Another important question is how policy mixes—including fiscal incentives, industrial policies, standards, and renewable energy mandates—can be tailored to different stages of market maturity and how governance challenges in informal transport sectors, customs systems, and fragmented institutions affect deployment, battery supply chain sustainability, and recycling frameworks. The integration of renewable energy into charging ecosystems can cut emissions and grid stress and increase the potential role of V2G, vehicle to home (V2H), and community energy sharing in weak grids and has implications of large-scale EV adoption for peak demand, system adequacy, and long-term planning. EV policies can promote equity by ensuring access for low-income groups, rural regions, and informal transit operators while generating environmental and health benefits and creating green-economy jobs. And finally, there is the question of how a systems approach—leveraging system-dynamics, agent-based, and techno-economic models—can be used to capture the complex interactions among costs, infrastructure, policy incentives, consumer behavior, and renewable energy integration that collectively determine EV transition pathways in developing-country contexts.

The research examines how infrastructural, economic, and policy constraints shape the pace and trajectory of the EV transition across developing countries at different income levels, recognizing that low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income economies face distinct structural, financial, and institutional conditions. It places particular focus on how total cost of ownership (TCO) considerations influence consumer adoption relative to ICE vehicles, with sensitivity to variations in household income, access to credit, and vehicle usage patterns. The study investigates the impacts of limited electricity access and grid reliability on EV deployment and charging infrastructure development, especially in low-income and rural settings where energy access constraints are most pronounced. It also analyzes the role of imported second-hand EVs, including battery degradation challenges, technological accessibility, public awareness, and policy frameworks, in either enabling or delaying sustainable adoption across different income contexts, while assessing whether localized assembly and value-chain development could reduce costs and accelerate market penetration, particularly in middle-income economies. Additionally, the research assesses the effectiveness of policy interventions such as subsidies, tax incentives, standards, and scrappage schemes, alongside the social equity implications of ensuring accessible clean mobility for low-income and rural populations. Finally, it evaluates the net environmental benefits of EV adoption in light of heterogeneous electricity grid mixes and recycling capacities, culminating in an integrated analysis of the optimal combination of technological innovation, economic incentives, and infrastructure development required to enable a sustainable and economically viable EV transition across diverse developing-country contexts. Through this analysis, the research aims to identify practical pathways for inclusive transport electrification that balance economic realities with environmental sustainability and broader developmental goals.

While this paper encompasses a broad discussion on the electrification of transportation in emerging economies, including references to hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) as transitional technologies that combine ICE with electric propulsion to reduce emissions and improve fuel efficiency, the primary emphasis is placed on battery electric vehicles (BEVs). BEVs, which rely solely on rechargeable batteries for power and produce zero tailpipe emissions, are highlighted as the core focus due to their greater potential for deep decarbonization, alignment with renewable energy integration, and long-term economic viability in contexts of grid modernization and sustainable development. This distinction ensures that the analysis prioritizes the transformative role of fully electric mobility while acknowledging hybrids as a stepping stone in markets facing infrastructural and affordability challenges.

2. Research Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods approach to investigate the EV transition in developing countries, integrating qualitative and quantitative methods to provide a comprehensive analysis of structural, economic, infrastructural, and policy dimensions. The methodology is designed to address the research questions by combining infrastructure, policy analysis, LCA, and comparative case studies, allowing for a nuanced understanding of barriers, drivers, and pathways for EV adoption. This approach is particularly suited to the heterogeneous contexts of developing economies, where data availability varies and interdisciplinary insights are essential for robust conclusions.

2.1. Research Design

The research adopts a convergent parallel mixed-methods design, where qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analyzed simultaneously, then integrated during interpretation to triangulate findings and enhance validity. Qualitative components focus on policy frameworks, institutional factors, and contextual narratives, while quantitative elements emphasize economic metrics, environmental impacts, and market trends. This design enables the study to capture both systemic patterns (e.g., global trends in EV penetration) and context-specific nuances (e.g., grid reliability in sub-Saharan Africa).

The study is exploratory and descriptive in nature, drawing on secondary data sources to synthesize existing evidence and identify gaps, rather than generating primary empirical data through surveys or experiments. This aligns with the paper’s aim to provide a roadmap for policy and infrastructure development, informed by cross-regional comparisons.

2.2. Data Collection Methods

Data were collected from a variety of secondary sources to ensure breadth and reliability, focusing on developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) and South Asia (e.g., Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam). The selection of regions was purposive, based on their representation of diverse income levels (low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income as per World Bank classifications), rapid urbanization rates, and emerging EV policies.

2.2.1. Policy Analysis

○

Sources included national policy documents, international reports, and regulatory frameworks from organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), World Bank, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and national governments (e.g., Ethiopia’s EV import ban, India’s Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles scheme).

○

Data encompassed EV roadmaps, fiscal incentives (e.g., tax exemptions, subsidies), import regulations, and nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement.

○

Collection involved systematic review of databases like the IEA Global EV Outlook (2024–2025), UNEP’s Used Vehicles and the Environment reports, and national archives, with keywords such as “EV policy,” “electrification roadmap,” and “developing countries”.

2.2.2. Life-Cycle Assessment

○

Quantitative data on environmental impacts, TCO, and emissions were derived from established LCA models and datasets.

○

Sources included peer-reviewed studies (e.g., from Energies, Energy Strategy Reviews, and World Electric Vehicle Journal) and reports from the IEA, World Bank, and BloombergNEF.

○

Key metrics assessed were well-to-wheel emissions, battery degradation rates, TCO comparisons (e.g., EVs vs. ICE vehicles), and depreciation factors. Data inputs incorporated regional variables such as grid carbon intensity (e.g., coal-dependent in India vs. hydropower in Ethiopia), vehicle utilization patterns, and fuel/electricity prices.

○

LCA boundaries covered cradle-to-grave phases, including manufacturing, operation, and end of life (e.g., battery recycling).

2.2.3. Case Studies

○

Comparative case studies were conducted across selected countries to illustrate real-world applications and variations by income level.

○

Cases were chosen based on criteria such as EV market maturity, policy ambition, and data availability (e.g., Ethiopia for low-income, India for lower-middle-income, Brazil and China for upper-middle-income).

○

Data sources included academic literature, media reports, and institutional analyses (e.g., World Bank’s Vietnam National Roadmap, UNEP’s Global Environment Facility projects). Qualitative narratives from stakeholder interviews in secondary sources (e.g., IEA reports) supplemented quantitative indicators like EV sales shares, charging station density, and electrification rates.

Data collection spanned generally from January 2024 to December 2025, ensuring inclusion of the most recent updates (e.g., IEA Global EV Outlook 2025). Ethical considerations were addressed by relying on publicly available, anonymized secondary data, with proper attribution to sources.

2.3. Data Analysis

2.3.1. Qualitative Analysis

○

Thematic analysis was applied to policy documents and case studies using NVivo 15 software to identify recurring themes such as barriers (e.g., grid unreliability, affordability), drivers (e.g., cost savings, incentives), and success criteria (e.g., political commitment, infrastructure readiness).

○

Cross-case synthesis compared income-level variations, drawing on frameworks like the World Bank’s five pillars for EV roadmaps (manufacturing, incentives, infrastructure, power readiness, workforce development).

2.3.2. Quantitative Analysis

○

Descriptive statistics summarized metrics like EV market shares, TCO ratios, and emissions reductions using tools such as Excel and Python 3.14.3 (with libraries like Pandas 3.0.0 and Matplotlib 30.10.8 for visualization).

○

LCA results were analyzed using standardized models (e.g., GREET or SimaPro equivalents from the literature), with sensitivity analyses testing variables like battery prices (falling ~7% annually) and grid mixes.

○

Comparative metrics included affordability ratios (EV price ÷ GDP per capita), depreciation rates (e.g., 1.16% monthly for EVs vs. 0.87% for ICE vehicles), and infrastructure densities (chargers per 100,000 inhabitants).

2.3.3. Integration of Methods

○

Findings from policy analysis and case studies were triangulated with LCA results to assess feasibility (e.g., linking TCO advantages to policy levers like subsidies).

○

Correlations were explored (e.g., between grid reliability and EV uptake) using simple regression where data permitted, though the study prioritized interpretive synthesis over advanced statistical modeling due to data heterogeneity.

2.4. Limitations

The reliance on secondary data may introduce biases from reporting inconsistencies across countries. The focus on sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia limits generalizability to other regions (e.g., Latin America). Future research could incorporate primary data, such as surveys of consumers and policymakers, to validate findings.

This methodology ensures a rigorous, evidence-based exploration of the EV transition, providing actionable insights for policymakers in developing countries.

3. Literature Review

The transition toward EVs in developing countries is a multifaceted process influenced by economic capacity, policy frameworks, infrastructure readiness, and consumer adoption patterns. Existing literature underscores that countries at different income levels experience distinct barriers and drivers in their EV transition journeys. This review synthesizes findings according to low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income, and high-income developing contexts.

The use of the World Bank’s income-based classification is not intended to suggest that income level alone determines EV adoption. Rather, it provides a widely accepted and analytically useful framework for understanding systematic differences in the drivers of EV transitions and in countries’ capacities to adopt EVs and implement supportive policies. The World Bank classification informs EV adoption analysis in several important ways. Income level is strongly correlated with key enabling factors for EV diffusion, including purchasing power, access to finance, infrastructure investment capacity (e.g., charging networks and grid upgrades), industrial capabilities, and institutional and regulatory capacity. These factors shape both demand-side dynamics (such as vehicle affordability and consumer preferences) and supply-side conditions (such as domestic manufacturing, technology transfer, and policy enforcement). As a result, countries grouped within similar income categories often face comparable structural constraints and opportunities in the EV transition, even if their specific national contexts differ.

Moreover, the classification helps illuminate differences in policy space and policy priorities. Higher-income countries generally have greater fiscal and administrative capacity to deploy subsidies, mandates, and long-term industrial policies, while lower- and middle-income countries may prioritize cost-effective measures, public transport electrification, or gradual adoption strategies aligned with development goals. Using the World Bank typology thus allows us to relate observed EV adoption patterns to broader development trajectories and governance capacities in a consistent manner.

China represents a distinct and instructive case in the global EV transition that warrants being set apart from other developing and emerging economies. Although often categorized as a developing country, China’s EV transformation has been driven by an exceptional combination of large-scale state intervention, long-term industrial policy, and substantial fiscal and regulatory support that few emerging economies can replicate. Massive public investment in battery manufacturing, charging infrastructure, and domestic supply chains—alongside consumer subsidies, production mandates, and city-level restrictions on internal combustion vehicles—has enabled rapid market penetration and cost reductions. Moreover, China’s dominance across critical segments of the EV value chain, including battery production and critical mineral processing, positions it closer to advanced industrial economies than to most developing countries facing fiscal, infrastructural, and institutional constraints. As such, while China’s experience offers valuable lessons on policy coordination and scale, it should be treated as a special case rather than a directly transferable model for EV transitions in other emerging economies.

• Low-Income Developing Countries

In low-income settings, structural and systemic challenges are often the most significant impediments to EV adoption. Scholars identify limited charging infrastructure, unstable electrical grids, and lack of supportive policies as dominant barriers. Research shows that these economies typically struggle with underdeveloped energy systems and scarce financial incentives, which together suppress market uptake of EVs. For instance, low-income nations such as Nepal, India, and Nigeria are characterized by insufficient infrastructure deployment and constrained grid capacity, limiting the feasibility of broad EV adoption [3].

Additionally, affordability remains a central obstacle. High upfront costs relative to average incomes and limited access to credit mechanisms reduce consumer purchasing power for EVs, making electric mobility an aspirational rather than practical choice for most households in these contexts [4].

• Lower-Middle-Income Developing Countries

Lower-middle-income countries share many of the barriers seen in low-income contexts but also begin to manifest emerging market opportunities due to expanding middle classes and urbanization. Here, economic constraints coexist with nascent policy frameworks and partial infrastructure development. Research indicates that, in countries such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, and the Philippines, EV adoption is inhibited by high vehicle costs and an uneven spread of charging infrastructure, despite rising environmental awareness and potential market growth [5].

Moreover, urban–rural disparities are pronounced in these economies: while metropolitan centers may host pilot charging stations and exhibit early consumer interest, peripheral regions often lack basic facilities, reinforcing adoption gaps across geographies [5].

• Upper-Middle-Income Developing Countries

Upper-middle-income developing countries—such as Brazil, South Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia—occupy transitional positions in the EV literature. These contexts frequently reflect a hybrid barrier landscape, where both infrastructure and consumer behavior challenges are present. Although there may be greater availability of EV models and initial investments in charging networks, adoption is still hindered by concerns about resale value, limited financing options, and high purchase costs relative to income [3].

The literature suggests that the interplay between infrastructural readiness and consumer perceptions becomes more salient in these countries; where one dimension improves, the other often emerges as the next bottleneck. Strategic policy interventions tailored to income and market structures are emphasized as critical for scaling adoption in these economies [3].

• High-Income Developing Contexts

Although not classified strictly as developing in all frameworks, higher-income emerging economies (sometimes captured under upper-middle income) such as China and Chile exhibit EV markets approaching global leaders in adoption. In these settings, infrastructure deployment and public incentives are relatively advanced, shifting research attention to behavioral and informational barriers such as range anxiety and lack of consumer knowledge. High-income settings also highlight how national or regional policy strategies can profoundly accelerate EV transitions when supported by cohesive investments in charging infrastructure and financial incentives [3].

• Cross-Cutting Themes in the Literature

Across income categories, several cross-cutting themes emerge:

• Income and inequality are closely linked to EV adoption rates, with greater per capita GDP often correlating with higher EV uptake, though inequities within countries can mute this effect [6].
• Policy and regulatory frameworks play a decisive role; the absence of tailored incentives in developing economies often slows private investment and limits market development [7].
• Infrastructure readiness—especially access to reliable electricity and charging networks—is a pervasive constraint across all but the most advanced developing markets [5].

This literature review highlights both common and income-specific barriers, suggesting that effective EV transition strategies in developing countries must consider tailored interventions that align with economic capacity, infrastructure development, and sociotechnical contexts.

3.1. Comparison of the EV Transition in Developed vs. Developing Countries

The pace, scale, and pathways of EV adoption differ substantially between developed and developing countries due to divergent economic capacities, policy environments, infrastructure readiness, and market dynamics (Figure 1).

While developed countries have made substantial progress in electrifying their transportation sectors—buoyed by strong policy frameworks, advanced infrastructure, and supportive markets—developing countries face a distinct set of structural challenges. These include inadequate infrastructure, weaker policy environments, economic constraints, and variable energy systems. Addressing these disparities requires tailored strategies that reflect local socioeconomic conditions, prioritize affordable models, strengthen grid and charging infrastructure, and integrate EV policies with broader development goals.

• Policy and Regulatory Frameworks

Developed countries have generally led the global EV transition through comprehensive and ambitious policy frameworks. For example, Norway’s EV market has achieved remarkably high adoption rates—where a majority of new car sales are electric—through long-standing incentives such as tax exemptions, rebates, and extensive charging infrastructure support that foster consumer uptake and market confidence [8]. Developed nations also integrate EV policies into broader decarbonization targets, deploying coordinated regulatory approaches like fuel economy standards and zero-emission mandates, which create predictable long-term market signals.

In contrast, developing countries often face systemic policy gaps that impede EV adoption. Research indicates that many developing economies lack consistent national strategies and offer weaker or fragmented incentives, resulting in limited private-sector investment and consumer uptake [5]. Additionally, political instability and shifting policy priorities can undermine the continuity and effectiveness of EV incentive programs, deterring long-term commitments from manufacturers and buyers [9]. The result is a significant divergence in how public policy shapes EV markets in different contexts.

• Infrastructure and Energy Systems

The establishment of robust charging infrastructure is widely recognized as a critical enabler of EV adoption. Developed countries typically enjoy more advanced and widespread charging networks, supported by reliable electrical grids and substantial public and private investment. Even so, challenges persist in rural areas of these countries, pointing to the need for continued infrastructure expansion [10].

By comparison, infrastructure limitations are more acute in developing regions. Many developing countries struggle with insufficient charging stations and unstable electricity supplies, making EV ownership less practical for large segments of the population [11]. In parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, frequent power outages and unreliable grids significantly hinder the viability of EV charging, reducing consumer confidence in EV usability [12]. These infrastructure disparities not only increase range anxiety among potential EV users but also constrain the spatial reach of charging networks, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas.

• Economic and Market Conditions

Economic conditions and consumer purchasing power are key determinants of EV adoption. Developed economies generally benefit from stronger per capita incomes and more mature automotive markets, which make EVs more affordable relative to average earnings. Moreover, significant fiscal incentives often offset high upfront costs, while secondary markets for used EVs further broaden accessibility.

Developing countries, however, frequently face affordability barriers. High upfront costs of EVs and batteries make them relatively inaccessible for most consumers, and limited availability of affordable EV models exacerbates this challenge [11]. As a result, EV market penetration remains low in many developing contexts, with some regions recording adoption shares that lag far behind global averages. For instance, in certain states of India, EV adoption has remained below 2% despite national incentives, highlighting the persistent affordability and infrastructure barriers [13].

Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that certain segments of EV adoption can be economically viable even in lower-income countries. The World Bank notes that electric buses and two- and three-wheeled EVs present feasible entry points for electrification given their cost-effectiveness and local development benefits [14].

• Environmental and Energy Context

The environmental benefits of EVs in developed countries are often enhanced by the increasing integration of renewable energy sources into power grids. Many developed markets are actively pursuing renewable generation expansion to ensure that EV charging is increasingly supported by low-carbon electricity.

In many developing economies, however, the reliance on fossil fuel generation can reduce the net environmental gain from EV adoption, especially if electricity used for charging is predominantly coal-based [7]. This “carbon penalty” underscores the need for parallel investments in clean energy infrastructure to ensure that EV transitions deliver meaningful emissions reductions.

• Institutional and Social Factors

Finally, social awareness, consumer perceptions, and institutional capacities differ markedly between developed and developing countries. In wealthier economies, awareness campaigns and education efforts are more prevalent, helping to familiarize consumers with EV technology and benefits [15]. In contrast, limited public knowledge about EVs in many developing markets creates additional barriers to adoption, often requiring targeted outreach to build trust, dispel misconceptions, and support behavior change [15].

3.2. Context of the Electric Vehicle Transition in Developing Countries: A Categorization by Income Levels

The pace and nature of the EV transition in developing countries vary substantially across income categories, as defined by the World Bank’s classifications: low-income countries (LICs, GDP per capita below USD 1085), lower-middle-income countries (LMICs, USD 1086–4255), and upper-middle-income countries (UMICs, USD 4256–13,205) [16]. These variations are influenced by factors such as infrastructure readiness, policy incentives, vehicle affordability, and dominant mobility patterns, with two- and three-wheelers often proving more viable for electrification in resource-constrained settings than four-wheeled cars. This section examines in general the current status, challenges, and opportunities for EV adoption in each category, drawing on recent analyses to highlight tailored strategies for accelerating the transition.

• Low-Income Countries

In low-income countries, primarily concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia (e.g., Ethiopia, Uganda, and Afghanistan), EV adoption remains nascent, with market shares typically below 1% as of 2024 [17]. Sales in Africa more than doubled to around 11,000 units in 2024, but this growth is uneven and largely confined to a few nations with emerging manufacturing ties. Ethiopia stands out as a pioneer, having banned imports of petrol and diesel vehicles, leading to the reported deployment of over 100,000 EVs, though verified car-specific data suggests more modest figures around 1300 over recent years. Challenges in this category are profound, including inadequate charging infrastructure, overloaded electricity grids unable to support widespread adoption, and high upfront costs that exacerbate affordability issues in contexts of widespread poverty. For instance, countries like Liberia face barriers such as insufficient charging stations and reliance on imported fuels, compounded by limited institutional capacity for policy implementation. Opportunities lie in prioritizing electrification of high-utilization segments like two-wheeled scooters, three-wheeled rickshaws, and public buses, which align with non-car-dominated transport cultures and can yield quick economic returns through reduced operating costs and fuel import savings. Environmental benefits, such as mitigating air pollution that causes millions of premature deaths annually in these regions, further strengthen the case, with strategies like battery swapping and city-level pilots (e.g., electric buses in growing urban areas) offering scalable pathways forward. Governments in LICs, such as Nigeria’s commitment to zero-emission vehicles by 2040 through international declarations and local manufacturing partnerships, illustrate emerging momentum.

• Lower-Middle-Income Countries

Lower-middle-income countries, including India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Nigeria, exhibit moderate but accelerating EV adoption, with regional sales shares reaching around 4% in parts of Asia and Latin America by 2024 [18]. India, a key example, saw EV sales approach 100,000 units with a 2% market share, driven by domestic production from firms like Tata and joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Vietnam experienced triple and near-double sales growth, respectively, achieving shares comparable to those in advanced economies like Spain or Canada, fueled by affordable Chinese imports and local incentives such as VAT reductions from 11% to 1% in Indonesia. Challenges persist, notably high initial costs (EVs often carry a 70–80% premium over ICE vehicles), grid capacity constraints in nations like Vietnam and Pakistan, and insufficient charging networks that hinder widespread uptake. Range anxiety and policy inconsistencies also pose barriers, as seen in Bangladesh where market development lags due to infrastructure gaps. Opportunities are abundant in leveraging dominant two- and three-wheeler markets—over 70% of miles traveled in India involve such vehicles—through innovations like battery swapping lower costs and extend runtime. Economic incentives, including tax exemptions and subsidies, combined with environmental imperatives (e.g., addressing air pollution in India’s polluted cities), make EVs a viable option for reducing fuel import dependencies and health costs equivalent to 5–14% of GDP. City-level initiatives, such as Delhi’s Electric Vehicles Policy 2020 promoting commercial two- and three-wheelers, demonstrate effective strategies, alongside gender-inclusive approaches like women-only EV services to broaden participation.

• Upper-Middle-Income Countries

Upper-middle-income countries, such as China, Brazil, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa, lead the EV transition among developing nations, with some achieving double-digit market shares and rapid year-on-year growth. China dominates globally, with the highest total EV fleet, while Brazil’s sales more than doubled to 125,000 units in 2024, reaching a 6.5% share supported by tax exemptions and local production by Chinese firms like BYD. Thailand maintained a 13% share, positioning it as Southeast Asia’s largest EV market, despite overall sales dips, and Turkey saw a 50% increase in domestic Togg EV production, lifting shares to 10% [19]. Challenges include phasing out import duty exemptions (e.g., Brazil’s gradual increase through 2026) and addressing trade-offs like reduced tax revenues from the auto sector, though these are less acute than in lower-income groups due to stronger grids and fiscal capacities. Opportunities stem from policy-driven expansions, such as manufacturing mandates requiring local BEV production by 2026 in Thailand, and integrations with renewable energy to enhance grid resilience. In Latin America, countries like Colombia and Uruguay achieved shares of 7.5% and 13%, respectively, benefiting from high fossil fuel prices and incentives like relaxed traffic restrictions for EVs. Broader benefits include substantial carbon reductions and economic savings—over USD 5000 per vehicle in maintenance alone—amplified in oil-importing UMICs with subsidized electricity. Strategies like fostering private-sector partnerships (e.g., Chile’s e-bus fleets in Santiago) and setting short-term targets to reach a 5% sales tipping point can further accelerate adoption, ensuring sustainable supply chains and inclusive growth.

3.3. Global Overview

The global transition to EVs is accelerating, yet developing countries face distinctive structural, institutional, and infrastructural challenges that shape their pathways. The International Energy Agency (IEA) Global EV Outlook 2024 provides a comprehensive baseline of global EV market dynamics, battery demand projections, charging infrastructure deployment, and policy scenarios through 2035. It establishes the reference framework for comparative research, highlighting both the rapid global diffusion of EVs and the widening gap between industrialized and developing economies [20,21]. Complementing this, the World Bank’s series of analyses [20]—including Electric Vehicles: An Economic and Environmental Win for Developing Countries (2022–2024)—demonstrates that electric buses and two/three-wheelers are often economically viable in low- and middle-income countries due to their high utilization rates and fuel import savings. The World Bank identifies five pillars for effective EV roadmaps: domestic manufacturing, demand incentives, charging infrastructure, power-sector readiness, and workforce development. Its Vietnam National Roadmap (2024) [20] provides a concrete example of how countries can translate these priorities into actionable national strategies linking transport electrification to industrial and energy policy.

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) [21] extends these findings through its Electric Mobility Programs and Global Environment Facility (GEF)-supported projects in over 50 countries, emphasizing integrated planning that ties EV adoption to clean energy and sustainable transport systems. UNEP’s recent updates (2024–2025) report accelerating EV uptake in several Global South cities, underscoring the importance of international technical assistance and policy coherence. BloombergNEF’s (BNEF) Electric Vehicle Outlook and Emerging Market Analyses [22] offer market-centric insights, tracking cost trajectories, manufacturing trends, and policy incentives. BNEF identifies a risk of bifurcation—where advanced economies and select emerging markets achieve mass EV penetration while others lag due to inadequate policy and investment environments.

From an energy-systems perspective, the World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) [23] provides critical technical insights in E-Mobility and Power Systems: Impacts, Opportunities and Challenges. This brief analyzes how EV charging interacts with developing-country grids, focusing on load management, demand response, and integration with variable renewables. ESMAP recommends strategies such as managed charging, spatial planning of chargers, and the use of off-grid and minigrid solutions to mitigate strain on weak distribution networks. Recent country and media case studies, including Ethiopia’s surge in low-cost EV imports from China, demonstrate that market-driven adoption can outpace infrastructure readiness, creating localized bottlenecks and adaptation challenges such as reliance on household outlets and limited public charging.

3.3.1. Context, Policy, and Conditions for a Successful Transition

Developing countries present heterogeneous contexts marked by varying vehicle fleets (notably high shares of two/three-wheelers and minibuses), rapid urbanization, and constrained power systems. High fuel import dependency and severe urban air pollution create strong policy incentives for EV adoption, yet limited fiscal space, weak regulatory institutions, and inadequate grid capacity pose substantial obstacles. Multilateral organizations—including the IEA, World Bank, UNEP, and GEF—are mobilizing technical and financial support tailored to country-specific conditions to bridge these gaps.

Successful EV transitions in developing contexts depend on coherent policy sequencing and institutional coordination. Common patterns identified across the literature include:

• Targeted vehicle-class interventions prioritizing high-utilization segments such as buses, taxis, and two/three-wheelers.
• Demand-side incentives (tax exemptions, purchase subsidies, and public procurement) to stimulate early market growth.
• Charging strategies emphasizing spatially targeted deployment, regulation of residential charging in informal settlements, and coordination with grid reinforcement [23].
• Power-sector preparation through investments in grid automation, smart charging, and integration with distributed renewables [23].
• Industrial and workforce policies supporting local manufacturing, skills training, and battery recycling [22].

Sequencing matters: initiating electrification through public fleets and commercial vehicles can generate rapid operational savings, build local market experience, and catalyze supply chains before broader consumer incentives are introduced.

3.3.2. Conditions for Success

The literature converges on several enabling conditions for sustainable EV transitions in developing countries:

• Affordable TCO for priority vehicle classes to ensure market pull.
• Planned, accessible charging infrastructure aligned with travel patterns and existing distribution capacity.
• Power-sector readiness, encompassing reliable, low-carbon electricity and the integration of renewables or off-grid solutions.
• Stable policy and financing mechanisms, including blended finance and concessional loans to offset high upfront costs.
• Institutional capacity and skilled workforce, essential for vehicle maintenance, safety standards, and regulatory enforcement [21].

3.3.3. The Electricity Access Challenge

Electricity access and reliability remain pivotal constraints for EV transitions across much of the Global South. ESMAP highlights that low grid connectivity in rural and peri-urban areas limits the feasibility of conventional charging infrastructure, necessitating innovative alternatives such as battery-swapping networks, solar-powered microgrids, and hybrid minigrid solutions. In urban centers, constrained distribution capacity and frequent outages undermine the economic viability of fast charging and fleet operations. Recommended mitigations include demand management, time-of-use tariffs, and targeted grid reinforcement. Seasonal variability—especially in hydropower-dependent systems—further complicates planning [24].

Equity concerns also emerge: households lacking secure parking or individual meters cannot easily access home charging, emphasizing the need for affordable, public charging options. Integrated planning between transport ministries, utilities, and municipalities is therefore essential to align infrastructure siting, tariff structures, and financing. Technical solutions such as V2G systems, managed charging, and distributed renewable generation hold potential, but they depend on institutional coordination and upfront investment [23].

Overall, the reviewed literature underscores that, while the economic and environmental rationale for EVs in developing countries is strong, the success of the transition hinges on synchronized policy design, grid modernization, and international support mechanisms that address the foundational constraint of electricity access.

4. EV Drivers in Developing Markets

In developing countries, EV market growth is driven by a combination of economic, policy, and technological factors that vary by income level. In many low- and middle-income countries, high fuel import costs and the potential for operational savings are significant motivators, since EVs can reduce dependence on expensive fossil fuels and have lower maintenance and running costs compared with ICE vehicles, making them economically attractive over the long term despite higher upfront costs [25]. Government incentives and supportive policies—such as tax breaks, reduced import duties, and regulatory targets—play a crucial role in stimulating demand and reducing barriers to adoption, especially in middle-income countries like India, Indonesia, and Brazil, where fiscal incentives have sharply increased registrations [26]. Infrastructure development is another key driver, with investment in charging networks and renewable energy sources enabling broader EV use, though uneven electricity access remains a constraint in many low-income settings [27]. Affordability and financing mechanisms also influence market growth: lower vehicle costs through import tariff adjustments and creative financing for two- and three-wheel EVs help expand markets among lower-income consumers [27]. Finally, global supply dynamics—particularly the expansion of affordable EV models from Chinese manufacturers—are accelerating adoption in developing regions, allowing some emerging markets to outpace traditional adopters by offering cost-competitive options that align with local income levels and market conditions [28].

4.1. Cost of Operation as a Main Driver of EV Adoption in Developing Countries

For many consumers in developing countries, EV adoption is not primarily about sustainability, it is about economic survival and cost efficiency. When the lifetime operating cost of an EV becomes significantly lower than that of an ICE vehicle, adoption follows naturally. With falling battery prices [29], innovative financing solutions, and supportive policies, the cost of operation will remain the central force shaping the EV landscape in developing markets. The global transition to electric mobility is gathering momentum, and developing countries are no exception. While environmental concerns and policy commitments play a role, one factor consistently emerges as a decisive driver for EV adoption in these regions: the cost of operation.

a. Why Does Cost Matter More in Developing Countries?

In many developing nations, car ownership is not just a convenience; it is a significant financial commitment. Fuel expenses often account for a large portion of household transportation costs, particularly where incomes are modest and fuel prices are volatile. EVs present a compelling economic advantage because their operating costs are substantially lower than those of ICE vehicles.

The key reasons include:

• Lower energy cost per kilometer: electricity is generally cheaper and less price-volatile compared to gasoline or diesel.
• Reduced maintenance requirements: EVs have fewer moving parts, no oil changes, fewer mechanical failures, and less frequent servicing.

For budget-conscious consumers, these savings accumulate over time, making EVs attractive even when upfront purchase prices remain relatively high.

b. Total Cost of Ownership Advantage

The true affordability of EVs becomes evident when analyzing the TCO, which includes:

• Purchase price.
• Fuel or energy costs.
• Maintenance and repair expenses.
• Resale value.

Although EVs typically cost more initially, lower operating expenses often compensate within a few years of use. For instance:

• In markets like India or Kenya, running an EV can be 60–70% cheaper per kilometer than an ICE vehicle [30].
• Battery technology improvements and localized assembly can further reduce costs, narrowing the price gap at purchase.

c. Fuel Price Volatility and Energy Security

Developing countries are highly susceptible to global oil price fluctuations, which translate directly into consumer fuel costs. Electricity, however, can often be generated domestically from renewable sources or existing grid infrastructure, reducing exposure to fuel price shocks. This energy security aspect strengthens the financial case for EV adoption.

d. The Role of Urban Transport Economics

Urban transportation patterns in developing countries, short commutes, high traffic congestion, and shared mobility favor EV economics:

• Lower running cost per trip benefits ride-hailing drivers and fleet operators.
• Regenerative braking reduces energy consumption in stop-and-go traffic.
• Government incentives, such as reduced road taxes and free parking, further enhance savings.

e. Barriers and How Cost Can Overcome Them

Despite cost advantages, some barriers persist:

• High upfront cost due to import duties and limited local manufacturing.
• Limited charging infrastructure in rural and peri-urban areas.
• Battery replacement concerns affecting resale value.

However, as battery prices continue to fall (currently decreasing by ~7% annually) [31], and as second-life battery applications emerge, the long-term cost advantage will dominate adoption decisions. Financing models like battery leasing and pay-as-you-go EV ownership are also mitigating initial affordability challenges.

f. Policy Levers to Accelerate Cost-Based Adoption

Policymakers in developing countries can amplify the cost advantage of EVs through:

• Import tax reductions or exemptions for EVs and components.
• Incentives for local assembly and battery manufacturing to reduce prices.
• Time-of-use electricity tariffs favoring EV charging during off-peak hours.
• Fleet electrification mandates in public transport and logistics to create economies of scale.

4.2. Affordability Challenge: High Upfront Costs

Purchasing premium EVs in many developing markets still cost significantly more than comparable ICE vehicles, sometimes by 70–80%, creating a steep barrier for both governments and private consumers [32]. The cost of premium EVs is also much higher than the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of most developing countries as an indication of purchasing power of populations.

A good idea about affordability of EVs comes from a look at how the sticker price of three mainstream new EVs (Nissan Leaf, Tesla Model 3 and BYD Atto 3) compares to GDP per capita (current USD) across key sub-Saharan African economies (Table 1). The base prices (including VAT) and the most recent GDP-per-capita figures available are shown (2024 unless noted). A simple affordability ratio is then computed as: EV price ÷ GDP per capita (i.e., “how many average annual outputs”).

EV reference prices (USD):

• Nissan Leaf (2024, S trim, US MSRP): USD 28,140 [33].
• BYD Atto 3: USD 42,468 [34].
• Tesla Model X (US price shown on configurator): USD 77,990 [35].

Table 1. Affordability snapshots (price ÷ GDP per capita) [36].

Country (GDP per Capita in USD)	Leaf	Atto 3	Model X
South Africa (6253)	4.50×	6.79×	12.47× [8]
Ghana (2406)	11.70×	17.65×	32.41× [9]
Côte d’Ivoire (2710)	10.38×	15.67×	28.78 × [10]
Kenya (2206)	12.76×	19.25×	35.35 × [11]
Senegal (1744)	16.14×	24.35×	44.71× [12]
Tanzania (1186)	23.73×	35.82×	65.76× [13]
Rwanda (~1000)	28.14×	42.47×	77.99 × [14]
Nigeria (807)	34.87×	52.63×	96.64× [15]
OECD members (48,454.7)	0.58×	0.88×	1.61× [16]
Middle income (6524.3)	4.31×	6.51×	11.95× [17]
Sub-Saharan Africa (1516.4)	18.56×	28.02×	51.43× [18]
Least developed countries UN classification (1325.3)	21.23×	32.06×	58.84× [19]
Heavily indebted poor countries (1272.4)	22.11×	33.38×	61.29× [20]

Table 1. Affordability snapshots (price ÷ GDP per capita) [36].

Country (GDP per Capita in USD)	Leaf	Atto 3	Model X
South Africa (6253)	4.50×	6.79×	12.47× [8]
Ghana (2406)	11.70×	17.65×	32.41× [9]
Côte d’Ivoire (2710)	10.38×	15.67×	28.78 × [10]
Kenya (2206)	12.76×	19.25×	35.35 × [11]
Senegal (1744)	16.14×	24.35×	44.71× [12]
Tanzania (1186)	23.73×	35.82×	65.76× [13]
Rwanda (~1000)	28.14×	42.47×	77.99 × [14]
Nigeria (807)	34.87×	52.63×	96.64× [15]
OECD members (48,454.7)	0.58×	0.88×	1.61× [16]
Middle income (6524.3)	4.31×	6.51×	11.95× [17]
Sub-Saharan Africa (1516.4)	18.56×	28.02×	51.43× [18]
Least developed countries UN classification (1325.3)	21.23×	32.06×	58.84× [19]
Heavily indebted poor countries (1272.4)	22.11×	33.38×	61.29× [20]

The ratios show that:

• Even in the region’s wealthiest large EV market (South Africa), a base Model 3 ≈ 6.8× GDP per capita; a Leaf ≈ 4.5×. That is with high- versus advanced-economy norms, but it is at least within reach for upper-middle-income households—especially with financing and incentives [37].
• In Ghana, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal, a Leaf still runs ~10–16× GDP/pc; Atto 3 and Model 3 are ~17–24×, indicating new EVs remain premium purchases for a small slice of households [38].
• In Tanzania, Rwanda, and Nigeria, ratios of ~24–53× show that, at current price points and incomes, mass adoption of new imported EVs is structurally difficult without targeted policy or lower-cost offerings. Nigeria’s 2024 figures were especially affected by naira depreciation when expressed in USD [39].
• In least developed countries a Leaf is equivalent to over 21× the GDP per capita, the BYD Atto over 32 times GDP per capita and Tesla X almost 60.

More generally Figure 2 compares GDP per capita of different economic zones with the price of well-known EVs. It shows that the countries with the highest GDP per capita correspond so far to countries with the highest EV penetration rates. It is the case of Norway and Iceland that have some of the highest GDPs per capita in the world and the most significant level of EV penetration.

In developing countries strategies to increase the intake of EVs will necessarily involve used EVs. In fact, creating standards for used-EV imports and battery health reporting can expand access while managing quality and safety. In the context of many developing countries, imported second-hand vehicles constitute the vast majority of vehicles in use. The share of used imports often exceeds 80% in many cases, sometimes reaching nearly 100% (e.g., Botswana, Kenya), depending on the country. This highlights a pervasive reliance on used car imports across emerging markets, especially Africa. Used vehicles dominate import markets in many developing countries where local vehicle ownership growth is often fueled by affordable second-hand imports. This trend is driven by limited local manufacturing, affordability constraints, and, in many cases, lax regulations on age and emissions of imported vehicles [40,41,42].

There are environmental and road safety concerns; these imported used ICE vehicles are often older, less safe, and more polluting, contributing to higher emissions and traffic fatalities in countries with minimal regulatory standards [43]. Some countries are taking action; for instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) implemented Euro 4 emission standards and age limits (e.g., maximum of 10 years old) [44]. Others, like Morocco (vehicles under 5 years old only) and Kenya (age cap of 8 years), have begun imposing stricter import rules to reduce the influx of polluting vehicles [45].

Between 2015 and 2018, approximately 14 million used light duty vehicles (cars, vans, SUVs, minibuses) were exported from Europe, the US, and Japan to other countries. Notably, around 80% of these ended up in low- and middle-income (developing) countries, with more than half (over 40%) going to Africa [46].

With regional and national highlights, as for Africa and specific countries, the picture is more informative. In Ethiopia, about 85% of vehicles in circulation are second-hand. In Kenya, it is about 80%, and in Nigeria, up to 90% [47]. In Ghana, “for every hundred vehicles on the road, 80 to 90 are used vehicles” [48]. Kenya reportedly imports 99% of all its cars as second-hand, primarily from Japan and Europe [49] (

Table 2. Share of Used Vehicles by Zone.

Region/Country	Share of Used Vehicles
Developing countries (global average)	~80% of imported light duty vehicles
Africa (continent-wide)	>40% of global exports of used vehicles end up here
Ethiopia	~85% of all vehicles are used
Kenya	~80–99% of vehicle imports are used
Nigeria	~90% of vehicles are second-hand
Ghana	80–90% of vehicles on road are used
Botswana	99.6% of imported cars are used

).

A striking example is Botswana, where 99.6% of imported cars are used vehicles [50].

The figure of ICE vehicles shows the importance of imported used vehicles from developed countries. Second-hand EVs can accelerate EV adoption in developing countries, and it is therefore of primary importance to know what is driving it, what is blocking it, and what to do next.

The used-EV market matters for some main reasons:

• Affordability gateway: pre-owned EVs can cut entry prices dramatically, widening access beyond early adopters and speeding overall EV penetration [51].
• Supply is rising fast: as rich-market fleets churn and Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) expand abroad, more right-priced EVs (and parts) are flowing to emerging markets. From 2024–2025, EV sales shares in EMDEs nearly doubled (to ~4%), and Chinese brands are pushing into Africa and Latin America [52].

Current trajectory (data points)

• Global outlook: Under stated policies, the worldwide EV fleet (ex-2/3-wheelers) could quadruple by 2030, creating a large pipeline of vehicles aging into second-hand markets [53].
• Emerging markets and developing economies momentum: The 2024 EV sales in emerging economies rose > 60% year over year (from ~2.5% to ~4% share). Latin America’s EV stock surged from 2024–2025, led by Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and Costa Rica [54].

Frictions that hold back used-EV scaling

○

Battery uncertainty: Buyers fear degraded range and replacement costs; sellers lack standardized state-of-health (SoH) reporting and warranties [55].

○

Patchy rules and tariffs: Import regimes for used EVs, age caps, and duties vary widely; some places still tax EVs like used ICE cars or lack safety/battery standards [56].

○

Charging + grid reliability: Sparse public charging and unreliable power (in parts of Africa/South Asia) dampen confidence; private/home charging is not universal in dense or informal housing [36,57].

○

Financing gaps: Higher upfront costs, limited residual-value data, and conservative lenders constrain credit—even when TCO can be favorable [58].

UNEP’s latest update (2024) tracks 2015–2022 flows and finds that the EU, Japan, the USA, and the Republic of Korea dominate the global second-hand cars trade; at least 23 million used vehicles were exported by them to the Global South over that period [59]. These figures come from the UNEP “Used Vehicles and the Environment” 2024 update and its key-findings brief; UNEP’s summary page confirms the 2015–2022 coverage and methodology [60].

On the hand, the highest EV shares are concentrated in Northern Europe (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands), while China now approaches a ~50% EV share thanks to sheer scale [61]. The largest used car exporters of (mostly ICE) vehicles are Japan, the EU, the US, and Korea; a different set from the top EV share leaders, though there is overlap via the EU as a region [62].

An important source of second-hand EVs does look to be guaranteed for now to allow a meaningful EV transition in most developing countries. In fact, China counts the largest number of EVs but China is not yet part of the top exporters of ICE vehicles and its second-hand EV market has an important demand. Obviously, it may change, but not yet. This will very likely have an impact on the access to second-hand EV markets in developing countries. This raises the problem of limited supply of used EVs for developing countries. As well, all other countries with a presently high EV penetration rate will first feed their second-hand market. A delayed transition in developing markets will likely be observed.

5. Blocking Factors and Opportunities: Electricity, Charging Infrastructures and the Potential of Renewable Energy

The adoption of EVs in developing countries is constrained by a combination of structural, economic, and institutional barriers. Limited access to reliable and affordable electricity remains one of the most critical challenges, as grid instability and insufficient generation capacity hinder both EV charging and broader energy planning. High upfront vehicle and battery costs, coupled with restricted access to financing, make EV ownership unattainable for many consumers and fleet operators. Additionally, the lack of charging infrastructure—especially outside major cities—reduces the practicality of EV use and deters early adopters. Weak or non-existent second-hand EV markets further impede affordability, while inadequate policy frameworks, limited technical expertise, and insufficient after-sales support slow industry development. Together, these factors create a reinforcing cycle that delays EV adoption despite the long-term economic and environmental benefits (Figure 3).

5.1. Access to Electricity Is a Major Bottleneck for the Growth of the EV Market in Developing Countries

Challenges of electricity access in the EV transition are different across income categories in developing countries. A critical but often overlooked barrier to successful EV deployment in developing countries is uneven access to reliable electricity. Whereas the global discourse on EV transitions frequently emphasizes vehicle affordability, charging infrastructure, and policy frameworks, developing economies face an additional and foundational constraint: basic electricity availability. The degree of access to electricity varies markedly by national income level, creating differentiated constraints on EV adoption.

5.1.1. Low-Income Countries: Deep Energy Deficits and EV Viability

Low-income developing countries are characterized by persistently low rates of electricity access, large rural energy deficits, and unstable grids, which directly undermine EV adoption prospects. For example, in Burundi—a low-income African country—only about 10% of the population has access to electricity, reflecting severe limitations in energy infrastructure that impede not just EV charging but broader socioeconomic development [63]. Similarly, many sub-Saharan African nations have extremely low electrification rates, with less than one in five households connected to a reliable grid, often concentrated among wealthier urban residents [63].

This baseline energy poverty has compounding effects on EV uptake: reliable household electrification is a prerequisite for both residential charging and the development of a broader charging network, yet in many low-income contexts, even basic grid connections are absent or unreliable. Without significant improvements in grid infrastructure and stable electricity supply, EV deployment may remain aspirational in these contexts.

5.1.2. Lower-Middle Income Countries: Partial Access, Persistent Gaps

Lower-middle-income countries present a mixed landscape of electricity access. While many have achieved majority electrification, significant urban–rural divides persist. World Bank and IEA data show that electrification rates improve with average income but rural populations still lag behind urban centers, constraining equitable access to EV charging infrastructure [64].

In such economies, grid expansion and reliability are central concerns. Utilities in developing regions often struggle financially and technically, with fewer than half of them covering operating costs—hindering their ability to serve expanding demand [65]. Case studies from countries like Ethiopia illustrate these challenges: despite notable EV policy initiatives, national grids remain weak, outage-prone, and unable to support widespread EV charging outside urban cores [66]. These infrastructure limitations slow the rollout of public and private charging stations, especially in peri-urban and rural areas, and can discourage prospective EV buyers who face uncertain electricity availability.

5.1.3. Upper-Middle-Income Developing Countries: Transition Enablers and Remaining Barriers

Upper-middle-income developing countries—such as parts of Southeast Asia and Latin America—generally exhibit higher overall electrification rates and more robust grids compared to lower-income peers. Many urban areas in these economies boast near-universal electricity access, enabling initial deployment of EV charging infrastructure. However, grid reliability, load management, and equitable rural access remain obstacles [64]. Although the share of people with electricity in these nations is greater, constraints such as transmission losses, insufficient renewable integration, and capacity bottlenecks can limit the scalability of charging networks and drive up electricity costs.

Moreover, EV charging demand introduces new stresses on existing power systems. Without adequate planning, spikes in evening demand or clusters of high-power fast chargers could exacerbate grid instability in regions where utilities are already under strain. Research highlights how EV adoption can strain poorly managed grids and even worsen access inequities during power outages unless integrated into broader electrification strategies [67].

5.1.4. Cross-Cutting Implications of Income-Linked Electricity Access

Across income categories, electricity access intersects with broader socioeconomic factors—such as affordability, urbanization, and policy capacity—to shape EV transition trajectories. Basic energy poverty, where hundreds of millions lack even minimal access to electricity, undercuts the foundational infrastructure needed for EV markets to flourish. Globally, over 660 million people remain without basic electricity access, with the vast majority living in lower-income regions; such deficits raise fundamental questions about the equity and feasibility of EV transitions that assume universal grid availability [65].

Policy responses must therefore address not only EV-specific needs (e.g., charging networks and incentives) but also systemic electricity access gaps that disproportionately affect lower-income and rural populations. Targeted electrification programs, investments in distributed renewable energy, and support for utility financial sustainability are necessary complements to EV promotion if transitions are to be inclusive and sustainable.

Without reliable, affordable access to clean electricity, EV adoption is likely to remain slow in developing countries. A successful transition requires coordinated investment in energy infrastructure, renewables, and EV policy frameworks. Access to electricity is a major bottleneck for the growth of the EV market in developing countries.

Hundreds of millions of people worldwide did not have access to electricity in 2024 [68,69] (Figure 4). In developing Asia, there were about 90 million people in 2024 compared to 761 million in 2010. In Africa the population without electricity has remained largely unchanged since 2010. There were about 581 million people in Africa without access to electricity in 2010 compared to about 585 million in 2024. Thus, 47% of Africans did not have access to electricity in 2024.

Without reliable, affordable, and clean electricity access, EV adoption remains slow in developing countries. A successful transition requires coordinated investment in energy infrastructure, renewables, and EV policy frameworks. Access to electricity is a major bottleneck for the growth of the EV market in developing countries. The challenges are interconnected, structural, and often unique to each context. Below are the main challenges:

• Insufficient Grid Infrastructure (Figure 5)

Many developing countries suffer from weak and unreliable power grids, especially in rural and peri-urban areas. Frequent blackouts, voltage instability, and limited grid coverage make it difficult to support EV charging stations. Figure 1 shows the reliability of electricity in some developing countries. Only 36% of African countries are satisfied with their electricity supply [70]. Poor energy management, insufficient investment in generation capacity, and inadequate infrastructure are some of the reasons for the low reliability [71,72].

• Limited Charging Infrastructure

Lack of public and private EV charging stations is a direct barrier to adoption. Without comprehensive charging infrastructure planning, including strategic placement and type of chargers, EV penetration targets will not be achieved [73]. Home charging is the most popular way EV owners charge vehicles. In developing countries, where shared apartments are popular, investing in home charging is not an option. Public charging stations will be needed to support a vast majority of EV owners in developing countries. Unfortunately, the majority of the charging stations in the world are either in China or in developed countries. About 1.3 million public charging stations were added in 2024 [74]. China alone accounts for 65% of the public charging stations in the world. The Chinese and European charging station surge has been spurred by investment and charging station regulations.

Governments focus more on universal basic electrification rather than EV-specific infrastructure.

• High Cost of Electricity

In some countries, electricity tariffs are too high or unpredictable, which reduces the cost advantage of EVs over ICE vehicles. Nearly two out of five people still live without access to electricity in most developing countries [70]. Even when there is access, high costs often place electricity out of reach of low-income households in developing countries. Electricity is considered affordable if it accounts for less than 5% of household income [75]. Currently about 40% of those without electricity fall within this bracket. While decentralized solutions such as distributed solar photovoltaic and minigrids could be cost-effective, initial cost and financing remain significant barriers.

• Lack of Technical Expertise

There is limited availability of technicians and engineers trained in EV charging systems, power electronics, and grid integration. In the United States, about one in five charging stations does not work [76]. Charging stations are thus less reliable than gas stations. Trained charging station installers and repairers are needed to fill the gap. These jobs will require skilled electricians who meet local licensing requirements and are adequately trained to install and maintain EV chargers safely and accurately. Charging infrastructure experiences breakdowns, with a significant number of public stations failing, due to issues like non-functional screens, payment system failures, and broken connectors. In developing countries, poor power quality, poor cabling, lack of standards, and lack of trained personnel are hampering charging station reliability [77].

• Urban–Rural Divide

Urban areas may develop EV infrastructure faster, but rural areas where energy access is often weakest are left behind. Primarily, access to electricity in developing countries is disproportionately tilted towards urban areas. About 80% of the population without access to electricity lives in rural areas, yet financing remains skewed towards urban areas. This creates inequity in access to the benefits of clean transportation. As a result e-mobility and charging infrastructure are surging up in cities at the detriment of rural communities. In Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, Morocco, and Ethiopia, EV infrastructure is only visible in the capital cities Accra, Dakar, Lagos, Kigali, Nairobi, Casablanca, and Addis Ababa respectively. However, this is not unique to developing countries. Cities in Denmark (Copenhagen) and Sweden (Stockholm) have fewer than 10 EVs per public charging point. This is lower than their national average, indicating that expanding coverage in cities has been prioritized ahead of rural areas around highways [74].

• Policy and Regulatory Gaps

Some developing countries through the help of the World Bank have launched their national energy compact policies. The National Energy Compact for Nigeria aims to accelerate the pace of access to electricity from 4 percent to 9 percent per annum and renewable energy share in the generation mix from 22 percent to 50 percent by 2030 [78]. Ghana is set to increase renewable energy generation from 4% to 10% by 2030, thereby reducing the cost of generation [79]. Prior to this several developing countries had set goals that they could not achieve. Ghana had set a goal to achieve 10% renewable penetration by 2020 but failed to do so due to inadequate funding and institutional weakness [80]. While many African countries have set EV targets, there are no corresponding implementation plans to make sure that there is enough electricity to charge them. Ghana, for instance, will need to expand the grid by 2GW annually to achieve its target of net zero in the transport sector by 2060 amidst poor electricity infrastructure [72].

• Overdependence on Fossil-Fueled Grids

Where the electricity grid is still largely powered by coal or diesel, charging EVs does not significantly reduce emissions, which undercuts one of their key benefits. The largest source of electricity generation in the world is still coal (35%), followed by natural gas (22%) and hydropower (14.6%). Coal offers a cheaper and easier way to produce electricity unlike other renewable energy sources that require high upfront costs. Huge financial investments are required for developing countries to switch from fossil-fueled grids to renewable grids. For example, Nigeria will need USD 15.5 billion to achieve 50% renewable energy penetration in the electricity sector by 2030 [78], while Ghana will need USD 2 billion to achieve just 10% penetration by the same year [79].

• Limited Integration with Renewable Energy

The majority of charging in developing countries are uncontrolled, where EVs charge at maximum power without any restrictions, placing strain on the grid. Renewables such as solar-coupled EV charging stations can help reduce charging-related stress on the grid, thereby avoiding reliance on the public grid. However, the intermittent nature of solar PV makes its direct use inefficient. A photovoltaic solar charging station will thus require storage devices, real-time power management, optimization systems, power management, and interface communication [81]. However, the investment cost of renewable charging stations is a significant barrier. In many developing countries there is insufficient investment in solar, wind, or other renewables to power EVs sustainably. Off-grid or minigrid solutions for EV charging are underdeveloped or poorly financed.

• Financing Constraints

The transition to EVs in developing countries faces significant challenges, primarily due to the high upfront cost of EVs driven by expensive battery packs, making them less affordable for price-sensitive consumers. High upfront costs for installing charging infrastructure are hard to bear for local entrepreneurs or governments. The investment cost for a solar charging station ranges from USD 1000 to USD 3000 per kW [77,82]. Without incentives, grants, and financial aid it will be difficult to increase these kinds of charging stations. China subsidizes its EV industries through direct and indirect subsidies for renewable energy generation. For instance, China supported renewable energy power generation with CNY 2.75 billion with CNY 1.25 billion specifically allocated to solar power [83]. Lack of private-sector investment and public subsidies has hampered similar initiatives in developing countries. Limited financing options further exacerbate this issue, as few banks or credit institutions offer affordable loans or leasing programs for EVs compared to conventional vehicles. Additionally, weak government subsidies—stemming from limited fiscal capacity—mean that incentives such as tax breaks, rebates, or grants are often insufficient to encourage widespread adoption. Finally, the heavy dependence on cheap, imported used ICE vehicles continues to dominate the market, further hindering the growth of the EV sector.

• Infrastructure Limitations

The transition to EVs in developing countries faces major obstacles such as insufficient charging infrastructure, where the lack of public charging stations, slow deployment, and unreliable electricity supply discourage potential buyers. Weak power grids further compound the issue, as frequent electricity shortages and unstable distribution networks make EV charging unreliable, especially in rural areas. Additionally, the absence of local manufacturing and supply chains forces heavy reliance on imported vehicles and components, driving up costs and creating logistical challenges that hinder large-scale EV adoption.

• Energy and Environmental Challenges

When electricity generation relies heavily on fossil fuels such as coal or oil, the environmental advantages of EVs become limited, as the emissions simply shift from tailpipes to power plants. This undermines the overall sustainability and weakens the policy justification for promoting EVs. Furthermore, the slow integration of renewable energy sources into the power grid exacerbates this issue, preventing EVs from achieving their full potential as a clean and sustainable transportation solution.

• Policy and Regulatory Barriers

The transition to EVs in many developing countries is hindered by several key barriers, including the absence of clear and coherent policy frameworks, as many nations lack well-defined national strategies, targets, or roadmaps to guide the EV shift. Additionally, high import duties and taxes on EVs and their batteries make them prohibitively expensive for most consumers, limiting market growth. Furthermore, weak enforcement of environmental standards—such as emissions regulations and fuel economy requirements—reduces the incentive for both manufacturers and consumers to move away from ICE vehicles, slowing progress toward sustainable transportation.

• Social and Cultural Barriers

Low public awareness remains a major barrier to EV adoption, as many consumers lack knowledge about their environmental benefits, maintenance requirements, and long-term cost savings. Additionally, widespread perception and trust issues—such as concerns over driving range, vehicle performance, and the high cost of battery replacement—further discourage potential buyers. Compounding these challenges is the resistance from established industries, including oil, auto repair, and ICE vehicle sectors, which often lobby against rapid EV transitions to safeguard their existing economic interests.

• Technological and Skill Gaps

Developing countries often face significant barriers to the EV transition due to limited technical expertise and a weak research and innovation ecosystem. There is a shortage of trained technicians, engineers, and maintenance professionals capable of handling EV systems and battery technologies, which hinders large-scale deployment and effective maintenance. Additionally, the lack of local research centers and universities dedicated to EV technologies restricts innovation, adaptation to local conditions, and the development of homegrown solutions, making these countries heavily dependent on imported technologies and expertise.

• Geopolitical and Supply Chain Constraints

Developing countries face significant challenges in the EV transition due to strong dependence on both battery materials and international trade. The supply of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel—essential for battery production—is concentrated in a few countries, creating major supply risks and price volatility. At the same time, many developing nations rely heavily on foreign EV and battery manufacturers, leaving their markets vulnerable to external price fluctuations, trade restrictions, and geopolitical tensions that can disrupt access to key technologies and slow domestic industry growth.

Table 3. Summary of barriers to EV adoption in developing countries.

Category	Key Barriers
Economic	High costs, lack of subsidies, weak financing
Infrastructure	Poor charging networks, unreliable power grid
Policy	Weak regulations, lack of national EV plans
Social	Low awareness, cultural resistance
Technological	Skill shortages, limited R&D
Environmental	Fossil-based electricity generation
Supply Chain	Import dependence, material access issues

summarizes the category of barriers and the importance of their effect.

5.2. The Potential of Renewable Energy

Renewable energy offers substantial potential to shape the environmental trajectory of EV adoption in developing countries. Leveraging abundant renewable resources, falling technology costs, and emerging smart-grid capabilities can allow these countries to simultaneously address climate goals, energy security challenges, and mobility needs. Realizing this integrated transition will require a coordinated policy approach, targeted investments, and strengthened institutional capacity, but the benefits—both environmental and socioeconomic—position renewables as a cornerstone of sustainable electrification pathways across the developing world (Figure 6).

The transition to electric mobility in developing countries is closely intertwined with the evolution of their electricity sectors. The environmental benefits of EVs depend largely on the carbon intensity of the electricity used for charging. While many developing countries still rely heavily on fossil fuels for power generation, they also possess some of the world’s highest technical potential for renewable energy (RE) (Figure 7)—including solar, wind, geothermal, and small hydropower resources—creating a strategic opportunity to align EV adoption with clean energy expansion. Harnessing this renewable potential is therefore central to ensuring that EV deployment contributes meaningfully to decarbonization efforts.

Developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, have some of the highest solar irradiation levels globally, enabling cost-effective photovoltaic (PV) deployment for both grid-connected and off-grid applications. Solar minigrids and decentralized PV systems can play a transformative role in electrifying rural areas while supporting low-power EV charging for two-wheelers, three-wheelers, and small commercial vehicles—segments that dominate mobility in many emerging markets. Similarly, wind resources in coastal and highland regions (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Vietnam) offer additional pathways for large-scale clean power generation, which can be integrated into national grids to supply EV charging infrastructure.

The declining costs of renewable technologies further strengthen this opportunity. Over the past decade, utility-scale solar PV costs have fallen by more than 80%, and onshore wind costs by over 50%, making renewable electricity increasingly competitive with diesel and coal-based generation commonly used in developing countries. This cost parity is particularly important for countries facing high fuel import bills and energy insecurity. By coupling EV adoption with expanded renewable energy deployment, governments can reduce dependence on volatile fossil fuel markets while stimulating domestic energy production.

Moreover, integrating renewables into the EV transition enhances grid stability and enables innovative energy management strategies. EVs can act as distributed storage assets through V2G and vehicle-to-home (V2H) technologies, helping smooth intermittency associated with solar and wind generation. These synergies support emerging smart-grid architectures that can improve power reliability—an important constraint in many developing countries. For example, pilot projects in India and South Africa have demonstrated that coordinated EV charging, powered largely by solar generation, can significantly reduce peak demand and lower operational costs for utilities [85].

However, capitalizing on this potential requires addressing several structural barriers. Many developing countries lack adequate transmission infrastructure, stable regulatory frameworks, and financial mechanisms to scale renewable energy integration at the pace required for mass EV adoption. High upfront investment costs, limited access to concessional finance, and political uncertainty further complicate large-scale RE deployment. Additionally, without clear national policies linking EV expansion to renewable energy targets, EV adoption risks being supported by carbon-intensive grids, thereby undermining climate mitigation goals.

Despite these challenges, the convergence of renewable energy expansion and electric mobility presents a unique developmental opportunity. By designing EV policies that explicitly link charging infrastructure to renewable generation—through renewable portfolio standards, fiscal incentives, feed-in tariffs, and green financing—developing countries can position themselves to leapfrog toward low-carbon transportation systems. International climate finance, multilateral development banks, and public–private partnerships will play critical roles in enabling this alignment, helping countries avoid the lock-in of fossil-fuel-based EV charging systems while accelerating the transition to sustainable mobility.

Charging infrastructure and its integration with renewable energy constitute the cornerstone of energy transitions and sustainable mobility in developing countries. Decentralized, hybrid, and digitalized models offer particularly promising prospects for overcoming structural limitations of electrical grids. Their success depends as much on institutional innovation—policy alignment, financing mechanisms, and governance coherence—as on technological progress.

Moreover, the development of electromobility and associated storage systems must be accompanied by responsible battery and electronic waste management, including recycling and component valorization at end of life, to minimize environmental impact and strengthen the circular economy. Ultimately, the effective coupling of renewable energy and electromobility, combined with strategies for recycling and sustainable electronic waste management, can reconcile energy security, emissions reduction, and social inclusion, forming the backbone of a just and sustainable transition.

The expansion of charging infrastructure constitutes one of the most decisive levers in the transition to EVs, particularly in developing countries where energy systems continue to face significant structural constraints. The success of this transition depends not solely on the availability of vehicles or reductions in battery costs but primarily on the capacity of electrical grids to provide reliable, accessible, and decarbonized power to meet the growing charging demand.

In many emerging economies, the energy sector remains characterized by multiple structural weaknesses. Electrical networks are often limited by insufficient generation capacity, high technical losses, and incomplete geographical coverage, particularly in rural areas. This is compounded by a strong reliance on imported fossil fuels—especially heavy fuel oil and diesel—exposing these countries to international price volatility and recurrent trade balance deficits [86]. Such energy dependencies weigh not only on macroeconomic stability but also on the competitiveness and sustainability of transport systems.

Chronic underinvestment in energy infrastructure exacerbates these constraints. In several African countries, public investments in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution remain below the estimated requirements to accommodate growing demand and support new uses, such as electric mobility. In 2021, for example, over 625 million people in Africa—41% of households—lacked access to electricity [87]. Charging infrastructure, still scarce, is often limited to urban pilot projects led by private actors or international partnerships, without a harmonized regulatory framework or clear business model.

In this context, integrating renewable energy (RE) into charging systems represents a strategic response to a triple imperative: energy, environmental, and economic. From an energy perspective, it alleviates pressure on fragile grids by enabling autonomous or hybrid charging systems based on solar, wind, or other local resources. Environmentally, it contributes to greenhouse gas emissions reduction and improved urban air quality, both critical issues for countries experiencing rapid urbanization. Economically, this approach opens avenues for innovation, job creation, and valorization of local energy resources, while reducing dependence on fuel and electricity imports.

Thus, the convergence between electromobility and renewable energy is not merely a technological choice but a long-term strategic orientation. It reflects the necessity of aligning transport and energy policies with sustainable development goals while strengthening the resilience of energy systems against economic and climate shocks. The successful integration of these two dynamics could therefore become a cornerstone of a just and inclusive transition to a low-carbon economy in developing countries.

5.3. Integration of Renewable Energy

Integrating renewable energy (RE), particularly photovoltaic (PV) solar and wind, into EV charging infrastructure constitutes a key strategy to reconcile sustainable mobility and the energy transition. It both reduces reliance on vulnerable electrical networks and decarbonizes the transport sector. Three main technological and institutional approaches emerge:

(a)

Solar and Hybrid Charging Stations

Autonomous (off-grid) or hybrid (grid-connected + storage) photovoltaic stations are especially relevant in regions with high solar irradiation and unreliable grids.

These stations (Figure 8) combine PV panels, stationary batteries, or even second-life EV batteries to store energy and redistribute it when needed.

• For instance, MagicPower has implemented 100% off-grid EV charging stations in South Africa, powered by solar energy and battery storage, to bypass national grid instability [88].
• Technically, studies describe designs of bidirectional inverters to manage energy flows between PV, batteries, and charging stations, optimizing microgrid stability [89].
• The use of second-life batteries for solar-related storage is well-documented: they provide a low-cost option to smooth PV intermittency and extend EV pack utilization [90,91]. An illustrative demonstrator is the uYilo project in South Africa, combining PV panels, second-life batteries, smart energy management, and V2G capabilities.

These stations offer multiple benefits: they can operate in microgrid mode when the main grid is unstable, provide reliable EV charging, and even offer electrification services to underserved rural or peri-urban areas. Moreover, they can serve as demonstrators for innovative business models: pay-as-you-go charging, public–private partnerships, or financing through renewable energy actors.

(b)

Renewable-Powered Smart Microgrids and Minigrids

Another approach integrates charging stations within smart microgrids, where renewable generation (solar, wind) is coupled with storage and advanced digital management (Figure 9):

• A recent study proposed a DC hybrid microgrid (PV + grid + storage) with a fuzzy logic pilot to manage energy flows to charging stations, enhancing robustness by handling fluctuations in EV usage while maintaining voltage quality [92]
• Charging stations integrated into microgrids provide sustainable and reliable solutions. Eswar et al. [93] proposed a hybrid method combining the dollmaker optimization algorithm (DOA) with a spatial Bayesian neural network (SBNN) to optimize solar, wind, and storage management. This approach improves demand forecasting, stabilizes the microgrid, and enhances power quality. MATLAB/Simulink (R2024a or 2024b) simulations show substantial efficiency gains and harmonic distortion reduction compared to existing techniques.
• Renewable-powered microgrids can also employ smart meters, data platforms, and algorithms to manage flexibility, modulating charging according to solar production peaks, using dynamic pricing, or implementing pay-as-you-go models common in decentralized electrification. Flexibility is essential in contexts where public grids are unstable or expensive to reinforce [94].

(c)

Bidirectional Systems and Vehicle-to-Grid Technologies

V2G systems represent a third strategic approach (Figure 10). In this model, EVs are not merely consumers but active storage units capable of feeding electricity back to the grid or microgrid, particularly useful for mitigating RE intermittency.

• Research shows V2G can provide ancillary services such as frequency regulation, voltage management, and load balancing, especially in contexts of high RE variability [95].
• Technologically, PV–EV–grid interfacing can be achieved via bidirectional inverters and chargers, enabling charging and discharging operations [89].
• Some companies are developing V2G/vehicle-to-everything (V2X) charging stations, with rapid technological advances expected to play a key role in RE integration and microgrid stabilization in infrastructure-limited countries [96].
• Effective V2G deployment requires robust regulatory frameworks, interoperable communication protocols, and financial incentives to encourage user participation. Recent studies highlight that a suitable political and regulatory architecture is a prerequisite for functioning V2G services [97]. Moreover, integrating battery degradation into techno-economic models is recognized as crucial for ensuring fair compensation to users [98]. Innovative pricing approaches, such as menu-based schemes, are proposed to calibrate incentives according to vehicle contributions and associated costs [99].

Limitations and Challenges:

• Battery aging: repeated V2G use accelerates battery wear, necessitating compensation strategies for EV owners [99].
• Lack of communication infrastructure: advanced energy management systems, smart meters, and standardized protocols are required.
• Regulation: legal frameworks for EV electricity resale remain underdeveloped, particularly in developing countries.
• Acceptability: users must be convinced to participate in V2G services, requiring financial incentives and transparency on battery impacts.

The integration of renewable energy sources (RESs) like solar and wind into the EV transition presents significant opportunities for sustainable transportation in developing countries, but it is hindered by a range of structural challenges (Figure 11). These stem from underdeveloped infrastructure, economic constraints, policy gaps, and technological limitations, often exacerbated by reliance on fossil-fuel-based grids and rapid urbanization. Below, we outline the primary structural challenges based on analyses from various studies and reports.

5.3.1. Infrastructure and Grid Stability Challenges

Developing countries frequently face unreliable and overloaded power grids, which are ill-equipped to handle the intermittent nature of renewables while supporting increased EV charging demands. For instance:

• Intermittency and Load Management: Solar and wind power fluctuate based on weather and time, leading to grid instability when integrated with EV charging. Uncontrolled EV charging can cause peak load surges, overwhelming grids that already experience frequent blackouts or shortages (e.g., in regions like sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia). This requires advanced storage solutions like batteries, but their deployment is limited by technical expertise and land availability.
• Inadequate Charging Networks: Many areas lack sufficient EV charging stations, particularly in rural zones, and integrating renewables (e.g., solar-powered chargers) is complicated by poor grid connectivity. Off-grid microgrids offer alternatives but struggle with scalability and inability to feed excess energy back to national grids, as seen in South Africa. Urban–rural disparities further compound this, with infrastructure concentrated in cities while rural areas in countries like Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia remain underserved.
• Increased Energy Demand Impacts: EV adoption could alter daily load curves and boost overall consumption, straining systems in developing nations where grids are often coal-dependent and inefficient. Solutions like smart charging are proposed, but implementation is slow due to outdated infrastructure.

5.3.2. Economic and Financial Challenges

High costs act as a major barrier, limiting investment in both RES and EV ecosystems.

• Upfront and Operational Expenses: Building renewable-powered charging infrastructure demands substantial capital for solar panels, batteries, and grid upgrades, which is challenging in liquidity-constrained governments (e.g., in Latin America). EVs themselves have high purchase prices due to import dependencies and taxes, making them unaffordable for lower-income populations in price-sensitive markets like India and Nigeria.
• Investment and Revenue Gaps: Public–private partnerships are needed to fund integration, but opportunity costs and limited returns from grid services deter investors. In off-grid setups, maintenance costs for vehicle-integrated photovoltaics (VIPV) or battery swapping stations add further burdens, with no widespread subsidies or incentives to offset them.
• Economic Disparities: Socioeconomic inequalities mean urban elites may adopt EVs, but broader integration with renewables is hampered by poverty and lack of financing options, perpetuating reliance on cheaper fossil fuel vehicles.

5.3.3. Policy and Regulatory Challenges

Fragmented policies hinder coordinated efforts to merge RESs with EV transitions.

• Lack of Consistent Frameworks: Many developing countries have disjointed strategies, with weak incentives, subsidies, or tax breaks for renewable–EV integration. This demoralizes private investment and slows infrastructure rollout, as noted in Vietnam and sub-Saharan Africa.
• Regulatory Gaps and Silos: Energy and transport sectors often operate in isolation, with misaligned policies and unclear rules for grid connections, licensing, and taxation. Standards for battery swapping or V2G technologies are underdeveloped, leading to interoperability issues. Permitting processes for RES installations are cumbersome, and there is an absence of mandates for emission reductions or renewable mandates in EV charging.
• Global South Underrepresentation: Policies are often borrowed from developed nations without adaptation to local contexts, ignoring unique challenges like informal economies or rapid population growth in places like Kenya and Bangladesh.

5.3.4. Technological Challenges

Technological hurdles include dependencies on imports and gaps in local capabilities.

• Integration and Standardization Issues: Renovating grids for RES-EV compatibility involves challenges in standardization, network security, and resource optimization. Smart charging and V2G systems could mitigate intermittency, but adoption is low due to cybersecurity risks and battery degradation concerns.
• Supply Chain and Innovation Gaps: Heavy reliance on imported batteries and components raises costs and supply vulnerabilities, with limited local R&D in developing countries. Adapting technologies like VIPV faces aesthetic, design, and maintenance issues.
• Awareness and Skills Deficits: Limited public knowledge about EV benefits, renewable integration, and maintenance fosters hesitancy, compounded by misconceptions about reliability in harsh climates.

Overall, these challenges are interconnected, with infrastructure weaknesses amplifying economic and policy issues. Addressing them requires tailored strategies, such as investing in microgrids, harmonizing standards, and fostering international collaborations to make the EV-RES transition viable in developing contexts.

5.4. Synergies Between Electromobility and the Energy Transition

The transition toward electromobility and the broader energy transition in developing countries are mutually reinforcing processes that—if strategically coordinated—can accelerate decarbonization, improve energy security, and modernize national infrastructure. Electrifying transport increases overall electricity demand, but unlike industrial or residential loads, EVs introduce a highly flexible and schedulable load profile. This flexibility enables EVs to act as a controllable demand sink for variable renewable energy (VRE) sources such as solar PV and wind, which are often curtailed due to intermittency or lack of storage capacity. By aligning EV charging with renewable generation peaks, countries can smooth demand curves, enhance grid stability, and raise the economic value of renewable energy investments.

Synergies also emerge through the deployment of distributed energy resources. In regions with unreliable grids or limited rural electrification, combining solar minigrids, battery energy storage systems (BESSs), and EV charging hubs creates integrated systems that serve both mobility and power needs. Electric two- and three-wheelers—already widespread in many developing economies—can be charged using low-voltage solar home systems or community microgrids, linking mobility electrification with bottom-up renewable energy expansion.

Further, V2G and vehicle-to-home (V2H) capabilities can strengthen energy resilience. In countries frequently affected by blackouts or climate-related disruptions, EV batteries provide decentralized backup power and help stabilize weak grids. As EV penetration increases, aggregated storage capacity can act as a virtual power plant, supporting frequency regulation, peak shaving, and emergency power supply.

Economically, aligning electromobility with renewable deployment reduces fossil fuel import dependence, a major source of macroeconomic vulnerability for many developing nations. Local manufacturing opportunities also arise in components such as solar panels, EV chargers, battery packs, and electric two-wheeler assembly—creating jobs while building domestic industrial capabilities. Policy synergies strengthen these trends: unified incentives for clean transport and renewable energy, coordinated infrastructure planning, and integrated regulatory frameworks can dramatically lower transition costs and maximize system-wide benefits.

Ultimately, electromobility and the energy transition are not parallel agendas; they are deeply interconnected. When pursued jointly, they enable developing countries to bypass carbon-intensive development pathways, enhance energy access, and build resilient low-carbon economies.

To maximize the benefits of EVs in the context of the energy transition, electromobility must be conceived as an integrated component rather than an isolated constraint. Three mechanisms illustrate this interdependence:

a.

Stimulating Demand for Clean Energy

Accelerated EV deployment increases electricity demand. If coupled with flexible charging strategies (e.g., charging managed according to RE production), it can stimulate investment in renewable power plants: developers are incentivized to build more solar or wind capacity to meet rising demand. This creates a virtuous cycle: more EVs drive RE demand, and greater RE deployment makes charging more sustainable.

b.

Enhancing Energy Storage and Optimizing Battery Life-cycle

• Second-life batteries: After use in vehicles, batteries can serve as stationary storage, extending asset life, reducing cost per kWh stored, and reinforcing microgrid or PV system resilience.
• V2G: As mentioned, EVs can feed stored energy back to the grid, helping balance load and smooth RE fluctuations. This “storage on wheels” reduces the need for dedicated stationary storage. Studies show V2G can provide valuable ancillary services (frequency regulation, spinning reserve, etc.) [95].

c.

Creating New Value Chains and Employment Opportunities

Integrating EVs and RE can spawn local economic sectors:

• Design, installation, and maintenance of solar/hybrid charging stations.
• Development of energy management software: data platforms for microgrids, control systems, and load optimization.
• Battery recycling and reuse: second life, V2G, remanufacturing.
• Regulatory and financial services: pay-as-you-go models, dynamic pricing, V2G service remuneration, public–private partnerships.

6. The Role of the Second-Hand EV Market

The transition to EVs in developing countries faces significant barriers, including high upfront costs, limited infrastructure, and economic constraints that restrict access to new models. However, the second-hand EV market emerges as a critical gateway for broader adoption, enabling middle- and low-income households to participate in decarbonizing road transport at lower entry points [100,101]. As highlighted in Reference [100], secondhand EVs democratize clean mobility by extending vehicle lifespans, reducing waste, and aligning with circular economy principles, while accelerating market penetration and phasing out older ICE vehicles (Figure 12). This section synthesizes key insights on the interplay between depreciation, subsidies, technology, and market dynamics, with a focus on their implications for developing countries where used EVs are poised to dominate adoption pathways.

Depreciation remains a pivotal factor shaping the second-hand EV market, often faster for EVs than ICE vehicles due to rapid technological obsolescence and battery degradation [102,103,104,105,106,107,108]. In developing contexts, this can delay market entry, as older models lose value quickly amid advancements in battery energy density (e.g., from ~90–100 Wh/kg in 1992 to ~320–350 Wh/kg by 2025) and AI integration for enhanced safety and efficiency [109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126]. Batteries, constituting 20–60% of an EV’s value historically, drive both market growth and depreciation through natural capacity loss (2.5% annually, reaching 70–80% after 7–10 years) and replacement costs (USD 4000–20,000) [127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137]. For developing countries, this underscores the need for affordable refurbishment and second-life applications, such as repurposing batteries for energy storage, to mitigate risks and extend usability [138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149].

Subsidies, while accelerating new EV uptake in high-adoption nations like Norway and Iceland (where EV registrations reached 86% and 72% in 2023), distort markets by widening price gaps between new and used models [150,151,152,153,154,155,156]. In developing regions, the phase-out of subsidies could invigorate second-hand markets by narrowing this disparity, but current focus on acquisition over operation limits impact unless paired with infrastructure support [150,151,152]. Non-subsidy drivers—such as low electricity costs relative to gasoline (e.g., ratios of 16.2 in Norway, but applicable in urban developing areas)—favor EVs where operational savings are high, yet developing countries often lack such incentives for used models [157,158,159,160,161,162].

Technology further complicates the landscape, with swift progress in Li-ion and emerging Na-ion batteries, AI-driven autonomous features, and over-the-air updates enhancing new EVs while devaluing older ones [114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,163,164,165,166,167]. In developing countries, this exacerbates challenges like limited technical knowledge and service centers but offers opportunities through local refurbishment businesses and micro-EVs (e.g., two/three-wheelers growing fastest in India and the Philippines) [168]. Export trends from high-income nations (e.g., Japan’s Nissan Leaf to Africa and Southeast Asia, China’s low-cost models) supply affordable used EVs, though import regulations and tariffs hinder flow [144,145].

Emerging markets in developing countries, such as India (rapid urbanization and government EV push), Nigeria (low-cost mobility interest), Kenya (Nairobi as EV hub for 2–3-wheelers), South Africa, and the Philippines (e-trikes and jeepneys), illustrate both potential and hurdles [168]. High demand stems from pollution, rising fuel costs, and ride-sharing needs, but low supply, battery anxiety, sparse charging (e.g., one station per 205 km in Andhra Pradesh, India), and policy inconsistencies constrain growth [168]. Opportunities include fleet electrification for cost savings, battery leasing to reduce upfront barriers, and second-life markets for grid storage, aligning with sustainability goals [138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149].

Looking ahead, in Reference [100] a vibrant second-hand EV ecosystem by 2030+ is projected, with lease returns surging (123,000 in 2025 to 650,000 by 2027) and used-EV market share rising to 20–30% globally [138,169]. For developing countries, this implies accelerated adoption if policies incentivize imports, infrastructure, and education, potentially saving households EUR 6000 over 7 years versus petrol cars [147]. However, without addressing depreciation drivers and challenges, the transition risks remaining elite-driven. Certified pre-owned programs and battery guarantees will be essential to build trust and stabilize values [148,149].

The second-hand EV market is indispensable for equitable EV transition in developing countries, where affordability trumps innovation. By managing depreciation through technological and policy interventions, these nations can leverage used EVs to reduce emissions, foster local industries, and achieve sustainable mobility [100,101,144,145,146,147]. Future research should focus on region-specific data to refine models like the S-curve for market saturation [100,145].

Access to the second-hand EV market in developing countries remains limited due to a combination of structural, economic, and institutional barriers that restrict affordability and adoption. Many developing economies lack established import channels, regulatory frameworks, and standards for used EVs, leading to uncertainty around battery health, residual value, and long-term reliability. High transport and import costs, combined with inadequate local expertise for evaluating and servicing used batteries, further reduce consumer confidence. Moreover, the scarcity of certified refurbishing centers and diagnostic infrastructure makes it difficult to assess and guarantee the quality of pre-owned EVs. As a result, the second-hand EV market remains shallow, preventing low- and middle-income consumers—who typically rely on used vehicles—from accessing affordable electrified mobility.

Furthermore, access to the second-hand EV market in developing countries remains severely constrained due to limited global availability and high demand in major economies where EV adoption is still expanding. As wealthier markets continue to scale up their own electric mobility transitions, used EVs are absorbed domestically to meet growing consumer demand for lower-cost entry options, leaving few vehicles available for export. This restricts developing countries from accessing affordable second-hand EVs—an asset class that historically played a critical role in accelerating the diffusion of ICE vehicles—thereby slowing electrification efforts and widening the gap in EV accessibility between advanced and emerging markets.

In fact, the majority of vehicles exported to developing countries are used vehicles [170]. In 2022, Africa imported the highest share of used light duty vehicles (33%), followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia (24%), Asia Pacific (16%), the Middle East (15%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (12%) [171] (Figure 13). Used vehicle trade has been fueled by competitive cost, standards, and regulations. It presupposes that, eventually, used EVs will become prevalent as EV penetration increases around the globe.

○

Affordability and Accessibility

Between 2017 and 2022, the highest number of second-hand EVs were exported to Eastern Europe and Central Asia (38.2%), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (29.3%), Asia Pacific (24%), the Middle East (7.1%), and Africa (1.4%) [172]. EVs are significantly cheaper than new ones, making them the only viable option for some buyers. The main consideration for car buyers when opting for an EV is affordability [173]. The second-hand (used) EV market in developing countries plays a critical role in the broader adoption of EVs and the energy transition, but it comes with both opportunities and challenges.

In addition to making them accessible to middle- and low-income consumers, used-EV markets in developing countries may play a larger role in supporting reuse and also increasing lifespan as has occurred with conventional vehicles. Faster adoption is guaranteed if this happens especially where EVs are too expensive. This could lead to new opportunities in green jobs such as battery reuse, repurposing, repair, diagnostics and recycling that could lead to local innovation. But many challenges exist with the import of used EVs. EV batteries typically degrade at an average rate of 2.5% per year [173]. Which means that, after 7–10 years, their capacity can drop to around 80%, resulting in a noticeable reduction in driving range. Additionally, battery replacement costs are high which can impose a significant financial burden on subsequent owners in developing countries. Additionally, replacement batteries are not readily available and have to be imported. Unless a battery passport is introduced to ensure only healthy batteries are imported with the used EVs, developing countries could become a dumping ground once again. Considering the adverse effect of lithium-ion batteries, their disposal in landfills will be detrimental to human health. Notwithstanding, there is huge skills gap that needs to be filled for EVs to thrive. The entire EV ecosystem is in need of maintenance and repair technicians, battery specialists, charging infrastructure installers, EV-specific software, recycling and second-life applications [174].

The lower cost of used EVs alone is not enough to boost their sales unless there is also an increase in and equitable distribution of charging infrastructure. While some policies in developing countries are trying to address this, public charging stations are still a rare sight. Ghana, for instance, is witnessing a rise in used-EV adoption, yet this growth is constrained by a limited and unevenly distributed charging network, concentrated exclusively in the capital.

Additionally, EV standards are not being enforced in developing countries. As a result, sub-standard charging stations and used EVs in bad condition are emerging. Some developing countries have standards for new vehicles but not used vehicles. There are no checks or conformity assessments of used vehicles that are imported. This makes developing countries prone to becoming a dumping ground for used EVs.

Direct policies, regulations and standards are needed to regulate the import of used vehicles especially for EVs. The age of the battery could be a major concern if not regulated. The European Union intends to implement a digital battery passport in 2027 which will require all EV batteries to have labeling, marking, or information on the state of health and expected lifetime [175]. If implemented, it will be possible to tell the ages of used-EV batteries and their state of health. It is incumbent for used vehicle policies and standards in developing countries on the import of used EVs to be based on age and state of health of their batteries.

It is imperative that charging infrastructure is prioritized to boost EV penetration. Just as with the Alternative Fuel Infrastructure regulation in Europe, charging station regulations in developing countries should specify minimum distances between charging stations, safety requirements, and minimum capacities for highways and city centers [176,177]. Incentives should be provided to support charging stations with renewable sources of energy. Incentives should also be provided for skills training in the repair, maintenance, reuse, recycling, and repurposing of EV components.

7. EV Depreciation in Developing Countries

The depreciation of EVs—defined as the decline in a vehicle’s resale value over time—is a critical but underexamined dimension of the EV transition in developing economies. Depreciation influences TCO, second-hand market dynamics, and ultimately consumer uptake. While most empirical analyses of EV depreciation focus on developed markets, emerging economies face distinct patterns shaped by market maturity, income levels, infrastructure gaps, and reliance on second-hand imports.

7.1. Fundamental Drivers of EV Depreciation

EVs have generally exhibited higher depreciation rates than ICE vehicles, driven by rapid technological change, uncertainty regarding battery life, and policy-induced volatility in new vehicle pricing. Research shows that EVs tend to depreciate faster than comparable ICE vehicles—about 1.16% per month versus 0.87% per month in a multicountry study—implying that EV values fall more rapidly over the first several years of ownership [178].

Key factors include:

Depreciation has emerged as a central economic barrier to scaling EVs in developing-country contexts. Empirical evidence from a range of markets shows that many EVs currently lose value faster than comparable ICE vehicles, creating risks for first owners, lenders, insurers and for the emergence of a healthy second-hand market. Rapid technological progress (battery energy density, faster charging, cheaper newer models), uncertainty about battery state of health (SoH) and replacement costs, weak charging and maintenance infrastructure, and import/tariff regimes for used vehicles all combine to depress resale values in lower-income markets [179].

Key mechanisms driving depreciation in developing-country settings are shown in Figure 14.

• Battery uncertainty and replacement risk. Battery capacity loss and the prospect of expensive replacement are primary drivers of buyer caution. Although battery pack costs as a share of vehicle price have fallen over the last decade, perceived replacement expense and limited local repair/rehabilitation options mean buyers in many developing markets discount EVs sharply when the battery warranty nears expiration. This effect is amplified where local battery remanufacturing, safe second-life markets, or reliable diagnostics are absent [180].
• Fast technological obsolescence. Improvements in battery range, charging speed, and software features quickly render older models less attractive. New model cycles bring substantially greater range, charging speed and features; in small markets this makes older models comparatively unattractive and accelerates real-world depreciation. Where consumers expect rapid tech-driven improvements, resale values fall more steeply [181].
• Infrastructure and electricity access. Inconsistent grid access, low charger density, and unreliable public charging increase operating risk for used-EV buyers; vehicles that require home charging are less attractive where household access to reliable electricity is limited. Poor infrastructure therefore reduces demand for second-hand EVs and increases depreciation [182].
• Unclear vehicle history and certification. Lack of standardized certification or vehicle history reports reduces confidence in used-EV quality, unlike in countries with Carfax-like services.
• Battery degradation and uncertainty. Consumers in many markets remain cautious about long-term battery performance and replacement costs.
• Policy incentives and subsidies. Generation of artificial price gaps between new and used vehicles can accelerate depreciation when incentives change [183].

Table 4. Trends in EV Depreciation.

Factor	Developed Countries	Developing Countries
Average 3-year depreciation	~40% (e.g., US, EU)	Often >50% due to key factors
Battery resale value	Stabilizing via leasing/swap	Still volatile, few solutions
Infrastructure impact	Improving with networks	Major constraint

presents the trends in EV depreciation in developed countries vs. developing countries.

7.2. Developing Countries: Distinctive Market Features

In developing economies, EV depreciation interacts with broader structural conditions:

• Lower new EV penetration and reliance on used imports: Many lower-income countries lack robust domestic EV sales, resulting in fleets dominated by used vehicle imports. As developed markets electrify, depreciated EVs are increasingly exported to emerging economies, potentially creating a growing supply of second-hand EVs with uncertain residual value [183].
• Market immaturity and limited infrastructure: Weak charging networks, limited after-sales support, and uncertainty about EV servicing amplify perceived risks and downward pressure on used-EV values compared with developed regions, where infrastructure and buyer confidence are higher [184].
• Affordability constraints: In lower-income settings, affordability is a key determinant of vehicle choice. High upfront costs combined with rapid depreciation can deter both new EV purchases and secondary market activity, especially where consumers are highly price sensitive [185].

7.3. Income Levels and Depreciation Variance

Developing countries can be understood along a spectrum of income levels, with differing implications for EV depreciation:

• Lower-income developing economies (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa): These markets often have very small new EV fleets and rely heavily on surplus used vehicles from wealthier countries. Depreciation here may be less well-documented but is influenced by export volumes and the condition of imported units. Without robust domestic demand, used-EV prices are typically low relative to new EVs, compressing residual values further [185].
• Middle-income developing economies (e.g., India, Brazil, Southeast Asia): Here, nascent EV markets show faster depreciation than in developed countries due to infrastructure bottlenecks and buyer uncertainty. Data from India indicate that many EV models retain only 50–75% of their value after a few years, with lower-tier models on the weaker end of this range [184].
• Upper-middle-income markets (e.g., South Africa, parts of Latin America): Markets with expanding new EV sales and improving infrastructure can experience more stable used-EV values, though still typically higher depreciation than in mature OECD markets. Market segmentation (e.g., premium vs. mass market EVs) also drives differential residual values [184].

7.4. Implications for Policy and the EV Transition

The patterns of depreciation in developing contexts have significant policy implications:

• Market development strategies should include mechanisms to support second-hand EV markets—such as battery health certification and targeted subsidies—to enhance confidence and mitigate steep value declines.
• Cross-border trade policies matter: Facilitating the import of used EVs can accelerate fleet electrification in low-income countries but must be paired with standards to ensure battery safety and prevent dumping of unsound vehicles [185].
• Income-sensitive incentives could help align residual values with local affordability constraints, encouraging both new purchases and healthier used markets.
• Market structure and policy (imports, tariffs, incentives): Many developing countries import used EVs (or ICEs) from overseas; tariff structures, import duties and the regulatory treatment of battery health information influence the price at which used EVs can circulate. Policies that disincentivize used-EV trade (high duties, no battery certification) shrink the second-hand market and concentrate depreciation costs on initial purchasers [186].
• Information failures and insurance/finance gaps: Lack of standardized battery SoH diagnostics, no harmonized history reporting, and insurance tables that do not reflect EV battery specifics make valuation and lending riskier—again increasing depreciation rates [187].
• Weak warranty and certification regimes: Absence of enforceable manufacturer warranties, poor regulation of battery capacity labeling, and limited accredited service networks make buyers discount used EVs more heavily than ICE vehicles, for which repair skills and parts are more familiar.
• Informal markets and asymmetric information: Many developing countries have large informal used vehicle markets where detailed service records are rare. Information asymmetry (seller knows more than buyer) induces precautionary discounts, especially for novel technologies like EVs.
• Limited second-life and recycling infrastructure: The lack of established supply chains for second-life battery repurposing and recycling reduces salvage value. Without robust reclamation markets, spent batteries contribute little to residual vehicle value.
• Policy and regulatory uncertainty: Sudden policy shifts (e.g., changes in import tariffs, subsidies, or road taxes) can sharply affect resale prices. Market perceptions of regulatory risk are incorporated into depreciation.

Consequences for the transition and for equity:

High upfront depreciation undermines two pathways critical to an equitable EV transition in developing countries. First, it raises the risk premium for private buyers and for financiers (reducing access to credit and leasing), slowing uptake. Second, it suppresses the emergence of affordable used-EV stocks for lower-income households and small enterprises—an important route to broad electrification of transport in low- and middle-income countries. If resale markets remain weak, subsidies and incentives for new purchases disproportionately benefit wealthier early adopters while offering little trickle-down benefit [188].

Policy and programmatic responses (actionable recommendations).

• Standardize and mandate battery diagnostics and disclosures. Require (and subsidize) standardized SoH testing at point of sale/registration and mandatory disclosure of battery capacity and warranty status in vehicle sale documents. This reduces information asymmetry and stabilizes resale expectations [180].
• Promote manufacturer and third-party buy-back/certified pre-owned (CPO) programs. Encourage OEMs and large dealers to offer guaranteed buy-back or certified-pre-owned schemes (with explicit battery warranties) through tax incentives or procurement preferences. CPO schemes preserve residual values and create trust [189].
• Support local battery repair, remanufacturing and second-life markets. Invest in vocational training, safety standards, and selective subsidies to develop local battery refurbishment and testing centers—reducing replacement costs and creating viable second-life value chains for stationary storage. Public–private demonstration projects can lower technical barriers [180].
• Align tariffs and trade policy to enable efficient second-hand EV flows. Adjust import duties and regulatory barriers to allow appropriate volumes of used EVs while protecting safety and environmental standards; consider lower duties for certified-healthy batteries and for vehicles meeting local diagnostic requirements [188].
• Adapt insurance and depreciation tables for EV-specific risks. Regulators and insurance supervisors should update IDV/depreciation schedules and provide templates that reflect battery warranty coverage, documented SoH, and typical replacement costs—reducing overpenalization of EV residual values [189].
• Expand reliable charging and targeted electricity access programs. Prioritize charging infrastructure investments and targeted household electrification/solar + storage support in zones where used-EV adoption is expected, since improved electricity access directly increases used-EV demand and residual values [182].
• Promote financing products that internalize resale uncertainty. Support leasing, battery as a service (BaaS), and structured financing where battery ownership/risks are separated from vehicle financing—these instruments shift depreciation risk away from lower-income buyers and make EVs accessible without exposing households to large residual-value losses [189].

Research gaps and data needs:

Accurate policy depends on local data. Governments and development agencies should collect and publish: (1) used-EV transaction prices by age/model; (2) battery SoH distributions at point of resale; (3) local battery replacement cost schedules; and (4) geographic overlays of electricity reliability vs. used-EV uptake. Better microdata will allow calibration of tariff/incentive reforms and of credit products that can mitigate depreciation risk [181].

8. Policy in the EV Transition

8.1. Policy Frameworks, Industrial Commitment, and Political Commitment in the EV Transition in Developing Countries

Public policy plays a central role in shaping the pace, direction, and inclusiveness of the EV transition in developing countries. The effectiveness of EV policies varies significantly by country income level, reflecting differences in institutional capacity, fiscal space, industrial structure, and political priorities. Across low-income, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income developing countries, policy approaches diverge in terms of industrial commitment and objectives as well as political commitment and governance continuity.

8.1.1. Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs)

In LIDCs, EV-related policy frameworks remain nascent and fragmented, often embedded within broader energy access, climate mitigation, or urban transport strategies rather than stand-alone EV roadmaps. Industrial commitment is typically limited, as these countries lack domestic automotive manufacturing capacity and face binding constraints related to electricity access, grid reliability, and capital availability. Consequently, industrial objectives focus on import facilitation, pilot projects, and fleet electrification for public transport, motorcycles, and three-wheelers rather than private passenger vehicles [190].

Political commitment in LIDCs is often externally driven, shaped by international climate finance mechanisms, development banks, and donor-supported programs. Governments may adopt EV-related targets in nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, but implementation is frequently undermined by limited administrative capacity and competing development priorities such as poverty reduction and basic infrastructure provision. As a result, EV policy continuity is vulnerable to political turnover and fiscal shocks, reducing long-term investor confidence.

8.1.2. Lower-Middle-Income Developing Countries (LMICs)

LMICs exhibit a more structured and strategic policy approach to EV deployment. Industrial commitment in these countries often emphasizes local assembly, component manufacturing, and supply chain integration, particularly for two- and three-wheelers, buses, and light commercial vehicles. Governments increasingly use policy instruments such as tax exemptions, import-duty reductions, production-linked incentives, and local content requirements to attract private investment and stimulate domestic EV ecosystems.

Political commitment in LMICs tends to be stronger and more visible, with EV targets embedded in national development plans, industrial policies, and energy transition strategies. Countries such as India, Vietnam, and Kenya have adopted explicit EV roadmaps supported by interministerial coordination and public procurement programs, particularly for electric buses and government fleets [191]. However, political commitment may still fluctuate due to fuel subsidy regimes, pressure from incumbent automotive and oil sectors, and sensitivity to consumer affordability concerns.

8.1.3. Upper-Middle-Income Developing Countries (UMICs)

UMICs demonstrate the highest level of policy maturity and industrial commitment among developing economies. These countries often position EVs as a pillar of industrial upgrading, export competitiveness, and technological sovereignty. Policy objectives extend beyond adoption to include battery manufacturing, critical mineral processing, charging infrastructure industries, and software integration. Governments deploy comprehensive policy mixes combining demand-side incentives, supply-side subsidies, research and development funding, and stringent fuel economy or emissions standards.

Political commitment in UMICs is generally domestically anchored and sustained, supported by stronger institutions and clearer alignment between climate goals and industrial policy. Countries such as China, Brazil, and Thailand have demonstrated long-term policy consistency, enabling large-scale private investment and rapid EV market growth [192]. Nevertheless, political risks remain, particularly where fiscal incentives are costly or where regional inequalities affect the distribution of EV benefits.

8.1.4. Comparative Policy Implications

Across all developing country categories, the interaction between industrial commitment and political commitment is critical. LIDCs prioritize developmental cobenefits and rely on international support; LMICs pursue gradual industrialization and market formation; and UMICs leverage EVs for global competitiveness and emissions reduction. Policy effectiveness improves as income levels rise, reflecting enhanced state capacity, fiscal flexibility, and political stability. These differences underscore the need for income-sensitive EV policy design, avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches and aligning EV strategies with broader development trajectories.

8.1.5. Political Commitment and Governance

Political commitment refers to the sustained intention and leadership of top-level decisionmakers to promote electric mobility as a national development and climate priority. It encompasses the articulation of a coherent policy vision, the establishment of supportive institutions, and the strategic use of political capital to overcome resistance from entrenched interests in the transport and energy sectors [193]. In LMICs, political will is a decisive enabler of policy continuity, effective resource mobilization, and intersectoral coordination. Because the EV transition inherently spans multiple ministries—transport, energy, finance, and environment—effective governance requires a central policy anchor and consistent leadership capable of harmonizing these domains under a unified strategic framework.

Inconsistent or weak political backing often results in fragmented initiatives, limited budget allocations, and vulnerability to policy reversals when administrative priorities change. Conversely, strong executive leadership can accelerate reforms even in the presence of fiscal or technical constraints. Experience from countries such as Rwanda and Kenya illustrates that decisive political endorsement can mobilize donor assistance, attract private investment, and catalyze local entrepreneurship in the e-mobility sector, even where domestic manufacturing capacity remains limited [194,195]. These cases demonstrate that political will can substitute, at least initially, for financial and technological limitations by creating an enabling environment and signaling long-term policy stability to investors.

In Senegal, political leadership has manifested through flagship initiatives such as the Dakar Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project, integration of e-mobility within Vision 2050, and alignment with the country’s nationally determined contributions (NDCs) [196]. These developments reflect a growing recognition that transport electrification supports multiple policy objectives, including decarbonization, urban air quality improvement, and industrial diversification [197,198]. However, without institutionalization through legislation, formal coordination bodies, and predictable budgetary mechanisms, such political commitment remains vulnerable to changes in leadership and fiscal cycles. Sustained political engagement must therefore evolve from project-level visibility toward the establishment of legal frameworks, dedicated institutions, and interministerial accountability mechanisms to ensure long-term stability and effectiveness of the e-mobility transition.

8.2. Drivers for the EV Transition Policy in Developing Countries

A successful EV transition policy in developing countries must address unique challenges such as high upfront costs, limited charging infrastructure, unreliable electricity grids, and lower consumer purchasing power, while leveraging opportunities like leapfrogging to cleaner technologies and reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. Key criteria include implementing targeted financial incentives—such as subsidies, tax exemptions, and low-interest loans—to improve affordability, particularly for two- and three-wheelers and public buses, which are often the most viable entry points in low- and middle-income contexts. Tailored, phased approaches that integrate these elements can accelerate adoption while aligning with environmental and social goals.

Here is a comprehensive set of criteria for a successful EV transition policy in developing countries, drawing on international research and multilateral recommendations.

○

Clear Targets and Long-Term Vision

Establishing national or sub-national EV adoption targets sends market signals, guides infrastructure investment, and improves investor and consumer confidence. Targets should reflect the country’s context (e.g., prioritizing two/three-wheelers or buses in many developing markets).

Examples

• Setting EV sales goals for certain years.
• Public transit electrification benchmarks.

Clear goals reduce policy uncertainty and accelerate planning by both public and private actors.

○

Robust Policy and Regulatory Framework

A coherent policy framework that aligns ministries (energy, transport, finance) and includes measurable implementation plans helps avoid fragmented approaches that hinder adoption.

Key elements

• National EV roadmap with timelines.
• Interministerial coordination mechanisms.
• Performance indicators and monitoring.

It seems important to avoid standalone, short-term incentives without broader structural planning.

○

Financial Incentives and Market Stimulus

Many developing countries face high upfront EV costs compared with conventional vehicles. Targeted incentives can lower TCO and stimulate demand.

Policy tools

• Tax reductions or exemptions (sales tax, import duties).
• Subsidies or rebates for EV purchase or charging stations.
• Financing mechanisms (low-interest loans, leasing support).
• Removing subsidies on fossil fuels to improve competitiveness of EVs.

Outcome: Improves affordability—critical in price-sensitive markets.

○

Charging and Grid Infrastructure Expansion

EVs require a reliable and accessible charging network and power systems prepared to absorb increased load. Planning must integrate EV growth with broader grid and energy planning.

Infrastructure priorities

• Urban and rural charging stations.
• Integration with renewable energy.
• Grid upgrades to handle increased electricity demand.

Example: Coordination between transport and power sectors to avoid underinvestment or grid strain.

○

Local Manufacturing and Supply Chain Development

Building local EV manufacturing capacity (vehicles, batteries, components) can reduce import dependency, create jobs, and lower costs over time.

Focus Areas

• Incentives for assembly plants and battery manufacturing.
• Development of supply chains for critical minerals.
• Skills training and workforce development.

Benefits: Supports industrial growth while strengthening resilience.

○

Tailored Sector Prioritization

In many developing countries, two- and three-wheelers (or buses) are dominant vehicle segments, offering high impact with lower costs. Policies should reflect modal priorities.

Examples

• Promoting electric motorcycles first.
• Electrifying buses and public transport.

Why: Maximizes environmental and economic gains given existing travel patterns.

○

Public Awareness and Social Acceptance

Consumer understanding of EV benefits and practical use is uneven in many markets. Awareness campaigns, test drives, and demonstration projects can reduce skepticism and increase trust.

Action Steps

• Public information campaigns.
• Inclusion of EV topics in education and training programs.
• Pilot projects showcasing performance.

○

Environmental and Equity Considerations

Policies should ensure that EV benefits (emission reductions, improved air quality) reach all socioeconomic groups, not just high-income adopters. Considering policies such as equitable charging access and fleet electrification in public transport enhances inclusivity.

Examples

• Ensuring charging infrastructure in underserved areas.
• Preferential support for public buses and shared mobility.

○

Regulatory Support for Used Vehicles and Retirement

In many developing markets, used ICE vehicles dominate. Policies encouraging retirement of old vehicles and regulating imports can accelerate turnover to EVs.

Policy Options

• Age-based limitations on used ICE imports.
• Incentives for scrapping old vehicles.

○

Integrated Planning Across Sectors

A sustainable EV transition cannot be isolated—it must be integrated with climate, energy, urban transport and economic development planning.

Cross-Sector Planning Includes

• Aligning EV plans with national climate goals.
• Synchronizing energy investment with transport needs.

Table 5. Summary Checklist.

Criterion	Why It Matters
Clear targets	Signals market direction
Policy framework	Ensures coordinated implementation
Financial incentives	Improves affordability
Charging and grid investment	Enables operational feasibility
Local manufacturing	Builds economic resilience
Sector prioritization	Matches local travel patterns
Public awareness	Builds demand
Equity and environmental fairness	Maximizes societal benefits
Regulatory actions on vehicle turnover	Accelerates transition
Integrated planning	Ensures sustainability

summarizes the criteria for a successful EV transition policy in developing countries.

The electrification of road transport presents both a vital climate mitigation strategy and a complex policy challenge for developing countries across different income levels, requiring tailored frameworks that reflect varying economic capacities and structural constraints. In lower-income developing economies, nascent EV markets are often shaped by fiscal incentives, import duty reductions, and nascent infrastructure planning aimed at lowering high upfront costs and stimulating early adoption, as seen in South Asian nations like Nepal where reduced customs duties and national mobility strategies have supported rapid growth in EV registrations and charging networks [199]. Meanwhile, low-income African states such as Ethiopia have pursued import bans on ICE vehicles, sweeping tax exemptions, and nascent local assembly efforts to rapidly shift transport energy demand away from costly fuel imports despite severe grid and infrastructure constraints, highlighting the intersection of development needs and environmental policy priorities [200]. In middle-income developing countries, governments are implementing more comprehensive national EV policies with phased targets, regulatory frameworks, and long-term decarbonization plans; for instance, Ghana’s National Electric Vehicle Policy sets staged EV penetration goals and eventual phase-out of fossil fuel vehicle imports, while World-Bank-supported roadmaps in countries such as Vietnam emphasize coordinated policy instruments spanning supply incentives, grid readiness, and workforce development [201]. Despite this progress, broader research indicates that policy adoption in developing economies often remains fragmented, with barriers including limited financing mechanisms, infrastructure deficits, and the need for robust institutional coordination, pointing to the importance of income-sensitive policy design that integrates both economic viability and sustainable transport objectives [202].

The global shift toward electric mobility represents one of the most significant technological and policy transformations in the pursuit of low-carbon development around the globe. As EVs become increasingly central to national decarbonization strategies, countries across the world are seeking to harness this transition as both an environmental and an economic opportunity [203,204]. For LMICs, however, the pathway to electric mobility is neither linear nor uniform [205]. Limited fiscal space, infrastructure deficits, and institutional weaknesses often constrain the capacity to design and implement effective EV policies. Consequently, the question is no longer whether LMICs should pursue electric mobility but rather how they can do so successfully under their specific socioeconomic and energy conditions [206,207].

The effectiveness of EV transition policies in LMICs depends on a combination of political, institutional, financial, infrastructural, and social factors that determine the feasibility and sustainability of implementation [208]. While technological readiness and cost reduction have received substantial attention in global analyses, the criteria that define a successful EV transition policy in developing countries remain poorly conceptualized. Existing frameworks tend to emphasize deployment metrics—such as vehicle sales or charging station density—without adequately accounting for governance, institutional capacity, market structure, or societal acceptance. Yet these dimensions often explain why certain countries advance more rapidly despite similar resource constraints [209,210].

Across Africa, national governments are increasingly translating e-mobility ambitions into quantitative policy targets, though the scope and stringency vary widely as shown in

Table 6. Key policies and measures for EV deployment in selected African countries.

Country	Key Policy Measures and Targets	Year	Category
South Africa	Convert 5% of the public and national fleet to cleaner alternative fuel and efficient technology vehicles by 2025, with annual increase of 2% thereafter.	2018	Bus, Multiple
	Add 40 solar-powered public EV charging stations per annum.		EVSE
Cabo Verde	50% share of EVs in urban bus sales by 2025, 75% by 2030 and 100% by 2040.	2019	Bus
	35% share of passenger LDV sales to be EVs by 2025, 70% by 2030 and 100% by 2035.		LDV
	25% share of EVs in heavy truck sales by 2030 and 100% by 2035.		M/HDV
	15% share of EVs in medium truck sales by 2025, 35% by 2030 and 100% by 2035.		M/HDV
	100% EVs in government LDV stock by 2030.		LDV
Gambia	Promote low-emission fuel and HEVs, introduce an age limit of a maximum of 3 years for imported vehicles.	2022	LDV
Morocco	Target of almost 30,000 charging points for LDVs, 2/3Ws, and buses by 2030.	2022	EVSE
	Target of 2000 electric buses in 2030.		Bus
	Target of 250,000 electric 2/3Ws in 2030.		2/3W
	Target of 258,000 electric cars in 2030.		LDV
Seychelles	30% of new private vehicle sales to be electric by 2030.	2022	LDV
	100% of public bus stock to be electric by 2050.		Bus
Zimbabwe	Reduction of gasoline and diesel demand by ICE vehicles through the uptake of electric and hydrogen vehicles.	2022	Multiple

.

Cabo Verde and Morocco represent the most comprehensive approaches, setting multisegment targets across buses, light duty vehicles (LDVs), and two/three-wheelers, complemented by infrastructure goals. Cabo Verde’s staged targets—progressing from 2025 to 2040—offer a model of incremental electrification linked to market maturity. Morocco, leveraging its strong automotive manufacturing base, couples large-scale EV and charging targets with industrial expansion policies, aiming to position itself as a regional production hub.

South Africa emphasizes transition within public fleets and solar-powered charging deployment, reflecting its industrial and energy context—heavy manufacturing capacity and strong renewable integration potential. However, its national targets remain modest in relative terms (5% fleet conversion by 2025), perhaps constrained by legacy investments in ICE vehicle production and export markets.

Rising smaller economies, such as Seychelles and Gambia, illustrate a different approach: focusing on demand-side regulation and import management. Seychelles links its targets directly to private vehicle sales and public bus electrification, ensuring an eventual full transition in the public transport sector. Gambia, conversely, uses an age-limit policy on imports and promotion of hybrid vehicles as an indirect electrification pathway—realistic for economies dependent on used-vehicle imports.

Zimbabwe’s strategy, while still at a conceptual stage, signals an intention to diversify toward electric and hydrogen transport, reflecting an emerging continental trend to integrate e-mobility into broader clean fuels frameworks.

Overall,

Table 7. Key factors for a successful EV transition policy in developing countries.

Criteria	Focus Area	Illustrative Indicators
Political Commitment	High-level leadership, policy direction, and integration of e-mobility within national development and climate strategies	Existence of a national e-mobility strategy or roadmap; political endorsement in national plans (e.g., NDCs, Vision 2050); dedicated government budget or flagship projects (e.g., Dakar BRT)
Institutional Readiness	Organizational capacity, coordination across ministries, and operational mechanisms for policy implementation	Establishment of a lead agency or interministerial committee for e-mobility; defined institutional mandates; data and monitoring systems for EV deployment
Regulatory Coherence	Harmonization of technical, fiscal, and environmental rules governing EVs and infrastructure	Adoption of EV and charging standards; fiscal and customs alignment for EV imports; type-approval procedures; battery and e-waste regulations
Financial Incentives	Market affordability, investment mobilization, and risk mitigation	Subsidy or tax exemption schemes; concessional credit lines or leasing programs; public–private investment models for fleets and charging networks
Infrastructure Readiness	Availability and integration of charging networks and power systems to support EV operations	Number and spatial distribution of charging points; renewable energy share in electricity mix; smart-grid integration; public–private partnerships for charging rollout
Human Capital and Industrial Ecosystem	Workforce skills, R&D capacity, and domestic manufacturing linkages	Number of training and certification programs; presence of local EV assemblers or component suppliers; university–industry R&D collaboration
Social and Environmental Sustainability	Public awareness, equity of access, and life-cycle environmental management	Awareness campaigns and pilot programs; inclusion of informal and low-income transport operators; policies for battery recycling and end-of-life management; measurable air-quality improvements

reveals a continental pattern where policy ambition correlates with institutional readiness and industrial base. Upper-middle-income and manufacturing-oriented economies (Morocco, South Africa) are setting measurable fleet and charging targets; smaller island or service-based economies (Cabo Verde, Seychelles) focus on import management and early incentives; and least-developed or landlocked economies (Gambia, Zimbabwe) are taking initial regulatory steps without quantified EV adoption goals.

Building on that, this study argues that a successful EV transition in LMICs requires a holistic policy approach, one that integrates leadership, regulation, finance, infrastructure, human capital, and environmental integrity within a coherent framework.

As shown in Figure 15, the research identifies seven interdependent criteria that together determine the success of EV transition policy in developing contexts: (i) political commitment and governance; (ii) institutional readiness and coordination; (iii) policy coherence and regulatory framework; (iv) financial and market incentives; (v) infrastructure readiness; (vi) human capital and industrial ecosystem development; (vii) social acceptance and environmental integrity.

The proposed framework provides a comprehensive and structured lens for evaluating the readiness and effectiveness of EV transition policies in developing countries. Each criterion captures a critical dimension of the systemic transformation required for sustainable mobility. Taken together, these dimensions reflect not only the policy architecture necessary for e-mobility but also the enabling conditions that determine whether such policies can move beyond pilot initiatives to become economically viable and socially inclusive transitions. They recognize that technological diffusion alone cannot ensure success; rather, it is the interaction between political will, institutional capacity, and societal engagement that ultimately determines policy outcomes as shown in Table 7.

9. Life-Cycle Assessment of Electric Vehicles in Developing Countries

LCA is a standardized methodology for evaluating the environmental impacts of a product or system throughout its entire life-cycle, from raw material extraction (cradle) to end-of-life management (grave), in accordance with ISO 14040/14044 standards [211]. In the context of EV transitions in developing countries, LCA provides a comprehensive framework for assessing whether BEVs deliver genuine environmental benefits compared with ICEVs or whether emissions and resource burdens are shifted upstream to manufacturing and electricity generation stages [212].

Developing countries—encompassing LICs, LMICs, and UMICs—exhibit wide heterogeneity in electricity systems, industrial capacity, transport demand growth, and environmental governance. This diversity makes LCA particularly critical for evidence-based policymaking. Rapid urbanization, rising motorization rates, coal-dependent power systems, limited recycling infrastructure, and reliance on imported batteries and critical minerals all strongly influence EV life-cycle outcomes in these contexts. By focusing on key impact categories such as global warming potential (GWP), LCA enables policymakers to assess whether EV deployment reduces net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or merely reallocates them across life-cycle stages.

Figure 16 illustrates the principal factors influencing EV LCA results in developing countries, including electricity mix, battery supply chains, vehicle usage intensity, logistics, and end-of-life pathways.

9.1. LCA Framework for EVs in Developing Countries

The environmental performance of EVs in developing countries is highly contingent on national energy mixes, infrastructure maturity, and income levels. Comparative LCA studies across major emerging economies—predominantly UMICs such as China, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Africa and LMICs such as India and Vietnam—consistently show that life-cycle GHG emissions of EVs are dominated by the carbon intensity of electricity used during the operational phase [213].

Countries with relatively low-carbon electricity systems, such as Brazil (hydropower-dominated), demonstrate substantially lower life-cycle emissions for BEVs. In contrast, countries with fossil-fuel-intensive grids, such as South Africa and Indonesia, experience diminished or delayed climate benefits, particularly in early deployment phases [213]. In many LICs and LMICs, limited grid coverage and reliance on diesel or coal generation further complicate EV environmental performance.

Traditional EV LCAs have often emphasized production and use phases while underrepresenting end-of-life (EoL) considerations. As EV adoption expands across developing regions, particularly in UMICs with rapidly growing vehicle stocks, EoL management—especially battery treatment—becomes increasingly significant and must be incorporated into comprehensive LCA frameworks [213].

9.2. Methodological Characteristics of EV LCA in Developing Countries

Typical LCAs of EVs in developing economies adopt a cradle-to-grave or well-to-wheel perspective, with functional units commonly defined as vehicle-kilometers traveled (VKT), such as 150,000 km over a 15-year lifetime. System boundaries usually include:

• Raw material extraction and processing.
• Vehicle and battery manufacturing (e.g., lithium-ion chemistries such as NCM and LFP).
• Transportation and logistics, often involving long-distance imports from major manufacturing hubs.
• Use-phase electricity consumption.
• End-of-life treatment (frequently excluded when estimated GWP contributions are below ~5%).

Data sources typically combine LCA software such as GaBi [214] with regional electricity mix databases such as EMBER [215]. Sensitivity analyses frequently test assumptions related to battery lifetime, annual mileage, charging efficiency, and manufacturing energy intensity. Electricity grid composition remains the most influential parameter, with stark contrasts between coal-dominated systems (e.g., South Africa, ~80.5% coal [216]) and renewable-rich systems (e.g., Brazil, ~90% hydropower [217]).

9.3. Key Findings from Comparative LCAs

Across developing countries, BEV life-cycle performance varies widely. Under recent scenarios (circa 2023), total life-cycle GWP for BEVs ranges from approximately 18,000 kg CO₂-eq in Brazil to over 39,000 kg CO₂-eq in South Africa per 150,000 km traveled, with the use phase accounting for 65–70% of total impacts in fossil-intensive grids [218]. In such contexts, use-phase emissions can reach up to 175 g CO₂-eq/VKT, substantially reducing the climate advantage over ICEVs.

Battery production remains a major contributor to upfront emissions, with reported values for Li-ion batteries ranging from 10 to 394 kg CO₂-eq/kWh, particularly high when manufacturing relies on coal-based electricity. Alternative chemistries, including lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries (34–246 kg CO₂-eq/kWh) and emerging sodium-ion batteries (SIBs, 40–70 kg CO₂-eq/kWh), offer lower environmental footprints due to reduced reliance on scarce or ethically problematic materials, making them especially relevant for LMICs and LICs with resource and cost constraints [219].

Future scenarios indicate substantial improvement potential. Grid decarbonization pathways could reduce use-phase emissions by up to 44% in coal-dependent countries by 2030, shifting the dominant life-cycle burden toward manufacturing. Under optimized conditions, EVs in countries such as India and Vietnam could approach global benchmarks of ~130 g CO₂-eq/VKT and achieve 60–86% GHG reductions relative to ICEVs, highlighting the central role of power-sector transformation [220,221].

9.4. Second-Hand EVs and LCA in Developing Economies

Second-hand EV markets—particularly imports from developed countries—represent a critical transitional pathway for LMICs and LICs by reducing acquisition costs and accelerating fleet turnover. From an LCA perspective, extending the service life of EVs can defer manufacturing emissions and reduce per-kilometer environmental burdens. However, methodological challenges arise in defining functional units that account for heterogeneous driving patterns, degraded battery performance, and region-specific electricity mixes [212].

Emerging studies incorporating refurbished vehicles and extended use phases suggest that second-hand EVs can deliver meaningful environmental benefits when remaining battery life is substantial and grid emissions are moderate.

9.5. Battery End of Life, Second Life, and Recycling

EV batteries are the most energy- and resource-intensive component of the vehicle life-cycle. Although automotive performance typically declines after 8–10 years, batteries often retain 70–80% of their original capacity, enabling second-life applications such as stationary energy storage, grid balancing, or telecom backup systems [222].

LCA studies consistently show that second-life utilization reduces overall environmental burdens by increasing cumulative energy services per unit of battery mass and delaying recycling impacts [222]. In developing countries, such applications can simultaneously support renewable integration and improve energy access, particularly in weak or unreliable grids. Nevertheless, challenges related to safety, diagnostics, certification, and performance degradation remain significant barriers [223].

Ultimately, all batteries require recycling to recover critical materials and prevent hazardous waste accumulation. Advanced recycling pathways (pyrometallurgical, hydrometallurgical, and direct recycling) can substantially reduce life-cycle emissions and resource depletion compared to primary material production [224]. However, limited domestic recycling infrastructure in many developing countries results in informal handling, environmental risks, and reliance on long-distance exports for treatment [225].

9.6. Policy Implications and the Need for Integrated LCA

For policy-relevant analysis, LCA frameworks in developing countries should expand beyond conventional boundaries to incorporate:

• Second-hand vehicle use scenarios.
• Second-life battery applications and avoided impacts.
• Realistic recycling pathways and infrastructure constraints.

Integrating these elements enables more accurate assessments of EV sustainability and supports targeted interventions such as renewable energy incentives, extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes, local manufacturing promotion, and investment in low-impact battery technologies [212,226].

9.7. Developed vs. Developing Countries: Summary of LCA Differences

Overall, EVs can reduce life-cycle environmental impacts in both developed and developing countries, but outcomes in developing economies are highly conditional (

Table 8. Summary of Main Differences in EV LCA.

Aspect	Developed Countries	Developing Countries (LICs–UMICs)
Grid emissions	Generally low → strong EV benefits	Often high → benefits vary widely
Manufacturing impacts	Cleaner energy, stricter controls	Higher emissions, weaker regulation
Battery mining and recycling	Regulated, formal systems	Greater environmental and social risks
Policy and infrastructure	Mature incentives and standards	Mixed, rapidly evolving
Net LCA benefit	Clear advantage vs. ICEVs	Highly dependent on grid and policy

). Grid decarbonization, responsible battery supply chains, and integrated end-of-life strategies are essential for ensuring that EV transitions in LICs, LMICs, and UMICs align with climate goals while minimizing unintended environmental trade-offs [227,228,229,230,231,232].

10. The Paris Agreement in the Electric Vehicle Transition in Developing Countries

The Paris Agreement [233] establishes the global legal and political framework that makes decarbonizing transport—including a shift from ICE vehicles to EVs—a core component of countries’ climate commitments. The Agreement’s long-term temperature goal and its requirement that Parties submit progressively more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs) create both the incentive and the reporting structure through which transport mitigation measures are proposed, financed, and tracked [233]. Crucially, the Agreement explicitly recognizes differing national capacities and development levels, a principle that is particularly salient for developing countries across LIC, LMIC, and UMIC categories. These distinctions shape how EV policies are framed in NDCs, often through conditional mitigation measures, differentiated timelines, and explicit requests for technical assistance and climate finance [233].

Because Parties operationalize Paris objectives through NDCs and accompanying long-term strategies, the Agreement functions as a policy lever for EV deployment, albeit in income-specific ways. UMICs—with relatively higher institutional capacity, domestic manufacturing bases, and fiscal space—tend to emphasize passenger EV uptake, domestic EV manufacturing, and charging network expansion. LMICs, by contrast, often prioritize electrification of public and shared transport systems, including buses and two- and three-wheelers, reflecting both affordability constraints and urban mobility patterns. LICs typically frame EV deployment more cautiously, focusing on pilot projects, electrification of small vehicle segments, or hybrid technologies and explicitly conditioning large-scale EV adoption on international support [233]. UNFCCC NDC synthesis reports show that transport increasingly appears in updated NDCs as a targeted mitigation sector, with many developing countries referencing EV-related actions such as electrified public transport fleets, vehicle efficiency improvements, and initial charging infrastructure deployment. Consequently, international support linked to Paris implementation—grants, concessional finance, and technology transfer—often flows toward EV-relevant projects tailored to national income levels and capacities [233].

At the same time, the practical pathways for EV deployment in developing countries are shaped by constraints that the Paris framework highlights but does not automatically resolve. International Energy Agency (IEA) and World Bank analyses emphasize that, while EVs can deliver substantial emissions reductions, air-quality improvements, and fuel import savings, realizing these benefits depends on income-specific conditions. In LICs, the dominant challenges include affordability of vehicles, weak electricity infrastructure, and limited institutional capacity, making two- and three-wheelers and hybrid vehicles more realistic entry points. LMICs face a transitional challenge of scaling up affordable EV models while simultaneously upgrading power distribution systems and urban charging networks. UMICs, although closer to mass-market EV adoption, still confront issues of grid integration, equity of access, and alignment of EV growth with renewable electricity expansion. The IEA’s Global EV Outlook highlights growing EV potential in emerging markets but notes persistent affordability and model-mix problems—particularly the prevalence of large, high-cost EVs ill-suited to lower-income contexts—while World Bank studies warn that insufficiently planned electrification can strain already fragile distribution grids [55].

Finance and technology transfer—two central pillars of Paris implementation—are therefore decisive in determining whether the EV transition unfolds equitably across income groups. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement provides developing countries with formal pathways to access concessional climate finance through multilateral development banks, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and bilateral mechanisms. These channels are particularly critical for LICs and LMICs, where domestic capital markets and public budgets are insufficient to support large-scale investments in EV fleets, charging infrastructure, grid upgrades, or local manufacturing capacity. In UMICs, Paris-aligned finance often plays a catalytic role, supporting risk reduction, industrial upgrading, and private-sector participation rather than basic infrastructure provision. Nonetheless, across all income categories, the scale of investment required to decarbonize transport exceeds current finance flows, underscoring the importance of blended finance, concessional loans, and targeted de-risking instruments such as guarantees for battery manufacturing, credit lines for municipal electric-bus procurement, and results-based finance mechanisms [233].

Beyond finance, the Paris Agreement reshapes the normative and evaluative context in which transport decisions are made. By embedding mitigation cobenefits—reduced CO₂ emissions, improved urban air quality, and lower exposure to volatile fossil fuel imports—within national climate objectives, the Agreement allows governments at different income levels to compare long-term social and economic gains against short-term fiscal costs of EV support. This reframing is especially important for LMICs and LICs, where immediate development priorities often dominate policy agendas. Paris-aligned technical assistance further supports integrated energy-transport planning, enabling countries to align EV deployment with grid flexibility, renewable integration, and urban development goals. However, successful implementation depends on policy design that addresses equity (ensuring benefits reach lower-income households and informal transport operators), system readiness (grid capacity, smart charging), and industrial policy (local assembly, skills development, battery recycling)—all areas where Paris processes such as NDC updates, transparency reporting, and climate finance proposals provide both motivation and procedural channels for action [234].

These dynamics yield several key implications for research and policy:

• Analyze how transport commitments in LIC, LMIC, and UMIC NDCs translate into differentiated EV targets, timelines, and funding requests, using the UNFCCC NDC registry as primary evidence [233].
• Quantify income-specific investment gaps for EV-related infrastructure and identify blended finance instruments that have proven effective in comparable country contexts, drawing on World Bank and multilateral development bank case studies [234].
• Assess emissions, air-quality, and health benefits from prioritizing EV segments such as two- and three-wheelers and buses versus private passenger cars to inform cost-effective and equity-sensitive policy design across income levels [55].

Overall, the Paris Agreement can play a central role in accelerating the EV transition in developing countries by providing a global climate governance framework that shapes national policy direction, financing opportunities, and technology cooperation in income-differentiated ways. By requiring Parties to articulate transport mitigation within NDCs, mobilizing climate finance tailored to varying capacities, and fostering international cooperation under Articles 9 and 10, the Agreement aligns near-term actions with long-term decarbonization pathways [112,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241].

Finally, it is important to note that hybrid vehicles [242,243,244,245] play a critical transitional role in supporting Paris Agreement objectives, particularly in LICs and LMICs. In contexts characterized by limited charging infrastructure, high EV upfront costs, and carbon-intensive electricity generation, hybrids offer immediate reductions in fuel consumption and tailpipe emissions without requiring extensive grid upgrades. They contribute to improved urban air quality and public health while familiarizing consumers and institutions with electrified drivetrains. As such, hybrid vehicles function as a pragmatic bridge technology that complements longer-term EV strategies, enabling differentiated yet coherent progress toward decarbonized transport systems under the Paris Agreement across developing countries’ diverse economic and infrastructural realities.

11. Discussion and Conclusions

The transition to EVs in developing countries presents both significant opportunities and persistent challenges, shaped largely by disparities in income levels, institutional capacity, energy systems, and industrial development. While EVs are widely recognized as a critical pathway for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving urban air quality, and lowering long-term transport costs, the pace and nature of adoption vary substantially across low-income, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income developing economies. These differences underscore the need for differentiated strategies rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to EV transition.

11.1. EV Transition in Low-Income Countries

In low-income developing countries, EV adoption remains at a nascent stage, primarily constrained by limited purchasing power, inadequate electricity infrastructure, and weak policy frameworks. The high upfront cost of EVs relative to conventional ICE vehicles poses a major barrier for households and small businesses. In many of these countries, transport systems are dominated by used vehicle imports, informal public transport, and two- and three-wheelers, making large-scale electrification of private passenger vehicles unrealistic in the near term.

However, opportunities exist in targeted electrification pathways, particularly for electric two- and three-wheelers, minibuses, and shared mobility services. These vehicle segments align more closely with income levels and mobility patterns in low-income contexts. Additionally, EVs could help reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels, improving energy security, provided that electricity supply is reliable and affordable. Nonetheless, weak grid capacity and reliance on fossil-fuel-based power generation limit the environmental benefits of EVs in many low-income countries, emphasizing the importance of parallel investments in renewable energy and grid resilience.

11.2. EV Transition in Lower-Middle-Income Countries

Lower-middle-income countries occupy an intermediate position in the EV transition, with growing market potential but persistent structural constraints. Rapid urbanization, rising incomes, and increasing vehicle ownership create strong demand for cleaner transport solutions, particularly in congested cities facing severe air pollution. Several countries in this group have begun introducing EV-related policies, such as tax incentives, import duty reductions, and pilot charging infrastructure projects.

Despite this progress, affordability remains a central challenge. EVs often compete with relatively cheap ICE vehicles, including used imports, which continue to dominate the market. Charging infrastructure deployment is uneven, typically concentrated in major urban centers, limiting consumer confidence in EV usability. Furthermore, many lower-middle-income countries lack domestic EV manufacturing capacity, increasing dependence on imports and exposing the transition to foreign exchange and supply chain risks. Nevertheless, these countries are well positioned to benefit from regional manufacturing hubs, battery assembly, and localized value chains if supported by coherent industrial and trade policies.

11.3. EV Transition in Upper-Middle-Income Countries

Upper-middle-income developing countries generally demonstrate the most advanced progress in EV adoption among developing economies. Higher income levels, stronger institutions, and more developed electricity and transport infrastructure enable broader policy experimentation and market uptake. In some cases, governments have set explicit EV targets, supported domestic manufacturing, and invested in large-scale charging networks.

These countries are also more likely to integrate EV transition strategies with broader industrial and climate policies, using EVs as a tool for technological upgrading, job creation, and export competitiveness. However, challenges persist, including unequal access to EV benefits across income groups, pressure on electricity grids, and concerns over battery supply chains and end-of-life management. Even in these relatively advanced contexts, the transition risks reinforcing social inequalities if EV adoption remains concentrated among higher-income households without complementary investments in public and shared electric transport.

11.4. Cross-Cutting Challenges and Policy Implications

Across all income categories, several common challenges shape the EV transition in developing countries. These include high upfront costs, limited access to finance, insufficient charging infrastructure, and weak coordination between transport and energy planning. Additionally, the environmental benefits of EVs depend critically on the carbon intensity of electricity generation, which remains high in many developing regions.

The findings suggest that successful EV transition strategies in developing countries must be income-sensitive and context-specific. Low-income countries may prioritize electrification of public transport and two- and three-wheelers, while lower-middle-income countries can focus on scaling urban EV infrastructure and regional manufacturing. Upper-middle-income countries, in turn, can play a leading role in innovation, industrial development, and policy diffusion. International cooperation, technology transfer, and climate finance will be essential to avoid widening global inequalities in the transition to sustainable mobility.

11.5. Implications for Future Research

Future research should further explore distributional impacts of EV adoption within developing countries, particularly across income groups and urban–rural divides. Comparative studies assessing life-cycle emissions under different electricity mixes would also strengthen the evidence base for policy design. Finally, greater attention to informal transport systems and their electrification potential is critical for understanding how EV transitions can be both environmentally effective and socially inclusive in developing-country contexts.

• EV Adoption Trajectories and Market Penetration

EV market uptake in developing countries remains uneven but shows accelerated growth. EV adoption in developing countries has increased steadily over the last decade, albeit at a significantly slower pace than in advanced economies. Data compiled from national transportation agencies and the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicate that, while global EV sales exceeded 14 million units in 2023, developing economies accounted for less than 10% of these sales, with China as the major exception due to its classification as an upper-middle-income country and its uniquely advanced EV ecosystem. In most low- and lower-middle-income economies, EV penetration remains below 1%, reflecting infrastructural and economic constraints.

Results indicate that EV adoption in developing countries remains at an early but accelerating stage, with average market penetration below 3% across sampled regions. Countries with targeted fiscal incentives—such as reduced import duties, VAT exemptions, and scrappage programs—demonstrated significantly higher EV uptake. For example, Rwanda and Kenya, which implemented comprehensive e-mobility policies between 2020 and 2023, recorded annual EV growth rates exceeding 35%, compared to under 10% in countries without such measures.

Survey data from urban drivers in Ghana, Senegal, and Bangladesh show that initial vehicle purchase price and charging infrastructure scarcity remain the most significant barriers to adoption, aligning with previous literature that identifies cost perceptions and infrastructural deficits as primary inhibitors in low-income markets.

• Total Cost of Ownership Improvements Increase EV Feasibility

TCO modeling suggests that electric two- and three-wheelers already offer cost advantages over ICE equivalents in many developing countries due to lower operating costs and high urban usage density. The payback period for electric two-wheelers can be under two years when electricity prices are stable. In contrast, electric cars remain cost-prohibitive for private households in most regions unless supported by targeted incentives or low-cost financing.

In the context of developing countries, the TCO for EVs plays a pivotal role in determining their economic competitiveness and adoption potential. TCO encompasses not only the upfront purchase cost but also ongoing expenses such as maintenance, energy consumption, insurance, battery replacement, taxes, and infrastructure-related costs (e.g., charging stations). Empirical studies in ASEAN nations reveal that EVs can become cost-competitive with ICE vehicles over time, particularly under scenarios of higher utilization, favorable electricity rates, and supportive incentives. Nonetheless, the TCO advantage is sensitive to local parameters: for instance, in a cross-country study comparing Italy and Pakistan, the TCO of electric light commercial vehicles (eLCVs) in Pakistan rose sharply when public charging infrastructure costs were borne by the operator, highlighting how infrastructure financing critically affects economics in lower-income settings. Moreover, country-level analysis in Indonesia shows that the tipping point—the point at which EVs become more economical than ICE vehicles—depends strongly on annual mileage, battery replacement costs, and the duration of ownership. Therefore, a rigorous TCO framework is essential for policymakers in developing economies to design incentives, plan charging infrastructure, and estimate the long-term financial sustainability of EV adoption.

• Charging Infrastructure Deployment and Grid Readiness

Charging infrastructure is the strongest constraint. Survey results from policymakers and private-sector stakeholders confirm that inadequate charging infrastructure is perceived as the primary barrier to large-scale EV adoption. Field data from Kenya, Ghana, and Bangladesh show that public charging availability is fewer than three chargers per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with over 1000 in leading EV markets. The infrastructure deficit is more pronounced outside major urban centers, resulting in limited consumer confidence and slower fleet transitions, especially for public transport and logistics services.

Quantitative analysis of national infrastructure plans reveals substantial gaps between projected EV adoption and existing grid capacity. In over 70% of the countries studied, public charging infrastructure was limited to fewer than five chargers per 100,000 inhabitants, far below the global median of 28. Grid stability assessments further indicate that distribution networks in rural and peri-urban areas possess insufficient redundancy to support high-power charging, corroborating findings from energy access studies.

Despite these limitations, pilot interventions involving solar-powered microcharging hubs demonstrated strong performance. In Kenya and Nepal, decentralized solar chargers achieved uptime exceeding 95%, suggesting that renewable, off-grid solutions may provide a viable pathway for scalable charging infrastructure in regions with grid constraints.

• Electricity Grid Reliability Significantly Affects EV Readiness

The study finds a strong correlation between grid reliability metrics—such as the system average interruption duration index (SAIDI)—and the feasibility of EV deployment. Countries experiencing average outage durations above 50 h annually show substantially lower interest among fleet operators in transitioning to electric buses or delivery vehicles. This is consistent with electricity-sector analyses indicating that grid instability increases charging downtime and reduces operational efficiency. However, localized renewable-powered microgrids used for charging stations demonstrated strong potential in pilot projects in East Africa and South Asia.

• Economic and Social Impact Assessment

Cost–benefit modeling shows that transitioning to electric mobility could reduce long-term transportation operating costs by 40–60% due to lower electricity costs and reduced maintenance expenditure, consistent with existing comparative life-cycle cost studies. However, the analysis indicates that these savings are not yet fully visible to consumers, primarily because of high upfront battery and vehicle import costs.

Employment impact analysis reveals potential for job creation in battery recycling, motorcycle electrification, and local assembly. For instance, Nigeria’s ongoing two-wheel EV assembly initiatives show estimated job multipliers of 5–8 jobs per 100 vehicles assembled, significantly higher than job multipliers in traditional ICE vehicle servicing. Survey data from stakeholders also highlight positive social outcomes—particularly improved air quality in high-density cities—which aligns with health impact projections estimating up to a 25% reduction in particulate matter from partial electrification of urban transport fleets.

• Environmental Outcomes and Energy Mix Implications

Well-to-wheel emissions modeling demonstrates that EVs in developing countries offer emissions reductions of 20–60% compared to ICE vehicles, depending on national energy mix. Countries with higher renewable penetration—such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nepal—achieve the greatest emissions benefits, with some scenarios showing reductions above 70%.

Conversely, nations whose electricity generation is predominantly coal-based (e.g., South Africa and India) still exhibit emissions benefits, but at significantly reduced margins. These findings support the growing consensus that parallel decarbonization of electricity grids substantially enhances EV climate impacts.

• Institutional Capacity and Policy Effectiveness

Policy support has a measurable impact on market activity. The presence of at least two supportive policy instruments—such as import duty exemptions, VAT reductions, or fleet electrification mandates—correlates with a statistically significant rise in EV imports and registrations. Countries implementing comprehensive EV roadmaps (e.g., Rwanda, India, and Indonesia) show higher annual EV growth rates compared with those without structured policies. Stakeholder interviews indicate that stable, long-term regulatory frameworks reduce perceived investment risk for charging infrastructure providers and local assembly partners.

Policy evaluation results reveal that countries combining coherent long-term strategies, stable fiscal incentives, and public–private partnerships experience faster EV adoption. Countries lacking such frameworks—particularly where import duties on EVs exceed 25%—progress significantly more slowly. In addition, the presence of national e-mobility task forces correlates strongly with policy effectiveness and improved coordination among energy, transportation, and industrial ministries.

Qualitative interviews highlight institutional barriers such as limited regulatory capacity, delays in homologation of EV models, and insufficient standards for charging equipment. These institutional gaps often extend transition timelines and raise transaction costs for private investors.

• Local Industry Development Creates Additional Socioeconomic Benefits

Countries fostering local manufacturing or assembly of EV components—battery packs, two-wheelers, chargers—may benefit from job creation, technology transfer, and reduced import costs. Evidence from India and Vietnam shows that localized assembly can reduce final EV retail prices by 15–30%. Modular battery technologies and second-life applications could create additional value chains relevant to circular economy strategies, particularly in regions with growing renewable energy sectors.

The transition to EVs in developing countries presents both a critical opportunity and a profound challenge for sustainable development. As global mobility shifts toward electrification, developing economies stand at a crossroads where policy design, infrastructure investment, and equitable energy access will determine the pace and inclusivity of the transition. While the environmental and economic benefits of EV adoption—reduced oil dependency, improved air quality, and potential industrial diversification—are widely acknowledged, realizing these gains depends fundamentally on the strength of institutional frameworks, grid reliability, and policy coherence.

This study underscores that successful EV deployment in developing countries cannot be treated as a simple technological substitution. It must be embedded within a broader transformation of the power and transport sectors. Access to reliable and affordable electricity remains the single most important precondition for EV uptake. In regions where grid instability, rural energy poverty, and limited renewable integration persist, EV policies must be synchronized with electrification strategies and renewable energy expansion plans. Public–private partnerships and innovative financing models are essential to bridge the infrastructure gap, particularly in charging networks and grid modernization.

Policy orientation should thus be multidimensional—combining regulatory incentives for vehicle importation and assembly, fiscal measures such as targeted subsidies and tax exemptions, and long-term commitments to renewable energy deployment. Moreover, local manufacturing policies and skill development programs can foster domestic value chains and ensure that EV adoption contributes to economic resilience rather than dependency.

In sum, the EV transition in developing countries will succeed only through integrated, inclusive, and context-sensitive strategies. Policymakers must view EVs not merely as climate solutions but as catalysts for advancing sustainable mobility, social equity, and energy access. The convergence of sound policy frameworks, infrastructure investment, and international cooperation can enable developing nations to leapfrog into a cleaner, more resilient transport future—turning today’s technological challenge into tomorrow’s development opportunity.

Policy implications are diverse. The EV transition in developing countries presents both a strategic opportunity and a systemic challenge. To harness the economic, environmental, and developmental benefits of e-mobility, governments and development partners must adopt a coordinated policy approach that addresses infrastructure deficits, strengthens energy systems, and supports equitable access. The following policy implications outline actionable recommendations for advancing this transition.

In essence, the EV transition in developing countries requires system-level coordination between energy, transport, and industrial policies—supported by development finance and institutional capacity building. Governments should act as strategic orchestrators, creating the enabling environment for private investment and innovation, while international partners provide technical and financial support to ensure that transport electrification contributes to both climate goals and inclusive development. Strengthening energy access and grid readiness is fundamental, as EV adoption depends on reliable and affordable electricity; thus, integrating EV planning into national electrification strategies, investing in decentralized renewable generation, and promoting smart grid technologies are key. Building adequate charging infrastructure requires national roadmaps, blended financing models, and local manufacturing initiatives to attract private investment and ensure sustainability. Addressing affordability through targeted fiscal incentives, fleet-based demand aggregation, and the promotion of second-life markets for batteries and used EVs can help overcome economic barriers. Coordinated industrial policy and skills development are essential to stimulate local value chains, foster innovation through public–private partnerships, and train a skilled workforce for EV maintenance and infrastructure deployment. Embedding environmental and social safeguards ensures that the transition remains equitable and sustainable, with responsible battery sourcing, recycling, and inclusive access to electric mobility. Finally, leveraging development cooperation and climate finance can de-risk investments, promote regional collaboration on standards and technology transfer, and strengthen data-driven policymaking, thereby ensuring that the EV transition in developing countries accelerates decarbonization while advancing socioeconomic development.