Ethnicised Citizenship and the Post-Socialist Model of Diversity Management: The Case of Slovenia’s ‘Unrecognised’ Minorities from Former Yugoslavia

Abstract

This article examines how Slovenia’s post-communist approach to diversity management marginalizes minorities from the former Yugoslav republics. The constitution grants cultural rights and parliamentary representation to Italian and Hungarian minorities, but communities from Bosnia, Serbia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Croatia are excluded from these protections. Recognised mainly by religious affiliation, these groups have limited access to formal minority rights. Their fight for recognition is fragmented, lacking unified political representation, and the 1992 “erasure”—the removal of thousands from the permanent resident registry after independence—still undermines their sense of belonging. Drawing on theories of racialized citizenship, belonging, multiculturalism, and social mobility, the article examines how exclusionary legal frameworks create hierarchies of belonging that hinder mobility for these unrecognised minorities. The qualitative interviews with descendants of Bosnian migrants reveal intergenerational struggles with recognition, ambivalent experiences of citizenship, and discrimination. Set in the post-communist Eastern European context, the study argues that even under the pressures of EU integration, citizenship regimes remain divided along ethnic lines. This division maintains structural inequalities and marginalizes certain groups despite their long-term residence and formal citizenship. The study contributes to debates on ethnicised citizenship and diversity management by showing how legal exclusion, historical legacies, and fragmented minority politics limit belonging and mobility in post-communist societies.

1. Introduction

Slovenia’s transition from a socialist republic within Yugoslavia to an independent EU member has greatly influenced its stance on diversity. After 1991, the post-communist framework for minority protection officially recognised the Italian and Hungarian minorities and provided a special form of protection for the Roma. However, the country’s larger minority groups—Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Albanians, often called the “new” or ABČHMS minorities—still lack official recognition. Despite their demographic presence, historical connections, and societal contributions, they are still considered immigrants rather than ethnic minorities. This paradox highlights a selective and hierarchical approach to diversity, raising important questions about citizenship, minority rights, and belonging in a post-socialist society.

This article explores three interconnected research questions. First, it looks at how Slovenia’s post-communist policies on diversity management have influenced the recognition or marginalization of minorities from the former Yugoslav republics. Second, it investigates how legal frameworks for citizenship and minority rights interact to produce ethnicised patterns of inclusion and exclusion in Slovenia. Third, it examines the experiences of descendants of Bosnian migrants regarding citizenship, belonging, and social mobility, highlighting broader trends in ethnicised citizenship across post-communist Europe.

The analysis draws on Étienne Balibar’s (2004) concept of degrees of citizenship, Alana Lentin’s (2020) framework of racialized citizenship, Will Kymlicka’s (2007) theory of multicultural citizenship, and Nira Yuval-Davis’s (2011) ideas on the politics of belonging. These approaches collectively show how formal equality can exist alongside layered inclusion, how states create symbolic boundaries of membership, and how individuals navigate their identities within changing national imaginaries.

This article explores the historical and political backdrop of diversity management in Slovenia, focusing specifically on how the state treats minorities from the former Yugoslavia. To shed light on the lived experiences of citizenship and belonging, it also examines qualitative interviews with descendants of Bosnian migrants in Slovenia. These stories reveal strong attachments to Slovenia as a homeland alongside feelings of ambiguity, hybridity, and occasional exclusion. Although many participants see themselves as loyal citizens who feel at home, their stories about being called “southerners,” having their surnames corrected or mocked, or facing discrimination in education and work illustrate the ongoing presence of ethnicised notions of belonging. Overall, these experiences provide important insights into the gap between Slovenia’s image as a tolerant European democracy and the realities faced by its most prominent unrecognised minorities.

By placing Slovenia’s experience within the broader context of post-socialist Europe, this article shows how nationalist ideologies, fears of small-state nationalism, and practical issues related to territorial concentration have resulted in a limited and selective approach to minority protection. It also emphasizes the need for and viability of alternative strategies. Custom measures, such as extracurricular mother-tongue classes, ongoing funding for cultural groups, and symbolic parliamentary seats, could better align Slovenia’s policies for ex-Yugoslav minorities with its democratic principles and European commitments.

2. Theoretical Framework

This section outlines the conceptual framework for studying citizenship and belonging among minority groups from the former Yugoslav republics in Slovenia. Drawing on sociological theories of citizenship and multiculturalism, as well as perspectives on identity formation and inclusion in migration and post-socialist contexts, this approach emphasizes four core concepts: citizenship, multiculturalism, identity, and belonging. These serve as the basis for analysing diversity management in Slovenia. The chapter then discusses each concept in detail, describing its role in understanding minority experiences of belonging.

2.1. Citizenship and Multiculturalism

Citizenship is usually seen as a legal status that grants equal rights and full membership in a nation-state. However, in reality, citizenship is more than just a legal or universal category; it is influenced by political debates about belonging and identity. Étienne Balibar (2004) argues that modern nations create different levels of citizenship, where legal equality exists alongside social inequalities. Likewise, Yasemin Soysal’s (1994) concept of post-national membership suggests that immigrants in Europe can access rights and protections even without holding national citizenship, effectively separating legal status from social belonging. Both viewpoints highlight that legal inclusion alone does not ensure societal acceptance.

Contemporary research introduces the concept of racialized citizenship, showing how formal citizenship can be divided by ethnicity and race. Alana Lentin (2020) notes that European states often claim to promote colour-blind equality but hide “invisible” hierarchies that favour the majority and discriminate against minorities. Drawing on this theoretical approach, we extend the analysis to the notion of ethnicised citizenship, arguing that similar, though often less visible, mechanisms of differentiation and discrimination emerge along ethnic rather than explicitly racial lines. Similarly, Hellgren and Bereményi (2022) highlight that European citizenship is racialized: legal equality exists alongside structural exclusion, with minority citizens often seen as outsiders. Racialization and ethnicisation affect more than visible features; they also include symbolic markers such as religion, language, and ancestry. In Slovenia, this means that the Italian and Hungarian minorities, recognised as autochthonous1 by the constitution, receive cultural protections and political representation. Meanwhile, communities from Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and other successor states remain unrecognised. Even with Slovenian citizenship, people’s sense of belonging can be challenged by ethnicised boundaries of ethnicity and culture, echoing Balibar’s (2004) idea that citizenship is inherently stratified.

Debates over multiculturalism explore how nations accommodate cultural differences. Kymlicka (2007) argues that liberal democracies must go beyond purely individual notions of equality by recognizing group-specific rights, such as language programs and cultural institutions, to promote genuine minority participation. Vertovec’s (2017) concept of super-diversity builds on this by emphasizing the growing complexity of migration-related diversity, where ethnicity, legal status, class, and religion intersect in ways that challenge traditional multicultural approaches. However, multiculturalism is not just a policy issue but also closely connected to lived experiences. Yuval-Davis (2011) introduces the concept of the politics of belonging, describing how societies draw symbolic boundaries between insiders and outsiders. She claims that belonging functions both structurally, through institutions and rights, and personally, through feelings of acceptance or exclusion. In Slovenia, multicultural policy is highly selective: Italian and Hungarian minorities are officially recognised and supported, while ex-Yugoslav groups remain invisible. This selective approach maintains hierarchies of belonging, where some groups are seen as legitimate citizens, while others, despite long-term residence, face marginalization.

2.2. Identity and Belonging

Theories of identity highlight its ever-changing, relational, and historically shaped nature. Stuart Hall (1996) emphasizes that identity is not a fixed core but an ongoing process of becoming, influenced by discourse and interactions. Benedict Anderson (2016) describes national identity as an imagined community created through shared stories, symbols, and institutions rather than based on objective sameness. Croatian anthropologist Jasna Čapo Žmegač (1996) notes that identities are social and political constructs that appear and fade depending on the circumstances, with larger communities often imposing secondary, constructed identities on their members. From a non-essentialist perspective, identity is fluid and dependent on context, shaped by both personal self-identification and external classification (Jenkins 2014). Rattansi and Phoenix (2005) argue that identity only gains meaning through its relationship with others, while Jenkins (2014) describes this as the internal-external dialectic of identification: how individuals see themselves is always influenced by others’ perceptions. For migrant descendants, identity formation often involves balancing multiple affiliations—ethnic, national, cultural, and religious—while seeking recognition within the host society. We take ethnicity to be a (self)ascribed, socially constructed identity category, defined along cultural, religious, historical, and linguistic lines. Chimienti et al. (2019) show that migrant descendants in Europe often face systemic barriers to inclusion, which limit their options for expressing identity and achieving social mobility.

Belonging, which is closely connected to identity, involves the emotional and symbolic ties people form with communities, places, and cultural stories. Antonsich (2010, p. 122) distinguishes between the personal, emotional sense of belonging—”feeling at home”—and the political aspect of belonging, which determines who is recognised as a legitimate member of society. Yuval-Davis (2011) adds that belonging can be understood through three dimensions: social positions, identifications, and emotional bonds, along with value systems used to evaluate inclusion. In migration contexts, these dimensions become especially important as individuals navigate the tension between their inherited traditions and the demands of integration.

The four concepts—citizenship, multiculturalism, identity, and belonging—together form a coherent framework for analysing the situation of minorities from the former Yugoslav republics in Slovenia. Citizenship offers the legal foundation for membership, but, as shown by Balibar (2004) and Lentin (2020), its meaning is layered and racialized (ethnicised) through the symbolic boundaries of ethnicity and culture. Multiculturalism emphasizes the state’s selective recognition of diversity, which, according to Kymlicka (2007) and Vertovec (2017), shows how some groups gain institutional support while others become marginalized and invisible. Identity, as defined by Hall (1996), Anderson (2016), and Jenkins (2014), involves the ongoing, relational processes through which people understand themselves and how others see them. Finally, belonging—conceptualized by Yuval-Davis (2011)—connects these structural and personal elements, illustrating how recognition, exclusion, and emotional bonds intersect in daily life. Examining these interconnected aspects reveals a core paradox in the Slovenian context: minorities can be officially recognised as citizens, but without real acceptance and acknowledgment, their identities and sense of belonging remain fragile.

3. Historical Context: Yugoslav Unity, Slovene Nationhood, and Minority Exclusion

3.1. Yugoslavia’s “Brotherhood and Unity” Policy

After 1945, socialist Yugoslavia adopted the motto of “brotherhood and unity” to bridge ethnic divisions and unite its diverse population under a common socialist identity. Led by Josip Broz Tito, this policy aimed to ensure equal recognition for the federation’s nations and nationalities while promoting a supra-ethnic Yugoslav identity (Ramet 2002; Glenny 1996). The government’s propaganda, education, and official ceremonies emphasized inter-ethnic solidarity, often downplaying historical conflicts.

The Yugoslav Constitution officially recognised both nations and nationalities, “providing cultural and linguistic rights for minorities such as Albanians, Hungarians, and Italians” (Mandelc and Učakar 2011, p. 28). However, scholars note that this approach was contradictory: it acknowledged ethnic diversity while also promoting a supranational Yugoslavism (Troch 2010). After Tito died in 1980, this fragile balance collapsed as economic crises and nationalist movements undermined the “brotherhood and unity” narrative, ultimately leading to the federation’s disintegration (Ramet 2002).

3.2. Slovenia’s Independence and the 1992 “Erasure”

Slovenia’s independence in 1991 was widely celebrated as a peaceful separation, especially compared to the violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia (Bebler 2010). However, domestically, the transition exposed significant exclusions. The most well-known example is the 1992 “erasure” (izbris), when about 25,000 residents—mainly citizens of other Yugoslav republics living in Slovenia—were “removed from the register of permanent residents after failing to secure Slovenian citizenship following independence” (Mandelc and Učakar 2011, p. 33). Suddenly, these individuals became foreigners without legal status, losing access to housing, jobs, healthcare, and political rights (Jalušič 2003; Lipovec Čebron 2007).

The erasure was more than a bureaucratic mistake; it was a purposeful act of exclusion aimed at strengthening Slovenia’s national identity and differentiating itself from its “Balkan” neighbours (Jalušič 2003). Authorities saw the failure to gain citizenship as a sign of disloyalty, labelling those erased as traitors or outsiders (Jalušič 2007). This resulted in what Arendt (1973) called the deprivation of the right to have rights. Although Slovenia’s Constitutional Court later declared the erasure unconstitutional, the process of providing remedies was slow, and it was only after the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Kurić and Others v. Slovenia that compensation programs were established (The Erased 2025).

3.3. Legal Framework: Recognised vs. Unrecognised Minorities

Slovenia’s Constitution of 1991 institutionalized a sharp division between recognised “autochthonous” minorities and unrecognised groups. Article 64 grants special rights to the Italian and Hungarian minorities, including bilingual education, political representation, and cultural autonomy,2 while the Roma enjoy partial recognition (Mandelc and Učakar 2011).3 In contrast, minorities from former Yugoslav republics, Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs are not recognised as national minorities. They have no collective rights, cultural protections, or reserved representation, “despite forming one of the largest minority populations” (Mandelc and Učakar 2011, pp. 30–31).

This selective recognition illustrates a strategy of nationalization. Protecting historical minorities was viewed as fulfilling Slovenia’s international obligations to Italy and Hungary (Petrović 2009). On the other hand, recognizing newer minorities was considered risky because it could legitimize Yugoslavia’s multicultural heritage (Mandelc and Učakar 2011). In 2003, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights criticized this arbitrary distinction and urged Slovenia to “abolish the division between autochthonous and non-autochthonous minorities” (Rizman 2006, p. 129). Despite these suggestions, successive governments have ignored them, leaving many communities without legal recognition.

3.4. EU Conditionality and Minority Protection

Slovenia’s path to joining the EU involved external pressures concerning democracy and minority rights. The Copenhagen criteria explicitly required respecting and protecting minorities as a condition for accession (Copenhagen European Council 1993). However, in practice, “Slovenia mostly met EU standards by emphasizing protections for Italians, Hungarians, and Roma, while excluding “new” minorities from the constitutional framework” (Ješe Perković 2014, p. 114).

The Copenhagen Political Criteria (Copenhagen European Council 1993) explicitly include “respect for and protection of minorities,” but in practice, monitoring has focused more on formal compliance than on the full scope of recognition. The Council of Europe monitoring repeatedly pointed out Slovenia’s selective application of minority standards: as early as the 2nd Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC) Opinion, concerns were raised about limited consultation and narrow implementation of the Framework Convention (Council of Europe 2005); in the 5th monitoring cycle (2022), the Advisory Committee again noted that Slovenia restricts the Framework Convention to “autochthonous” Italians, Hungarians, and Roma, leaving other long-standing groups outside its scope (Council of Europe 2022). ECRI’s 5th report on Slovenia (Council of Europe 2019) similarly highlighted ongoing issues with combating discrimination. Under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the COMEX 6th Evaluation Report on Slovenia (Council of Europe 2025) emphasized the different approach toward constitutionally recognised communities compared to other groups. These documents demonstrate how accession-driven alignment led to legal compliance while maintaining a national boundary around recognition.

EU monitoring mainly focused on formal compliance with human rights treaties, such as ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Slovenia ratified it but limited its scope to indigenous minorities, a decision accepted by EU bodies (Kralj 2008). The situation of the “erased” received some global attention during accession negotiations, but solutions were slow and incomplete for quite some time (Ješe Perković 2014). Researchers argue that EU conditionality often resulted in mere “ostensible compliance” in sensitive policy areas, with elites making rhetorical promises without implementing substantial reforms (Grabbe 2003).

The broader context reveals ambivalence in EU influence. Although accession encouraged legal reforms, the EU held back from pressuring Slovenia to extend recognition to the ex-Yugoslav minorities, leaving the decision to the national government (Ješe Perković 2014). After accession, this dynamic lessened further: the Economist Intelligence Unit (2018) pointed out democratic “backsliding” and ongoing ethnic exclusions in the Western Balkans, including Slovenia. Therefore, EU conditionality increased protections for some groups but continued the nationalizing approach that marginalized others.

The shift from Yugoslavia’s ‘brotherhood and unity” to Slovenia’s independent status shows both continuity and change. Continuity appears in the persistent exclusionary attitudes; even during Yugoslavia, Slovenians often saw migrants from other republics as outsiders (Petrović 2009). The change is clear: independence turned co-citizens into foreigners, creating a legal and symbolic hierarchy between recognised and unrecognised minorities. EU membership further strengthened this selective approach by emphasizing formal compliance while overlooking deeper exclusions. This results in a form of ethnicised citizenship, where official equality coexists with systemic marginalization.

4. Minorities from Former Yugoslavia in Slovenia: Ethnicised Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and Belonging

4.1. Groups Involved and Contested Recognition

The independence of Slovenia in 1991 redefined many former Yugoslav co-citizens into a new category of unrecognised “new” minorities within the country. These groups make up a significant portion of Slovenia’s population, yet they lack formal constitutional recognition as national minorities. These ABČHMS communities4 “do not possess a collective social status in Slovenia” (Kralj 2013). They are not granted special protections for group rights; instead, they rely solely on general civic equality and individual rights to cultural expression and language, as defined in Articles 61 and 62 of the constitution (Kralj 2013). Practically, this means that while members of these former Yugoslavian ethnic groups are Slovenian citizens, they are not recognised as ethnic minorities with collective rights, resulting in limited support for their languages and cultures (Kralj 2013). This exclusion is both legal and symbolic, suggesting that these communities are not considered part of the national body politic in the same way as the Italian or Hungarian minorities. Slovenian scholars have called these six communities “unconstitutional national minorities” to underline the paradox of their existence as de facto minority groups without de jure recognition (Kržišnik-Bukić 2014).

The roots of this discrepancy originate from Yugoslav state-building logic: during socialism, each republic’s titular nation was considered the main nation, while others did not receive recognition as minorities; this mindset influenced Slovenia’s independent policies (Valentinčič 2018). After independence, Slovenia’s constitution explicitly guaranteed special rights for Italians, Hungarians, and later Roma, but it did not recognise the rights of Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, and others, despite their long-standing presence (Kralj 2013). The main reason given was that these groups were migrants from other Yugoslav republics rather than indigenous minorities—an arbitrary and politicized distinction criticized by many (Komac 2005; Kralj 2008). In reality, many members of these so-called “new” communities are second- or third-generation residents, complicating the idea of who is autochthonous (Kralj 2008). Researchers note that Slovenia’s persistent use of the autochthony criterion is a notable exception in Europe—the term has largely been abandoned in EU minority rights discussions because it’s easily manipulated (Kralj 2008). Overall, Slovenia’s narrow view of national minorities contrasts with broader European trends (Kralj 2013).

The consequences of not being recognised are complex. Legally, these communities do not have the group-specific rights that recognised minorities do, such as guaranteed representation in parliament, bilingual education, official language status, and permanent state-funded cultural institutions5. Politically, they have limited visibility and influence in minority policy discussions and are often seen as part of the majority for the sake of integration. Symbolically, non-recognition suggests that their identities are considered less valid; many members feel like outsiders in the only country they see as home (Kralj 2008). Our research also shows that some individuals face discrimination because of their “southern” origin. This ethnicised citizenship regards them as second-class citizens, defined by a subtly racialized ethnicity (Lentin 2020). It shows up in everyday prejudices and in the structure of citizenship, where cultural hierarchies of belonging undermine formal equality.6

The constitutional order of Slovenia still reflects a hierarchy of belonging: Italians and Hungarians (and Roma by law) are recognised as core national communities with collective rights, while Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and others are effectively seen as immigrants, expected to integrate without special privileges. This contested recognition—or rather, recognition that is denied—shapes the patterns of activism, identity framing, and political struggles discussed in the following sections.

4.2. Fragmented Activism and Weak Political Representation

Without official minority status, former Yugoslav communities in Slovenia primarily organize through cultural and civic associations rather than formal political channels (Žagar et al. 2006). Since the 1990s, each ethnic group has created networks of mono-ethnic cultural societies dedicated to preserving their language, folklore, and connections to their homelands. For example, there is a Bosniak cultural association that publishes a community paper (Bošnjak), several Serbian groups in different towns, and Albanian associations such as Bashkimi in Maribor, which host cultural events (Žagar et al. 2006). Bešter et al. (2023) note that these communities tend to organize along mono-ethnic lines, with most associations forming between 2000 and 2009. These groups are among the oldest, cover larger geographical areas, and engage in a wider range of activities compared to other immigrant groups. Nearly all focus on cultural preservation, with about a quarter also involved in educational initiatives. Other activities include advocacy, humanitarian work, and sports. This pattern reflects a fragmented, project-based activism, where each group pursues its own cultural goals, often centred on heritage language classes, national holiday celebrations, and folk performances (Bešter et al. 2023). The Slovenian government provides some support through small grants or public tenders for minority cultural projects, but there is no systematic funding for core activities. Researchers describe this approach as projectized multiculturalism, where the state promotes diversity via short-term projects rather than sustained support for minority institutions (Komac 2005; Žagar et al. 2006). As a result, these efforts create a patchwork of initiatives that, while culturally meaningful, rarely lead to lasting political empowerment for these communities.

Overall, the political representation of ABČHMS communities in Slovenia remains notably limited. No political party explicitly defends its interests, although the left-wing Levica includes the recognition of these minorities in its program (STA 2025). While individuals of Bosniak, Serbian, or Croatian descent have occasionally held office in mainstream parties, they rarely publicly advocate on minority issues. In the early 2000s and again in the 2010s, sporadic parliamentary proposals emerged to establish a special law or constitutional amendment to improve the status of these so-called new national communities. For instance, in 2004, a petition by minority associations prompted some parliamentarians to draft an amendment listing Croats and Serbs in the constitution. More recently, in 2018, a Law on the Cultural Rights of Former SFRY Nations was proposed (Letnar Černič 2018; Valentinčič 2018). However, these initiatives often failed to pass due to a lack of consensus or quorum. The prevailing view in the Slovenian parliament has been that civic equality suffices, and recognizing new minorities might open a Pandora’s box of claims (Komac 1999). As a result, activists from former Yugoslav minorities have primarily turned to NGOs and international forums for advocacy. Organizations like the Peace Institute in Ljubljana support research and awareness campaigns on minority rights, including efforts to address discrimination in employment and education (Kralj 2008). Some community leaders have engaged the Council of Europe and OSCE, seeking to leverage international pressure. Notably, the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention has repeatedly raised concerns about Slovenia’s unrecognised minorities. In 2020, a Council of Europe expert report urged the recognition of Serbian, Croatian, and German as minority languages in education and media (Tesija 2025). These efforts reflect activism “from the outside in,” compensating for domestic political marginalization by appealing to European standards and scrutiny (Ješe Perković 2014).

The lack of institutional representation also feeds feelings of disenfranchisement. Community organizations operate under fragile conditions, depending on volunteers, small municipal grants, or homeland cultural funds (Bešter et al. 2023). This soft infrastructure of multiculturalism may promote diversity in theory, but it often exhausts minority activists who must repeatedly seek funding and defend their existence. It fosters an environment where multiculturalism is seen more as folklore than a political issue. As a result, a cycle of weak representation forms: without formal recognition, these communities lack political influence to improve their status, and without influence, they remain unrecognised. As Balibar might observe, this leads to different levels of citizenship within Slovenia—those in constitutionally recognised groups enjoy more substantial citizenship rights. Meanwhile, former-Yugoslav minorities have a more fragile, less visible citizenship—formally equal but collectively unseen (Prelić 2009).

4.3. Critical Synthesis: Ethnicised Citizenship and the Politics of Belonging

The situation of former Yugoslav minorities in Slovenia shows how citizenship can be ethnically divided and stratified even within a democratic, EU member state. Using Alana Lentin’s idea of racialized citizenship, groups like Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and others are legally equal but socially excluded from the nation’s core identity. They are like “civic ghosts”: present socially but absent from the official image of the country (Pajnik 2016). The negative stereotype of čefurji7 demonstrates this stigma, lumping diverse groups into one inferior Balkan category. Étienne Balibar’s (2004) concept of “degrees of citizenship” applies here: while legally included, these communities lack full participation and recognition. Not recognizing Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Serbs (ABČHMS) creates an internal border that weakens their citizenship.

Nira Yuval-Davis’s (2011) framework on the politics of belonging highlights how Slovenian national identity has been shaped by a narrative of continuity and European-ness, differentiating Slovenia from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. This has resulted in a “narrow-but-deep” approach to recognizing minorities, limited to Italians and Hungarians as historically European (Komac 1999). At the same time, groups of Balkan origin are seen as migrants who can be assimilated rather than as recognised communities. As a result, Mojca Medvešek (2006) describes this as ‘fragmented integration,’ where individuals may integrate economically and linguistically, but their collective identities are still marginalized.

The Slovenian example illustrates the limits of EU multicultural tolerance. Slovenia’s smooth accession overlooked daily multicultural issues, adopting a minimalistic model that seemed tolerant but maintained ethnic hierarchies. Younger generations, raised in Slovenia as an EU member state, are now calling for more inclusive and pluralistic policies, aligning with European multicultural standards. With approximately 10% of the population having South Slavic roots, ongoing marginalization risks weakening social cohesion and underutilizing cultural resources (Council of Europe 2018).

In conclusion, the Slovenian case shows how certain post-socialist countries have built exclusionary regimes of belonging as a legacy of socialist governance, while also demonstrating how marginalized groups challenge their invisibility through activism and resilience. Insights from Lentin, Balibar, and Yuval-Davis show that this pattern is part of a larger European trend, where citizenship is unevenly distributed across racial and ethnic lines.

5. Case Study Bosnian Descendants: Minority Rights, Identity and Belonging

5.1. Methodology

To demonstrate how diversity management works in Slovenia, we draw on an analysis of our qualitative research. Our study focuses on the descendants of Bosnian immigrants in Slovenia, who are Slovenian citizens. This sample is not representative of all former Yugoslav minorities in Slovenia, but it offers valuable insight into how one group experiences belonging, identity, and citizenship. While the interviews were part of a broader research project, we specifically asked about issues related to identity, belonging, discrimination, and political engagement.

We used a qualitative research method, conducting semi-structured interviews. The ten questions offered a basic framework for the discussions, but their order and focus were adjusted based on the participants’ responses. The interviews took place in 2020 and 2021. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, eight interviews were held in person, each lasting two hours or more, while four were conducted online via Zoom and were shorter. The absence of face-to-face contact made the atmosphere less relaxed, leading to more concise answers. To protect participant anonymity, pseudonyms were assigned. Participants were informed about the study’s goals, their voluntary participation, the right to withdraw, and the confidentiality of their information. All interviews were conducted in Slovenian, recorded, transcribed, and securely stored.

We used snowball sampling to reach this population, starting with personal contacts who introduced us to new interviewees. Participants recruited this way may feel more comfortable and trusting, which could lead to richer data. Additionally, we attended an event organized by the Union of Unions of Cultural Associations of the Constituent Nations and Nationalities of the Former Yugoslavia in Slovenia (ExYumco), as well as a press conference hosted by the newspaper Dnevnik, where representatives from Serbian and Bosniak associations were present, providing additional opportunities for interviews.

Although the sample size of interviewees was small, we aimed for internal diversity. They vary in terms of gender, age, education, ethnic background (Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks), and religion (Orthodox, Muslim, and atheist). The youngest was 32, the oldest 57, with an average age of 41.5. The group included nine women and three men. To ensure geographic diversity within Slovenia, we selected participants from Ljubljana, Jesenice, Velenje, and Mengeš—all of which, especially the first three, have been major industrial centres since the 1960s, where most internal migrants settled. All interviewees are descendants of economic migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina who moved to Slovenia between 1960 and 1990 during Yugoslavia’s era. We focused on descendants of economic migrants for easier comparison and plan to study refugees from the 1990s Bosnian war in future research. Although not all are from the same generation because of the time gap, their parents shared the common economic motivation to migrate to Slovenia for a better life. The characteristics of the interviewees are given in

Table 1. Summary of key characteristics of the interlocutors.

Characteristic	Summary
Gender	9 women; 3 men
Age (years)	32–57 (mean ≈ 41.5)
Main places of residence	Ljubljana; Jesenice; Velenje; Mengeš
Education (self-reported)	Upper-secondary to tertiary (heterogeneous)
Occupations (self-reported)	Public and private sectors; varied
Religion (self-identification)	Orthodox; Muslim; atheist (incl. non-practising)

below.

We should clarify a linguistic point from the interviews. To keep the informal tone, we kept the word ‘down’. In Slovenian, ‘down’ indicates southern areas, while ‘up’ points to northern regions, relative to the speaker’s viewpoint. From a Slovenian perspective, Bosnia and Herzegovina is ‘down,’ a term often used by interlocutors to refer to Bosnia. When we mention ‘Bosnia,’ we mean Bosnia and Herzegovina. All interviews were conducted in Slovenian. Quotations were translated into English by the authors. We prioritised semantic equivalence over literal rendering and checked idiomatic expressions in a second pass to minimise meaning loss.

5.2. Experiences of Belonging and Identity

The interviews with descendants of Bosnian migrants in Slovenia reveal complex and fluid experiences of belonging. Many interviewees expressed a dual sense of home, with Slovenia as their main place of residence and attachment, and Bosnia as a symbolic homeland associated with memory and family. One woman explained, “I am used to Slovenia; it is my homeland. I like to go to Bosnia for the memories, but I would not live there.” Another noted that her identity shifts depending on where she is: “In Slovenia, I say I’m Bosnian; in Bosnia, I say I’m Slovenian.” These accounts reflect Yuval-Davis’s (2011) idea that belonging is situational, always negotiated in relation to social and spatial contexts.

Religion emerged as a recurring yet complex marker of identity. As Yuval-Davis (2011, p. 116) notes, “religious practices are often distinguished from the secular through rituals, but in everyday life, these boundaries become blurry.” Our participants confirmed this: very few reported regular religious activity, and several identified as atheists. Yet even these individuals celebrated Bajram or other holidays due to family expectations. One explained: “I don’t go to mosque, but I celebrate Bajram with my parents. It is part of who we are.” Another person described celebrating both Bajram and Christmas with friends and neighbours. This illustrates Berger’s (2014) concept of cognitive contamination, where exposure to multiple traditions encourages the development of hybrid practices. Religious holidays, in this context, serve less as faith-based observances and more as symbolic expressions of heritage, connecting individuals to their family and community.

Identity was also expressed through language. Several interviewees described speaking a mix of Slovene and Bosnian at home. One noted, “We mixed languages, so I never spoke either perfectly. Teachers corrected me in school, and at home, my parents corrected my Slovene.” This linguistic hybrid created both cultural richness and insecurity, positioning descendants between two linguistic worlds. Dušan described a pragmatic view of identity: “I don’t think there’s anything particularly problematic here… I know who I am, I know what I am, and I don’t make a big deal out of it. I work and live normally.” In contrast, Tamara reflected on the pressures of categorization: “Just because my parents are from Bosnia doesn’t mean I have to be Bosnian… Society expected us to choose: are we Bosnians or Slovenians? I still have a problem with this today.” Selma, however, expressed pride: “I never hide where I’m from… I’m proud of that too.”

Plural and post-national identities were also expressed. Vesna explained: “I feel equally Slovenian, Serbian, and Bosnian,” framing this multiplicity as cultural richness. Marija adopted an even more cosmopolitan view: “I see myself as a human being… Where you’re from doesn’t matter.” Others explicitly embraced a European identity as a supranational framework. As Samira stated, “I feel European. It is easier than explaining if I am Bosnian or Slovenian.” These identifications align with Delanty’s analysis of European identity as a post-national concept that allows individuals to navigate multiple affiliations (Delanty and Rumford 2005).

5.3. Perceptions of Exclusion and Recognition

While more than half of the respondents reported not experiencing direct discrimination, those who did shared encounters that left deep and lasting impressions. These stories demonstrate how racialized (or ethnicised) citizenship (Lentin 2020) operates unevenly: not all descendants feel targeted, but those who do face exclusion that shapes their identity and social trust.

Dušan remembered a key event from elementary school: “It was the end of the first school year, and our teacher handed out certificates. When she reached mine, she said something needed to be corrected. She told my classmates that the letter ‘Ć’ in my last name was wrong and should be changed to ‘Č’. She took a pen and made the correction. I was only seven years old.” Although he faced no open hostility from classmates, the teacher’s act of “correcting” his surname sent the message that Bosnian names did not belong. As Balibar (2004) suggests, such actions create internal borders of citizenship: Dušan was a Slovenian student but symbolically perceived as an outsider.

Leila shared a powerful story of exclusion: “A lot of bad experiences, unfortunately. It is enough if your surname ends with ‘IĆ’. Because of my surname, I was a ‘damn Bosnian’. My history professor told me that he thought I was slaughtered, because Muslims slaughter each other. Is this normal?” Here, ethnicised discourse linked her surname and presumed religion to violence, reinforcing stereotypes that portray Bosniaks as perpetual outsiders. She also said: “My daughter works in a shop in Mojstrana, and someone insulted her with ‘damn Bosnian’ only two weeks ago.” This intergenerational transmission of stigma shows how exclusion isn’t limited to the immediate post-independence years but continues to shape daily life.

Leila also pointed out the silence surrounding discrimination: “Many people do not want to admit they have negative experiences. Many prefer to stay quiet.” Silence acts as a way to cope, but it also prevents acknowledgment, as biases remain unchallenged. This matches Yuval-Davis’s (2011) observation that belonging involves not only inclusion but also the ability to speak and be heard.

Other respondents described more subtle forms of exclusion. One woman explained that, although she had never faced direct insults, she often felt “different” because teachers or peers would ask her to explain Bosnian customs or foods, placing her in a position of cultural otherness. Another noted, “I had to explain my surname at every job interview. It became routine, but I always knew they were wondering where I was from.” Such microaggressions reinforce outsider status, even without overt hostility.

Recognition of cultural identity often happens only in private or semi-public spaces, such as diaspora associations. Several interviewees mentioned attending Bosniak or youth clubs where traditions were kept alive through dance, music, or language classes. However, these associations operate with limited funding and lack official recognition, which reinforces the idea that Bosniaks and other ex-Yugoslav groups are “invisible” in Slovenia’s constitutional system. As one participant noted, “Italians and Hungarians are recognised. We are not. We exist, but not officially.” This reflects Komac’s (2005) critique of Slovenia’s selective multiculturalism, where diversity is tolerated but not officially acknowledged.

5.4. Aspirations and Barriers to Social Mobility

Education and work played a central role in participants’ stories, often viewed as goals for integration and upward mobility. Many highlighted the importance their parents placed on schooling. One participant explained: “My parents came as workers. They told me education is the only way to be equal.” Another emphasized resilience: “We had to work harder, but it made us stronger. I wanted to finish school to prove I can.”

Yet discrimination and structural barriers still persist. Leila explained how surnames serve as silent filters in the labour market. Another participant shared her experience of applying for a public administration job and never receiving a callback after revealing her surname. These experiences reflect Medvešek’s (2006) observation of fragmented integration, where formal equality exists but structural discrimination hampers true mobility.

Workplace prejudice continues into the second generation. One participant’s daughter faced insults at her job, showing how stigma persists despite citizenship and education. These examples demonstrate how ethnic hierarchies limit hopes for social change: even when descendants pursue education and integration, symbolic exclusion restricts their options.

Not all experiences were negative. Some respondents highlighted the benefits of hybrid identities. One reflected: “It enriches your whole life, you have two cultures, in a way Bosnian and Slovenian.” Others adopted supranational identities, aligning with Delanty and Rumford’s (2005) view of European identity as a resource for navigating diversity. Samira explained: “I feel European. It is easier to say that than to explain if I am Bosnian or Slovenian.”

Nevertheless, the empirical evidence reveals a contradiction. While individuals achieve personal success and develop hybrid identities, collective acknowledgment and structural fairness remain elusive. Without official minority status or systematic protections, descendants stay vulnerable to discrimination and symbolic exclusion. This limits their opportunities for upward mobility and sustains what Lentin (2020) describes as racialized citizenship—a citizenship divided by ethnicity, language, and origin.

6. Discussion

This article explores the contested status of minorities from the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia, combining historical, theoretical, and empirical views. It reveals a paradox within Slovenian multiculturalism: although the Italian and Hungarian minorities are constitutionally recognised and granted extensive rights, and the Roma are protected through a unique approach, the largest post-Yugoslav groups remain unrecognised by law. This selective recognition is not only due to their demographic size but also reflects political sensitivities linked to Slovenian nationalism, the country’s small size, and practical concerns about territorial distribution.

From a theoretical perspective, Balibar’s (2004) idea of degrees of citizenship demonstrates the layered nature of belonging in Slovenia. Italian and Hungarian minorities enjoy a privileged status with collective rights. In contrast, Roma have a lower but distinct recognition, and Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Albanians are considered regular citizens without collective rights. Lentin’s (2020) concept of racialized citizenship also emphasizes this. Despite having citizenship and showing loyalty to Slovenian society, ex-Yugoslav minorities face symbolic exclusion through stigmatization and a lack of constitutional recognition. Yuval-Davis’s (2011) approach to the politics of belonging further explains how boundaries are created—accepting Italians and Hungarians as historic Europeans, while Balkan-origin groups are seen as outsiders, even after many years of settlement.

The empirical data support these theoretical insights. Interviews with descendants of Bosnian migrants show strong ties to Slovenia as their homeland, confirming their integration and loyalty. Several explicitly consider Slovenia their true home, while Bosnia is mainly a place of memory. However, respondents also display layered or mixed identities—Bosnian, Muslim, Serb, Slovenian, European—reflecting the reality of belonging to multiple groups. These identities, though enriching, are marginalized in the national narrative. Everyday discrimination experiences, from teachers correcting surnames to open insults in shops, demonstrate ongoing symbolic exclusion. Meanwhile, many interviewees report never facing overt discrimination, suggesting that silence and coping strategies have become normalized. This unevenness reveals how ethnicisation functions differently but consistently influences the boundaries of belonging.

The lack of recognition also presents structural challenges. According to Komac (2005) and Žagar et al. (2006), Slovenia adopts a project-based multicultural approach: diversity is celebrated through cultural initiatives, but institutional positions, such as schools, councils, and parliamentary seats, are allocated for “autochthonous” minorities. Interviews support this, showing that Bosniak and Serbian associations are fragmented, underfunded, and lack consultative status. As a result, their participation is mostly cultural rather than political. Political representation is crucial. For Italians and Hungarians, reserved parliamentary seats symbolize their equal status within the nation. For ex-Yugoslav minorities, even a single seat would be symbolically significant, acknowledging their contributions and giving them a voice in national debates.

Careful consideration is necessary when addressing the practical objections to recognition often raised by policymakers. Although it’s true that ex-Yugoslav minorities are spread out geographically, making bilingual signage or specialized schooling challenging in some areas, the Roma minority shows that tailored approaches are achievable. While Roma do not have the same collective rights as Italians and Hungarians, they still benefit from targeted support. Similar strategies could be used for ex-Yugoslav minorities, such as providing mother-tongue instruction as extracurricular activities in schools where at least 20 percent of students are from these communities. Cultural organizations could also receive ongoing funding to operate language classes and cultural events, building on their current voluntary efforts. Political representation could be ensured by allocating one parliamentary seat to collectively represent all ex-Yugoslav minorities. These measures would strengthen Slovenia’s national identity by promoting diversity and reaffirming the country’s democratic and European commitments.

The interviews also show that recognizing these factors would align with what minorities themselves aspire to. Far from rejecting Slovenian society, Bosnian migrant descendants see themselves as loyal citizens who feel at home in Slovenia. They take pride in their roots and want to preserve their culture and language. Recognizing these ties would not create division but instead strengthen social cohesion. In an era of global migration, Slovenia needs to manage the integration of newcomers from different regions. Migrants from the Western Balkans, however, share linguistic, cultural, and value similarities with Slovenians. This makes their integration less controversial and offers an opportunity to develop a progressive model of minority inclusion that combines national traditions with contemporary diversity.

7. Conclusions

The Slovenian case illustrates how both continuity with socialist legacies and the selective adoption of European frameworks for minority rights characterize post-socialist regimes of diversity management. Slovenia’s recognition of Italians, Hungarians, and, to some extent, the Roma, alongside the exclusion of larger ex-Yugoslav communities, reflects a politics of belonging in which national identity is narrowly defined and hierarchies of citizenship are maintained. This selective recognition is not unusual but signifies broader patterns in Eastern Europe, where states simultaneously declare equality before the law while maintaining differentiated regimes of civic worth.

The experiences of Bosnian descendants in Slovenia highlight these dynamics. Their layered identities and daily negotiations of belonging show how ethnicised citizenship functions not only through legal systems but also in everyday life. While formal citizenship seemingly ensures equality, subtle forms of exclusion continue through stereotypes, language hierarchies, and the stigmatization of cultural differences. These findings support Balibar’s idea of “degrees of citizenship” and Lentin’s theory of racialized belonging, illustrating how citizenship remains layered even in officially democratic and EU-integrated settings.

Seen in a comparative light, Slovenia shows how post-socialist countries deal with the tension between national identity and international norms of diversity. The case demonstrates that exclusionary practices are less maintained through explicit denial of rights and more through inconsistent acknowledgment of minority identities and the silencing of migrants and their descendants. At the same time, the resilience, hybridity, and civic participation of Bosnian descendants challenge common narratives of national homogeneity, indicating that belonging is reshaped not only from top-down through state policies but also from bottom-up through everyday acts of identification.

More broadly, the Slovenian example highlights the politics of recognition and exclusion in Eastern Europe after socialism. It emphasizes how post-communist nation-states continue to draw symbolic boundaries around the nation, while those pushed to the margins seek new ways of belonging that challenge these boundaries. Instead of viewing Slovenia as an exception, the case encourages us to see it as indicative of regional patterns where citizenship is theoretically inclusive but practically exclusive.