1.1. Background and Aims
Road traffic crashes are a major cause of death among all age groups. About 1.35 million people are killed annually on the world’s roads, while between 20 and 50 million people are non-fatally injured [
1]. The numbers of people killed or severely injured in road crashes have gradually been reduced in recent years, as a result of traditional safety strategies focusing on safety behaviours, technology, and infrastructure [
2]. There are, however, still possibilities for further reductions, but it has been argued that this requires the application of new approaches to road safety. The safety culture perspective comprises such a new approach, with a great potential to reduce road accidents, as culture makes up an important risk factor not currently addressed by traditional interventions [
3,
4,
5].
The relationship between organizational safety culture/climate and safety outcomes is well-documented in meta analyses of organizational safety [
6,
7]. Previous studies indicate a high focus on organizational safety culture in other transport sectors with a recognized high safety level, especially aviation [
8,
9], but also the maritime sector [
10] and rail [
11]. Explaining the safety performance in these sectors, these studies point to safety culture as an indispensable factor [
8,
9,
10,
11]. The safety culture level of aviation is, for instance, used as a model for improving safety culture in oil and gas [
8], and also in other industries and sectors. Accordingly, studies report relatively successful implementations of safety management systems (SMSs) aiming to facilitate the development of a positive safety culture in rail [
11] and in the maritime sector [
10]. In comparison, it seems that the safety culture perspective has been applied to some extent by companies and regulators in the road sector. This is partly due to the fact that the road sector lacks SMS requirements focusing on safety culture. Studies have nevertheless found strong relationships between organizational safety culture and safety outcomes in the road sector (e.g., [
12,
13,
14,
15]).
The concepts of safety culture and climate have traditionally been applied to organizations. Organizational safety culture can be defined as shared and safety-relevant ways of thinking or acting that are (re)created through the joint negotiation of people in social settings [
16]. Safety climate can be conceived of as “snapshots”, or manifestations of safety culture [
17]. As drivers at work are members of organizations, they have been subjected to organizational safety culture/climate studies, which have documented a relationship between culture/climate and safety outcomes (e.g., behaviours, near misses, accidents) [
12,
14,
15]. About 40% of fatal accidents in Norway involve drivers at work [
18]. Most of these are members of organizations, and thus susceptible to organizational safety culture measures.
The safety culture perspective has, however, only recently been applied to the road sector, and more research is needed if we are to exploit its full potential as a tool for developing road safety measures. An important step in this process is to also employ the safety culture concept to analytical units additional to organizations [
4,
5]. Edwards et al. [
5] conclude that road safety culture (RSC) can be understood as a different application of the same foundational concept as organizational safety culture. The difference is that when we apply the safety culture to road safety in general, we also apply it to other sociocultural units than organizations. This involves also applying it to private car drivers, and the sociocultural units that they are part of, e.g., nations, communities, and peer groups [
4,
5]. As Luria et al. [
19] suggest, most drivers on the road at any one time are not at work. Given the potential importance of the safety culture perspective for road safety, we should therefore also employ it to private drivers, especially since these include groups (e.g., young and old drivers) with higher accident risk. There are, however, few studies applying the road safety culture/climate concept to private drivers [
3,
5,
19]. Those that do exist concur that the safety culture concept should not necessarily be restricted to organizations, but applied to other social units, such as nations, regions, sectors, communities, and peer groups (cf. [
3,
5,
19]). This is a relatively unresearched issue that the present study contributes to.
Differences in national road fatality rates indicate that the national level is a key sociocultural unit to also apply the safety culture perspective to, and it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that differences between national RSC may shed light on national differences in fatality rates (cf. [
3]). Studies of national differences between road safety behaviours (e.g., [
20,
21]) often hypothesize that the results indicate differences in national culture, without specifying or measuring the (cultural) mechanisms generating these different national behaviours. Several factors that could influence road safety culture are national (e.g., traffic rules, the police enforcing the rules, road user interaction, infrastructure). For these reasons, we could expect the existence of different national road safety cultures. On the other hand, we could perhaps hypothesize that some groups within countries, e.g., professional drivers, are less influenced by national RSC, as they undergo EU-standardized training (Directive 2003/59/EC), and as they often are members of organizations that are obliged to facilitate to safe transport. Professional drivers differ from private drivers in several important respects. First, professional drivers, unless they are self-employed, drive as part of an employment relationship, and they are members of work organizations. Previous studies have found that managers’ focus on safety issues and organizational safety culture influence professional drivers’ safety behaviours [
12,
13,
14]. Organizational safety culture may reduce the (negative) impact of national safety culture [
22]. Second, professional drivers often relate to deadlines and customers, and previous studies have found that their perceived levels of time pressure and stress influence their road safety behaviour [
12,
13]. We expand more on these issues below. By comparing different groups (private and professional drivers) within the same countries, we will be able to examine the importance of national road safety culture for road safety behaviours and accident involvement. If certain road safety behaviours vary less among driver groups within than across the national samples, we may hypothesize that this could be due to the influence of national RSC.
An empirical study was therefore conducted, aiming to: (1) Compare the road safety behaviours among professional and private drivers in Norway and Greece, (2) Examine the factors influencing road safety behaviours, focusing especially on national road safety culture, and (3) Examine the influence of road safety behaviours and other factors (e.g., demographic and work-related variables) on accident involvement. The present paper compares private car and professional drivers (heavy goods vehicles and buses) in Norway and Greece. We study safety behaviours that are hypothesized to vary according to nationality (e.g., aggressive violations), and behaviours that are hypothesized to vary according to the professional versus private driver dimension (e.g., seat belt use). A central objective of the study is to examine whether the former safety behaviours are more similar among private and professional drivers within the countries than among professional and private drivers across national samples, indicating common national road safety cultures among private and professional drivers in the respective countries. In the present study, we define road safety culture (RSC) as shared patterns of behaviour, shared norms prescribing certain road safety behaviours and thus shared expectations regarding the behaviours of others.
Norway and Greece were selected for comparison since the road safety status in the two countries differs significantly. Norway had the lowest road mortality rate in Europe with 20 road deaths per million inhabitants in 2017, and the lowest road death risk [
23]. In comparison, the mortality rate in Greece in 2017 was 69 road deaths per million inhabitants, which was well above the EU average of 50 [
23]. According to Yannis and Papadimitriou [
24], Greece has one of the worst road safety records of all EU-27 countries. The fatality rate of Greece was higher than the EU average in all years between 2001 and 2014. The age-standardized number of deaths for all forms of road transport in 2010 was 136 per million population, with only Romania performing worse [
25]. The corresponding figure for Norway in 2010 was 52 per million citizens. Greek motorists also report poorer safety behaviours in traffic, and recent research points to serious flaws in the way road safety is managed at all levels in Greece [
26,
27].
Our study is carried out as part of a research project titled “Safety culture in private and professional transport: examining its influence on behaviours and implications for interventions”, funded by the Norwegian Research Council and undertaken by the Institute of Transport Economics (TØI, Norway) and the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA, Greece). Results from this project focusing only on professional drivers have been presented in conference papers, focusing on heavy goods vehicle (HGV) drivers [
28] and bus drivers [
29]. The conference paper on bus drivers was also developed into a journal paper [
22]. The present study builds on these previous studies by including and comparing findings from private drivers from Norway and Greece. A very short and previous version of the present study has also been presented as a conference paper [
30]. The results in the present study have also been presented in an extended Norwegian Safe Culture project report, which also presents full results from 61 qualitative interviews [
31].
1.3. What Is National Road Safety Culture?
Edwards et al. [
5] note that, although the concept of “driving culture” was already introduced in 1992, there are still no definitions of road safety culture that are commonly accepted by road safety researchers. Edwards et al. [
5] review the status of the road safety culture concept, in a paper contributing to a 2014 special issue (in “Transportation Research Part F”) devoted to traffic safety culture. Their review concludes that most of the current literature on the concept was collected in an anthology collecting papers from the American Automobile Association’s (AAA) workshop on road safety culture [
45]. The definitions of road safety culture provided by the contributors to the anthology were, e.g., the “beliefs, norms and values and things people use that guide their social interactions in everyday life” [
46], “implicit shared values and beliefs”, and “common practices, expectations and informal rules that drivers learn by observation from others in their communities” [
47]. These aspects of RSC can be studied both by using quantitative and qualitative methods. Among the few studies available of RSC, the quantitative approach is the most common, measuring RSC by means of safety climate questionnaires (e.g., [
19,
48,
49,
50]). RSC can, however, also be studied by means of in-depth qualitative studies (e.g., ethnography, interviews), elucidating deeper patterns of meaning motivating and legitimizing behaviours, and which are related to identity (e.g., [
51]).
The mentioned studies of national differences between DBQ items [
20,
21] often hypothesize that the results indicate differences in national culture. These studies do not, however, directly measure RSC or specify the (cultural) mechanisms generating these different national behaviours. According to Ward et al. [
3], research on road safety culture often seems to lack an explanation of the theoretical link between safety culture and safety behaviours. They state that the applicability of the safety culture perspective requires the development of a theoretical model to explain this relationship.
In the present study, we define RSC as shared patterns of behaviour, shared norms prescribing certain road safety behaviours, and thus shared expectations regarding the behaviours of others. Road safety culture can be understood as a different application of the same foundational concept as organizational safety culture [
5], which generally is defined as shared and safety-relevant ways of thinking and acting [
16]. Thus, our definition of road safety culture seems to include the most important aspects, focusing on shared patterns of behaviour, shared norms, and shared expectations. Other studies have, however, also included shared values, beliefs, assumptions, etc. The latter aspects of RSC (shared norms and expectations) are operationalized as descriptive norms, which refer to individuals’ perceptions of what other people actually do [
52]. Descriptive norms may influence behaviour by providing information about what is normal [
52]. Operationalizing RSC partly as descriptive norms, we may refer to the mechanism mediating between safety culture (shared norms and expectations) and safety behaviours as “subtle social pressures” [
52]. It is also important to note that descriptive norms can also influence behaviour through the false consensus bias, in which individuals overestimate the prevalence of risky behaviour among their peers in order to justify their own behavior [
53].
Finally, as discussed by Nævestad and Bjørnskau [
4] and Edwards et al. [
5], safety culture is a concept that can be related to several different sociocultural units. Although studies of professional drivers indicate the importance of organizational safety culture [
12,
14], other studies indicate the importance of regional road safety culture [
49], community safety climate [
19], and RSC related to peer-groups [
50].
1.4. Hypotheses
Based on previous research, we first hypothesize that there will be more aggressive violations in the Greek sample than in the Norwegian sample (Hypothesis 1). Second, we assume that there will be more over speeding in the Norwegian sample than in the Greek sample (Hypothesis 2). Third, we hypothesize that some safety behaviours (i.e., aggressive violations and over speeding) will be more similar among private and professional drivers within the national samples, than among professional and private drivers across the national samples (Hypothesis 3), indicating different national RSC (specified as shared patterns of behaviour) in the two countries. Fourth, in accordance with previous research, we hypothesize that other safety behaviours (i.e., driving under the influence and seat belt use) will be more similar between private drivers and professional drivers across countries, indicating that being a private or professional driver is more important than nationality in these instances (Hypothesis 4). Fifth, we also measure national RSC as descriptive norms, and hypothesize that we will see relatively similar scores comparing means for national RSC between the groups within countries, but significantly different when comparing groups across countries (Hypothesis 5). In accordance with this, we expect relationships between respondents’ behaviours and national RSC, especially on the variables that we primarily hypothesize to vary according to nationality. Sixth, we hypothesize that the safety behaviours of professional drivers will be influenced by work-related variables, such as organizational safety culture, time pressure, and sector focus on safety (Hypothesis 6). Seventh, we hypothesize that the safety behaviours of private drivers will be influenced by factors such as the road safety culture in their community, or in their peer groups, and their level of education (Hypothesis 7). Eight, we hypothesize that professional and private car drivers’ safety behaviours will be influenced by demographic variables, such as age, gender, and nationality (Hypothesis 8). Ninth, we hypothesize that drivers’ accident involvement will be influenced by their safety behaviours (e.g., aggressive violations) (Hypothesis 9). Tenth, we hypothesize that drivers’ accident involvement will be influenced by demographic variables, such as age, gender, and nationality (Hypothesis 10). Eleventh, we hypothesize that drivers’ accident involvement will be influenced by their mileage (Hypothesis 11). Twelfth, we hypothesize that work-related variables, such as time pressure and stress, sector, and framework conditions, will influence the accident risk of professional drivers (Hypothesis 12).