Some Human Dimensions of Understanding Flood Risk Management

Abstract

Flood risk management involves managing the consequences of flooding as well at its hazard characteristics. This means attending to the human effects of floods and flood risk reduction. These effects are many and varied and are often poorly understood by those who make the relevant decisions. This short piece addresses this issue and calls for a greater awareness of what measures those at risk are motivated likely to undertake to reduce the risks that they personally face.

This short piece discusses some aspects of the human dimensions of flood risk management in the UK (FRM), emphasising how difficult this is in the context of a complex understanding of risk, weak trust in science and specialists, and sky-high expectations from members of the public as to what they can experience in modern society in terms of risk and impact.

First, expectations. Above all, members of the public at risk of flooding expect to be protected, and government emphasis on the term ‘defence’ in Flood Defence Grant Aid makes this more than likely [1]. There had previously been a trend away from use of such terms, including terms such as flood ‘protection’, but in the 21st century this seems to have been upended, and the unrealistic terms ‘defence’ and ‘protection’ have come to be dominant parts of the FRM narrative. In any case, the public will say “I pay my taxes and expect government to protect me”, reflecting the welfare state expectations often prevalent in the United Kingdom today. Emphasis on communities becoming ‘resilient’ to flooding [1] is not reassuring for those at risk, indicating as it does that the government expects those at risk to do more to help themselves rather than be protected by state interventions and government money.

Also in terms of expectations, the public expects to be warned about imminent flooding, and they appear to expect this to come as a personal message. So, for example, in 2007, when widespread and serious flooding was publicised extensively in the media, including on television most nights, people still said that they had not received a warning. For them, a warning is somebody knocking on their door saying a flood is coming and you need to evacuate.

Another expectation concerns flood insurance and compensation for losses. Members of the public often believe that insurance payouts will amount to 100% of the damage costs, or that the government will and should compensate victims because “something must have gone wrong”. In both cases, they will be disappointed, not least because many people are either not insured or underinsured [2]. The payment of small compensation sums to flooded households by the government and the development of Flood Re have done little to reduce expectations, and indeed any subsidised flood insurance or compensation programme is likely to encourage people to stay at risk or choose risky locations in which to live [3]. The consequence is unnecessarily high insurance premiums for those not at risk.

Secondly, the public’s trust in science, and in FRM specialisms, shows itself fundamentally in an understanding of terminology. Terms such as ‘the 100-year flood’, the ‘0.1% flood’ and similar descriptors are widely misunderstood by members of the public, not least with many still thinking that once a 100-year flood has occurred, another similar one is not going to happen for 99 years, so “we won’t worry”. Some progress has been made in the United States, with a flood expressed as something that will happen once in every year or two times in a human lifetime.

The public does not accept or understand flood protection standards. When flood defences are overtopped, for example as a result of events exceeding design standards, the public thinks this is an unacceptable fault in FRM. The government agencies and other specialists involved know that any flood defence infrastructure can be exceeded, and that design standards are finite. The public appears unable to understand this and also misunderstands terms such as ‘frequent flooding’ for events that might occur on average once every 75 years. This is as much as two generations and cannot be expected to be understood by the public as ‘frequent’.

Flooding and climate change is another area of misunderstanding. The public may attribute serious events to a changing climate, but many projections indicate for the UK a worsening of flooding in winter and a reduced risk in summer. Our experience over the last decade or so shows that this is an oversimplification or flawed. So far, the major rivers of the UK have not shown a climate change signal, and the modelling showing otherwise is often mistrusted [4].

Thirdly, floods are dangerous and the at-risk can be their own worst enemies here. By and large, our floods are not especially dangerous in the UK, but motorists continue to try to drive through flooded areas, only to find their vehicles afloat and their lives at risk. Floods attract “tourists”, particularly at the coast, where violent storms throw up large waves which appear to onlookers to be exciting but are actually rather dangerous. In terms of annual average damage, these stormy situations generally show low values, but every storm is a story for the media and most stories contain inaccuracies in relation to this type of event and its impact.

The dangers of development in at-risk areas such as ‘floodplains’ are not well understood, particularly in areas subject to low-probability events and urban drainage issues. The term floodplain can be a misunderstood concept here, yet it is widely applied. Another danger that is not widely appreciated is the health impacts of flooding. These have been researched much more extensively in the last 20 years [5], and we now come to appreciate the mental health impacts of flooding on an at-risk population and that these impacts can last for many years, while the physical health impacts may last just a few months. So far, such considerations have not featured substantially in any FRM investment appraisal methodology, but it appears to be the case that these impacts are large and enduring.

What can we learn from these situations? Those in the relevant agencies involved in FRM must appreciate the misunderstandings that the public has and work harder still to provide accurate, timely, and appropriate understanding and advice. Politicians should steer well clear of flood events because they may become tempted to provide simple analyses, and these spread further misunderstanding. The scientists involved in flood research need to place more emphasis on understanding by the public and less stress on the niceties of the science behind their conclusions.