The Kerper–Bowron Method: A Foundational Change for Service Contract Claim Estimation and Accounting
Abstract
1. Introduction
- Solvency II (Directive 2009/138/EC) requires exact equivalence to the ideal equation for finite risks.
- IFRS 17 requires a similar calculation of expected cash flows.
- ASC 606 (U.S. GAAP) requires revenue recognition based on the industry that it applies. For service contracts, this is also equal to expected cash flows. Existing aggregate methods cannot satisfy these standards simultaneously while maintaining contract-level granularity, leading to inefficiencies in reserving, compliance, and capital management.
- Section 2—Introduces the fundamental concept of the Earned Service Contract, which is the basis for balance sheet and income statement items across the global service contract space.
- Section 3—Provides a history of the service contract market.
- Section 4—Reviews US and global accounting and insurance regulatory standards.
- Section 5—Describes the current actuarial and industry practices to support estimates for future liabilities and revenue recognition for service contracts.
- Section 6—Describes the Kerper–Bowron Method.
- Section 6.1—Exposure Development.
- Section 6.2—Model Development.
- Section 6.3—Calculation of Expected Claims and Cancels by Valuation Period.
- Section 6.4—Applications and Exposure Adjustments for Non-VSC Service Contracts.
- Section 7—The impact of the Kerper–Bowron Method across various accounting and insurance regulatory standards.
- Section 8—Applications to customer lifetime value.
- Section 9—Conclusions.
2. Earned Service Contract
- Total loss forecast at sale of the contract,
- Forecast for liability for each month after sale of the contract,
- Months till expiration (typically term + 1)
3. A Brief History of Service Contracts
- Diversification of Coverage: Initially focused on mechanical failures, modern service contracts may cover accidental damage and maintenance services. For example, auto service contracts might include towing or rental car reimbursement (Federal Trade Commission 2023).
- Third-Party Administration: The rise of third-party administrators has introduced greater complexity and flexibility. These entities often act as obligors and create a layered ecosystem involving manufacturers, retailers, administrators, and insurers (Breitenstein 2020).
- Customization and Innovation: Providers now offer tiered coverage plans tailored to consumer needs, such as high-mileage vehicle plans or coverage for luxury cars. Data-driven pricing strategies and predictive analytics have enabled providers to assess risks more accurately and offer competitive products (Brown 2025).
4. US and Global Standards for Accounting for Service Contracts
5. Current Actuarial Practices with Service Contracts
5.1. US Statutory Accounting—SSAP 65
5.1.1. Test 1: Refund Test
5.1.2. Test 2: Proportional Test
5.1.3. Test 3: Discounted Projected Future Losses and Expenses
5.2. Earnings Curves
5.3. European Service Contract Actuarial Practice
6. The Kerper–Bowron Method
- 1.
- Exposure Development and Associated Losses
- 2.
- Model Development
- 3.
- Projected Future Losses and Cancels
6.1. Exposure Development
6.1.1. Exposure Development Theory
- Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty: Covers most vehicle components (e.g., electrical, suspension, air conditioning, engine) except wear-and-tear items (e.g., brake pads, wipers, tires). Exclusions vary by manufacturer.
- Powertrain Warranty: Covers engine, transmission, driveshaft, differentials, and related components. Some manufacturers (e.g., Hyundai, Kia (both South Korea)) limit powertrain coverage beyond the bumper-to-bumper coverage to the original owner. If the bumper-to-bumper warranty has expired, this will provide more limited coverage under the warranty and additional coverage under the service contract.
6.1.2. Exposure Calculations Using Public Data
- = Month i,
- A = Service contract’s term miles,
- B = Service contract’s term months,
- C = Manufacturer’s warranty term miles,
- D = Manufacturer’s warranty term months,
- E = Vehicle’s mileage at purchase of service contract,
- = Mean of the natural logs of monthly mileage for all contracts, and
- = Standard deviation of the natural logs of monthly mileage for all contracts.
6.1.3. Exposure Averaging
- Bumper-to-Bumper Exposures: Weighted to the percentage of expected bumper-to-bumper claims.
- Powertrain Exposures: Weighted to the percentage of expected powertrain claims.
- Other Benefit Exposures: Weighted to benefits that do not depend on the underlying manufacturer’s warranty. This might include a rental car benefit while the car is being repaired. These are typically a small percentage of the overall claims. In addition, these are the exposures that are used for the cancellation adjustment.
6.1.4. Future Exposure Calculation
6.2. Model Development
6.2.1. Developing the Model
- Participation: Books in which the seller will ultimately receive all or a significant percentage of the profits and losses of a service contract will have lower loss estimates than books where the seller receives no profits. This is especially true if the seller has a service bay, which can transfer the profits from the sale to the servicing of the contract.
- Marketing: VSCs marketed and sold after the purchase of the collateral will tend to have higher losses. In addition, a higher percentage of the ultimate losses will appear in the initial period after the contract is sold.
- Administrator/Contract Differences: Administrators, who design and service the claims and cancels of VSCs, will have different coverages and different claims philosophies on settling VSC claims.
6.2.2. Generalized Linear Models
- 1.
- Random component
- 2.
- Systematic component
- 3.
- Link function
- Initial Odometer Reading: New vehicles have lower loss patterns, likely due to no knowledge of the underlying reliability of the vehicle as well as the increased time from the VSC purchase to a potential claim.
- Make of Vehicle: Not surprisingly, makes of vehicles have a major impact with more expensive vehicles in general having higher claims. However, European makes at any price will tend to have higher rating factors. Some vehicle makes, such as Toyota, have exceptional reliability.
- Age of Contract: This is often combined with the initial odometer and can have significant or insignificant results. In general, service contracts sold through dealers with service bays will have a higher persistency of claims. It is likely that without the reminder through service appointments, there is a “forget factor” among service contracts. Also, while the service contract can typically be transferred with a fee, this is rarely done. A share of these contracts is not cancelled, so a number of older in-force VSCs cover vehicles that are no longer owned by the purchaser of the service contract. This would cause downward bias in the Age factor.
- Deductible: There are typically many deductible options for a service contract, but incentives are typically towards lower deductibles.9 These will have higher losses, even more than suggested by the deductible amount. This is due to self-selection of lower claiming risks towards higher deductibles.
- Four-Wheel Drive: These risks have relatively more claims and are a significant percentage of most VSC books in the USA.
- Coverage Level: Often books will have the Olympic medals as coverage, with a powertrain option. These are critical but depend on the book.
- Covered Miles/Month: These typically increase for higher mile options. In conjunction, different exposure distributions can be modified by Covered Miles/Month.
- Other Factors: These can include region of the country, additional options such as turbo as well as other factors. Each book can show different significant results. Large blocks of contracts under common control, such as dealerships or retailers, may have significance.
6.3. Calculation of Expected Claims and Cancels by Valuation Period
6.3.1. Calculation of the Future Cancels and Exposure Reduction
- = Predicted retention rate on rate for contracts as of month i,
- = Count of cancels in month i in the study data,
- = Other benefit exposures in month i in the study data,
- = Valuation age,
- = Future age for exposure adjustment,
- = Future exposure,
- = Adjusted future exposure,
- = Valuation age,
- = Expiration date,
- = Cancellation rate for month ,
- = Unearned pro-rata premium for month ,
- = Cancellation factor for different than pro-rata cancellation,11
6.3.2. Kerper–Bowron Method Estimates
- = Model loss per exposure for month ,
- = Seasonality factor for month ,
- = Trend factor for month ,
6.3.3. Model Application and Performance
- Limitations of Current Applications:
- Systematic Errors:
- Impact of Specific Models:
6.4. Applications and Exposure Adjustments for Non-VSC Service Contracts
- Phone Service Contracts: Typically, these are monthly or short-term service contracts such as AppleCare+ (Cupertino, CA, USA) or Samsung Care+ (South Korea) sold by the respective manufacturers. Asurion (Nashville, TN, USA) is a major player in this segment of service contracts.
- Miscellaneous Service Contracts on Items at the Time of Sale: This includes a wide variety of collateral from home appliances and electronics to a large number of service contracts sold through internet providers such as Amazon (Seattle, WA, USA). These can vary from high end electronics to trivial service contracts on flash drives. A wide variety of terms is available. Often, specialized administrators will focus on aspects of this market such as internet sales or furniture. These amounts are added to the purchase price at the time of sale. Large providers include SquareTrade(Brisbane, CA, USA) and Dell (Round Rock, TX, USA) d. Home Service Contracts: These include a variety of specified systems in a home such as air conditioner, refrigerator, etc. These are sometimes directly marketed or sold through real estate agents.
- Commercial Service Contracts: Service contracts can be a popular purchase for businesses who seek to normalize the “Repair and Maintenance” line item. These can include service contracts listed above as well as more commercial types of collateral such as heavy trucks and equipment.
- Boats, Motorcycles, Powersports, Recreational Vehicles, etc.: Service contracts have a significant presence in each of the markets above in the USA.
7. The Kerper–Bowron Method’s Impact Across the Financial Statement
7.1. Kerper–Bowron Method Equivalency to Solvency II, Article 77, Number 2
“The best estimate shall correspond to the probability-weighted average of future cash-flows, taking account of the time value of money (expected present value of future cash-flows), using the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure.”
- = Total future loss from unearned premium,
- = Loss and cancel estimates for contract in accident month ,
- = Number of contracts,
- = Months from valuation date of the analysis to Expiration Date (),
- = Future cash flow,
- = Estimated cash flow for contract in calendar month ,
- = Number of contracts,
- = Number of LDFs for accident month IBNR until no additional development,
- = Months from valuation date of the analysis to Expiration Date (),
- = ,
7.2. Kerper–Bowron Method Application to ASC 606 and IFRS 17
- Identify the Insurance Contract or Group of Contracts: IFRS 17 requires insurers to group contracts with similar risks and profitability for measurement. Since estimates are done by contract, groupings could be identified by the profitability and variance standard required, in addition to the required standard of issue year.
- Estimate Fulfillment Cash Flows: Fulfillment cash flows represent the expected cash inflows and outflows from the insurance contract. This is directly applicable to the Solvency II approach above plus any other identified cash flows. The premium is typically at the beginning of the contract.
- Discounting: Expected cash flows are discounted to their present value using a discount rate that reflects the time value of money and the characteristics of the cash flows (e.g., liquidity and duration). Illiquidity refers to the premium over the risk-free rate for the characteristics of these liabilities versus widely traded and highly rated government debt.
- Risk Adjustment: A risk adjustment reflects the uncertainty in the cash flows due to non-financial risks (e.g., claims estimate variance). This can be calculated using a variety of methods like cost of capital, confidence level, or value-at-risk techniques. This will depend on company preference and local regulatory standards. In practice, the company has some latitude on the methodology and selection of the risk adjustment (Casualty Actuarial Society 2025). In practice, the risk selection may be identical to the Solvency II standard. The lower variance of KB method estimate would theoretically result in a lower risk adjustment than conventional estimates.
7.3. USA Auto Vehicle Service Contracts
7.3.1. Service Contract Risk in the USA for Various Entities
- Administrators:
- = Revenue the administrator receives for the contract ($200),
- = Months from inception date of contract to the valuation date ( term),
- Dealerships:
- = Revenue the dealer receives for the contract ($1000),
- = Months from inception date of contract to the valuation date ( term),
- Agents:
- = Revenue the agent receives for the contract ($100),
- = Months from inception date of contract to the valuation date ( term),
- = Premium placed into trust,
- Admitted Insurance Company:
- = Premium the insurance company receives for the contract ($40),
- = Months from inception date of contract to the valuation date ( term),
- Trust:
- = Premium (“Reserve”) the trust receives for the contract ($1660),20
- = Months from inception date of contract to the valuation date ( term),
- US Insurance GAAP:
- = Total Acquisition Costs,
- e = Original term of contract,
- = Months from inception date of contract to the valuation date,
7.3.2. Extended Warranty Special Case
- An extended warranty would be paid by the seller and included in the retail price. It is not an option—all customers who purchase the collateral will receive the extended warranty.
- These extended warranties will fall under the jurisdiction of the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act described above instead of the applicable Service Contract law. This allows for more restrictive language on coverage and the lack of cancellation provisions.
- Because this product is “embedded” in the product, the knowledge of the extended warranty is lower in the consumer’s mind than a service contract. Therefore, claims will be lower than a service contract for the same coverage. This impact can be modelled using the techniques described above.
- Extended warranties could be considered “first-party” risk—in that it is insuring the obligations of the seller, while a “service contract” would be “third-party” risk since it is insuring a sold product to a consumer. This may have an impact on the tax implications of how the transaction is characterized.
- Another special case is the “Lifetime Warranty”, which does not have an expiration date. In order to account for this, an assigned term of perhaps 20 years would be assigned to these contracts. These types of contracts will typically have few claims in the tail. This is a balance of capturing all the exposure on the contracts and the need to expire these contracts at some point. In any event, systems should allow for the occasional claim on an expired contract.
8. Monthly Contracts and Customer Lifetime Value (CLV)
9. Conclusions
- Functional equivalency to the challenge of exact Solvency II equivalence for finite risks.
- Replacement of aggregate approximations with auditable, contract-specific projections.
- Transformative implications for reserving accuracy, compliance, and capital efficiency.
- Practical applications extend to real-time equity visibility, automated regulatory reporting, and potential lending solutions within reinsurance trusts.
- Identified extensions of the KB Method including customer lifetime value models as well as other applications outside the scope of this paper including manufacturer’s warranty accruals
10. Patents
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Flow Chart of the Kerper–Bowron Method
Appendix B. Goodness of Fit Tests for Lognormal Distribution

Appendix C. Puget Sound Data Process
- 1.
- The Puget Sound Study data can be shown to produce a distribution of individual driving habits by performing the following steps: Download the raw data from Puget Sound Study (2004–2006) 2004–2006 Puget Sound Traffic Choices Study|Transportation Secure Data Center|NREL.
- 2.
- Only the data from extracted table v_gpstrips were used.
- 3.
- A total of 64 records attributed to 9 different SampNos were removed due to data insufficiencies. Removing all records with these SampNos will remove those 64 records: 30696, 43406, 43420, 43427, 43428, 43446, 43451, 43457, and UPDAT.
- 4.
- Column ‘bktp_mt_total’ is summed by sample number to calculate the total miles driven during the study for each sample number and defined as ‘Miles.’
- 5.
- The minimum of ‘bktp_start_date’ and maximum of ‘bktp_end_date’ of each sample number rounded down to zero digits is selected to establish a start and end date of study participation for each SampNo. Note—rounding down to zero digits is important because the dates in the data are stored in a date-time format. Calculation results will differ if time is not removed.
- 6.
- The length of participation in the study in years for each SampNo was then calculated using this formula.
- 7.
- Finally, the Miles per Month is calculated and used for the lognormal definitions above. This should result in monthly driving patterns for 319 drivers.
| 1 | A somewhat common exception would be the creation of a Premium Deficiency Reserve (“PDR”). The PDR occurs when the forecast liability is greater than the unearned premium. These numbers could easily be calculated using the techniques developed below. |
| 2 | In order to determine whether a service contract on a vehicle has any remaining manufacturer’s warranty, it is necessary to know both the current odometer reading on the vehicle and the in-service date of the vehicle. While the odometer reading is virtually universally known, accurate information on the in-service date is difficult to determine. |
| 3 | The “Reverse Rule-of-78s” is the inverse of the “Rule-of-78s”, which earns contracts on a “sum-of-the-digits” method. The “Rule-of-78s” was developed to allocate interest and principal on loans beginning in the early 20th century. Interest would be allocated on the sum-of-the-digits basis. For a 12-month loan, interest for the second month would be allocated as (1 − (10 × 11))/(12 × 13) or 29.5% of the total interest for the second month. The method is favorable to the lender. Due to this and technological advancements, this method has fallen out of favor. The “Reverse Rule-of-78s” counts from the beginning, so the number 11 in the example above is changed to 2. This method has increasing earnings levels for each month. For new cars, this is not correct. There is virtually no earned premium in the second month of a new vehicle, as a negligible number of vehicles have exceeded the mileage under a new vehicle warranty. In addition, many drivers will expire their contract by exceeding the service contract mileage limitations before the time limitations. Because of this, this method has fallen largely out of favor but still remains on a few older programs and systems. |
| 4 | In the authors’ opinion, the usage of separate frequency and severity estimates is fundamentally flawed for service contract analysis due to the frequently observed high negative correlation between frequency and severity depending on a variety of factors. For example, if a service contract provider (Administrator) introduces a new maintenance benefit, the observed frequency of the book will increase (perhaps dramatically) while the severities will fall. Another common issue is powertrain coverage, which limits coverage to engine components. These exposures will have lower frequencies and higher severities. The use of loss costs or pure premiums eliminates this noise effectively. |
| 5 | The General Data Protection Regulation, adopted in 2018, has limited participation to approximately 30% of drivers. See ISG, “Technology That Creates Flood of Data Can Also Help Actuaries Make Better Decisions” (Winkler 2021). EV reliability and EV battery life remains an open question. Many administrators are seeking to add EV Battery coverage in the USA. There are proposed repairs that may not require a full battery replacement. EV Battery warranties are typically 8–10 years with high mileage limits. There is a lack of data on battery life after the warranty due to the relatively low number of EVs with expired battery warranties. Battery replacement is an expensive repair, with reports of some EV replacements reaching $20,000 or more. There is also the question of “betterment”, as a new battery could almost be considered a new engine. Traditional battery coverage is not offered on VSCs without a maintenance component because it is considered a wear-and-tear item. |
| 6 | Mileage is captured upon cancellation or claim. Since the cancellation date and loss date are also included, mileage patterns can easily be estimated from an existing book. |
| 7 | Historical “system reports” were almost always segregated by policy year. |
| 8 | Most service contracts are based on term miles, which is miles in addition to starting miles. A significant minority use the odometer reading as the expiration miles. For example, a 5 year/75,000 mile contract with 20,000 miles at purchase would expire at 95,000 miles on term mile contract and 75,000 miles on an odometer mile contract. For the purpose of this paper, we consider all miles to be term miles. These can easily be calculated for odometer expiration contracts by taking the odometer expiration miles less that initial odometer reading. |
| 9 | The structure of the VSC industry in the USA often includes flat additions for the Dealer Markup, Agent Fee, and Administrator Fee rather than a percentage. Due to this, any options such as coverage and deductible will be biased towards the most comprehensive coverage (higher term, lowest deductible, highest coverage) since the consumer will only pay for the increase in the portion in expected losses. |
| 10 | The amount retuned on cancellation (60–80% of unearned) may be similar to the future loss ratio, which will have minimal impact on the overall liability but will impact the cash flow, as the cancellation will occur before the projected claims. Most cancels occur early in the contract, and “flat cancels”, which are cancels for a full refund typically occurring without a claim and in the first 30 days, are removed from the analysis. |
| 11 | VSCs are typically cancelled on the greater of months and miles, without regard to the underlying manufacturer’s warranty. In most cases, this will result in a refund less than the underlying unearned premium reserve. In any case, a factor can be calculated based on the average refund/unearned premium observed. If telematics or other sources of contract mileage data are available, a better estimate can be formed. |
| 12 | For example, televisions have historically been more dependable than refrigerators or washing machines. |
| 13 | EVs are getting more reliable, but they still lag behind hybrids and gas-only cars. |
| 14 | The Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is defined in Articles 100–127 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) as the capital needed to cover a 99.5% worst-case scenario over one year, calculated using the standard formula or an approved internal model. |
| 15 | For example, Dell Technologies’ total revenue for fiscal year 2025 (ended 31 January 2025) was $95.6 billion. An undisclosed amount is due to service contracts, but this revenue likely exceeds 3 billion. |
| 16 | US statutory accounting does not allow for the amortization of acquisition costs. Since this type of structure has high acquisition costs and long terms, it produces significant statutory income losses in the first few years of the contract, followed by high profits in the latter part of the term. |
| 17 | The most popular domiciles for these companies is the Turks and Caicos and the Delaware Tribe of Kansas, with occasional companies in other offshore domiciles such as the Seychelles. Offshore companies will file a 953(d) election, which elects US tax treatment of the transaction. Regardless of domicile, the financial assets remain in the USA. |
| 18 | There is some confusion over nomenclature in the industry in this area. Many of these entities are known as “reinsurance companies”. A minority function as reinsurance companies, with all funds passing through an “A-rated” company and fully reinsured to these companies. However, the majority directly assume the risk. |
| 19 | An example would be “Lease Wear and Tear”, which covers cosmetic damage to a returned leased vehicle. The majority of these leased vehicles will be returned near or at the lease end date. |
| 20 | Industry nomenclature typically replaces “premium” with “reserve” for these entities. |
| 21 | Deferred Acquisition Costs (DAC) refer to certain costs incurred by an insurance company that are directly related to acquiring or renewing insurance contracts. These costs are capitalized and amortized over the period in which the related premiums are earned, rather than being expensed immediately, to align with the revenue recognition principle under GAAP. |
| 22 | The topic of robocalls and direct-marketed contracts has filled the authors’ ears at a few dinner parties. While these types of calls were always illegal, enforcement was lacking until 21 July 2022, when an FCC order (File No. EB-TCD-21-00031913) effectively ended the practice by a heavy sanction action. Therefore, the calls have stopped for now. Despite the noise, direct marketed VSCs have always had an immaterial market share. Another interesting facet of direct marketed service contracts is the term of the contracts sold. VSCs are traditionally sold as longer terms because they are financed with the loan for the underlying vehicle. Direct-marketed VSCs could have been offered with a monthly term, but industry systems and tradition allowed for longer term contracts. Finance companies technically financed these contracts, but consumers who failed to pay did not owe further obligation since the refund generated by a cancellation was typically sufficient to satisfy the balance of the “loan”. The acquisition costs were funded immediately but the cancellation ratio was very high, as many customers only used or needed this product for a few months. Unfunded refund liabilities led to well-documented defaults such as US Fidelis (Wentzville, MO, USA). While these practices were deficient, the need to fund the acquisition cost for a direct-marketed service contract is a legitimate concern for these entities, which these techniques can address. |
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| Month | Pro-Rata | Reverse Rule of 78s | Experience Based |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| 1 | 0.0278 | 0.0015 | 0.0387 |
| 2 | 0.0556 | 0.0045 | 0.0767 |
| 3 | 0.0833 | 0.0090 | 0.1138 |
| 4 | 0.1111 | 0.0150 | 0.1502 |
| 5 | 0.1389 | 0.0225 | 0.1859 |
| 6 | 0.1667 | 0.0315 | 0.2209 |
| 7 | 0.1944 | 0.0420 | 0.2552 |
| 8 | 0.2222 | 0.0541 | 0.2888 |
| … | … | … | … |
| 36 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| Pure Premiums − Paid Losses/In-Force Contracts | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| by Age | |||||||||||||
| Policy | Policy | ||||||||||||
| Year | Quarter | 3 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 24 | 27 | 30 | 33 | 36 |
| 2019 | 1ST | 26.83 | 25.14 | 23.99 | 22.20 | 19.42 | 18.09 | 16.59 | 17.65 | 15.56 | 14.88 | 15.26 | 13.80 |
| 2019 | 2ND | 23.74 | 25.63 | 25.59 | 21.91 | 20.82 | 21.20 | 16.45 | 16.75 | 16.45 | 15.45 | 14.62 | 14.43 |
| 2019 | 3RD | 27.18 | 26.12 | 23.67 | 20.13 | 19.26 | 18.97 | 19.16 | 17.28 | 15.67 | 15.99 | 14.53 | 14.09 |
| 2019 | 4TH | 28.55 | 23.91 | 25.96 | 21.16 | 20.71 | 18.61 | 18.24 | 15.69 | 17.86 | 16.40 | 13.69 | 13.77 |
| 2020 | 1ST | 24.21 | 25.54 | 25.93 | 23.71 | 21.93 | 19.37 | 19.43 | 19.13 | 17.80 | 15.69 | 15.31 | 14.25 |
| 2020 | 2ND | 25.96 | 27.48 | 24.53 | 23.37 | 20.54 | 21.41 | 18.46 | 17.28 | 17.91 | 16.74 | 15.07 | 13.63 |
| 2020 | 3RD | 25.77 | 26.15 | 26.03 | 23.08 | 20.84 | 20.21 | 19.04 | 17.32 | 15.52 | 14.56 | 13.50 | 12.99 |
| 2020 | 4TH | 28.39 | 27.95 | 22.89 | 24.02 | 22.73 | 19.76 | 18.45 | 19.12 | 15.72 | 15.81 | 16.25 | 13.23 |
| 2021 | 1ST | 26.11 | 27.95 | 25.82 | 22.56 | 23.23 | 22.29 | 20.67 | 16.62 | 16.53 | 15.46 | 13.58 | 15.32 |
| 2021 | 2ND | 28.10 | 27.29 | 26.16 | 23.87 | 22.72 | 21.62 | 20.74 | 18.63 | 18.15 | 14.51 | 14.33 | 14.53 |
| 2021 | 3RD | 25.25 | 23.75 | 23.17 | 24.38 | 22.56 | 19.98 | 18.18 | 16.75 | 18.01 | 14.62 | 15.39 | 13.22 |
| 2021 | 4TH | 29.50 | 27.84 | 23.31 | 23.30 | 21.73 | 21.20 | 19.38 | 17.72 | 18.73 | 16.35 | 14.77 | 15.13 |
| 2022 | 1ST | 28.18 | 28.89 | 25.25 | 25.90 | 22.51 | 21.50 | 18.78 | 20.16 | 18.14 | 16.08 | 14.98 | 14.29 |
| 2022 | 2ND | 25.87 | 28.07 | 24.91 | 23.15 | 21.63 | 23.22 | 18.39 | 18.48 | 18.50 | 17.49 | 16.92 | |
| 2022 | 3RD | 26.71 | 28.78 | 25.23 | 25.01 | 23.82 | 22.21 | 19.92 | 19.85 | 18.45 | 17.96 | ||
| 2022 | 4TH | 31.81 | 28.47 | 27.20 | 26.15 | 23.66 | 22.98 | 20.72 | 20.11 | 18.48 | |||
| 2023 | 1ST | 28.01 | 26.59 | 24.96 | 25.26 | 21.06 | 20.27 | 21.88 | 18.61 | ||||
| 2023 | 2ND | 32.43 | 29.00 | 26.88 | 23.44 | 21.20 | 20.72 | 22.15 | |||||
| 2023 | 3RD | 29.26 | 30.07 | 27.08 | 26.39 | 25.37 | 22.65 | ||||||
| 2023 | 4TH | 29.15 | 30.05 | 28.95 | 22.77 | 23.69 | |||||||
| 2024 | 1ST | 27.61 | 28.49 | 29.18 | 23.28 | ||||||||
| 2024 | 2ND | 33.13 | 31.16 | 28.31 | |||||||||
| 2024 | 3RD | 33.03 | 28.09 | ||||||||||
| 2024 | 4TH | 32.46 | |||||||||||
| Exponential Fit | 30.42 | 28.83 | 26.42 | 24.13 | 22.70 | 21.43 | 20.11 | 18.31 | 17.67 | 15.49 | 14.29 | 13.25 | |
| Selected | 30.42 | 28.83 | 26.42 | 24.13 | 22.70 | 21.43 | 20.11 | 18.31 | 17.67 | 15.49 | 14.29 | 13.25 | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interpolated | Incremental | Cumulative | |||
| Prior Period | Future Period | Monthly | Earnings | Earnings | |
| Month | Pure Prem | Pure Prem | Pure Prem | Curve | Curve |
| 0 | 30.42 | 0.00 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |
| 1 | 30.42 | 30.42 | 0.039 | 0.039 | |
| 2 | 30.42 | 29.89 | 0.039 | 0.078 | |
| 3 | 30.42 | 28.83 | 30.42 | 0.039 | 0.117 |
| 4 | 30.42 | 28.83 | 29.89 | 0.039 | 0.155 |
| 5 | 30.42 | 28.83 | 29.36 | 0.038 | 0.193 |
| 6 | 28.83 | 26.42 | 28.83 | 0.037 | 0.230 |
| 7 | 28.83 | 26.42 | 28.03 | 0.036 | 0.267 |
| 8 | 28.83 | 26.42 | 27.23 | 0.035 | 0.302 |
| 9 | 26.42 | 24.13 | 26.42 | 0.034 | 0.336 |
| 10 | 26.42 | 24.13 | 25.66 | 0.033 | 0.369 |
| 11 | 26.42 | 24.13 | 24.89 | 0.032 | 0.401 |
| 12 | 24.13 | 22.70 | 24.13 | 0.031 | 0.432 |
| 13 | 24.13 | 22.70 | 23.65 | 0.030 | 0.463 |
| 14 | 24.13 | 22.70 | 23.17 | 0.030 | 0.492 |
| 15 | 22.70 | 21.43 | 22.70 | 0.029 | 0.522 |
| 16 | 22.70 | 21.43 | 22.28 | 0.029 | 0.550 |
| 17 | 22.70 | 21.43 | 21.85 | 0.028 | 0.579 |
| 18 | 21.43 | 20.11 | 21.43 | 0.028 | 0.606 |
| 19 | 21.43 | 20.11 | 20.99 | 0.027 | 0.633 |
| 20 | 21.43 | 20.11 | 20.55 | 0.026 | 0.660 |
| 21 | 20.11 | 18.31 | 20.11 | 0.026 | 0.686 |
| 22 | 20.11 | 18.31 | 19.51 | 0.025 | 0.711 |
| 23 | 20.11 | 18.31 | 18.91 | 0.024 | 0.735 |
| 24 | 18.31 | 17.67 | 18.31 | 0.024 | 0.759 |
| 25 | 18.31 | 17.67 | 18.10 | 0.023 | 0.782 |
| 26 | 18.31 | 17.67 | 17.89 | 0.023 | 0.805 |
| 27 | 17.67 | 15.49 | 17.67 | 0.023 | 0.828 |
| 28 | 17.67 | 15.49 | 16.94 | 0.022 | 0.850 |
| 29 | 17.67 | 15.49 | 16.22 | 0.021 | 0.871 |
| 30 | 15.49 | 14.29 | 15.49 | 0.020 | 0.891 |
| 31 | 15.49 | 14.29 | 15.09 | 0.019 | 0.910 |
| 32 | 15.49 | 14.29 | 14.69 | 0.019 | 0.929 |
| 33 | 14.29 | 13.25 | 14.29 | 0.018 | 0.947 |
| 34 | 14.29 | 13.25 | 13.94 | 0.018 | 0.965 |
| 35 | 14.29 | 13.25 | 13.59 | 0.018 | 0.983 |
| 36 | 13.25 | 13.25 | 0.017 | 1.000 | |
| Total | 775.80 | 1.000 |
| Line of Business | Exposure Base |
|---|---|
| Homeowners | Earned House Year |
| GL (Premises) | Square Footage |
| Workers’ Comp | Payroll |
| Commercial Auto | Earned Car Year |
| Inland Marine | Property Value |
| Umbrella | Underlying Policy Premiums |
| Special Event | Time-Based Exposure (Hours/Days) |
| Apt/Condo Liability | Number of Units |
| Product Liability | Gross Sales/Revenue |
| Make | Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty | Powertrain Warranty | Locations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Toyota | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | Japan |
| Ford | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | United States |
| Chevrolet | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | United States |
| Honda | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | Japan |
| Nissan | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | Japan |
| Hyundai | 5 years/60,000 miles | 10 years/100,000 miles | South Korea |
| Kia | 5 years/60,000 miles | 10 years/100,000 miles | South Korea |
| Jeep | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | United States |
| Ram | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles (gas) | United States |
| GMC | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | United States |
| Subaru | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | Japan |
| Mazda | 3 years/36,000 miles | 5 years/60,000 miles | Japan |
| Average Annual Miles | Std Dev ln(Miles per Month) | Mean ln(Miles per Month) |
|---|---|---|
| 13,083 | 0.62 | 6.83 |
| Starting Odometer | 850 |
| Mean ln(Miles per Months) | 6.83 |
| Std Dev ln(Miles per Months) | 0.62 |
| Service Contract Months | 96 |
| Service Contract Miles | 96,000 |
| Manufacturers Warranty Months | 36 |
| Manufacturers Warranty Miles | 36,000 |
| Starting Mileage | 850 | |||||
| Warranty Mileage Term | 36,000 | |||||
| Warranty Mileage Remaining | 35,150 | |||||
| (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) | |
| Miles Driven in | Remaining | Miles Driven in | Remaining | Service | ||
| Month to Exceed | Percent in | Month to | Percent in | Contract | Adjusted | |
| Month | Service Contract | Service Contract | Exceed Warranty | Warranty | Exposure | Exposure |
| 0 to 1 | 192,000 | 1.0000 | 70,300 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| 1 to 2 | 64,000 | 1.0000 | 23,433 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| 2 to 3 | 38,400 | 1.0000 | 14,060 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| 3 to 4 | 27,429 | 1.0000 | 10,043 | 0.9999 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 |
| 4 to 5 | 21,333 | 1.0000 | 7811 | 0.9997 | 0.0003 | 0.0003 |
| 29 to 30 | 3254 | 0.9797 | 1192 | 0.6607 | 0.3190 | 0.2935 |
| 30 to 31 | 3148 | 0.9769 | 1152 | 0.6406 | 0.3363 | 0.3425 |
| 31 to 32 | 3048 | 0.9739 | 1116 | 0.6208 | 0.3530 | 0.3480 |
| 32 to 33 | 2954 | 0.9706 | 1082 | 0.6013 | 0.3693 | 0.3761 |
| 33 to 34 | 2866 | 0.9672 | 1049 | 0.5822 | 0.3849 | 0.3794 |
| 34 to 35 | 2783 | 0.9635 | 1019 | 0.5635 | 0.4000 | 0.4074 |
| 59 to 60 | 1613 | 0.8178 | 591 | 0.0000 | 0.8178 | 0.8329 |
| 60 to 61 | 1587 | 0.8105 | 581 | 0.0000 | 0.8105 | 0.7989 |
| 61 to 62 | 1561 | 0.8032 | 572 | 0.0000 | 0.8032 | 0.8181 |
| 62 to 63 | 1536 | 0.7959 | 562 | 0.0000 | 0.7959 | 0.7844 |
| 63 to 64 | 1512 | 0.7885 | 554 | 0.0000 | 0.7885 | 0.8031 |
| 64 to 65 | 1488 | 0.7811 | 545 | 0.0000 | 0.7811 | 0.7955 |
| 89 to 90 | 1073 | 0.5961 | 393 | 0.0000 | 0.5961 | 0.5484 |
| 90 to 91 | 1061 | 0.5891 | 388 | 0.0000 | 0.5891 | 0.6000 |
| 91 to 92 | 1049 | 0.5822 | 384 | 0.0000 | 0.5822 | 0.5738 |
| 92 to 93 | 1038 | 0.5753 | 380 | 0.0000 | 0.5753 | 0.5859 |
| 93 to 94 | 1027 | 0.5684 | 376 | 0.0000 | 0.5684 | 0.5602 |
| 94 to 95 | 1016 | 0.5616 | 372 | 0.0000 | 0.5616 | 0.5720 |
| 95 to 96 | 1005 | 0.5548 | 368 | 0.0000 | 0.5548 | 0.5651 |
| Contract Start Date | 7 September 2026 |
| Term | 96 |
| Contract Exp Date | 7 September 2034 |
| (A) | |
| Valuation Date | Service Contract Exposure |
| 30 September 2026 | 0.0000 |
| 31 October 2026 | 0.0000 |
| 30 November 2026 | 0.0000 |
| 31 December 2026 | 0.0000 |
| 31 January 2027 | 0.0002 |
| 28 February 2027 | 0.0006 |
| 31 March 2029 | 0.3385 |
| 30 April 2029 | 0.3441 |
| 31 May 2029 | 0.3724 |
| 30 June 2029 | 0.3758 |
| 31 July 2029 | 0.4040 |
| 31 August 2029 | 0.4188 |
| 30 September 2031 | 0.8006 |
| 31 October 2031 | 0.8198 |
| 30 November 2031 | 0.7861 |
| 31 December 2031 | 0.8048 |
| 31 January 2032 | 0.7972 |
| 29 February 2032 | 0.7388 |
| 31 March 2034 | 0.6016 |
| 30 April 2034 | 0.5754 |
| 31 May 2034 | 0.5875 |
| 30 June 2034 | 0.5618 |
| 31 July 2034 | 0.5735 |
| 31 August 2034 | 0.5666 |
| 30 September 2034 | 0.1276 |
| Retail Price | 3000 | |
| Amount | Remaining | |
| Entity | Received | Amount |
| Dealership | 1000 | 2000 |
| Agent | 100 | 1900 |
| Administrator | 200 | 1700 |
| Insurance Company | 40 | 1660 |
| Trust | 1660 | 0 |
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© 2026 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
Share and Cite
Kerper, J.; Bowron, L. The Kerper–Bowron Method: A Foundational Change for Service Contract Claim Estimation and Accounting. Risks 2026, 14, 44. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks14030044
Kerper J, Bowron L. The Kerper–Bowron Method: A Foundational Change for Service Contract Claim Estimation and Accounting. Risks. 2026; 14(3):44. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks14030044
Chicago/Turabian StyleKerper, John, and Lee Bowron. 2026. "The Kerper–Bowron Method: A Foundational Change for Service Contract Claim Estimation and Accounting" Risks 14, no. 3: 44. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks14030044
APA StyleKerper, J., & Bowron, L. (2026). The Kerper–Bowron Method: A Foundational Change for Service Contract Claim Estimation and Accounting. Risks, 14(3), 44. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks14030044
