Opinion Diversity and the Resilience of Cooperation in Dynamical Networks
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Computational Model
2.2. Information-Based Decision Making
- If Then Connect
- If Then Do not Connect
- If Then Connect with probability p
- If Then Connect with probability q
3. Results
3.1. Private Information Decision Making
3.1.1. Increasing Opinion Diversity Leads to Network Changes
3.1.2. Increasing Selection Strength Leads to Increase in Network Instability
3.2. Private/Public Information Decision Making
3.2.1. Opinion Diversity Affects the Frequency of Information Cascades
3.2.2. Strong Selection Results in Higher Frequency of Information Cascades
3.2.3. Opinion Diversity Can Mitigate Disruption of Networks
3.2.4. Sharp Increases in the Number of Transitions for Strong Selection
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. RStudio Functions
Appendix A.1. Standard Error Function
Appendix A.2. Graph Initialisation Function
Appendix A.3. Cooperation Plot Function
Appendix A.4. Prosperity Plot Function
Appendix A.5. Degree Plot Function
Appendix A.6. Transition Plot Function
Appendix A.7. NCascade Count Plot Function
Appendix A.8. NCascade Length Plot Function
Appendix A.9. PCascade Count Plot Function
Appendix A.10. PCascade Length Plot Function
Appendix A.11. Specificity and Sensitivity Plot Function
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Miles, A.L.; Cavaliere, M. Opinion Diversity and the Resilience of Cooperation in Dynamical Networks. Mathematics 2021, 9, 1801. https://doi.org/10.3390/math9151801
Miles AL, Cavaliere M. Opinion Diversity and the Resilience of Cooperation in Dynamical Networks. Mathematics. 2021; 9(15):1801. https://doi.org/10.3390/math9151801
Chicago/Turabian StyleMiles, Adam Lee, and Matteo Cavaliere. 2021. "Opinion Diversity and the Resilience of Cooperation in Dynamical Networks" Mathematics 9, no. 15: 1801. https://doi.org/10.3390/math9151801