Integrating Evolutionary Game-Theoretical Methods and Deep Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Strategy Optimization in User-Side Electricity Markets: A Comprehensive Review
Abstract
:1. Introduction
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- Integration of EGT with deep Q-learning network (DQN): The paper introduces a novel integration of EGT with the DQN, a DRL technique, to enhance the adaptability of market participants in real-time. This combination allows for continuous learning and strategy optimization, enabling agents to adjust their behavior dynamically in response to fluctuating market conditions, which is particularly beneficial in fast-changing electricity markets.
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- Application to multi-agent systems: The study applies EGT to simulate interactions among multiple agents, such as consumers, producers, and regulators, in electricity markets. The multi-agent model used in the review provides a robust framework for understanding how these participants evolve their strategies over time, particularly under different pricing and demand-response scenarios.
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- Real-time decision making in energy trading: The integration of EGT with reinforcement learning (RL) addresses a critical limitation of traditional EGT—its inability to deal with real-time decision making in high-dimensional state spaces. The use of the DQN allows market participants to perform adaptive strategy optimization in real-time, making it possible to better manage supply–demand fluctuations and price volatility in electricity markets.
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- Enhanced analysis of demand response: The paper extends the application of EGT to demand-response mechanisms, offering insights into how consumer behavior can be modeled and optimized using evolutionary strategies. This contributes to more effective load management and peak shaving, improving grid stability and reducing operational costs.
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- Practical applications in renewable energy markets: The study explores the application of EGT in renewable energy integration, including the P2P trading of surplus energy. It demonstrates how EGT can model both cooperative and competitive dynamics in decentralized energy markets, providing a theoretical basis for optimizing energy storage and trading strategies.
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- Section 2 lays the theoretical groundwork by contrasting EGT with traditional game theory and its relevance in different domains.
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- Section 5 introduces DRL, specifically the DQN, as a key tool for enhancing real-time strategic optimization capabilities.
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- Section 8 connects these findings back to broader research opportunities, thereby providing a holistic view of the potential benefits and future applications of combining EGT with modern machine learning approaches.
2. Fundamentals of EGT
2.1. An Overview of EGT
2.2. Advantages of EGT
2.3. Bridging EGT and RL for Enhanced Strategy Formulation in Electricity Markets
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- Interdisciplinary integration: Integrating EGT with RL provides a comprehensive framework that combines the temporal dynamics of strategy evolution with the adaptability of individual learning mechanisms. This integration is particularly potent in environments like electricity markets, where agents must adapt to fluctuating conditions.
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- From population to individual learning: EGT focuses on population-level dynamics in which the success of strategies is influenced by their interaction with other strategies over time, tending towards an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). RL, conversely, emphasizes learning from individual experiences to maximize a reward function, adjusted continuously as the agent interacts with the environment. This shift from macro-level stability to micro-level adaptability is crucial for real-time responsiveness in electricity markets.
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- Dynamic adaptation: Both theories emphasize adaptation, but their approaches offer complementary strengths. EGT provides insights into the strategic stability and drift within populations, which is crucial for predicting long-term market trends. RL contributes by enabling agents to adjust strategies swiftly in response to immediate market changes, enhancing operational flexibility and efficiency.
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- Handling high-dimensional data: Electricity markets are characterized by high-dimensional and dynamic state spaces due to variable demand, supply conditions, and numerous participant interactions. RL’s ability to handle large state spaces effectively complements EGT’s approach to population dynamics, making the integrated approach well suited for such environments.
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- Real-time optimization: The rapid decision-making capability facilitated through RL, combined with the strategic depth provided via EGT, allows market participants to optimize their strategies not just for immediate gains but also for long-term stability. This is crucial for managing real-time bidding, pricing strategies, and load balancing.
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- Enhanced strategic forecasting: By applying EGT, market analysts can predict the evolution of competing strategies in the market, which, when combined with the tactical agility of RL, provides a robust model for anticipating and reacting to market shifts. This dual approach aids in developing strategies that are both competitively robust and highly adaptive.
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- Policy development and simulation: The hybrid model facilitates the simulation and analysis of potential policy impacts on market behavior over time, aiding policymakers and companies in crafting rules and strategies that promote efficient and stable market operations.
2.4. Exploration of Multi-Field Application of EGT
2.5. Modeling Dynamics Using EGT
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- Defining fitness for population-level dynamics: In typical EGT formulations, the fitness of a strategy determines whether it becomes more or less prevalent in the population. In our model, the payment function (Equation (1)) serves as the basis for calculating fi, which is used in the replicator dynamic equation. By doing so, it directly affects the evolution of strategy proportions in the population, providing the necessary link between individual agent actions and population-level outcomes.
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- Incentivizing individual agent behavior: The payment function also serves as a reward mechanism within the RL framework. This reward directly influences the learning process of individual agents, guiding their decisions to either exploit known strategies or explore new ones. The connection between the payment function and agent learning ensures that the rewards an agent receives align with the broader evolutionary dynamics modeled by EGT, fostering both individual adaptation and collective stability.
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- Replicator dynamics: The replicator dynamic equation is used to describe how the proportion of agents using a particular strategy changes over time based on the relative fitness of that strategy. In this study, the fitness, fi, is derived from payment function (1), which takes into account factors such as energy costs, consumption patterns, and market interactions. This fitness value feeds directly into the replicator dynamics to determine the growth rate of each strategy.
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- Role in dynamic specifications: The payment function plays a dual role by influencing both the replicator dynamics and the agent-level learning process. This dual functionality ensures that the strategies not only evolve according to individual incentives but also conform to population-level evolutionary stability. The replicator dynamics equation means that the payment function directly influences how strategies evolve at the population level by determining which strategies are more successful and should be propagated over time. Higher fitness, as determined by the payment function, means a greater likelihood that a given strategy will increase in prevalence, thereby influencing the evolutionary trajectory of the entire system. This ensures that the resulting equilibrium is an ESS, which is robust against invasion by alternative strategies. At the agent level, the payment function serves as a reward mechanism within the RL process. This reward is based on the immediate and cumulative payoffs that agents receive for choosing certain strategies, which subsequently influence their learning pathways. By using the payment function to guide individual agent decisions, we ensure that agents are continually learning to improve their own payoffs while also contributing to broader, collective dynamics. The reward structure based on the payment function provides critical feedback to the agents, informing them of the success or failure of their strategies in real time. This feedback loop is essential for ensuring that individual learning aligns with the desired long-term outcomes of the population. The dual functionality of the payment function—acting both as the determinant of population-level fitness in replicator dynamics and as a reward mechanism in agent-level RL—ensures that the evolution of strategies is both adaptive and stable. At the individual level, agents learn based on their experiences, optimizing their actions according to the rewards (derived from the payment function). At the population level, the replicator dynamics use these same fitness values to adjust the distribution of strategies among the agents, thus ensuring that successful strategies spread while less successful ones diminish. This interplay between individual learning and population dynamics facilitates a more holistic adaptation process, where both the micro-level decisions of agents and the macro-level evolution of strategies are consistently guided by the same underlying metrics. By influencing both replicator dynamics and agent-level learning, the payment function effectively links the micro and macro aspects of strategy evolution, ensuring that individual incentives are aligned with population-level evolutionary stability. This dual role addresses the reviewer’s concern by clearly demonstrating that the payment function is not merely an arbitrary payoff measure but is foundational to defining evolutionary stability through replicator dynamics. It ensures that the strategies that emerge from individual-level learning are sustainable and evolutionarily stable, thereby contributing to a more resilient and optimized system in the context of electricity markets. As agents adapt their strategies to maximize individual payoffs, the population-level replicator dynamics ensure that such strategies contribute to overall system stability, thus closing the feedback loop between individual adaptation and collective outcomes. The payment function thus ensures coherence between the incentives driving individual behavior and the evolutionary forces acting on the population, making it a fundamental element in the proposed dynamic specifications framework.
3. Integrating EGT for Strategic Optimization and Stability in Smart Grids
3.1. Multi-Agent Characteristics in Smart Grids
3.2. Fit Analysis of EGT and Smart Grid
3.3. Challenges and Limitations
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- Complexity in real-world systems: As EGT models scale up to represent complex, real-world smart grids involving numerous agents, diverse objectives, and intricate interactions, the overall system can become highly complex. This complexity makes it difficult to derive straightforward analytical solutions, and computational demands increase substantially as the number of agents grows. In real-world applications, the heterogeneity of agents—ranging from large energy producers to small prosumers—adds further layers of intricacy, requiring sophisticated modeling approaches to capture the nuances of each participant’s strategic behaviors. Moreover, interactions between renewable energy sources, market dynamics, and distributed energy resources (DERs) further increase the dimensionality and computational complexity of EGT-based models.
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- Convergence to suboptimal solutions: One of the inherent challenges of EGT in smart grid modeling is the risk of convergence to suboptimal solutions. The evolutionary nature of these models means that strategies evolve based on fitness, which may not always guarantee a globally optimal solution. In practice, agents can converge on locally optimal strategies that are beneficial within their immediate context but fail to provide the best outcome for the overall grid or the broader energy market. This challenge is especially pronounced when multiple Nash equilibria exist, where EGT might settle at a suboptimal equilibrium that does not maximize system efficiency or benefit all stakeholders equitably. Additionally, the presence of non-cooperative behaviors and competitive dynamics between agents can exacerbate the likelihood of such suboptimal convergence, leading to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources or market imbalances.
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- Data requirements and real-time implementation: Successfully implementing EGT models for real-time smart grid optimization requires extensive and reliable data collection, processing, and analysis. These models depend heavily on accurate, high-frequency data, such as real-time energy consumption, production metrics, pricing information, and weather conditions that influence renewable energy generation. The need for such large-scale data introduces several challenges, including the infrastructure requirements for data acquisition, the computational power needed to process this data in real time, and technical challenges related to data integration from different sources. Data privacy concerns also add an additional layer of complexity, as ensuring compliance with data protection regulations is critical when gathering information from individual users or households. Moreover, delays in data collection or inaccuracies in data processing can lead to suboptimal or outdated decisions, thus reducing the efficacy of the EGT model in dynamically adapting to real-time grid conditions.
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- Scalability and computational challenges: The scalability of EGT models is another significant limitation. As the number of participating agents and the complexity of their interactions increase, the computational resources required for running simulations grow exponentially. In large-scale smart grids, the time required to simulate interactions and derive evolutionarily stable strategies can become impractical, particularly when real-time decision making is needed. This issue necessitates the development of advanced algorithms or approximation techniques that can efficiently manage the increased computational load while still delivering timely and effective solutions.
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- Integration with other models and techniques: Integrating EGT with other modeling techniques, such as reinforcement learning or traditional optimization algorithms, also presents challenges. While the hybridization of these approaches can offer significant benefits—such as combining the adaptability of reinforcement learning with the strategic insights of EGT—ensuring a seamless integration that maintains the robustness and efficiency of each method is a non-trivial task. Hybrid models need careful calibration and tuning to ensure that the combined methodologies work harmoniously without introducing inconsistencies or convergence issues.
4. Applications and Fits of EGT in Energy Trading
4.1. Overview of Energy Trading
4.2. Integrated Application of EGT and RL in Energy Trading
4.3. Applications of EGT in Energy Trading
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- In real-time pricing, EGT optimizes competitive pricing strategies to enhance market efficiency.
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- EGT helps model cooperative and competitive dynamics among renewable energy producers.
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- EGT provides valuable insights into the strategic behaviors of firms in carbon emissions trading markets.
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- EGT plays a key role in modeling strategy adaptation in dynamic energy markets.
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- P2P energy trading is well suited to EGT analysis due to its decentralized and dynamic nature.
5. DQN for Strategy Optimization in Electricity Trading
5.1. DQN Algorithm Applied to Strategy Optimization in Electricity Markets
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- EGT for population-level dynamics: The replicator dynamics model how strategy proportions evolve within the population, ensuring stability through higher fitness. By calculating strategy success using the fitness values derived from payment functions, the population adapts over time.
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- DQN for individual adaptation: The Q-value update rule helps individual agents learn effective strategies in real time. By employing a deep neural network, DQN agents are capable of approximating optimal actions even in environments characterized by high-dimensional state spaces.
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- Synergistic framework: The conceptual flowchart now integrates the replicator dynamics and Q-value update rules, illustrating their combined impact. EGT ensures that, at the population level, strategies converge towards evolutionarily stable outcomes, while the DQN ensures individual adaptability to ongoing changes.
5.2. Application Scenarios of QDN in the Electricity Market
5.3. The Role of EGT in the RL Framework
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- Guiding long-term strategy evolution: The EGT component is used to analyze how individual agent strategies, which are learned through RL, contribute to the overall stability of the system. This is particularly important in electricity markets where individual optimization may not align with collective market stability. EGT helps ensure that strategies that emerge as a result of RL also lead to sustainable and evolutionarily stable outcomes when observed from a population-level perspective.
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- Providing population-level feedback: Unlike conventional RL, which relies solely on the reward function for individual agent adaptation, EGT provides population-level feedback that informs how strategies should evolve in relation to other agents. This feedback mechanism is crucial for mitigating issues such as the “tragedy of the commons,” where individual reward-driven actions might lead to collectively detrimental outcomes.
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- Informing strategy adoption and adaptation: In the RL framework, EGT is also used to determine the relative success of different strategies within the agent population, allowing less successful strategies to be gradually phased out while promoting strategies that show better adaptability and stability. This contributes to a more dynamic exploration–exploitation balance; the influence of EGT helps RL agents converge towards strategies that are not only optimal individually but also evolutionarily stable within the broader agent population.
6. The Application of EGT in Demand Response for Smart Grids and Electricity Market Transactions
6.1. User Behavior Modeling and Strategy Evolution
6.2. Demand Response Based on EGT
7. Empirical Analysis
7.1. Application of EGT in Electricity Market Transactions
7.2. Comparative Analysis: Traditional Methods and EGT
8. Conclusions and Future Prospects
8.1. Conclusions
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- Broad applicability of EGT in user-side electricity markets: The paper demonstrates that EGT is an effective tool for modeling the dynamic behavior of multiple agents in the user-side electricity market. EGT provides a unique advantage by accounting for bounded rationality and the gradual evolution of strategies, making it particularly useful in capturing long-term stable strategies in smart grid environments. EGT helps analyze how consumers, producers, and regulators interact in the market, adjusting their strategies over time based on changes in market conditions, pricing, and regulations.
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- Limitations of classical game theory in real-time decision making: While classical game theory is useful in static environments and assumes perfect rationality, it is not well suited for the dynamic and real-time changes observed in electricity markets. The review highlights the limitations of classical models in handling high-dimensional state spaces and real-time optimization, which are essential for smart grid management.
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- Integration of DRL with EGT for adaptive strategy optimization: To overcome the limitations of traditional game theory, the paper suggests the integration of DRL, specifically the DQN, with EGT. This combination allows for continuous strategy adaptation based on real-time feedback from the market. The use of the DQN enhances the ability of market participants to optimize their strategies dynamically, responding more effectively to rapid changes in supply, demand, and pricing conditions.
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- Application of multi-agent simulation models: The study emphasizes the importance of multi-agent simulation models for capturing the complex interactions among various stakeholders in the electricity market. By modeling the strategic behavior of multiple agents, including consumers, producers, and regulatory bodies, the study reveals how strategies evolve over time and under different market conditions. This provides valuable insights into the dynamic nature of user-side electricity markets and the factors that influence market stability and efficiency.
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- Significance in energy market optimization and policy formulation: The integration of EGT and DRL not only enhances market participants’ ability to optimize their strategies in real time but also has broader implications for market optimization and policy development. The findings of this paper can guide policymakers in designing more effective regulations and incentives that promote market efficiency, stability, and the adoption of renewable energy sources.
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- Future research directions: The paper concludes by suggesting several avenues for future research. These include further exploration of complex evolutionary game models in multi-agent systems, the development of hybrid models that integrate multiple types of game theory, and the use of advanced algorithms such as parallel evolutionary algorithms and machine learning techniques to enhance model accuracy and efficiency. Additionally, the paper calls for more empirical studies to validate the theoretical models in real-world market scenarios, as well as the development of practical tools and platforms for implementing these models in actual market operations.
8.2. Limitations of the Study and Future Prospects
8.2.1. Limitations of the Study
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- Simplified assumptions in modeling: Many of the models reviewed in this paper rely on simplified assumptions regarding participant behavior, information availability, and market conditions. For instance, the application of EGT often assumes that participants in the market act with bounded rationality and have limited but consistent access to market information. However, in real-world electricity markets, agents such as consumers, prosumers, and energy suppliers may exhibit more complex behaviors influenced by multi-objective considerations (e.g., cost minimization, environmental impact reduction, and comfort maximization). Recent studies have highlighted that prosumers in distributed energy systems are not only motivated by economic returns but also by environmental and social factors, which adds to the complexity of decision making [146,147]. Future research should focus on extending these models to capture these more nuanced and multi-faceted decision-making processes, incorporating more realistic agent preferences and behavioral dynamics [148,149,150,151]. Additionally, the models tend to treat market conditions as relatively stable within certain timeframes, but in reality, market dynamics are often subject to abrupt and unpredictable changes due to external factors like policy shifts, renewable energy availability, or unforeseen demand spikes. It has been found that renewable energy integration introduces high levels of volatility and unpredictability, which cannot be fully addressed by static or semi-static models, emphasizing the need for dynamic and adaptive modeling approaches.
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- Computational complexity and scalability issues: The integration of EGT with DRL presents considerable computational challenges, particularly when applied to large-scale electricity markets with multiple interacting agents. Traditional EGT approaches, while effective in modeling long-term strategy evolution, become computationally prohibitive when scaled to large markets with thousands of participants. Similarly, DRL, while useful for real-time decision making, can suffer from inefficiencies when dealing with high-dimensional state and action spaces. The combination of these two methods further amplifies the computational burden, especially when applied in high-frequency trading environments or systems requiring real-time responses. Therefore, one of the key limitations of the current state of research is the lack of efficient, scalable algorithms that can handle the increasing complexity and size of modern decentralized energy systems. Future research should focus on developing more sophisticated, parallelized algorithms that can distribute computational loads and manage the interactions between a growing number of market participants. Such advances will be critical for the practical implementation of EGT-DRL frameworks in real-world smart grid applications [152,153].
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- Limited empirical validation: Another limitation of the reviewed studies is the reliance on simulation-based models, rather than real-world empirical data. While simulations can provide valuable insights into the theoretical effectiveness of EGT-DRL integrations, they may not fully capture the complexities and uncertainties present in actual market environments. For instance, real-world electricity markets are influenced by external variables such as regulatory policies, economic conditions, and technological disruptions, which may not be accurately reflected in controlled simulation settings. Additionally, the variability introduced by renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, presents further unpredictability that needs to be tested with empirical data. Future work should prioritize the collection of real-time data from smart grids, DERs, and P2P energy trading platforms to validate these models. Such empirical studies would help refine the theoretical models, making them more robust and applicable to real-world scenarios.
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- Development of hybrid models to address complex market dynamics: Future research should focus on creating more advanced hybrid models that integrate EGT with other machine learning methods, such as supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and RL. These models should be designed to handle the inherent complexities and dynamic nature of electricity markets, where demand and supply are highly variable, and participant behavior is influenced by both economic incentives and policy regulations. Hybrid models can offer a more holistic approach, combining the long-term stability of EGT with the real-time adaptability provided via machine learning techniques. For example, supervised learning could be used to predict short-term market conditions, while DRL enables agents to adjust their strategies in response to these predictions. By integrating these methods, future models will be better equipped to optimize strategy evolution in both stable and rapidly fluctuating environments.
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- Real-world application and empirical studies: A key research direction is the application of EGT-DRL models in real-world settings, particularly within the evolving infrastructure of smart grids and decentralized energy systems [154,155,156]. Empirical studies should be conducted using data from actual market operations, such as load profiles, generation schedules, and real-time pricing data from P2P trading platforms. By analyzing the performance of these models in real-world conditions, researchers can assess their validity, scalability, and adaptability to unforeseen market disruptions [156]. For instance, future studies could explore how EGT-DRL models perform during periods of high renewable energy penetration, where grid stability is challenged by the intermittent nature of solar and wind energy. Additionally, partnerships with energy companies or utility operators could provide access to valuable data sets, enabling the testing of these models under different regulatory regimes and market conditions.
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- Scalability and efficient algorithms for multi-agent interactions: As the number of participants in electricity markets continues to grow, particularly with the rise of prosumers and decentralized energy resources, future research should prioritize the development of algorithms that can efficiently handle large-scale, multi-agent interactions. This involves creating computational frameworks that can manage the complex interactions between hundreds or even thousands of market participants, all of whom may have different objectives, constraints, and levels of market power. Techniques such as parallel computing, distributed algorithms, and agent-based modeling will be critical to ensuring that these interactions are accurately captured without overwhelming computational resources. Additionally, the use of advanced optimization methods, such as multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs), could help agents optimize their strategies across multiple criteria, such as cost minimization, energy efficiency, and carbon emissions’ reduction.
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- Incorporation of regulatory and policy considerations: Future research should also investigate how EGT-DRL models can be adapted to reflect the changing regulatory landscape of electricity markets. As governments and international organizations increasingly promote renewable energy adoption, carbon pricing, and other environmental initiatives, market participants will need to adjust their strategies accordingly. Investigating how policy interventions, such as subsidies for renewable energy, carbon trading schemes, and demand-side management programs, impact the strategic behavior of electricity market participants will be critical for ensuring the robustness of these models. Additionally, researchers should explore how regulatory frameworks can be designed to incentivize cooperation among market participants, particularly in decentralized and P2P trading environments, where individual incentives may not always align with system-wide goals of stability and sustainability.
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- Handling renewable energy variability and market volatility: The increasing integration of renewable energy sources into electricity markets presents both opportunities and challenges. Renewable energy introduces significant variability into the grid due to its dependence on external factors like weather conditions. Future research should focus on how EGT-DRL models can be optimized to handle this variability, ensuring that market participants can respond effectively to sudden changes in the supply while maintaining grid stability. This could involve developing advanced forecasting methods for renewable generation and incorporating these predictions into strategy optimization models. Additionally, DRL techniques could be used to enable market participants to dynamically adjust their energy trading strategies in response to real-time data on renewable energy availability, demand fluctuations, and price signals.
8.2.2. Future Prospects
- Expansion and utilization of evolutionary game models
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- Complex evolutionary models in multi-agent systems: With the rise of smart grids and distributed energy resources (DERs), the user-side electricity market is becoming more complex, with more participants and evolving behaviors. Future research should focus on developing sophisticated evolutionary game models within a multi-agent system (MAS) framework to investigate strategic interactions and evolutionary processes among these agents [155,156,157,158,159]. Such models will better capture collaboration, competition, and adaptive behaviors among users, thereby providing a more accurate representation of dynamic market processes. Moreover, integrating machine learning and reinforcement learning (RL) techniques could optimize these models by improving decision making and adaptability, allowing agents to learn and adjust strategies effectively in uncertain environments. For example, Shi et al. (2024) [157] demonstrated how evolutionary reinforcement learning can enhance multi-agent pathfinding efficiency, which is relevant for optimizing strategy adaptation in dynamic market settings.
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- Introduction of dynamic games and time-variable strategies: Traditional evolutionary game models often assume that strategies remain static over time, whereas real-world market strategies can change dynamically. Future research could explore dynamic game models that account for strategy evolution over time, prioritizing aspects such as adaptability to market changes, response to competitor strategies, and the impact of external factors on strategic adjustments. Liu et al. (2024) [158] highlighted the use of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning to handle dynamic and multi-modal challenges, providing insights into how time-variable strategies can be optimized in changing environments. This approach would not only simulate the market’s dynamic nature more accurately but also offer theoretical support for developing long-term strategies to manage market fluctuations.
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- Hybridization and integration of multiple models: Current research tends to focus on a single type of evolutionary game model. Future investigations could examine the hybridization and integration of different models, such as cooperative games, competitive games, and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs). For example, combining cooperative and competitive models could help market participants identify when to collaborate for mutual benefits and when to compete, leading to more effective strategy selection in fluctuating market conditions. Karaki and Al-Fagih (2024) [159] discussed how integrating different game-theoretic approaches can facilitate more robust and adaptable strategies within smart grids, highlighting the practical benefits of hybrid models in complex environments. This approach could expand the applicability of these models across a broader range of market conditions, providing more robust solutions for strategy selection in diverse scenarios.
- Algorithmic enhancement and innovation
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- Optimization of evolutionary algorithms [160,161,162,163,164]: Evolutionary algorithms are crucial for studying the evolution of strategic behavior, but existing algorithms can be inefficient when dealing with large-scale, multi-dimensional problems. Future research should aim to enhance efficiency through various approaches, such as the development of parallel evolutionary algorithms based on distributed computing, hybrid evolutionary algorithms, and multi-fidelity evolutionary algorithms. Zhao et al. (2024) introduced a morphological transfer-based multi-fidelity evolutionary algorithm, which significantly improves efficiency in complex design problems by leveraging different fidelity levels [160]. Additionally, Stranieri et al. (2024) proposed a forest-based evolutionary algorithm for reconstructing gene regulatory networks, which demonstrates how specialized evolutionary algorithms can handle complex, high-dimensional data effectively [161]. Moreover, Cubillos-Chaparro et al. (2024) utilized a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm for biomarker identification, illustrating the potential for handling diverse objectives in complex environments [162]. Such improvements could significantly boost computational efficiency while maintaining accuracy, particularly in complex market environments.
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- Fusion of artificial intelligence with evolutionary algorithms [165,166,167,168,169]: As AI technology advances, integrating AI techniques like deep learning and reinforcement learning (RL) with traditional evolutionary algorithms could enhance the adaptability and predictive capabilities of these models in uncertain environments. For instance, deep learning could be used to optimize strategy selection, while RL could enable models to self-improve and evolve. Imam et al. (2023) highlighted that hybridizing artificial immune system algorithms with other AI techniques can lead to enhanced performance in solving complex problems, which suggests that similar hybridization approaches could be beneficial in evolutionary algorithms [165]. Liang et al. (2021) also introduced an evolutionary deep fusion method for chemical structure recognition, demonstrating how deep learning can be effectively combined with evolutionary strategies for improved recognition accuracy [166]. Furthermore, Lima and Ludermir (2013) optimized dynamic ensemble selection procedures using evolutionary learning machines, indicating that ensemble methods could further enhance the robustness of evolutionary algorithms in dynamic settings [167]. Such integrations can provide a more comprehensive framework for addressing complex, uncertain market conditions.
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- Multi-objective optimization based on meta-heuristic methods [170,171,172]: Future electricity markets are expected to become increasingly complex, with participants having diverse objectives, such as minimizing costs, maximizing benefits, and reducing carbon emissions. Research on multi-objective optimization algorithms based on meta-heuristic methods (e.g., genetic algorithms, ant colony optimization, and particle swarm optimization) will be valuable for identifying optimal strategy combinations in these complex, dynamic environments, as these methods are particularly suited for efficiently exploring large solution spaces and finding near-optimal solutions when multiple conflicting objectives are involved. Wu et al. (2024) presented a hybrid meta-heuristic approach for emergency logistics distribution under uncertain demand, which demonstrated how combining multiple heuristic techniques can improve performance in highly uncertain and dynamic settings [170]. Similarly, Srivatsan and Venkatesan (2024) proposed an improved meta-heuristic technique for FIR filter design, showcasing the applicability of meta-heuristics in optimizing complex engineering problems [171]. Additionally, Ibnoulouafi et al. (2024) introduced an efficient meta-heuristic approach to solving the multi-objective green p-hub center routing problem, highlighting how such techniques can effectively handle multi-objective optimization in scenarios involving environmental sustainability [172]. These studies illustrate the potential of advanced meta-heuristic methods to address diverse and conflicting objectives in future electricity markets.
- Detailed study of application scenarios
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- Applications in the context of smart grids: With the development of smart grid technology, user behavior in electricity markets will become more intelligent and varied. For example, future home energy management systems (HEMSs) may not only rely on static electricity usage strategies but also dynamically adjust based on real-time electricity prices and weather forecasts. These real-time adjustments could help reduce overall energy consumption during peak times, lower costs for users, and maintain user comfort by optimizing energy usage in response to external factors. Future research should focus on refining the models used for these real-time adjustments, such as incorporating more sophisticated algorithms for predicting electricity demand based on machine learning, and exploring how these dynamic systems can adapt to extreme weather events or sudden market price fluctuations. Additionally, research on applying evolutionary game models to these intelligent systems, helping users optimize electricity costs while maintaining comfort, will be an important direction.
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- Management of DERs and microgrids: With the widespread adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as solar and wind energy, and microgrids, the structure and operation modes of user-side electricity markets will undergo significant changes. Future research could explore how to use evolutionary game models to optimize the integration, scheduling, and management of DERs, considering key factors such as energy availability, weather conditions, and market prices, to achieve optimal overall system operation. Additionally, studies could examine how game models can facilitate cooperation and resource sharing among multiple users in a microgrid environment, thereby improving overall system efficiency and stability. Future research should also investigate the potential for integrating advanced energy storage solutions with DERs to enhance reliability and efficiency, as well as evaluate the economic incentives needed to encourage active participation from all stakeholders.
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- Integration of electric vehicles and charging infrastructure: The large-scale adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) introduces new challenges and opportunities for the user-side electricity market. Future research could explore how evolutionary game models can optimize EV charging strategies, charging station layouts, and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) interactions. This includes addressing potential challenges such as balancing charging speed with grid stability, ensuring user convenience, and managing peak load demands effectively. In this process, emphasis should be placed on balancing the charging needs of electric vehicles with the load pressures on the electricity system and coordinating the interests of different stakeholders through game models. Additionally, future research could focus on developing predictive models to anticipate charging demand patterns, optimizing the placement of charging stations to minimize congestion, and investigating the use of renewable energy sources for EV charging to reduce the overall carbon footprint.
- Interdisciplinary research and multi-field synthesis
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- Combining economics with behavioral sciences: Electricity market trading is not merely a technical problem but also a system involving complex economic behavior and decision making. Thus, future research should emphasize interdisciplinary synthesis, particularly by integrating theories from economics and behavioral sciences into the study of strategic behaviors in electricity markets. For example, prospect theory from behavioral economics or game theory from economics could be used to better understand and predict user decision-making processes. Future studies could also incorporate social learning theory to examine how users adapt their strategies based on the observed behavior of others, which would help in modeling collective behavior in electricity markets. Additionally, integrating bounded rationality concepts could further enhance the understanding of decision making under constraints, as it reflects the limitations of real-world agents who may not have perfect information or unlimited cognitive resources. For instance, studying user decision preferences under uncertainty and risk and utilizing behavioral economic models could more accurately predict users’ strategy evolution process. Future research should also explore how nudging techniques, derived from behavioral economics, can influence consumer behavior in electricity markets to promote energy conservation and sustainable practices.
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- Comprehensive research from an ecosystem perspective: As a complex ecosystem, the operation of the electricity market is influenced by multiple fields, such as energy economics, environmental science, and social policy. Future research could adopt an ecosystem perspective, comprehensively considering the interactions among various subsystems, and explore how evolutionary game models can achieve sustainable development of the entire electricity ecosystem. This research not only helps resolve conflicts between energy and the environment but also provides new perspectives for global energy transitions. Future studies should explore the interdependencies between different energy systems, such as the relationship between renewable energy production and water usage, and how these interdependencies can be managed to promote sustainability.
- (iii)
- Coordinated research on policy and legal frameworks: The operation of electricity markets relies on the support of policy and legal frameworks. Future research should deeply explore how policy formulation and adjustment can guide the evolution of user-side strategic behavior. For example, policies such as feed-in tariffs have successfully incentivized renewable energy adoption by guiding user investments and strategic behavior towards cleaner energy options. Future studies could also investigate how regulatory sandboxes could be used to test new market mechanisms and policies in a controlled environment before broader implementation. Additionally, examinations could analyze the effectiveness of policy tools, such as carbon emissions trading mechanisms and electricity market access standards, and how legal measures can regulate unfair competition and monopoly behavior in the market. These studies will provide scientific evidence for policymakers, promoting fairness and efficiency in the electricity market.
- Practical applications and empirical studies
- (i)
- Deepening empirical research: Although evolutionary game models have achieved significant theoretical progress, their application in real markets still requires more empirical research. Future research should analyze real market data, such as electricity pricing data, consumption patterns, and grid stability metrics, to validate the practical effectiveness of the models and adjust and optimize them based on empirical findings. In particular, comparative analysis should be conducted on the application effects in different industries and market environments to ensure the models’ universality and robustness. Additionally, researchers should focus on longitudinal studies that track the performance of these models over extended periods to understand their effectiveness under varying market conditions and evolving technologies. Conducting case studies in different geographic regions can also help highlight the contextual challenges and opportunities specific to local market dynamics.
- (ii)
- Development of application tools and platforms: To promote the application of evolutionary game models in real electricity markets, future efforts could focus on developing more practical application tools and platforms. These tools could provide strategy optimization suggestions for market participants, such as load balancing strategies or price adjustment recommendations, and offer market regulation references for policymakers. Additionally, by developing open research platforms, collaboration between academia and industry can be enhanced, jointly advancing research and application progress in this field. Future research should also prioritize user-friendly interfaces for these tools to ensure accessibility for a broader range of stakeholders, including smaller energy providers and consumers. Furthermore, incorporating real-time data feeds and adaptive learning capabilities will allow these tools to evolve alongside changing market dynamics.
- (iii)
- Building intelligent decision support systems: With the increasing complexity and uncertainty of electricity markets, constructing intelligent decision support systems (DSSs) based on evolutionary game models will become a crucial direction for future research. These systems could integrate functions such as data analysis, strategy optimization, and real-time monitoring, assisting market participants in making more rational decisions in complex and changing environments. The development of intelligent DSS will significantly enhance the operational efficiency and stability of electricity markets, providing robust support for realizing the vision of smart grids by enabling improved real-time demand response, optimizing load management, and enhancing the integration of renewable energy sources. Future research should also explore incorporating predictive analytics and scenario-based simulations into DSS, enabling market participants to anticipate potential market shifts and make proactive decisions. Additionally, integrating machine learning techniques with evolutionary game models could further improve the adaptability and decision-making capabilities of DSS in dynamic market environments.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Nomenclature
Symbol/Term | Description |
Carbon emissions trading | A market-based approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by trading carbon emission allowances. |
Classical game theory | Classical game theory is a mathematical framework used to analyze strategic interactions between rational decision-makers; each participant aims to maximize their own payoff given the actions of others. |
DERs | Distributed energy resources are small-scale power generation or storage units, such as solar panels, wind turbines, or battery systems, that are located close to where electricity is used, allowing energy to be generated, stored, or managed locally within a distribution network. |
Demand response | A mechanism that incentivizes consumers to adjust their energy usage in response to price signals or other incentives. |
DQN | Deep Q-Learning network, a reinforcement learning algorithm that enables agents to optimize strategies based on real-time feedback. |
DRL | Deep reinforcement learning, a subset of machine learning that combines reinforcement learning with deep learning techniques. |
EGT | Evolutionary game theory, a mathematical framework used to model strategic interactions in dynamic systems. |
ESS | Evolutionarily stable strategy, a concept in game theory in which a strategy, if adopted by a population, cannot be challenged via an alternative strategy. |
Multi-agent system | A system involving multiple independent agents interacting and making decisions autonomously. |
Market volatility | Fluctuations in market conditions, such as supply and demand, that affect pricing and strategic behavior. |
P2P | Peer-to-peer refers to a decentralized network model in which participants, called peers, directly exchange resources or data without relying on a centralized server or authority. |
RL | Reinforcement learning, a type of machine learning in which an agent learns to make decisions by interacting with an environment in order to maximize cumulative rewards based on feedback on its actions. |
Real-time pricing | A pricing strategy in electricity markets where prices fluctuate based on supply and demand conditions in real time. |
Renewable energy | Energy generated from renewable sources such as solar and wind power, which are naturally replenished. |
SMEs | Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are businesses that maintain revenues, assets, or a number of employees below a certain threshold, typically characterized by their smaller scale of operations compared to larger corporations. |
Smart grid | An advanced power grid system that integrates information and communication technologies for efficient energy management. |
Strategy evolution | The process through which strategies change and adapt over time in response to interactions and environmental changes. |
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Theory Type | Theoretical Basis | Analytical Method | Research Emphasis |
---|---|---|---|
Traditional game theory | Assumption of complete rationality: participants can accurately calculate the optimal strategy | Static analysis, primarily addressing Nash equilibrium | Focus on the existence of Nash equilibrium and the choice of optimal strategies by participants |
Evolutionary game theory | Assumption of bounded rationality: participants determine the optimal strategy through continuous trial and adjustment | Dynamic evolutionary method, describing the evolutionary process of participants’ strategies | Focus on the evolutionary process and evolutionary stability of participant strategies |
Type of EGT | Application Scenario and Description | Detailed Explanation |
---|---|---|
Real-time pricing |
|
|
Renewable energy development |
|
|
Carbon emissions |
|
|
Market dynamics |
|
|
Electricity Market Scenario | Role of DQN | Expected Outcome |
---|---|---|
Real-time pricing strategy |
|
|
Demand-response management |
|
|
Load optimization |
|
|
Market participant bidding strategy |
|
|
Algorithm | Strategy Selection Method | Adaptability | Convergence Speed |
---|---|---|---|
Q-Learning | ε-greedy strategy | Moderate | Slow |
SARSA | Deterministic strategy selection | Moderate | Moderate |
DQN | Approximates Q-values using neural networks | High | Fast |
Double DQN | Addresses overestimation in the DQN | High | Faster |
Actor-Critic | Separates policy and value functions | High | Fast |
Algorithm | Strategy selection method | Adaptability | Convergence speed |
Q-Learning | ε-greedy strategy | Moderate | Slow |
Reference Number | Approaches Used in the Study | Results | Limitations |
---|---|---|---|
Shin et al. (2024) [117] | Based on EV user behavior analysis of V2G electricity performance, a V2G discharge optimization model was developed | Successfully predicted and optimized the usage patterns of electric vehicles in the V2G system | Considerations for qualitative factors in the analysis system of user behavior |
Zhong et al. (2018) [118] | Based on massive user profile data and electrical characteristics, a user behavior tag library was built, and the tags were analyzed through k-means clustering | Provided strong data support for power companies to understand users’ EPS usage habits, mine users’ electricity demands, and improve service level | k-means can only process numerical data, while some user behavior characteristics may be non-numerical |
Ji et al. (2021) [119] | Based on consumer behavior characteristics in electric–thermal grids, a method for the optimal scheduling of distributed solid thermal storage was proposed | Reduce wind curtailment and enhance the consistency between planned outcomes and expectations, thereby avoiding waste of electricity and thermal energy | The classification of consumer behavior may be overly simplified |
Xie et al. (2021) [120] | Adaptive data sampling strategy based on user behavior | The proposed algorithm can be implemented offline and online, with the latter capable of real-time data interaction with smart grids | The model may not fully adapt to all types of users, especially when load behavior exhibits unconventional patterns, which could affect the predictive outcomes |
Hu et al. (2021) [121] | A clustering model of user electricity consumption behavior was constructed based on the k-shape clustering algorithm | Accurately cluster users, extract features, and perform behavior profiling | The clustering method primarily considers the shape similarity of user electricity consumption patterns, which may overlook some important features of electricity usage behavior |
Yu et al. (2024) [122] | A “vehicle-road-network” integration strategy considering user behavior decision making was proposed | Coordinate the distribution of charging loads, alleviate traffic pressure during peak load periods, and reduce travel and charging costs for EV users | The model has limited capability in processing and responding to real-time data, which may result in delayed reactions when dealing with sudden traffic or grid load changes |
Tan et al. (2023) [123] | A new MMG-distributed robust energy management model was proposed based on the multi-period coupling effect of user behavior | Achieved excellent cost efficiency, convergence performance, and robustness | When dealing with complex real-world scenarios, the performance of the optimization model may be limited by data scale and computational complexity |
Reference Number | Approaches Used in the Study | Advantages | Limitations |
---|---|---|---|
He et al. (2024) [124] | Based on the multi-strategy evolutionary game model, considering the bounded rational decision making of SES operators and the community, a unique SES leasing fee pricing mechanism was designed | It can be effectively applied in dynamic environments, especially when market conditions and participant behavior are constantly changing | The simulation and computation are highly intensive, which presents significant technical challenges for implementing this theory in the actual electricity market |
Cheng et al. (2022) [125] | Focused on a general two-population n-strategy evolutionary game (2PnS-EG), especially for the general two-population three-strategy evolutionary game (2P3S-EG) | Complete RNP parameters are defined for 2P3S-SEG-based homogeneous PGM and 2P3S-AEG-based heterogeneous PGM | It ignores the diversity and dynamics in the game process and has not yet incorporated stochastic disturbance factors of group evolution under uncertainty into the scope of the study |
Yan et al. (2024) [126] | Using stochastic evolutionary game theory, the cooperative strategies of participants under bounded rationality were dynamically deduced | It can dynamically deduce cooperative strategies under bounded rationality and consider the impact of random disturbances, making the model more aligned with the complexity and dynamic changes in real markets | It may not be directly applicable to other types of electricity markets or trading mechanisms, which limits its scope of application |
Lee et al. (2022) [127] | The evolutionary game was combined with a non-cooperative game and a Stackelberg game, forming a multi-level game framework | The game theory-based P2P electricity trading system takes grid conditions into account | It responds slowly to sudden changes and rapid fluctuations in the market. This may cause the model to lag when dealing with large fluctuations in renewable energy output |
Wang et al. (2023) [128] | Considering the irrational bidding behavior of energy suppliers in the actual electricity market, an evolutionary game-based multi-market bidding optimization model was presented | The bidding strategies of participants are dynamically optimized through evolutionary game theory, enabling more efficient market operations | The model relies on government regulation and the enforcement of green certificates and carbon emission rights |
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Cheng, L.; Wei, X.; Li, M.; Tan, C.; Yin, M.; Shen, T.; Zou, T. Integrating Evolutionary Game-Theoretical Methods and Deep Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Strategy Optimization in User-Side Electricity Markets: A Comprehensive Review. Mathematics 2024, 12, 3241. https://doi.org/10.3390/math12203241
Cheng L, Wei X, Li M, Tan C, Yin M, Shen T, Zou T. Integrating Evolutionary Game-Theoretical Methods and Deep Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Strategy Optimization in User-Side Electricity Markets: A Comprehensive Review. Mathematics. 2024; 12(20):3241. https://doi.org/10.3390/math12203241
Chicago/Turabian StyleCheng, Lefeng, Xin Wei, Manling Li, Can Tan, Meng Yin, Teng Shen, and Tao Zou. 2024. "Integrating Evolutionary Game-Theoretical Methods and Deep Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Strategy Optimization in User-Side Electricity Markets: A Comprehensive Review" Mathematics 12, no. 20: 3241. https://doi.org/10.3390/math12203241
APA StyleCheng, L., Wei, X., Li, M., Tan, C., Yin, M., Shen, T., & Zou, T. (2024). Integrating Evolutionary Game-Theoretical Methods and Deep Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Strategy Optimization in User-Side Electricity Markets: A Comprehensive Review. Mathematics, 12(20), 3241. https://doi.org/10.3390/math12203241