6.2. Pure Nationalist and Pure Credentialist
The “Apostle Model” is a widely used method in ecology and basic classes of endangered species [
47]. It is an approach developed by Harvard Business School in the 20th century to optimise the results of organisations that supply products to buyers of goods. This approach was developed to guarantee the customer’s reliability and the satisfaction of the buyer of the goods. It identifies the “apostles” as faithful consumers, the “hostages” as those who do not seek alternatives, and the “mercenaries” as those buying products based on prices. The “defectors” or “deserters” are dissatisfied and not very loyal, so they can easily switch to another supplier or create a commodity. The Apostles are the “credentialists” in this study, while the deserters are “postnationalists”. On the other hand, the other two extremes-hostages and mercenaries-are individually represented by “civic-oriented” and “ethnic oriented”.
Some citizens have a broader vision of national identity that is not limited to the ethnic/civic idea. The ethnic and civic dichotomy of citizens is characterised by giving greater prominence to the set of indicators contained in each respective measure. For this reason, we defined the sample following the Apostle model, as it aims to give a broader perspective of national identity. Thus, the credentialist national identity is based on all eight attributes, represented by the upper right quadrant of
Figure 2. The opposite area for postnationalists comes from people who do not care about any analysed attribute. The results show that more than three-fifths of the interviewees are more credentialist and postnationalist (33.4% and 30%). In contrast, civic and ethnic orientation citizens accounted for 16.2% and 20.3%, respectively.
It appears evident that, using the classical Apostle model using the FTOPSIS method, the construction of national identity is blurred, as a citizen near the axes of the credentialist quadrant can be more similar to credentialist citizens than to any other kind of national identity. Therefore, we propose using the extended Apostle model based on the fuzzy clustering method to reduce the potential blur area of the event that determines the behaviour of credentialist, postnationalist, civic, and ethnic-oriented citizens. Thus, the global model shifts from a 4 profile subclassification to 16 broader replacement categories. We consider the fundamental difference from two points of pure profiles defined according to the average of the FTOPSIS method to four categories determined by the membership vector of the fuzzy clustering analysis.
Let and be the vectors of the membership functions for the ethnic and civic national identity obtained in the above section. A citizen is a credentialist if e1 and c1 are 0.5 or higher; post-nationalist if e2 and c2 are greater than 0.5; civic-oriented if e2 and c1 are greater than 0.5; and ethnic-oriented if e1 and c2 are greater than 0.5. The results for the extended Apostle model show that the ethnic-oriented group now agrees with 12.3% of the sample, but only 3.7% can be delineated as pure ethnic; i.e., they attach the utmost importance to ethnic attributes and low importance to civic attributes. On the other hand, civic-oriented groups represent 6.7% of the sample, although only 0.3% can be delineated as purely civic-oriented individuals. Unlike the classical Apostle model results, the postnationalist group represents our sample’s most minor representative category. The whole group accounts for 5.2%, while only 1.7% are deliberately pure postnationalists instead of opposed to the fashionable 30% obtained from the classic model. Almost 76% of the sample is classified as credentialist, but in this case, it is necessary to identify those who give more standing to civic proof, those that give more importance to ethnic criteria, and those that give greater importance to two criteria together—respectively, these represent by 28.2%, 9.2%, and 23.6%.
In the next section, we analyse whether some socio-economic characteristics can explain national identity. Binary probit models are used to detect which socio-demographic and economic characteristics influence being credentialist rather than postnationalist, ethnic, or civic-oriented.
6.3. The Relationship between Socio-Economic Variables and National Identity
The study aims to analyse the main drivers that affect citizens’ national identity. Four different binary probit models have been estimated for each category of national identity: credentialist, postnationalist, ethnic-oriented, and civic-oriented. Thus, the dependent variables are the corresponding national identity category for each model, and the independent variables are socioeconomic characteristics, such as country, political orientation, age, religion, income, gender, citizenship, main status, assiduousness in religious events, education, traditions, unilateralism, and multilateralism.
Table A1 shows the result of the binary probit model of our 13 covariates on ethnic-oriented, civic-oriented, postnationalist, and credentialist national identity. Regressors of the ethnic-oriented model do not appear to significantly affect the dependent variable, except for the year variable and assiduousness in religious events. From 2003 to 2013, citizens showed less interest in ethnic criteria, while those who attended one or several religious events a week showed a relevant relation to ethnic–national identity.
As for the civic-oriented model, age, income, gender, and main status have no significant effect. Indeed, from 2003 to 2013, citizens appeared to consider more civic criteria. At the country level, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway are positively related to civic-oriented national identity. On the other hand, Ireland, Portugal, and Russia did not give importance to civic identity items. Political orientation plays an important role as left-wing citizens showed a positive relationship to civic national identity, while those who have a conservative ideology or far-right political ideology showed less civic-oriented national identity. Regarding religion, it is interesting to remark that protestants showed a negative effect regarding the probability of being a civic-oriented citizen, while Islamic people and agnostics showed a positive relationship with civics. Being a native or foreign citizen turns out to be a significant predictor in the study of civic national identity, and the results show that being a native citizen negatively affects civic criteria, while being a foreigner positively affects the civic items. The level of education also plays an important role, as less-educated citizens appeared to have a negative relationship with civis in comparison with more educated citizens more inclined to civic criteria. Unilateralism and multilateralism are important key drivers in the study of civic national identity as well. Both those who prefer that countries should follow their interest even in conflict and who prefer that the international bodies should enforce solutions can be considered less civic-oriented citizens.
All covariates of postnationalist model have a significant effect on postnationalism, except for the variable that indicates if the citizen is a native or foreigner. Germany, Ireland, and Spain show a positive effect on postnationalist sentiment at the country level, while the North European countries—Norway and Denmark—and France negatively affect postnationalist national identity. Support for far-left political ideology positively affects postnationalism, while being more conservative is not related to being postnationalist. Age does not appear to be significant, except for those who are 75 years old or over, which negatively affects being postnationalist. Results show that being Catholic negatively affects postnationalist national identity. Nevertheless, agnostics do not consider any criteria for national identity. Gender is also an important factor that affects postnationalist identity. Indeed, men appear to be more postnationalist than women. The assiduousness of religious events marks differences in postnationalism between those who never participate and those who participate several times a week. In effect, the first group seems to be more postnationalist than the second one. Likewise, different levels of education are also important determinants. Lower-educated citizens have a positive effect on postnationalism, while citizens who are higher educated present a negative effect on the category of national identity that does not consider any criteria as important. In the same way, unilateralism and multilateralism are characterised by those who prefer that countries do not follow only their interests, and those who prefer that the international bodies do not enforce solutions are more postnationalist than other citizens.
The results regarding citizens demanding both ethnic and civic criteria show that Russia and United States are credentialist, while the Central–Northern European countries—Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and Norway, plus Portugal—have a low level of credentialist sentiment. Political orientation plays an important role in credentialist national identity. Indeed, those who are more conservative are credentialist, while left-wing political orientation negatively affects credentialism. Age does not show a significant effect, except for citizens older than 55 years old. Religion and assiduousness in religious events are key factors for being credentialist as Christians, such as Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian religions, are likely to be credentialist, while agnostics, Jews, Muslims, and those who profess other religions are not credentialist. Likewise, higher incomes positively affect the credentialist category, while lower levels of income have a negative effect. In the same way, women and native citizens are found to be more credentialist than men and foreign citizens. Main status and education level are important factors as well. Paid workers and students are not credentialist, and retired citizens are credentialist. Likewise, lower-educated citizens are credentialist, while higher educational levels negatively affect credentialist sentiment. Furthermore, there is a difference between citizens that demand that others must adapt to society and those who prefer that others maintain their traditions. Indeed, the first one positively affects the credentialist group, while the second one has a negative effect.
Table 5 shows the marginal effects on postnationalist, credentialist, and civic-oriented models. National identity based on ethnic criteria did not show any significant coefficient, so it was excluded from the analysis. The analysis first starts with postnationalism, and it can be seen that postnationalism does not show a significant change in the two waves analysed. Central–North European countries are found to be more postnationalist than average, while Portugal and the United States have a 0.16% negative marginal effect on this category. Far-left political orientation has a 0.5% positive marginal effect, but rightist citizens are 0.6 less postnationalist than average. The age of a citizen can affect the probability of being a postnationalist or not. Those younger than 55 are more postnationalist (0.15% more or less) than those older than 75 (−0.56%). In more postnationalist groups, the results show that agnostic citizens (0.53%) and those who profess other Christian religions (0.6%) tend to be postnationalist, while Catholics are less postnationalist than average (−0.30%). Those who perceive higher incomes and males are more postnationalist than average (0.83% and 0.19%, respectively). Student status increases the probability of being postnationalist by 0.04%, while paid workers and retirees have negative effects on not considering any criteria (both by about 0.10%). The time that a citizen spends in religious events also has a marginal effect on postnationalism, as the more assiduous are less postnationalist than average (−0.51%), and those who never attend religious events show a positive marginal effect at 0.22%. Education and traditions show significant marginal effects on postnationalism. Non-educated citizens and those who demand that others must adapt to larger society have negative marginal effects, at 0.365% and 0.15%, respectively. Native citizens have a 0.01% negative marginal effect on postnationalism, while foreign citizens are more postnationalist (about 0.4%) than average. No-unilateralism and no-multilateralism present similar marginal effects on postnationalism, at 0.91% and 0.84%, respectively.
Nevertheless, considering credentialist national identity, the results show that after a decade in the countries analysed, citizens have become more credentialist. Central–North Europe countries and Russia are less credentialist than the average citizen, while Ireland (3.19%), Spain (5.52%), Great Britain (2.37), and the United States (0.8%) are more credentialist than the average. On the left and right, the two extreme political ideologies are less credentialist than average, respectively, at −3.2% and −5.52%. Meanwhile, more moderate citizens such as Liberals and Conservatives present 4.2% and 7.31% positive marginal effects. All age groups are less credentialist than the average, except the group between 55 and 64 years old, which is 3.08% more credentialist than the average. Agnostic and Protestants present negative marginal effects, at −12.32 and −0.79%, respectively, while Jewish (0.56%), Islamic (1.23%), and members of other religions (1.06%) are more credentialist than average. Income and gender do not present significant effects, except for the seventh category of income (medium-high) and males, who are less credentialist than the average. Citizens who are native, not formally educated, and who attend religious events one or several times a week are more credentialist than the average, while those citizens who never go to religious events, students, and retirees show negative marginal effects. The traditions variable does not present differences between those who prefer that others adapt to a larger society and those who prefer that others maintain their tradition. Both groups seem to be less credentialist than the average, but the credentialist intensity is higher in those citizens who are more respectful of other traditions. Citizens who prefer that countries do not follow only their interests and those who prefer that the international bodies do not enforce solutions are less credentialist than the average, while those in favour of international bodies’ enforcement are more credentialist than the average (about 0.70%).
Finally, the analysis of the civic-oriented citizens shows that citizens were more civic-oriented in 2013 than in 2003. Central–North European countries show positive marginal effects, while Ireland, Portugal, Russia, and Spain show negative effects in this category. Leftist and Liberal citizens are also more civic-oriented than the average. All age groups are more civic-oriented than the average, except for the older than 75 years old group, which has a negative marginal effect of −0.94%. Likewise, agnostics, Muslims, and those who profess other religions are more civic-oriented than the average, while Protestant and Jewish citizens have marginal effects of −0.34 and −0.03, respectively. Income is not significant, except for the seventh category, which has a significant positive marginal effect. Men, natives, and non-educated citizens show negative effects, while paid workers and students are 0.15% and 0.13% more civic-oriented than the average. Those who prefer that others adapt to a larger society show negative marginal effects, but those who prefer that others maintain their traditions are 0.20% more civic-oriented than the average. Finally, the no-unilateralism position seems to be consonant with being more civic-oriented than the average, and multilateralism shows negative marginal effects.