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Economies, Volume 2, Issue 1 (March 2014) – 4 articles , Pages 1-94

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Article
Internet Education and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Regressions
Economies 2014, 2(1), 78-94; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2010078 - 20 Mar 2014
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 5749
Abstract
The effects of Internet education on economic growth are examined using a cross-section of 36 high-income countries. Internet usage rates are employed as a proxy for Internet education across countries. Regression results show that the frequent usage of the Internet has a positive [...] Read more.
The effects of Internet education on economic growth are examined using a cross-section of 36 high-income countries. Internet usage rates are employed as a proxy for Internet education across countries. Regression results show that the frequent usage of the Internet has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. The estimated growth effect of Internet skills is also found to be greater than the growth effect of math and science skills. The results are, in general, robust across model specifications. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Role of Education and Health in Economic Development)
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Article
Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces
Economies 2014, 2(1), 45-77; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2010045 - 06 Mar 2014
Cited by 10 | Viewed by 4552
Abstract
Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here [...] Read more.
Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
Article
A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Economies 2014, 2(1), 20-44; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2010020 - 22 Jan 2014
Cited by 6 | Viewed by 10017
Abstract
This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations [...] Read more.
This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations were judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling’s explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard’s with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams’ with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. The broad outlines of a more general explanation that addresses all of the foundational questions associated with the crisis within the confines of a single, integrated, game-theoretic model with incomplete information are laid out. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
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Article
Financial Markets, Banking and the Design of Monetary Policy: A Stable Baseline Scenario
Economies 2014, 2(1), 1-19; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2010001 - 30 Dec 2013
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4424
Abstract
A baseline integration of commercial banks into the disequilibrium framework with behavioral traders of Charpe et al. (2011, 2012) is presented. At the core of the analysis is the impact the banking sector exerts on the interaction of real and financial markets. Potentially [...] Read more.
A baseline integration of commercial banks into the disequilibrium framework with behavioral traders of Charpe et al. (2011, 2012) is presented. At the core of the analysis is the impact the banking sector exerts on the interaction of real and financial markets. Potentially destabilizing feedback channels in the presence of imperfect macroeconomic portfolio adjustment and heterogeneous expectations are investigated. Given the possible financial market instability, various policy instruments have to be applied in order to guarantee viable dynamics in the highly interconnected macroeconomy. Among those are open market operations reacting to the state-of-confidence in the economy and Tobin-type capital gain taxes. The need for policy intervention is even more striking, as the banking sector is modeled in a rather stability enhancing way, fulfilling its fundamental tasks of term transformation of savings and credit granting without engaging in investment activities itself. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Great Recession)
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