Authentication Techniques in Internet of Drones (IoD): Taxonomy, Open Challenges and Future Directions
Abstract
1. Introduction
1.1. Related Previous Works
1.2. Contribution
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- We provided an overview of a wide range of relevant review papers on entity interaction in the Internet of Drone environment, focusing on their impact on security and performance (in Section 1.1). In this section, we conduct a survey aimed at comparing various relevant reviews and surveys, highlighting the strengths, weaknesses, and areas of focus of current approaches to entity authentication within this context. By examining authentication systems and their associated technologies, we aim to identify the best practices and gaps in the existing literature, developing a better comprehension of the potential and challenges associated with enhancing security in the Internet of Drones.
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- We present an overview of IoD communication links used to achieve secure drone operations (in Section 3). This section focuses on the requirements authentication schemes must meet in the IoD, covering essential security features including integrity, availability, authenticity, confidentiality, and privacy. Additionally, we discuss common attacks in the IoD and outline drone performance requirements that are related to computation, communication, storage costs, and power consumption. We aim to offer a thorough grasp of the security landscape by addressing these components and performance considerations necessary for effective drone operations within the IoD.
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- The IoD environment faces attacks due to a lack of security measures. To mitigate these adverse impacts, protection measures must be established to guarantee IoD security (in Section 4). We offer a comprehensive taxonomy of the latest authentication schemes used in the IoD and conduct comparative analyses of software-based, hardware-based, and hybrid-based techniques and their application in the IoD. Also, we examine the security and performance requirements of these techniques and discuss potential attacks on these IoD authentication schemes.
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- A discussion and comparison of the surveyed schemes is presented, (in Section 5) highlighting open issues in the IoD that require attention in future scheme designs.
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- We discuss the security landscape (In Section 6), including various scenarios in which attacks can cause a drone or ground station server to stop responding, along with mitigation strategies to ensure service continuity and system resilience. We also address the threat modeling of drone delivery systems in the cyber domain and explore mitigation methods. By examining these aspects, we aim to highlight the importance of proactive security measures in maintaining the operational integrity of drone services.
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- We cover open research topics (in Section 7) and, explore several such topics for the IoD that can significantly contribute to future IoD systems. We discuss promising directions for further study that have the potential to enhance the design of authentication schemes. By focusing on these areas, researchers can address current challenges and develop more robust and secure systems for drone operations, ultimately improving the overall effectiveness and reliability of the IoD environment.
2. Methodology
2.1. Identification
2.2. Screening and Eligibility
3. An Overview of the IoD
- The ground station server registers the system’s components and initializes the system as a trusted authority.
- The user who has a smart device through which they can request access to the server’s stored data. The user interacts with the GSS to establish a secure connection and authenticate their identity.
- The drone, also referred to as an “unmanned aerial vehicle,” is an autonomous or distantly piloted flight system that performs various tasks within the IoD environment. The drone interacts with the GSS to establish a secure connection and authenticate its identity.
3.1. Requirements of Authentication Scheme in the IoD
3.1.1. Security Requirements
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- Security Features
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- Security Attack
3.1.2. Performance Requirements
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- Communication overheads:
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- Computation overheads:
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- Storage overheads:
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- Power consumption:
3.1.3. Summarization
4. Taxonomy of Existing IoD Authentication Techniques
4.1. Software-Based Authentication Techniques
4.1.1. Public Key Infrastructure-Based Authentication
4.1.2. Hash Function-Based Authentication
4.1.3. ECC-Based Authentication
4.1.4. Blockchain-Based Authentication
4.1.5. Machine Learning-Based Authentication
Scheme | Environment | Techniques | Security Analysis and Simulation Tools | Advantages |
---|---|---|---|---|
[29] | Flying Ad Hoc Network (FANET) | Hash functions | Real-Or-Random (ROR), ProVerif. | Low computation and communication costs. |
[26] | IoD | Public key infrastructure (PKI), Hash functions | ProVerif. | Execution efficiency, low computation costs. |
[33] | Wireless sensor network (WSN) | Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) | Informal analysis. | Low computation cost. |
[30] | UAV-based IoT | Hash functions | Random Oracle model (ROM). | Low power consumption, low computation cost. |
[31] | IoD | Exclusive-OR (XOR) operations, hash functions | Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic. | Low communication and computation costs, enhanced security features. |
[27] | IoD | PKI, hash functions | ROR, ProVerif. | Robustness against various attacks and efficiency through communication and computation overhead. |
[28] | FANET | PKI | Informal analysis. | Acceptable costs and high accuracy detection. |
[32] | IoD | ECC | Informal analysis. | Trade-off between efficiency and security. |
[34] | IoD | ECC | Informal analysis and ProVerif. | Low power consumption, computation, and communication costs |
[38] | UAV-based IoT | Deep Neural Network (DNN) | Informal analysis. | High level of accuracy. |
[39] | UAV | Linear discriminant Analysis (LDA) | Informal analysis. | Low computational overhead, and high accuracy. |
[40] | UAV | Machine Learning | - | Mitigate security risk through intruder detection. |
[36] | UAV | Blockchain | Informal analysis. | Efficiency and secure links. |
[37] | IoD. | ECC, hash functions, blockchain | Informal analysis, ROR, AVISPA. | Low communication, low computation costs. |
4.2. Hardware-Based Authentication Techniques
4.2.1. PUF-Based Authentication
4.2.2. TPM and HSM-Based Authentication
Scheme | Environment | Techniques | Security Analysis and Simulation Tools | Advantages |
---|---|---|---|---|
[41] | UAV | PUF | Informal analysis and Mao and Boyd logic | Low computational cost and resistance against attacks. |
[42] | IoD | Trusted Platform Module (TPM). | Informal analysis | Low computation and communication costs, and high security. |
[47] | UAV | PUF | Informal analysis | Low computation cost. |
[43] | IoD | PUF | Informal analysis, and ProVerif | Sufficient security features and efficient use of computer resources. |
[44] | UAV | PUF | Informal analysis and Mao and Boyd logic | Acceptable computation, and communication costs, and sufficient security. |
[48] | UAV | PUF | Informal analysis | Low computation cost, and low power consumption |
[46] | UAV | PUF | Informal analysis | Efficiency. |
4.3. Hybrid-Based Authentication Techniques
Scheme | Environment | Techniques | Security Analysis and Simulation Tools | Advantages |
---|---|---|---|---|
[52] | UAV | PUF Hash functions XOR | Informal analysis BAN logic AVISPA | Efficiency, and ability to, resist different types of security attacks. |
[50] | IoT | PUF MAC Symmetric key | Informal analysis Mao and Boyd logic | Low computation and communication costs, and high security. |
[53] | UAV | TPM Blockchain Hash functions PKI | Informal analysis | High security, and low computation and communication overheads. |
[49] | IoT | PUF SUKA | Informal analysis Mao and Boyd logic | Low computationa cost and resistance against attacks. |
[51] | UAV | PUF Chaotic system | Informal analysis OMNeT++ | High security. |
5. Open Issues in IoD Authentication Schemes
- Scalability: As the number of drones in the airspace continues to increase, authentication schemes must be scalable in terms of the amount of information transferred, the number of nodes in their architecture, and their time slots, while also being able to handle many devices simultaneously. Thus, most systems are either overwhelmed with operations or cause operations to become delayed or stop functioning.
- Security and Robustness against attacks: It is important for IoD authentication schemes to be resilient against various types of attacks, including impersonation, replay attacks, tampering attacks, etc. Enhancing the security of authentication protocols in the IoD is important for scheme creators, especially considering the sensitivity of the data involved. Authentication protocols are designed to protect sensitive information and ensure that only authorized entities can access it. As a result of that, the scheme needs to provide authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and privacy. All these security aspects must be guaranteed through simulation tools and mathematical proofs.
- Privacy: Protecting the privacy of drone operators and their sensitive information is paramount and essential. Authentication schemes should incorporate privacy-preserving techniques, such as anonymous authentication, to maintain the anonymity of operators and ensure un-linkability to prevent unauthorized tracking. These procedures ensure the confidentiality of operators activities and personal information, enhancing the privacy and security of authentication.
- Environments with limited resources: Many IoD entities, especially drones, operate with limited computational power, storage capacity, and power consumption. Designing a lightweight authentication protocol that minimizes communication, computation, and storage costs while maintaining sufficient security is vital.
- Trust: Establishing trust between network entities in an IoD environment, such as drones, ground stations, and other entities, is essential for secure communication. Designing techniques to verify the trustworthiness and integrity of participants in an environment is crucial. These techniques aim to ensure that the entities in the authentication phase are trusted and that their actions are conducted with integrity. By implementing these techniques, authentication schemes ensure their security and reliability.
Scheme | Resist Impersonation Attack | Resist MITM | Resist Privileged Insider | Resist Replay Attack | Resist DoS Attack | Resistance to Drone-Capture Attack |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[56] | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
[57] | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[33] | × | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[31] | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[26] | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × |
[45] | × | × | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[30] | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[53] | × | × | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
[41] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[44] | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
[58] | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
[59] | × | × | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[29] | × | × | × | × | ✓ | × |
[27] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[28] | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × |
[35] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[32] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[34] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[36] | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ | × |
[37] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[47] | × | × | × | ✓ | × | × |
[42] | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[43] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[60] | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | |
[52] | ✓ | × | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[61] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[62] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[63] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[64] | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
[65] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
Scheme | Mutual Authentication | Scalability | Anonymity | Un-Traceability | Perfect Forward Security |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
[56] | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ |
[57] | × | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
[33] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[31] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[26] | × | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[45] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
[30] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[53] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
[41] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[44] | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | - |
[58] | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ |
[59] | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ | × |
[29] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[27] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
[28] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[35] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[32] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[34] | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ |
[36] | ✓ | × | × | ✓ | × |
[37] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | - |
[47] | ✓ | × | × | × | × |
[42] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[43] | × | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[60] | × | ✓ | × | × | × |
[52] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
[61] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | × |
[62] | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
[63] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[64] | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ |
[65] | ✓ | × | ✓ | ✓ | × |
6. Use Case: Threat Modeling for Drone Delivery
- Endpoint entities, whether a user or a drone, are reliable entities that can connect to the network via public channels. Consequently, an adversary can intercept or eavesdrop on conversations and then alter or forge the exchanged messages.
- –
- Mitigation: Implementing end-to-end encryption techniques can ensure that data are secured on the drone’s end and stay encrypted until they reach the intended receiver, who possesses the decryption key. This method secures the communication channel by making the data unreadable to any unauthorized party that might attempt to intercept them during transmission. End-to-end encryption protects the security and privacy of the data being transferred from malicious actors and possible eavesdroppers. Attempts to access sensitive information or alter the transmitted messages are thwarted because, even if the data are intercepted, they cannot be decrypted without the encryption key [62].
- An adversary can launch a hardware attack targeting a drone or ground station server’s components, leading to system unresponsiveness. As a result, there could be security breaches, communication problems, and a loss of control over the drone.
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- Mitigation: Set up failover protocols that automatically switch communication channels or systems in the event of the drone or ground station server becoming unresponsive, thereby, ensuring continuous communication and control over the drone by transitioning to backup systems or communication links. [63].
- –
- Threat Modeling for Amazon Drone Delivery
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- Scenario of Unauthorized Access during Amazon Drone Delivery
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- Mitigation: It is crucial to concentrate on robust encryption and authentication. By asking users to confirm their identity using a secondary method—such as a number given to their mobile device—two-factor authentication will provide an additional degree of protection, as well as their password. Enforcing robust password policies is equally important, this includes requiring complicated passwords that contain a mix of capital and lowercase letters, digits, and special characters. It also entails enforcing frequent password changes to lessen the chance of unwanted access.
7. Discussion of Future Research Directions
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- IoD authentication schemes based on emerging technologies such as blockchain, edge computing, and machine learning should be proposed in tandem with traditional cryptography schemes. This is a research topic in the IoD that needs critical attention. Emerging technologies have the potential to enhance security and privacy in the IoD environment.
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- Investigating methods to increase the efficiency of authentication protocols and enhance their scalability for large-scale deployments of drones. This might involve exploring lightweight cryptographic techniques, optimizing communication protocols, and designing efficient key management approaches.
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- Advancing privacy-preserving techniques for IoD authentication protocols should protect the privacy of drones and the sensitive data transmitted by drones. This may involve exploring different privacy techniques, anonymization approaches, and secure multi-party computation.
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- Developing IoD authentication protocols that are resilient against advanced attacks, including advanced malware, sophisticated attacks, and spoofing techniques, is vital. This may require behavior analyses, the incorporation of anomaly detection, and security measures.
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- Future work could be dedicated to real-world deployments and validations of IoD authentication schemes to evaluate their usability, effectiveness, and performance. This would involves assessing the robustness, practicality, and scalability of these schemes in various scenarios.
8. Conclusions
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- A trade-off between security and efficiency should be made during the practical implementation of the IoD. While robust security measures are essential to protect against various threats, they often introduce overhead that can adversely affect system performance. This is particularly important for drones, which rely on battery power. For instance, implementing strong encryption algorithms may enhance security but lead to increased latency, which is significant in real-time applications. Therefore, finding the right balance between security and efficiency is vital to ensure that the IoD is secure and operationally efficient.
- –
- Computation, communication, and power consumption are the primary performance metrics employed by various authentication schemes.
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- Conventional cryptographic techniques, such as hash functions, ECC, and PKI, can be used to reduce the security threats and risks posed by malicious attacks.
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- ML-based techniques have opened up new avenues for security protection and separating malevolent from benign entities. Running these algorithms on the cloud greatly improves an IoD system’s efficiency, despite the fact that they need a large amount of processing power.
- –
- The implementation of blockchain technology provide an extra degree of protection.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Related Survey | Publication Year | Domain | Authentication Techniques | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
[9] | 2019 | UAV | Generic | A review of UAV-assisted communications’ features, standardization efforts, interference problems, and testbed activities. |
[10] | 2019 | UAV | Software-based | Review of machine learning-based security solutions and wireless and security concerns in UAV-based applications. |
[14] | 2019 | UAV | Software-based | Review of vulnerability, and SDN-based security solutions for UAV-based networks. |
[13] | 2019 | IoT | Hardware-based | Review of hardware security challenges in IoT devices. |
[8] | 2020 | UAV | Software-based | Survey on blockchain-based security solutions and security concerns in UAV networks. |
[9] | 2020 | Drone | Software-based | Analysis of drone-based networks’ communication connection vulnerabilities across a range of application domains. |
[15] | 2020 | IoT | Hardware-based | Review of hardware-based security techniques for the IoT. |
[12] | 2021 | UAV | Generic | Review of techniques for securing UAVs. |
[16] | 2021 | UAV | Software-based | Review of optimal techniques for securing UAVs that use watermarks, machine learning, and blockchain technology. |
[17] | 2021 | UAV | Software-based | Survey of security protocol and, software-based solutions. |
[11] | 2021 | IoD | Software-based | Review of the IoD’s security challenges, new methods, and unresolved problems. |
[18] | 2022 | IoD | Software-based and hardware-based | Review of related works on emerging and conventional techniques for the authentication of the IoD. |
[20] | 2022 | UAV | Software-based and hardware-based | Review of security methods for UAV-aided MEC-enabled IoT and a study of software- and hardware-based approaches for UAV network node authentication. |
Security Features | Description |
---|---|
Integrity | This ensures that data and information within the IoD system remain unaltered and intact throughout its lifecycle, protecting them from unauthorized modifications or tampering. |
Availability | This ensures that the services of the IoD system and its resources are accessible to authorized users, even under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that could impact the availability of drones, communication channels, or supporting infrastructure. |
Authenticity | This focuses on verifying an entity’s identification before allowing access to restricted resources or disclosing sensitive information. By implementing robust authentication mechanisms, the IoD system can ensure that entities are who they claim to be. |
Confidentiality | This ensures the sensitive information transmitted or stored within the IoD system remains protected from unauthorized access. |
Privacy | The aim is to protect the personal information and privacy rights of individuals throughout IoD operations. Anonymization techniques are among the privacy features that guarantee the safe handling of personal information while adhering to relevant privacy regulations. |
Non-Repudiation | The aim is to prevent individuals or entities from denying their actions or transactions. Implementing security measures becomes crucial when multiple parties are involved in an action, as these measures ensure that the action can only be denied with the knowledge of the other parties. |
Attacks | Description | |
---|---|---|
Replay attack | Confidentiality | An attacker intercepts messages transmitted between entities through unsecured channels to tamper with them. The adversary then exploits this information by replaying the intercepted message in a subsequent session to deceive or gain unauthorized access to a legitimate application or system. |
Spoofing attack | An attacker disguises their identity or impersonates a legitimate entity to deceive the IoD system and gain unauthorized access or control. There are different types of spoofing attacks, such as GPS spoofing, identity spoofing, and MAC address spoofing. | |
Man-in-the-middle attack | Integrity | An attacker intercepts and manipulates communication between two parties without their knowledge or consent. This allows the attacker to eavesdrop on the communication, alter the content of the messages, or even impersonate one or both legitimate entities involved. |
Eavesdropping attack | Attackers intercept communication channels within the IoD system to gather sensitive information, such as commands sent to drones or transmitted data. | |
Denial-of-service attack | Availability | The attackers send too many requests to the server to disrupt the availability of the IoD system, rendering it inaccessible or causing performance degradation. |
Known-key attack | Authenticity | If an adversary gains access to a session key, the exposed session key could allow the attacker predict or calculate the keys of future sessions. |
Impersonation Attack | The adversary disguises themselves as a legitimate user or entity to deceive the application provider or gain unauthorized access to the system to carry out malicious activities. | |
Forgery attack | Privacy | An attacker submits malicious code to a user or application, and the application trusts and executes that code, enabling the attacker to access sensitive data without authorization. |
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Share and Cite
Aldweesh, A.F.; Almuhaideb, A.M. Authentication Techniques in Internet of Drones (IoD): Taxonomy, Open Challenges and Future Directions. J. Sens. Actuator Netw. 2025, 14, 57. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan14030057
Aldweesh AF, Almuhaideb AM. Authentication Techniques in Internet of Drones (IoD): Taxonomy, Open Challenges and Future Directions. Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks. 2025; 14(3):57. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan14030057
Chicago/Turabian StyleAldweesh, Alanoud F., and Abdullah M. Almuhaideb. 2025. "Authentication Techniques in Internet of Drones (IoD): Taxonomy, Open Challenges and Future Directions" Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks 14, no. 3: 57. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan14030057
APA StyleAldweesh, A. F., & Almuhaideb, A. M. (2025). Authentication Techniques in Internet of Drones (IoD): Taxonomy, Open Challenges and Future Directions. Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks, 14(3), 57. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan14030057