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J. Low Power Electron. Appl. 2017, 7(1), 4;

A Novel Design Flow for a Security-Driven Synthesis of Side-Channel Hardened Cryptographic Modules

1,2,* and 2,3
Integrated Circuits and Systems Lab, Technische Universität Darmstadt, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany
The Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED), 64293 Darmstadt, Germany
Fakultät für Informatik und Mathematik, Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Regensburg, 93053 Regensburg, Germany
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Osnat Keren, Ilia Polian and Sanu Mathew
Received: 14 May 2016 / Revised: 13 January 2017 / Accepted: 26 January 2017 / Published: 8 February 2017
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Over the last few decades, computer-aided engineering (CAE) tools have been developed and improved in order to ensure a short time-to-market in the chip design business. Up to now, these design tools do not yet support an integrated design strategy for the development of side-channel-resistant hardware implementations. In order to close this gap, a novel framework named AMASIVE (Adaptable Modular Autonomous SIde-Channel Vulnerability Evaluator) was developed. It supports the designer in implementing devices hardened against power attacks by exploiting novel security-driven synthesis methods. The article at hand can be seen as the second of the two contributions that address the AMASIVE framework. While the first one describes how the framework automatically detects vulnerabilities against power attacks, the second one explains how a design can be hardened in an automatic way by means of appropriate countermeasures, which are tailored to the identified weaknesses. In addition to the theoretical introduction of the fundamental concepts, we demonstrate an application to the hardening of a complete hardware implementation of the block cipher PRESENT. View Full-Text
Keywords: side-channel analysis; secure CAE design side-channel analysis; secure CAE design

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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

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Huss, S.A.; Stein, O. A Novel Design Flow for a Security-Driven Synthesis of Side-Channel Hardened Cryptographic Modules. J. Low Power Electron. Appl. 2017, 7, 4.

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J. Low Power Electron. Appl. EISSN 2079-9268 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
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