In this paper I give a new information-theoretic analysis of the formalisms and interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) in general, and of two mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics in particular: The Copenhagen interpretation and David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Adopting Juan G. Roederer’s reading of the notion of pragmatic information, I argue that pragmatic information is not applicable to the Copenhagen interpretation since the interpretation is primarily concerned with epistemology rather than ontology. However it perfectly fits Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics in the realms of biotic and artificial systems. Viewing Bohm’s interpretation of QM in the context of pragmatic information imposes serious limitations to the qualitative aspect of such an interpretation, making his extension of the notion active information to every level of reality illegitimate. Such limitations lead to the idea that, contrary to Bohm’s claim, mind is not a more subtle aspect of reality via the quantum potential as active information, but the quantum potential as it affects particles in the double-slit experiment represents the non-algorithmic aspect of the mind as a genuine information processing system. This will provide an information-based ground, firstly, for refreshing our views on quantum interpretations and secondly, for a novel qualitative theory of the relationship of mind and matter in which mind-like properties are exclusive attributes of living systems. To this end, I will also take an information-theoretic approach to the notion of intentionality as interpreted by John Searle.
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