3.3. Life-Cycle Social Perspective
The LCI results for environment and cost (or financial) factors agree for the most part in terms of how to prioritize water system alternatives in terms of sustainability. However, these are only two of the categories of factors that affect the sustainability of a rural water system as described in
Table 1. The remaining categories are technical, human health, institutional, and community and managerial factors. When one examines the measures for the technical and human health factors, it is clear that there is a high degree of cause and effect between environmental and financial sustainability as it affects the technical and human health sustainability of a system. For example, a community water system that is financially sustainable means that there are adequate finances available to size the system appropriately and maintain reliable operation that results in users having adequate quantities and quality of water for their various needs. Similarly, we suggest that there is a high degree of cause and effect with the institutional and community and managerial aspects of sustainable water systems and this is where the socio-economic perspective matters. We examine these socio-economic sustainability factors of the water system by looking at the various decisions made across that life cycle, as well as the characteristics of those making the decisions. Below, we describe the main stages for each main decision maker with an overview in
Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Overview of the decision process for the life cycle of a rural water system in a resource-limited country.
Figure 1.
Overview of the decision process for the life cycle of a rural water system in a resource-limited country.
The Aid Organization. Typically the capital funding is provided in whole, or in part by an aid organization. The more common types of aid organizations are the large multilateral agencies and the international NGOs. Despite differences in organizational characteristics, the decision process for these organizational types has evolved to include many similarities as illustrated by WHO and WaterAid Nepal. WHO is a large multilateral agency while WaterAid Nepal is an international NGO. Descriptions of their decision processes are similar except that WaterAid emphasizes the importance of the initial decision to enter a community and the need for ongoing O&M and monitoring while WHO [
38] emphasizes the need for a contextual set of sustainability considerations for both system design and formal agreements. We use the combination to describe the typical four-step decision framework for an aid organization that occurs up front in the life cycle of a water system. The process is described below.
Step 1:
Determine the community’s assets based on a data-gathering stage known as the feasibility study. The feasibility study allows the aid organization and the community to determine viable technology options, to assess existing assets including the community’s capacity, and to establish the potential scope of the proposed project [
18]. A well-designed feasibility study includes appropriate design and wording of the questions, a thorough interviewer, and an adequate data pool across a variety of water users (household, community, and public institutions), the WUC, and the water sellers. Each of these entities is invested in a different aspect of the water sector and therefore perceives the life-cycle needs of the system differently [
18].
Step 2:
Decide whether or not to work with the community based on the data collected during the feasibility study. The key determination is whether the proposed community demonstrates the capacity necessary for effective project implementation and long-term system sustainability (WaterAid Nepal 2006a). WaterAid Nepal suggests that the decision to work with a community depends on whether the system is demand driven, if water users have a sense of system ownership, if there is an active WUC, and if it is likely that spare parts will be available over time. All of these considerations are life-cycle oriented [
18].
Step 3:
Use sustainability factors to choose the water system. This step involves four sub-decisions made in partnership with the WUC regarding the (a) distribution system; (b) water source; (c) treatment method; and (d) O&M strategy and rate structure. These selections should be made based on sustainability factors, and should also consider the community’s assets, with the ultimate goal of producing a life-cycle system design [
38].
Step 4:
Facilitate the formal agreements necessary for system implementation. The roles and responsibilities of involved stakeholders must be clearly defined to avoid confusion about which groups are responsible for performing particular services over the life cycle of the system [
38]. These stakeholders include the WUC, the users of the system, and any external groups, such as regional entities and/or private sector providers.
The Water User Committee (WUC). The outcomes of the aid organization’s decisions then depend on the decisions by the WUC and the households respectively. The community WUC is typically responsible for the daily management of the water system over its life cycle that includes setting and collecting water user tariffs, mobilizing local labor and materials for routine system repairs, and maintaining strong communication networks with water users [
31]. The process is described below.
Step 1: Use sustainability factors to choose & design the alternative(s). In a bottom-up approach, the WUC selects the water system design in partnership with the aid organization. Using feasibility data along with identified sustainability criteria, the WUC partnership then selects the (a) distribution system; (b) water source; (c) treatment method; and (d) system O&M strategy and rate structure. Collectively, these four sub-decisions result in the design of the overall water system.
Step 2: De-escalate or abandon the project. Based on the success of system implementation in terms of the household users’ response over the life cycle, the WUC periodically decides whether to continue providing water system services. Unfortunately, little literature is available regarding such project de-escalation and abandonment for water systems though it happens repeatedly as evidenced by failed systems throughout the resource-limited world. Poor response from the household user in the form of non-payment and/or not fulfilling responsibilities for the O&M of the system is one of the factors contributing to de-escalation and project abandonment for water system projects.
The Household User. The household users’ decisions represent the responses to the decisions previously made by the WUC and the aid organization in terms of the choices for a water system. The general process is described below.
Step 1:
Which system to collect water from. The household users’ selection of a water system directly impacts his/her subsequent choice of treatment and payment because these two decisions depend on the logistics and design of the water system. However, as noted by [
4], the choice as to which system the user prefers is complex and depends on the technologies provided as well as household characteristics such as financial capability and demographics, plus community characteristics including topography and site layout.
Step 2: Using a water treatment method (if applicable). In terms of treatment, a household user does not need to select a water treatment method if he/she previously chose a WUC-operated system with centralized treatment, or a third-party provider (we assume third party providers employ centralized treatment) e.g. bottled water. However, if the user self-collects from an unimproved source, or selects a WUC-operated system designed for point-of-use treatment, water treatment becomes a household responsibility and is subsequently included as part of the decision process.
Step 3: Paying the tariff (if applicable). As with Step 2, payment, whether it is a connection fee, a flat fee, or a unit rate fee, is required if a third-party water provider or WUC-operator is selected by the homeowner. However, payment is typically not required if the household users choose to self-collect.
The Panchakanya Case Study: The feasibility study data used by ADB showed that community members, particularly women, walked uphill in excess of two hours to collect water from a spring because the community’s existing taps could not provide sufficient water quantity [
30]. As such, ADB wanted to ensure that the final system would prevent that hardship [
30]. The design alternative selected was a WUC-operated system consisting of 14 community water points and several private household taps. The Panchakanya’s water users complained that they did not have a large role in the decision-making stages and the WUC members claimed that they did not receive sufficient financial and construction information [
30]. However, WaterAid Nepal reports the presence of significant community influence that allowed designers to consider community-specific characteristics in the project design [
30]. There are several examples of this cooperative decision process as discussed below.
The project designers originally planned to install 13 community water taps. However, they ultimately decided to add a fourteenth tap at the request of the water users who informed officials about five or six houses in a region of the village where no other water taps existed [
30]. All 14 ADB community taps were located a convenient distance from the household with a short wait time and short collection time [
30]. Additionally, the system provided water from the community taps throughout the day because the designers constructed reservoir tanks to ensure an adequate water supply at peak times. Furthermore, during the rainy season, the water provided by the taps could become muddy at the intake point, however the design included stored water that minimized this negative effect on users [
30]. The presence of these tanks also allowed water users to utilize the taps during the afternoon and at night thus providing the opportunity to partake in household gardening to supplement their diets [
30]. Finally, the WUC initially called for a monthly tariff of NPR 25, but lowered it to NPR 20 after water users, who were accustomed to paying only NPR 10 per month for an alternate system (or the free spring), bitterly complained [
30].
The Jhumka Case Study: Based on the feasibility study, ADB determined that while the Jhumka community obtained the majority of its water from private tube-wells financed either through a UNICEF revolving fund, or personal funds, rapid population expansion had placed significant strain on the existing infrastructure [
30]. As such, ADB selected a system that included 135 private household piped connections and 14 community taps [
30]. ADB required the creation of a WUC prior to project implementation [
30]. In terms of O&M, ADB (1996) used a “two-tier[ed]” approach made up of WUCs and the respective District Water Supply Office (DWSO). The regional DWSO played a “hands-on” role within communities by explaining O&M costs and responsibilities. DWSO also monitored and supported WUCs until they could independently manage the systems [
31]. The WUC employed a plumber, a meter reader, and a pump operator for the multiple tasks related to system O&M [
30].
In terms of formal agreements, ADB outlined three major issues that affected the Jhumka community: land rights, water rights, and government assurances to the ADB. Regardless of location, ADB (1996) dictated that communities must assume full responsibility for acquiring the land necessary for storage reservoirs, pipelines, and public tap stands. These acquisitions, per ADB decree, could not displace households or rural settlements [
31]. Once the government obtained the land, they were required by ADB to enforce holds on the land for all purposes other than DWSO office construction [
31]. A last factor that ADB addressed is that Nepal’s two primary laws governing water resources that only addressed domestic water rights. To remedy this situation, ADB mandated that the Nepalese government draft and enact the Drinking Water Supply Regulations by May 1997 [
31]. These regulations were required to include provisions on: WUC establishment and responsibilities, uniform registering and licensing procedures for “
de jure legal status,” and legal authorities including mitigating water dispute resolution [
31]. Finally, the Nepalese government was required to make specific “assurances” to ADB regarding the project, all of which were incorporated into legal documents containing standard agreements.
The above factors align with a life-cycle approach to water system design despite the fact that the WUC could not play an active part since it did not exist prior to the project. However, ADB made some decisions that could be seen as limiting successful sustainability. First, the Jhumka community did not rank highly in terms of all of ADB’s three selection criteria for project aid including hardship, per capita cost, and community participation. In particular, since the majority of the community water users already had private tube-wells and while water demand was increasing, the village was not experiencing a full-scale water crisis [
30]. Second, ADB limited the design alternatives that were considered to pre-selected technologies even though such a limitation does not consider the local context for a community [
30].
So how did the Jhumka community fare in the long term based on these decisions? Jhumka’s newly created WUC actively engaged in its required O&M responsibilities and WUC members regularly conducted community campaigns to encourage the installation of piped connections in an attempt to improve the financial sustainability of the system [
30]. In terms of daily maintenance and management, the Jhumka water system functioned at full capacity, and pipes and most spare parts for the individual household connections were readily available [
30]. The WUC set the initial connection fee at NPR2305 with a minimum monthly tariff at NPR30 and the majority of users reported to WaterAid Nepal that they could afford the fees [
30]. These are all signs of long-term sustainability of the water system across the life cycle.
However, at the time of the assessment report, only two of the 14 community taps (not household taps) that were designed to provide water to areas where the population lacked access to alternative sources were functioning [
30]. And, financial constraints led to the loss of two of the five original WUC employees [
30]. In addition, while 300 household connections were needed to make the project financially sustainable, only 135 were connected since some water users refused to pay for the installation costs because of poor water quality (allegedly due to a high iron content) [
30]. The WUC also concluded that the water system needed a treatment component, however it claimed that the regional administration disregarded the request [
30].
WaterAid ultimately concluded that the long-term sustainability of the Jhumka project was doubtful [
30]. The first reason relates to the lack of thoroughness in terms of considering alternative water resources that brings that adequacy of the feasibility study into question [
30]. The second reason is the WUC’s reluctance to take responsibility for the system when users complained bitterly about poor water quality indicating a lack of ownership [
30]. This result may be due in part to the lack of a WUC during the initial decisions. The third reason appears to be the lack of communication between stakeholders at several points in the process [
30].
The Indrapur Case Study: This case study demonstrates how poor technical, institutional, and managerial decisions along the life-cycle affect long-term sustainability.
The design of the water system included a majority of areas where one tube-well served between three and four households, however, in the community’s poorer areas, 20 to 25 households were forced to share one well [
30]. The distribution of the tube-wells were determined by the WUC and the Water Supply and Sanitation Division Office (WSSDO) [
30]. WaterAid Nepal’s review found that while the WUC was made up of nine members from each of Indrapur’s nine wards, when it came time to actually distribute the tube-wells, the ward chairs decided how many wells should be distributed and where they should go [
30]. In other words, the shift of “real” power to the chairpersons had major ramifications in terms of the decisions made.
Another poor design/construction decision occurred in one of these poorer areas where citizens had to filter the water with muslin cloths because of insects [
30]. The project developers blamed poor hygiene habits and the settlement’s low elevation for the poor water quality, however the reports show that the problem actually arose from carelessness during construction along with the insufficient training of the well managers [
30]. The water system design also resulted in annual water shortages below minimum ADB levels [
30]. In some instances, the shortages were seasonal while in other cases the wells were completely broken only a few years after construction. WaterAid Nepal reported that these shortages also resulted from poor construction decision since the wells were dug during the rainy season when the groundwater levels were high so workers stopped digging when they hit water [
30].
Besides design problems, other issues arose due to a lack of system ownership along with the community’s crumbling institutional organization ([
30]. The user’s sole contribution to the project was a flat installation fee that resulted in users assigning O&M duties to the household closest to the infrastructure, rather than utilizing the three-member subcommittees assigned to handle O&M [
30]. In addition, the majority of the institutional structures created to support the community and the WUC failed to provide necessary assistance e.g., DWSO failed to provide the community with the necessary tool sets to perform system maintenance and repairs; when tool sets were provided, the wrenches often did not fit the screws [
30,
31]. Additionally, WaterAid Nepal reports that spare parts were not locally available, forcing system repair workers to improvise with materials found in the community markets [
30]. Finally, the community’s maintenance fund was poorly understood and managed by the WUC and members did not know how much money was available, nor what the funds should be used for [
30].
What the Case Studies Show: While we do not have complete information regarding the aid organization’s decision process for the Panchakanya case study, the resulting water system design and the user response to the system suggest that the institutional as well as community and managerial sustainability factors described in
Table 1 were taken into account throughout the process. The Juhmka case study is more complicated. While technical decisions by the aid organization regarding the design of the Jhunka water system appeared to result in a successful system design based on short-term results, there were some indicators of problems for long-term sustainability due to failure to fully partner with the WUC and community. These results illustrate that many community and managerial factors can affect the success of an aid organization’s decisions, even when the majority of best practices are followed for institutional and financial sustainability. With the Indrapur case study, the project was headed towards possible de-escalation and failure in large part because many community and managerial sustainability factors were not included throughout the decision life cycle. The root cause of these problems appears to be changes in project management that led to local political leaders using the promise of tube-well installation as a way to appeal to their constituencies [
39]. Project managers also attempted to make these negative outcomes appear less threatening to the public in the face of unambiguously negative feedback and contradictions to the minimum service level targets, however this minimization only made the problem worse [
39].
While it is clear that if best practices for certain aspects of technical, financial, and environmental sustainability are not followed, a system is likely to fail, following those best practices does not ensure that the resulting water system will be sustainable. This result is in large part due to the responses from the households along the life cycle of the water system as they have to make decisions regarding what source to use, what treatment to use, and if to pay user fees. In particular, the prioritization among the sustainability factors listed in
Table 1 varies across decision makers and over time and space thus complicating the problem.