Ecosufism in the Thought of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī: Unity, Nature and Ecological Ethics in Sufi Metaphysics

Abstract

This article examines the ontological and ethical foundations of ecosufism through the views articulated by Muḥyiddīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638 AH/1240 CE) and Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672 AH/1273 CE) in their major works. Its central argument is that these two foundational figures of Sufi metaphysics offer a coherent, theocentric account of the human–nature relationship grounded in the principles of waḥdat (unity) and tajallī (self-disclosure). Conceiving the cosmos as a living and conscious reality, Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī further deepen this ontological vision through the Qurʾānic notions of khilāfah (vicegerency) and amānah (trust). These concepts are explained in Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching of al-insān al-kāmil (the Perfect Man) and in Rūmī’s teachings on humility and mercy, as both an ontological and ethical responsibility. This responsibility is expressed through the practical and ethical virtue of iʿtidāl (moderation), which limits the use of natural resources by humans. In this sense, ecosufism stands in clear opposition to anthropocentric approaches, rejecting the reduction of nature to a mere means to human ends. The study also shows that, without claiming any historical origin or conceptual identity, there are notable parallels between the foundations of ecosufism and modern ecological approaches. In this respect, meaningful points of convergence can be identified between ecosufism’s ontological and ethical framework and contemporary perspectives such as deep ecology, the intrinsic value of nature, the idea of a living cosmos, panpsychism, environmental stewardship, and environmental virtue ethics. The article argues that ecosufism, as an understanding that explains human–nature relationships both in a metaphysical sense and how this relationship should be reflected in concrete practices, has the potential to contribute to today’s ecological problems at both the theoretical and practical levels.

1. Introduction

Today, the rapid depletion of natural resources and the increasing frequency of environmental disasters in many parts of the world have generated widespread concern. Problems such as air, soil, and water pollution; the climate crisis; and biodiversity loss have further intensified this concern. In confronting global warming and pandemics that threaten both the present and the future of nature and all living beings on earth, societies have been forced to bear heavy economic and psychological burdens. Among the most significant factors driving the world toward these environmental problems are the exploitation of nature through technological development, rapid urbanization and population growth, capitalist patterns of production and consumption, wastefulness, and political and economic interests. This situation highlights the need to reassess the relationship between human beings and nature, making a shift toward lifestyles grounded in environmental sustainability inevitable.

In this context, strengthening the relationship between human beings and nature requires not only scientific and technological approaches but also a renewed awareness of the spiritual bond between humans and the natural world. Today, environmental protection is primarily addressed in economic and technological terms, while the moral and spiritual dimensions of the problem are often neglected. As a result, solutions are frequently proposed through fragmented perspectives rather than holistic approaches. Ongoing debates emphasizing the need to approach contemporary environmental problems from metaphysical and ethical perspectives clearly reflect this situation (Nasr 1996; Jenkins et al. 2017).

However, an examination of the interdisciplinary literature at the intersection of religion and ecology (Gottlieb 2006; Grim et al. 2013; Jenkins et al. 2017) shows that many religious and mystical teachings define the human–nature relationship on ethical and metaphysical grounds, emphasizing that God has entrusted nature to human beings and has charged them with the responsibility of protecting it.

Within these discussions on religion and environmental ethics, Sufism, which expresses the mystical dimension of Islam, also draws particular attention. In classical Sufi metaphysics, nature is generally regarded as a sacred reality manifested through God’s tajallī (self-disclosure) (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 50; Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verse 1785; Chittick 1989, p. 79), and the human relationship with nature is based on ethical responsibility (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 51; Rūmī 2004, vol. 5, verse 41; Demirli 2008, pp. 43–45). In recent studies, these Sufi perspectives have been revisited through the concept of “ecosufism,” which refers to an environmental conception grounded in Sufi metaphysics that approaches the God–cosmos–human relationship as an integrated whole. However, a significant portion of the existing literature (Rozi 2019; Sururi et al. 2020; Febriani et al. 2023; Sugiarti and Riyanto 2024; Sadjali 2024; Rohman et al. 2024) focuses either on the views of particular Sufi figures or on local practices. While these studies draw attention to the concept of ecosufism, they do not ground its ontological and ethical foundations in a sufficiently systematic manner. Consequently, they do not examine in detail the ecological implications of the God–human–nature relationship, and more importantly, they do not adequately address the parallels between ecosufism as derived from Sufi teachings and modern ecological approaches, nor do they sufficiently consider whether ecosufism can offer concrete responses to contemporary environmental problems.

Taking these gaps in the literature into account, this article aims to examine the ontological and ethical foundations of ecosufism not through isolated authorial readings but systematically through the thought of Muḥyiddīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638 AH/1240 CE) and Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672 AH/1273 CE), two foundational figures of Sufi metaphysics whose influence extends both across the Islamic world and globally. The central claim of the article is that, in the works of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, a coherent ground is formed for ecological awareness through ontological and ethical principles. In this way, an ontological ground shaped by the concepts of waḥdat (unity) and tajallī (self-disclosure), a view of the cosmos as living and endowed with awareness, and an ethical understanding based on the virtues of responsibility and iʿtidāl (moderation) come together to form an integrated system. According to this system, nature is a being that carries and reflects God’s self-disclosure and is therefore a trust that human beings are obliged to protect. Human beings, by contrast, are not the absolute masters of nature but moral agents who stand as its guardians.

The first question of this study, which is built around three main questions, is as follows: how do Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī understand the God–cosmos–human relationship, and what kind of ontological and ethical principles—such as unity, self-disclosure, vitality, consciousness, khilāfah (vicegerency), amānah (trust), and moderation—take shape as a result of this understanding? These principles emerge from a close reading of the primary texts of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, rather than being derived from modern ecological theory. The second question inquires about the contributions of Sufi teachings by Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī to the development of a form of awareness in response to modern ecological challenges. The third question concerns which modern approaches to ecological ethics show parallels with Ibn ʿArabī’s and Rūmī’s conceptions of nature.

In this context, it is essential to emphasize that the article does not aim to present ecosufism as the origin or equivalent of modern ecological ethical approaches. Instead, it seeks to examine the approaches to nature articulated by these Sufis within their own religious, historical, and metaphysical contexts and to explore the respects in which these approaches may establish parallels with specific modern ecological perspectives. In this way, it also takes as a guiding principle the refusal to reduce the Sufi conception of nature to modern secular debates and the careful avoidance of anachronism.

The article aims to make three main contributions to the literature on the relationship between mysticism and nature: First, it seeks to explain the ontological and ethical foundations of ecosufism holistically based on the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī. Second, it aims to reveal the structure that links ontological and ethical principles and, in doing so, to make visible a systematic framework that moves from theory to practice. Third, without claiming any historical or conceptual origin or equivalence, it explores the possibility of establishing meaningful similarities and parallels between ecosufism and modern ecological approaches, such as deep ecology, the intrinsic value of nature, the living cosmos, panpsychism, and environmental stewardship and environmental virtue ethics. Through this comparison, the article demonstrates that approaches to nature emerging under different historical, religious, and cultural conditions can produce similar responses to similar problems, highlighting their potential to inform and contribute to one another in addressing the contemporary environmental crisis.

Methodologically, the study draws on hermeneutical approaches (Gadamer 2004). Through these methods, the symbolic and multi-layered narratives found in Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya (The Meccan Revelations) and Fuṣūṣ al-hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom), as well as in Rūmī’s Mathnawī, are analyzed and interpreted within their historical and terminological contexts. At the same time, their parallels with modern ecological theories are examined in a comparative context, drawing on contemporary scholarship. This article’s approach does not situate Sufism within a pre-established ecological framework. Rather, it seeks to identify ontological and ethical principles through a close engagement with the writings of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī. In doing so, it does not rely on the templates of modern ecological theories but instead attends to these concepts within their own conceptual contexts. Therefore, the study does not aim to re-examine Sufi teachings in order to validate modern ecological theories but instead seeks to examine the parallels between Sufi metaphysics and modern ecology—without claiming any influence or conceptual identity.

The article consists of three main sections. Section 1 presents the theoretical framework concerning environmental conceptions in religious and mystical traditions and reviews the literature on the concept of ecosufism. In Section 2, the principles of unity, self-disclosure, vitality, consciousness, vicegerency, trust, and moderation—as they emerge from the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī—are examined as the ontological and ethical foundations of ecosufism. In Section 3, the parallels between these principles and modern ecological approaches are examined in a comparative context. In the conclusion, the ontological and ethical framework of ecosufism, its parallels with contemporary ethical approaches, and its potential contributions to understanding and addressing modern environmental problems are evaluated. In addition, the possible contributions of ecosufism to future interdisciplinary environmental research are emphasized.

In this way, the article aims to demonstrate how Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī—while articulating a shared ontological and ethical ground through different discursive forms—understand the source of nature’s value, human responsibility toward the natural world, and the transformation of spiritual virtues into ecological practices and how this shared perspective can be considered a mystical and ethical resource in the context of contemporary environmental crises.

2. Theoretical and Literature Framework: Environmental Conceptions in Religious and Mystical Traditions and the Development of Ecosufism

Religious and mystical traditions have long viewed the relationship between nature and human beings as a metaphysical and moral issue, making significant contributions to the development of environmental ethics. Particularly in recent years, the deepening environmental crisis has redirected attention toward religious and mystical conceptions of nature, bringing ecological ethical debates to the forefront in various contexts, such as cosmic order, the sacredness of nature, and human responsibility toward the natural world.

The three Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—articulate an ontological and ethical understanding that defines the human position vis-à-vis nature through the concept of trusteeship. Judaism establishes an ethical approach that prescribes a balanced relationship between human beings and nature. It advises that humans benefit from nature without causing harm, refrain from wasting natural resources, protect living beings, and adopt a way of life that seeks harmony with nature rather than conflict (Vogel 2001; Samuelson 2023). In Christianity, according to the passage in Genesis (Gen. 1:26–28), human beings are granted dominion over the earth. However, this dominion implies an obligation to protect and care for all that exists on it (Kearns 1996, p. 58; Kavusa 2019, pp. 239–40). In Islam, the creation of human beings as khalīfas (vicegerents) on earth (Q 2:30) establishes the ontological foundation of environmental ethics by assigning humans, alongside many other moral responsibilities, the duty to protect nature and all living beings. The Qurʾan presents all creatures in nature as a trust entrusted to humanity and states that human beings will be held responsible should ecological balance be disrupted (Q 30:41). Accordingly, the protection of the environment and natural resources and the avoidance of wastefulness are strongly encouraged (Q 7:31; 6:141), thereby outlining a model of environmentally ethical conduct (Haneef 2008, pp. 332–34; İpek 2014, pp. 233–34; Kuzudişli 2014, pp. 149–53; Ayten 2021, p. 31). All forms of excessive consumption and behavior that harm nature and living beings are prohibited, with a particular emphasis on the principles of compassion and trust. The belief that God creates everything, that each living being is created with wisdom, and that every creature serves both a divine purpose and a human need constitutes the core elements of the comprehensive environmental ethics articulated by Islam (Mert 2008, pp. 27–29; Ardoğan 2012; Ayten 2021, pp. 70–71).

Thus, it is evident that all three religious traditions provide a metaphysical and ethical framework for environmental ethics, based on the understanding that humans are trustees responsible for protecting nature, rather than its owners. Mystical traditions, such as Kabbalah, Christian mysticism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sufism, share similar perspectives on nature deepening our understanding of the human–nature relationship. According to mystical traditions, nature is a reflection of God on earth. This material reality manifests truth; therefore, respecting and protecting it constitutes both a spiritual and an ethical obligation.

Jewish mysticism, Kabbalah, understands nature as part of the sefirot system that lies at the heart of its teaching and as a manifestation of divine energy (Matt 1997, pp. 24–29). According to this system, disrupting the balance of nature goes beyond being an ecological problem and constitutes an intervention in the divine will and order (Idel 1988, pp. 144–46). Accordingly, human beings are obliged to protect, respect, and repair nature (Scholem 1995, pp. 274–78). In Christian mysticism, nature is regarded as a manifestation of God’s existence, and thus respect for the environment rests on a mystical foundation (McGinn 2001, pp. 132–33). Consequently, protecting nature is understood as both an ethical and religious duty. In Buddhist environmental thought, nature is viewed as a resource from which humans can benefit, yet it is also regarded as a being worthy of love, respect, and compassion (Henning 2002, p. 10). Environmental sensitivity emerges through inner transformation; as long as human beings fail to discipline their desires for consumption, greed, and selfishness, they cannot live in harmony with the environment (Kaza 2010, pp. 46–47). In Hinduism, nature, like human beings, is considered a manifestation of the divine (Nelson 1998, p. 21; Gosling 2001, p. 24) and therefore must be regarded as a sacred trust and protected accordingly (Nelson 1998, pp. 1–3; Gosling 2001, p. 18).

Sufism, which addresses the esoteric, moral, and spiritual dimensions of Islamic thought, articulates an understanding that places wholeness, compassion, love, balance, and harmony at the center of the relationship between humanity and nature. Within classical Sufi metaphysics, particularly in the works of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, nature is understood as part of God’s self-disclosure, power, and order, and they likewise understand the human being as the guardian of this divine manifestation. By interpreting all living beings in nature as manifestations of one of God’s names, Sufis encourage humans to approach nature with love and compassion and to construct a way of life in harmony with the natural world. Moreover, they consider such an approach a measure of spiritual training and moral development (Demirli 2008, pp. 43–45; Ergül 2015, pp. 206–15; Sayın 2017, pp. 463–66). From this perspective, Sufism addresses environmental ethics through a holistic metaphysical and ethical lens.

The common ground shared by these religious and mystical traditions lies in their understanding of nature as a sacred reality that reflects God and must therefore be protected. Rather than ownership, the principle of trusteeship—entailing moral and spiritual responsibility toward nature—comes to the fore in the human–nature relationship. These approaches thus hold the potential to serve as sources for alternative models of environmental ethics rooted in religious and mystical worldviews, responding to contemporary ecological crises.

In recent years, the approaches of religions and mystical traditions to environmental issues have been examined through interdisciplinary perspectives, and their contributions to environmental problems at the theological, ethical, and practical levels have been increasingly recognized. This body of literature argues that these traditions position nature as a sacred entity and possess the potential to offer solutions to the current ecological crisis (Gottlieb 2006, pp. 4–7; Jenkins et al. 2017, pp. 2–4).

Seyyed Hossein Nasr attributes the roots of environmental problems to modern scientific approaches, humanity’s desire to dominate nature, and the neglect of nature’s sacred character. According to Nasr, ecological consciousness can only be constructed on metaphysical and spiritual foundations (Nasr 1988, pp. 17–23). He further argues that Sufism offers the most profound articulation of how human beings can re-establish their relationship with nature (Nasr 1996, p. 281).

This perspective has come to be conceptualized in contemporary literature under the term “ecosufism.” Ecosufism reinterprets the ethical vision offered by Sufism in response to modern environmental problems and proposes solutions grounded in metaphysical and ethical principles, thereby bringing the call for a life in harmony with nature to the forefront.

In recent years, the number of studies centered on the concept of ecosufism has increased, and the literature has begun to address the relationship between Sufism and nature from various angles. The concept of ecosufism is interpreted by Rozi within the framework of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd (unity of Being). The spiritual balance between God, nature and humanity is presented as the foundation of environmental ethics. This perspective offers a metaphysically grounded approach to environmental ethics in response to ecological crises (Rozi 2019). Sururi, Kuswanjono, and Utomo center on Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s critiques of the environmental crisis, utilizing the concept of ecosufism to add a metaphysical dimension to modern environmental approaches (Sururi et al. 2020). Sadjali also analyzes the concept of ecosufism through Nasr’s ideas, interpreting the environmental crisis from a Sufi perspective (Sadjali 2024). Febriani and colleagues address the concept of ecosufism through a thematic interpretation approach based on Quraish Shihab’s work Tafsīr al-Miṣbāḥ (Febriani et al. 2023). Sugiarti and Riyanto use a field-based approach to ecosufism to examine the ecologically conscious lifestyles of local Sufis in Indonesia’s Pekalongan region. They emphasize the importance of Sufism in environmental ethics (Sugiarti and Riyanto 2024). Rohman and associates analyze the ecosufism movement by examining an Islamic school in Indonesia, illustrating the application of Sufi teachings to environmental practices (Rohman et al. 2024).

While the existing ecosufism literature emphasizes that Sufism addresses the human–nature relationship both theoretically and practically and offers an ethical and spiritual perspective on environmental problems, it does not systematically examine the ontological and ethical coherence of Sufi conceptions of nature, nor does it provide a conceptual and text-based analysis linking Sufi teachings with modern ecological theories. This gap in the literature leaves unanswered the question of how ecosufism can contribute to addressing contemporary environmental problems. Aiming to fill this gap, the present article examines ecosufism holistically through its ontological and ethical foundations and evaluates it comparatively in relation to modern ecological approaches.

3. The Theoretical Foundations of Ecosufism: The Ontological and Ethical Perspective of Nature in Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī

Due to the deepening environmental crisis worldwide, conceptions of nature found in religious and mystical traditions, alongside modern ecological approaches, are being reconsidered. In this context, the Sufi understanding of nature has been articulated through the concept of “ecosufism”. As foundational figures of Sufi metaphysics and representatives of a theocentric understanding of being, Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī address the relationship between nature and human beings from ontological and ethical perspectives. In their doctrines, nature appears as living and endowed with awareness as a manifestation of the Absolute One. The human being, by contrast, is understood as the ontologically superior being within the cosmic order and as a moral subject bearing responsibility for the preservation of the entire cosmic order.

In this section, the theoretical foundations of ecosufism are examined through the lens of Ibn ʿArabī’s and Rūmī’s conceptions of nature under four main headings. First, the principles of unity and self-disclosure are examined within the framework of the God–cosmos–human relationship. A discussion of the understanding of cosmic vitality and consciousness follows this. Subsequently, the ethical responsibility grounded in the human being’s ontological superiority is addressed through the concepts of vicegerency and trust. Ultimately, the practical manifestation of this ethical responsibility is embodied in the concept of moderation.

3.1. From Absolute Unity to Cosmic Diversity: Waḥdat (Unity) and Tajallī (Self-Disclosure)

One of the most fundamental issues in Sufi thought is the concept of being, which is used to explain the relationship between God, the cosmos and humanity. Both Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī address this relationship from an ontological perspective, based on the principles of unity and self-disclosure. Unity refers to the oneness and absoluteness of God (al-Hakīm 1981, p. 1145; Chittick 1994, p. 8), while divine self-disclosure denotes the manifestation of this Being in created things, that is, the appearance of God’s existence within multiplicity (Chittick 1998, pp. 78–80). Accordingly, for both Sufis, the cosmos and the human being consist of different degrees of divine self-disclosure. The passages cited below from the works of both Sufis are examined not merely as metaphysical expressions but also as clarifications of the ontological foundations of ecosufism.

In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, being belongs exclusively to God in an absolute sense, and all created things are manifestations of His existence (Chittick 1989, p. 79). Ibn ʿArabī expresses this view, which forms the core of the doctrine of unity of Being, in the Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya as follows:

“Nothing exists but God; even if multiplicity appears in mushāhada (witnessing), Being is one”.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 4, p. 357)

With this statement, Ibn ʿArabī explains that nature is a manifestation of God and not merely an object, thereby laying the metaphysical foundation for nature’s intrinsic value.

Multiplicity, therefore, is merely an appearance, whereas the essential reality is the unity of God (Chittick 1989, p. 57). According to Ibn ʿArabī, God created the cosmos as a mirror in which He contemplates His own names and attributes. Through the metaphor of the mirror, he explains the manifestation of unity in the universe, that is, the concept of self-disclosure:

“The Reality gave existence to the whole Cosmos [at first] as an undifferentiated thing without anything of the spirit in it, so that it was like an unpolished mirror”.

(Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 50)

Ibn ʿArabī also explains the universe’s lack of independent existence in relation to God through the metaphor of the ẓill (shadow). According to him, everything in the cosmos is the shadow of God’s existence, and the visible forms are nothing more than appearances or imaginings (Chittick 1989, p. 117; Corbin 1998, p. 191). Ibn ʿArabī states:

Know that what is ‘other than the Reality,’ which is called the Cosmos, is, in relation to the Reality, as a shadow is to that which casts the shadow, for it is the shadow of God, this being the same as the relation between Being and the Cosmos, since the shadow is, without doubt, something sensible.

(Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 123)

He further remarks:

“God created another creature. If you say of it that it both exists and does not exist, you speak the truth. It is imagination”.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 3, p. 442)

According to these statements, all forms that appear in the universe are shadows of the divine reality and remain, in relation to this reality, at the level of khayāl (imagination) (al-ʿAfīfī n.d., p. 103). In Rūmī’s ontology, being is likewise understood within the framework of unity and self-disclosure, and the universe is defined as the manifestation of the Absolute One. According to Rūmī, everything that appears in the cosmos emerges from God and continues to exist in constant unity with Him (Chittick 1983, p. 20). Nature and the human being are therefore not separate from God but represent different degrees of self-disclosure. Rūmī expresses this idea clearly in the Mathnawī:

“Our Mathnawī is the shop for Unity; anything that you see (there) except the One (God) is (only) an idol”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 6, verse 1528)

For Rūmī, thinking in terms other than unity distances the human being from truth (Chittick 1983, pp. 24–25). Therefore, one who seeks truth must abandon the distinction between “I” and “you” and grasp that all existence is grounded in a single divine source:

“O Thou whose soul is free from ‘we’ and ‘I’”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verse 1785)

“All this is (true), and do Thou come, O (Lord of the) Creative Word”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verse 1789)

In articulating his conception of nature, Rūmī employs the analogy of “lions on a banner” to illustrate that, just like human beings, everything in nature is a manifestation dependent on God’s existence and that even movement itself occurs only through this dependence:

Who are we, O thou soul of our souls, that we should remain in being beside thee?

We and our existences are (really) non-existences: thou art the absolute Being which manifests the perishable.

We all are lions, but lions on a banner: because of the wind they are rushing onward from moment to moment.

Our wind (that whereby we are moved) and our Being are of thy gift;

Our whole existence is from thy bringing (us) into being.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verses 601–5)

When this image employed by Rūmī is considered, it becomes clear that he does not view nature as a merely mechanical structure but rather understands it as a dynamic reality dependent upon God. According to these verses, the one who realizes unity establishes an existential identification with God and nature, recognizing that the separation between them is an illusion.

Thus, the same underlying truth is highlighted by Ibn ʿArabī through the metaphors of the mirror and the shadow and Rūmī through the images of the shop of unity and the lions on a banner. For both Sufi thinkers, the separation between human beings, nature, and God is an illusion; in reality, everything in nature is an appearance of a single being in different forms. This perspective constitutes the ontological foundation of ecosufism. Viewing nature as the locus of self-disclosure allows human beings to see both themselves and the natural world as mirrors reflecting God’s names and attributes. This metaphysical and cosmic mode of thought gives rise to an ecological ethical consciousness grounded in sensitivity toward nature, since harming nature comes to be perceived as harming self-disclosure itself. At this point, Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, in addition to the principles of unity and self-disclosure, construct another ontological layer of ecosufism by conceiving the cosmos as a living and conscious reality.

3.2. The Continuity of Divine Self-Disclosure in Nature: The Vitality and Consciousness of the Cosmos

In Sufi thought, nature is regarded as a living and conscious being that is continuously the locus of God’s self-disclosure. In this sense, Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī describe a form of cosmic vitality that flows uninterrupted from God into every particle of the universe (Chittick 2007, p. 92).

In the Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, Ibn ʿArabī states that there is nothing in nature that is absolutely inanimate or devoid of consciousness. According to him:

“Everything is either ḥayy nāṭiq (living and rational) or ḥayawān nāṭiq (a rational living being). Whatever is described as mineral, plant, or dead belongs to this category”.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 3, pp. 490–91)

However, Ibn ʿArabī draws attention to the fact that this cosmic vitality and consciousness cannot be apprehended at every level of awareness (Izutsu 1984, pp. 39–40). According to him, only those who are spiritually illuminated, –ahl al-kashf (people of unveiling)–can perceive this divine reality. Ibn ʿArabī expresses this as follows:

God has veiled the eyes of some of His servants from perceiving the life and consciousness that permeate all existence. That whose vitality is manifest is called living and alive, whereas that whose vitality remains concealed and is not apparent to every eye is termed plant or mineral. Thus, for the veiled, reality appears divided, while for the people of unveiling, it remains undivided.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 3, p. 258)

Ibn ʿArabī maintains that all beings in nature are alive and possess consciousness and that they incessantly glorify (tasbīḥ) God:

“God has veiled our eyes from perceiving the vitality of what is called mineral and plant. Nevertheless, we affirm that they are alive, for they glorify God, and whatever glorifies God is living and rational”.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 4, p. 177)

Within this cosmic understanding, Ibn ʿArabī establishes a connection between the four elements of nature (air, water, earth, and fire), the three realms of nature (mineral, plant, and animal), and the miracles of the prophets (Chittick 1984, p. 5). For example, in the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, he emphasizes that God subjected not only human beings, jinn, and animals, but also the elements themselves, to Solomon (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 195; Chittick 1984, p. 26).

Rūmī similarly views nature not as a collection of lifeless objects but as one of the manifestations of God—living and conscious (Clarke 2003, pp. 41–42). According to him, each element of nature bears a trace of God’s presence, and everything that appears inanimate is in fact a being endowed with will that obeys God’s command.

This understanding is clearly expressed in the following verses of the Mathnawī:

“Air and earth and water and fire are (His) slaves: with you and me they are dead, but with God they are alive”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verse 838)

“You yourself, too, know what the limpid water is saying to the sweet herbs and the sapling”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 6, verse 1069)

Then the sun says, ‘O thou who art not right (in thy belief), when I set ’twill become evident.

(thou wilt see what the truth is)

The plants say, ‘We are green of ourselves; we are blooming and smiling, and we are tall by nature’.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verses 3264–65)

In these verses, Rūmī depicts the elements of nature not only as living and possessing will but also as speaking and even feeling beings (Clarke 2003, p. 42). This vitality and speech of nature cannot be grasped through the senses; they require spiritual perception. As Rūmī states:

“The speech of water, the speech of earth, and the speech of mud are apprehended by the sense of those who have hearts (the mystics)”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verse 3279)

This verse emphasizes that the voices of nature can only be heard by spiritually purified hearts.

Another aspect of nature’s vitality in Rūmī’s thought is its continuous glorification of God through its very existence (Clarke 2003, p. 45). This understanding resonates with the Qurʾanic verse:

“The seven heavens and the earth and whatever is in them exalt Him. And there is not a thing except that it exalts [Allah] by His praise, but you do not understand their glorification”.

(Q 17:44)

Rūmī seems to interpret this verse in the Mathnawī as follows:

Inasmuch as Thou hast made everything a glorifier (of Thee)—the undiscerning and the discerning (alike).

Each glorifies (Thee) in a different way, and one is unaware of the state of this one.

Man disbelieves in the glorification uttered by inanimate things, but those inanimate things are masters in (performing) worship.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 3, verses 1495–97)

According to these verses, Rūmī emphasizes that every being in nature remembers God in its own way and that this dhikr (remembrance) is not limited to verbal expression. Beings turn toward God and glorify Him in accordance with their mode of existence, that is, in a manner appropriate to their creation.

Throughout the Mathnawī, Rūmī frequently portrays nature as a living and speaking reality and presents natural elements as intelligent beings capable of establishing relationships with prophets:

The wind becomes a bearer for Solomon, the sea becomes capable of understanding words in regard to Moses.

The moon becomes able to see the sign in obedience to Ahmad (Mohammed), the fire becomes roses for Abraham.

The earth swallows Qarun (Korah) like a snake; the moaning pillar comes into (the way of) righteousness.

The stone greets Ahmad (Mohammed); the mountain sends a message to Yahya (John the Baptist).

(They all say), ‘We have hearing and sight, and we are joyful, (although) with you, the uninitiated, we are mute’.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 3, verses 1015–19)

According to these verses, all elements and beings in nature serve as instruments of God’s will. Wind, sea, moon, earth, and fire function as messengers conveying God’s signs to the prophets. In other words, they are living beings that transmit divine speech.

In Rūmī’s thought, another reflection of the relationship between nature and the prophets appears in the portrayal of natural beings as helpers to the prophets. Rūmī uses these examples to portray elements of nature as conscious agents reflecting God’s self-disclosure, thereby underscoring nature’s ethical and ontological significance. This is clearly expressed in the following verses:

How that vengeful Sea dashed on Pharaoh, and how this Earth behaved to Qarun (Korah);

And what those babil (swifts) did to the Elephant, and how the gnat devoured the skull of Nimrod;

And how David hurled a stone (which) became six hındred pieces and shattered an army.

Stones rained upon the enemies of Lot, so that they were submerged in black water.

If I relate the help given rationally to the prophets by the inanimate things of the world.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 4, verses 785–89)

Thus, both Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī maintain that the cosmos is entirely composed of living, conscious, speaking beings oriented toward God. Both emphasize that this vitality is too subtle to be perceived by the senses and can only be grasped through spiritual unveiling. With this ontological perspective, nature becomes an ethical counterpart to humans. For this reason, the understanding of cosmic vitality and consciousness not only reinforces the ontological foundations of ecosufism, built upon unity and self-disclosure, but also prepares the ground for its ethical dimension. On the basis of such a vision of the universe, Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī go on to discuss the human position and responsibility toward nature through the concepts of vicegerency and trust.

3.3. From Ontological Superiority to Ethical Responsibility: Khilāfah (Vicegerency) and Amānah (Trust)

Islam maintains that humans are ontologically superior because they are God’s khalīfa (vicegerent) on earth, entrusted with His trust as the highest beings (Q 33:72; 2:30). However, this superiority also entails certain ethical responsibilities. The most important of these responsibilities is to protect everything in the universe. When viewed from this angle, it is evident that one of the most significant trusts given to humans in Islam is nature. By basing humanity’s place on earth on ontological superiority and ethical responsibility, Sufis deepen this Islamic perspective.

Ibn ʿArabī approaches the Qurʾānic conception of the human being on an ontological plane within the framework of his doctrine of al-insān al-kāmil (the Perfect Man). According to him, humanity’s status as God’s vicegerent signifies not only the human being’s elevated position within the cosmos but also points to the cosmic function of the Perfect Man as a steward of existence. Indeed, in Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, Ibn ʿArabī explicitly states that God preserves the universe through the mediation of the Perfect Man:

The [above-mentioned] formation is called Man and Vice-Regent [of God]. As for the first term, it stems from the universality of his formation and the fact that he embraces all the realities. For the Reality, he is as the pupil is for the eye through which the act of seeing takes place. Thus, he is called insan [meaning both man and pupil], for it is by him that the Reality looks on His creation and bestows the Mercy [of existence] on them.

(Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 51)

By describing the human being as the pupil of the eye, Ibn ʿArabī explains that the human is the most exalted and precious being in whom God manifests Himself. Another meaning implied here is that the human being becomes the means through which God looks upon His creation with mercy. Ibn ʿArabī explains this understanding more concretely with a metaphor; he compares the Perfect Man being to the kings who protect their treasures with seals. Therefore, God also protects the universe through the human being, who is the seal of this universe:

He is, in relation to the Cosmos, as the seal is to the ring, the seal being that place whereon is engraved the token with which the King seals his treasure. So he is called the Vice-Regent, for by him God preserves His creation, as the seal preserves the king’s treasure. … Even so is the Cosmos preserved so long as the Perfect Man remains in it.

(Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 51)

By presenting the Perfect Man as the means by which the cosmos is preserved, Ibn ʿArabī implicitly frames human existence as responsible for the continuity and protection of the natural order, thereby giving the doctrine of al-insān al-kāmil clear ecological implications. These passages clearly demonstrate that Ibn ʿArabī conceives of the human being not only as an ontologically superior entity but also as a guardian and trustee whose presence sustains the very existence of the world. However, alongside this exalted status, Ibn ʿArabī emphasizes the inseparable bond between the human being and nature by centering his argument on a Qurʾānic verse:

The human being was created from the earth: ‘From it We created you, to it We shall return you, and from it We shall bring you forth once again.’ (Q 20:55) Even though all the elements are present in the human being, the most essential element is the earth.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 1, p. 211)

Through these remarks, Ibn ʿArabī regards nature as the very source of the human body. Since humans originate from the earth and ultimately return to it, they bear a moral responsibility toward nature. Indeed, when human beings fail to protect nature and instead destroy it, they neglect their moral responsibility toward the very source of their own existence.

Rūmī approaches vicegerency and trust as an ethical dilemma expressed through the themes of moral responsibility and tawāḍuʿ (humility). In contrast, Ibn ʿArabī bases his understanding of these concepts on the idea of the Perfect Man. Rūmī regards human vicegerency as an existential form of excellence, maintaining that its highest rank is attained by winning the hearts of others. In Rūmī’s thought, human vicegerency does not consist in ruling over the world but rather in the responsibility to protect the beings that exist within it.

“Since in this epoch thou, O Vicegerent of God, art the commander of all righteous hearts”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 5, verse 41)

By linking vicegerency to spiritual maturity, Rūmī underscores the deep affinity and interdependence between the human being and nature. He insists that the human being is not separate from the natural world but is, instead, an integral part of it:

“Since thou art a part of the world”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 4, verse 2368)

Rūmī’s idea emphasizes humanity’s cosmic connection to nature and highlights its moral responsibility towards the natural world. According to him, since humans and nature exist in ontological unity, humans protect themselves when they protect nature. Rūmī’s approach parallels the Quran’s emphasis on humanity being created from the earth (Q 20:55; 23:12). Indeed, Rūmī also reminds us that humans are created from the earth and will ultimately return to it, drawing attention to the consciousness of humility:

“The earth also will return this earthen body of mine; to earth thou likewise wilt return, O terrible one”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 4, verse 2314)

Conversely, Rūmī criticizes the human tendency to fall into kibr (arrogance) and seek domination over nature, viewing such attitudes as signs of moral degeneration rather than superiority:

After all, you are a son of Adam. O degenerate! How long will you regard lowness as nobility?

How long will you say, ‘I will conquer a whole world, I will make this world full of myself’?

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verses 541–42)

In these verses, Rūmī criticizes humanity’s desire to dominate nature. In his view, humanity’s vicegerency is realized by protecting nature with humility and remaining faithful to the trust placed in them. Thus, like Ibn ʿArabī, Rūmī views vicegerency not only as a position of superiority but also as a position of protection and trustee.

Taken together, both Sufi thinkers ground humanity’s moral responsibility toward nature in responsibility toward the truth of one’s own being, thereby laying one of the most fundamental ethical foundations of ecosufism. For this ethical responsibility to be translated into concrete practice in everyday life, it must be guided by iʿtidāl (moderation), one of the central moral principles of Sufi ethics.

3.4. The Ethical Framework of Cosmic Balance: Iʿtidāl (Moderation)

In the Islamic intellectual tradition, the concept of moderation is regarded as one of the fundamental moral principles that delineate the limits of humanity’s engagement with worldly matters. In this respect, the Sufi tradition similarly advises that human beings should benefit from nature in a measured way, adopt a lifestyle that remains in harmony with the natural world, and adopt moderation as a guiding principle in preserving cosmic balance. Both Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī ground the relationship between human beings and nature in the concept of moderation, placing particular emphasis on humanity’s moral responsibility toward the environment. From their perspective, moderation constitutes a necessary duty toward the natural world and represents the most effective means of protecting it.

In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, the primary way for human beings to live a moderate life lies in being aware of their carnal needs without falling entirely under their control. He maintains that when a person adopts a measured attitude toward bodily needs, this restraint brings about spiritual balance, which in turn shapes the individual’s relationship with nature. Conversely, when bodily desires are left unchecked, this condition inevitably extends to the way nature is used. In other words, excess in consumption leads to the exploitation of natural resources and results in the disruption of cosmic balance. In this context, Ibn ʿArabī emphasizes in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya the necessity of maintaining balance and moderation in relation to the desires of the self:

As for the People of God, they engage with material affairs insofar as their vegetal and animal souls are concerned; yet, from another perspective, they remain with God. Just as the need for nourishment in this world does not veil them from God and spiritual matters, so too will the sensory delights of Paradise in the hereafter not veil them from God, even though they are described by names befitting the next life.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 1, p. 641)

With these words, Ibn ʿArabī expresses that excessive worldliness hinders the human spiritual journey while also acknowledging a legitimate, measured relationship with worldly blessings without completely distancing oneself from them. Thanks to this balanced attitude, humans manage to be moderate both in their inner world and in their relationships with the outside world. Ibn ʿArabī further concretizes this point, particularly through the theme of hunger:

Hunger is the reduction of food intake. The seeker eats only as much as enables him to stand before his Lord in obligatory prayer. Satiety invites superfluous matters. When the stomach is full, the limbs rebel and expend their energy on unnecessary movement, thought, sensation, and speech. All of this diverts the seeker from the path.

(Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 1, p. 278)

Accordingly, Ibn ʿArabī places eating according to need at the very foundation of Sufi discipline and articulates moderation in consumption as a guiding principle. Indeed, overeating also makes the relationship between humans and nature and their environment consumption-oriented. In this context, Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of moderation expresses a sense of moral responsibility related to preserving cosmic balance by limiting consumption.

Like Ibn ʿArabī, Rūmī also places the concept of moderation at the center of the moral relationship that humans establish with nature. Rūmī addresses this issue with more concrete examples than Ibn ʿArabī. For Rūmī, nature has been placed at humanity’s service by God in order to meet human needs. By virtue of creation itself, there exists an absolute and moral relationship between human beings and the natural world, and the continuation of this order depends on humans acting with moderation and compassion toward nature. Rūmī explains this necessary and moral relationship through the process of plants emerging from the union of soil and water, and these plants becoming food for humans and animals:

The grace of God bestows a throat on the earth, to the end that it may drink water and make a hundred herbs to grow.

Again, He bestows on the creature of earth (the animal) a throat and lip, in order that it may eat its (the earth’s) herbage with desire.

When the animal has eaten its herbage, it becomes fat; the animal becomes a mouthful for Man and goes (disappears).

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 2, verses 22–24)

Rūmī emphasizes that human life is tied to the cycle of soil, plants, and animals and points out that the moral limit of human exploitation of nature is moderation. Thus, moderation is a moral stance that also encompasses a responsibility towards nature. As these verses indicate, Rūmī regards humanity’s use of nature as legitimate. At the same time, he places particular emphasis on the fact that everything human beings eat and drink ultimately originates from the earth, highlighting soil as the essential resource upon which life depends:

This mouth, indeed, has always been an eater of earth,

but of earth that has been coloured.

This roast meat and this wine, and this sugar

are merely coloured and painted earth, O son.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 6, verses 4705–6)

Through these lines, Rūmī reminds human beings that the source of all nourishment lies in the earth and encourages a more conscious attitude toward nature. Rūmī points out that everything human beings eat and drink ultimately depends on the soil, and in doing so, he implies that our responsibility toward nature calls for a balanced and mindful attitude. He further links moderation in benefiting from nature to the principle of avoiding waste, explicitly referring to the Qurʾānic injunction, “Eat and drink, but do not waste” (Q 7:31):

“Hence the command ‘Eat’ is given for the sake of the snare (temptation) of appetite; after that (comes) ‘Do not exceed’: that is temperance”.

(Rūmī 2004, vol. 5, verse 582)

This statement reveals that Rūmī understands moderation in the use of natural resources as a religious and moral responsibility. While fulfilling one’s innate needs is natural, consumption that reaches the level of indulgent desire harms both the individual and the natural world. In this way, Rūmī implicitly suggests that excessive consumption leads to environmental degradation and irresponsible use of natural resources.

In conclusion, Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī define moderation as an ethical criterion in human responsibility towards nature and regard it as one of the indispensable principles in protecting nature. When understood as the transformation of humanity’s ontological awareness into ethical conduct, moderation becomes one of the key elements forming the practical and moral foundations of ecosufism.

4. Ontological and Ethical Parallels Between Ecosufism and Modern Ecological Approaches

Ecosufism, based on the ontological and ethical foundations established by Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, shares some commonalities with specific prominent approaches in modern ecological thought. However, pointing out these parallels does not imply that ecosufism is the origin or equivalent of modern ecological theories. The aim here is to demonstrate that ecosufism and modern ecological approaches focus on similar problems concerning the human-nature relationship within different historical, religious, and cultural contexts and offer similar solutions to these problems. In this vein, the ontological and ethical principles of ecosufism will be examined in relation to the perspectives of deep ecology, intrinsic value of nature, living cosmos, panpsychism, environmental stewardship, and environmental virtue ethics.

4.1. Deep Ecology and the Intrinsic Value of Nature

As a modern ecological approach, deep ecology posits that nature is inherently valuable, rather than assessing its value solely based on the benefits it provides to humans. Arne Naess’s foundational claim regarding deep ecology is that human beings do not occupy the center of nature and that all entities within the natural world exist in a web of relationships. For Naess, the intrinsic value of nature arises precisely from this network of interrelations, which leads him to reject an anthropocentric understanding of nature. According to him, nothing in the universe exists independently; instead, all beings owe their existence to one another through relations of mutual dependence (Naess 1973, pp. 95–96).

According to Devall and Sessions, deep ecology rejects an anthropocentric worldview and asserts that nature has an intrinsic value of its own, rather than being merely instrumental (Devall and Sessions 1985, p. 70). They describe deep ecology not simply as an ethical framework but as a philosophy of life that requires perceiving all beings in the universe as parts of an interconnected whole (Devall and Sessions 1985, pp. 65–67).

Warwick Fox approaches deep ecology from the perspective of the self. In Fox, deep ecology is based on the idea that human beings are not separate from nature but are fundamentally interconnected with it. When individuals come to see themselves as continuous with the natural world, their sense of self expands to encompass the entire cosmos. Through this process of identification, the protection of nature ceases to be merely a moral obligation and instead becomes an extension of self-realization. In this way, Fox interprets the deep ecological notion of intrinsic value through a perspective that combines ethical concern with an ontological understanding of the self (Fox 1995, pp. 221–25).

Although the ontological and ethical positions of deep ecology do not share a historical or conceptual identity with ecosufism, they nevertheless display notable similarities with the understanding of nature articulated by Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī. At the center of both Sufis’ metaphysical outlook lies the principles of waḥdat and tajallī, which rest on the idea that real being belongs solely to God and that everything in the universe represents manifestations of divine existence at different levels. According to Ibn ʿArabī, the real being is God. The universe is a mirror or shadow of His existence. For this reason, Ibn ʿArabī defends the idea that the multiplicity in the universe is not the multiplication of absolute unity but the manifestation of absolute unity in different forms (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 50; Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 3, p. 442). Rūmī similarly conveys the idea that all things emerge from the One and that the apparent ontological distinctions between God, the world, and humanity are ultimately illusory, a theme he repeatedly develops through narratives and analogies in the Mathnawī (Rūmī 2004, vol. 6, verse 1528; vol. 1, verse 1785; vol. 1, verses 601–5).

From this perspective, the parallel between ecosufism and deep ecology does not stem from a shared metaphysical foundation but from their common recognition of nature as possessing value in and of itself. The views of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī parallel those of Naess, Devall & Session, as well as Fox, who understood that all beings in nature are interdependent and ontologically inseparable. Both Sufis conceive of human beings and the natural world as entities dependent upon God, interpret this dependence as a consequence of divine unity, and regard nature as a domain in which the divine names are manifested. Through this understanding, nature is endowed with a transcendent value. Therefore, it is possible to say that the concept of nature’s “intrinsic value” in deep ecology and the understanding of nature as the “a space of divine self-disclosure” in ecosufism, despite being based on different metaphysical foundations, converge on the idea that nature possesses a transcendent value independent of humans.

Another point of convergence can be observed between Rūmī’s emphasis on overcoming the “I–Thou” distinction and the notion of the ecological expansion of the self in deep ecology. For Rūmī, the self reaches fulfillment only when it apprehends unity within the multiplicity of nature. Modern ecology argues that for human beings to preserve themselves, they must first protect nature, since humans fundamentally constitute an inseparable part of the ecological system.

When these parallels are considered, it can be seen that although the fundamental principles of deep ecology and ecosufism emerged from different historical and metaphysical backgrounds, they present similar approaches in both ontological and ethical dimensions.

4.2. Living Cosmos and Panpsychism

Modern ecology’s living cosmos and panpsychism approaches criticize the materialist discourse that defines nature as an unconscious and mechanical structure, although some contemporary panpsychist theories are formulated within broadly materialist or physicalist frameworks (Strawson 2008; Brüntrup and Jaskolla 2017; Goff 2017). According to these approaches, the universe is a whole of living and conscious beings, and everything in nature possesses a cosmic vitality. Although the concept of a living and conscious nature, one of the theoretical foundations of ecosufism, and the perspectives of panpsychism and the living universe do not share the same metaphysical grounding, there are interesting commonalities between them.

In the thought of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, the universe is described as a living reality continuously exposed to divine self-disclosure. The universe, which is not only alive but also conscious, constantly remembers God. In Ibn ʿArabī, there is nothing in nature that is absolutely inanimate; however, this cosmic vitality cannot be apprehended through the senses alone and is perceptible only to those endowed with spiritual unveiling (ahl al-kashf) (Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 3, pp. 490–91; vol. 3, p. 258). Rūmī takes a similar approach and describes water, air, earth, and fire as “slaves” in his Mathnawī, stating that they are beings with free will. Rūmī also states that the sun, plants, water, and earth speak, adding that this speech can be heard by those who are “people of the heart” (ahl al-dil) (Rūmī 2004, vol. 1, verse 838; vol. 6, verse 1069; vol. 1, verses 3264–65).

This brief outline of ecosufism’s understanding of nature does not offer a theory of consciousness identical to those proposed within modern ecological thought, particularly by Freya Mathews and others working on living cosmos and panpsychism. Nevertheless, it overlaps with them at key points, especially in rejecting views that reduce nature to a mindless aggregation of matter. Panpsychism, as an alternative to materialist philosophies that strictly separate matter and mind as two distinct substances, maintains that matter itself contains a psychic principle and attributes an inner life or mentality to all physical entities (Mathews 2003, p. 34).

In her work on living cosmos and panpsychism, Mathews criticizes any approach that reduces nature to non-conscious matter, arguing that such views lead ethically to anthropocentrism—that is, to a hierarchical worldview in which only human beings are regarded as intrinsically valuable. She instead contends that nature should be understood as a conscious reality and evaluated as a meaningful existence for all beings, not merely for humans (Mathews 2020, pp. 131–32). This position bears apparent similarities to the cosmological perspectives of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī. For both Sufis, every being in the universe possesses life and awareness as a manifestation of God, while for Mathews, the cosmos itself is living and its constituents possess forms of perception appropriate to their respective modes of existence.

Panpsychist approaches, on the other hand, discuss the contributions of panpsychism to environmental ethics, stating that, contrary to materialism, the entire universe is made up of beings with varying degrees of consciousness. Thus, beings in nature possess intrinsic value and possess a potential that goes beyond being merely instrumental entities. Such approaches also do not position humans as separate from nature but rather consider human consciousness to be part of the continuity of cosmic consciousness (Ogonegbu 2025, pp. 7–10). This view closely aligns with the understanding articulated by Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, who conceive of nature as a living and conscious manifestation of God.

In conclusion, the concept of a living and conscious universe, emphasized by Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, forming the basis of ecosufism, shares ontological and ethical similarities with the living cosmos and panpsychist approaches adopted by modern ecology. Rather than positioning human beings as absolute masters of nature, both perspectives regard humanity as an integral part of a living universe. Nature is thus presented as an indispensable component of a holistic ecosystem of which human beings themselves are a part. Addressing these approaches, emerging from different historical and metaphysical grounds, together may enable the strengthening of a more inclusive environmental ethics discourse in response to modern environmental issues.

4.3. Environmental Stewardship

As one approach to modern ecological ethics, environmental stewardship entails that humans should utilize natural resources responsibly, considering the interests of all living beings and future generations. This approach positions humans not as owners of the ecosystem but as stewards who protect it in its entirety. Environmental stewardship is considered an ethical responsibility that requires “responsible use” and is based on “answerability” to society and future generations regarding the conscious and measured use of natural resources (Worrell and Appleby 2000, pp. 263–64). In this vein, Bennett and colleagues define environmental stewardship as “the actions taken by individuals, groups or networks of actors, with various motivations and levels of capacity, to protect, care for or responsibly use the environment in pursuit of environmental and/or social outcomes in diverse social–ecological contexts” (Bennett et al. 2018, p. 599).

Beyond this, the environmental stewardship approach also articulates several ethical principles related to ecological awareness, particularly through concepts such as relational values and care ethics. West and his colleagues emphasize the relational values that humans establish with all of nature. Through the principle of care ethics, they explain not only that stewardship is merely a theoretical ethical approach but also that it involves concrete practices that translate into action (West et al. 2018, pp. 32–35).

Although the relationship between environmental stewardship and ecosufism does not rest on a conceptual identity, the human-nature relationship articulated by Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī through the notions of vicegerency and trust displays significant affinities with the modern understanding of environmental stewardship. Indeed, ecosufism addresses the statements in the Qur’anic verses that humans are vicegerents entrusted with stewardship (Qur’an 33:72; 2:30) on an ontological basis. In particular, Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of the Perfect Man offers humanity a metaphysical perspective on its role as stewards of nature. According to Ibn ʿArabī, humans are like God’s pupils in the universe because they manifest all divine names. God’s view of humans as His vicegerents stems from the comprehensiveness of their creation and their mercy towards other beings (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 51). Ibn ʿArabī also describes humans as “the seal of the universe,” in other words, its protector (Ibn al-‘Arabī 1980, p. 51). Therefore, according to Ibn ʿArabī, the fact that humans are the most superior beings in the universe also gives them the role of stewards of the universe.

This view closely aligns with the core principles emphasized by environmental stewardship, particularly the responsible and conscious use of nature, as well as answerability and responsible use toward society and future generations. The unique contribution that ecosufism can make to the environmental stewardship approach within the scope of these principles is that it offers a vision in which human responsibility towards nature is also a responsibility towards God. For Ibn ʿArabī, the obligation to protect the environment is not directed solely toward society but ultimately toward God Himself. Seyyed Hossein Nasr similarly points to this issue by identifying the root of the modern environmental crisis in humanity’s loss of awareness of vicegerency and trust, along with the forgetting of nature’s sacred character (Nasr 1988, pp. 17–19).

Rūmī’s conception of vicegerency is based on the idea that humans should protect nature with humility and compassion and that they are an inseparable part of the universe. Rūmī’s vicegerency emphasizes this point by referring to it as “being king over all hearts” (Rūmī 2004, vol. 5, verse 41) and considering humans as “a part of the universe” (Rūmī 2004, vol. 4, verse 2368). Rūmī’s approach aligns with the principle of relational values that stands out in environmental stewardship. The principle of relational values, which addresses the connection people establish with the socio-ecological system in their region as a sense of belonging and responsibility, offers the same assessment as ecosufism’s understanding of ontological unity and moral commitment between humans and nature.

Rūmī’s view of humans as beings who come from the earth and return to it, presenting the desire to dominate nature as a moral flaw and humility as a sense of stewardship (Rūmī 2004, vol. 4, verse 2314), draws an ethical framework similar to the approach of environmental stewardship within the context of the care ethic principle, whereby people limit their own interests in order to safeguard the long-term well-being of the ecosystem.

Thus, the concepts of vicegerency and trust in ecosufism converge with the principles of responsible use, answerability, care ethics, and relational values that are prominent in the modern environmental stewardship approach on a common ethical ground. In addition, ecosufism has the potential to bring a strong metaphysical and spiritual perspective to the discourse on environmental stewardship by addressing the issue as a responsibility of humans towards both God and nature.

4.4. Environmental Virtue Ethics

Environmental virtue ethics argues that preserving ecological balance and achieving sustainable consumption can only be achieved through human moral competence. This approach bases humanity’s relationship with nature on certain moral virtues. Within this framework, virtues such as temperance, simplicity, humility, and self-restraint are regarded as the fundamental moral conditions of an environmentally sensitive way of life (Hill 1983; Sandler 2017, p. 224).

Ronald Sandler defines consumption as the excessive and unsustainable use of environmental goods and treats this practice as both an environmental and a moral problem (Sandler 2007, p. 58). According to this viewpoint, environmental virtue ethics is a process of moral development and transformation in which people set limits on their consumption patterns, control their impulses, and adopt a measured way of behaving.

Within the Sufi tradition, this model of measured behavior is articulated through the concept of moderation. In this respect, ecosufism exhibits an apparent affinity with environmental virtue ethics. For instance, according to Ibn ʿArabī, the primary condition for establishing a harmonious relationship with nature is the control of carnal desires and moderation in consumption. He maintains that when human beings act without restraint in relation to bodily needs, they are likewise driven toward an uncontrolled attitude toward nature (Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 1, p. 641). Ibn ʿArabī emphasizes the principle of moderate eating as a solution to excess and lack of control in human consumption. He considers this principle to be one of the primary ways of protecting nature (Ibn ʿArabī 1911, vol. 1, p. 278).

This approach, articulated by Ibn ʿArabī, closely parallels the virtues of temperance and self-restraint emphasized in environmental virtue ethics. Sandler defines temperance as a character trait that enables individuals to regulate their desires and thereby develop sustainable forms of behavior toward nature while identifying unrestrained consumption as a form of moral weakness (Sandler 2007, p. 58). Similarly, Gambrel and Cafaro view these virtues as essential in the context of environmental ethics, based on a perspective that emphasizes simplicity and self-restraint in human consumption habits (Gambrel and Cafaro 2010, pp. 90–96). In this way, Ibn ʿArabī’s moderation-centered understanding of consumption and the virtues of temperance and self-restraint in modern ecological thought can be seen as expressions of the same moral model.

Rūmī, for his part, addresses the issue of consumption through the interconnected relationship between water, plants, animals, and human beings. By emphasizing that everything consumed ultimately originates from the earth, he presents moderation as a guiding value in humanity’s use of natural resources (Rūmī 2004, vol. 6, verses 4705–6). For Rūmī, excessive consumption signifies a form of moral degeneration, indicating that the human being has succumbed to the desires of the self. Proper conduct, by contrast, requires approaching both nature and other beings with humility and moderation (Rūmī 2004, vol. 2, verses 22–24). Rūmī’s understanding of moderation as a virtue that restrains wastefulness thus provides a meaningful point of connection with the virtues of humility and simplicity emphasized in environmental virtue ethics.

Indeed, Hill approaches humility as a concept that describes it as a result of humanity’s desire to exploit nature, its arrogance and sense of dominance (Hill 1983). Within this framework, Rūmī’s discourse on waste and excess addresses the virtue of humility in environmental virtue ethics from a spiritual perspective, set in a different historical context.

As a result, moderation, which is considered an ethical principle at the core of ecosufism, shares deep connections with virtues such as temperance, humility, simplicity, and self-restraint, which form the center of environmental virtue ethics. Ecosufism’s engagement with these virtues offers modern environmental virtue ethics not only historical depth but also a richer ethical and ontological grounding.

5. Conclusions

This article presents the ontological and ethical foundations of ecosufism, based on the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī, two of the founding Sufi thinkers, drawing on primary sources. It also examines the parallels between these foundations and modern ecological approaches. The main argument of the article is that these two Sufis present their conceptions of nature in a consistent and systematic manner within Sufi metaphysics; they are presented holistically within an ontological framework based on the principles of unity, manifestation, vitality, and consciousness and from an ethical perspective through concepts such as vicegerency, trust, and moderation. Together, these form a comprehensive perspective. A further claim advanced by the article is that this mystical mode of thought resonates with some contemporary ecological approaches at both the ontological and ethical levels. At the same time, the study does not seek to reduce ecosufism and modern ecological theories to a single historical or intellectual source; instead, it demonstrates that discussions of nature emerging in different periods and geographical contexts have arrived at similar ontological and ethical conclusions.

In this light, it becomes clear that Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī conceive of nature as a living and conscious reality, understood as a sacred domain in which divine manifestation takes place. This ontological vision is accompanied by the idea that, although humanity occupies a privileged position within the cosmos, its role is that of a steward and trustee of nature, rather than its master. Both Sufis discuss the virtue of moderation by outlining a practical and ethical framework for the relationship between humans and nature. Thus, nature, as a sacred realm of manifestation, becomes an entity that humans must protect and preserve, and humans themselves become moral agents responsible for its care. Thus, ecosufism not only provides a theoretical basis for environmental awareness rooted in ontological principles but also offers practical and ethical solutions to environmental issues. This presents a new vision for developing a behavioral model.

The study further demonstrates that these ecosufi perspectives intersect meaningfully with modern approaches in ecological ethics, such as deep ecology, the intrinsic value of nature, the living cosmos, panpsychism, environmental stewardship, and environmental virtue ethics. In this regard, it is evident that Sufism, as a mystical tradition, and ecological approaches, as a modern discourse, offer critiques of anthropocentric approaches that instrumentalize, devalue, and exploit nature within a specific framework and that they converge in the goal of promoting nature-friendly approaches.

In conclusion, the foundations of ecosufism, developed over centuries, provide both a theoretical and practical framework that has the potential to identify the roots of contemporary environmental problems and contribute to the search for meaningful solutions.

The results of this research also lay the groundwork for some new research topics for future studies. For example, examining the conceptions of nature in the works of other Sufis besides Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī could bring to light data that would increase the conceptual depth of ecosufism and make the ecosufism approach more visible. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of Sufi approaches to the conception of nature that emerged at different times and in various geographical locations could provide new insights into the historical development, diversity, and spread of ecosufism. Finally, the conceptual framework articulated by ecosufism may be productively applied to contemporary practices related to environmental sustainability, environmental ethics, and education. Educational and awareness initiatives that aim to develop an environmentally conscious mindset rooted in Sufism can make significant, concrete contributions to addressing the current environmental crisis. In light of all these recommendations, a more detailed and in-depth examination of ecosufism—both theoretically and practically—and its incorporation into interdisciplinary research and projects will provide meaningful contributions to studies on mysticism, religion, and environmental ethics.