A 21st-Century Environmental Ethic: Theistically-Conscious Biocentric and Biomimetic Innovation

Abstract

This article offers a theistically conscious biocentric environmental ethic that builds upon the scaffolding of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic with a synthesis of biocentric individualism, deep ecology, and Vaiṣṇava theology. The practical benefit of this proposed ethic is immediately recognized when viewed in light of innovation in biomimicry. Leopold set a fourfold standard for environmental ethics that included (1) acknowledging the evolution of consciousness needed to give rise to ecological conscience, (2) surpassing anthropocentric economic interests in ecological decision making, (3) cultivating individual responsibility and care for the land, and (4) offering a unified mental picture of the land to which individuals can relate. We defend his original work, from later interpretations where the communal aspect of the whole overshadows the uniqueness of the different parts. Transitioning from mitigating overemphasis on the value of the collective, we turn to biocentric individualism, which despite overvaluing the individual, identifies the practical necessity of a qualified moral decision-maker in discerning individual value within the web of nature. Deep ecology articulates self-realization as the qualification that this moral agent must possess. A theistically conscious biocentric environmental ethic balances the role of the individual and the collective by recognizing their irreducible interdependence as a simultaneous unity-in-diversity. This principle of dynamic oneness is introduced in deep ecology and fully matures in Vaiṣṇava theology. Individuals have particular functional value based on their unique role within the Organic Whole, and genuinely self-realized decision-makers can assess these values appropriately enough to discern how human civilization can flourish through harmonizing with nature. In many ways, this is the basis for biomimicry, a field where thoughtful people observe nature’s problem-solving and adapt those same strategies and design principles to humanity’s challenges. The development of biomimicry affirms the central thrust of the proposed environmental ethic, which can reciprocally inspire further biomimetic progress.

1. Identifying Leopold’s Standard for Environmental Ethics

An ethic is concerned with establishing a moral framework for informed decision-making based on clear values, and an environmental ethic is concerned with making ecologically beneficial choices. Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), the celebrated American environmentalist, set the standard for what an effective environmental ethic must address. In The Land Ethic, he offers an insightful and pertinent survey of mid-20th century environmental ethics, conservation, and economics. He explains that an environmental ethic contains an ecological and philosophical dimension, where the former is a “limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence”, while the latter “is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct” (Leopold 1949, p. 202). Therefore, an environmental ethic is concerned with regulating (1) humanity’s ecological relationships with other species of life and the natural landscape in general, as well as (2) moral standards for interpersonal relationships within human society. Leopold claims that historically, the second aspect has been adequately addressed by ethical approaches such as democracy; however, the ecological dimension of ethics still remains to be properly determined and implemented. He also decries the misleading assumption that humanity is the conqueror over nature and the failure of economically influenced conservation efforts. Although these thoughts were published in 1949, they remain relevant in 2025.

Leopold established an ethical standard that comprises (1) acknowledging the psychological and sociological evolution that underlies both recognizing the need for an environmental ethic in modern times, as well as rising to the occasion of its heartfelt implementation, (2) transcending anthropocentric economic value as the sole determiner of humanity’s ecological decisions while simultaneously accommodating them to an appropriate extent, (3) recognizing the necessity of individual responsibility and care for land in ecological decision making, which Leopold calls “ecological conscience,” and (4) providing a unified mental image of the dynamic aspects of the land that an individual can relate to, feel included in, and genuinely care about. Passages from The Land Ethic—provided in the appropriate forthcoming sections of this article—clearly establish these points, although mitigating against interpretations of Leopold’s commentators that detract from them is required. In subsequent sections, the proposed theistically conscious biocentric ethic proves to meet this standard in innovative and progressive ways.

The proceeding sections of this article meet the first three points above through emphasizing the importance of qualified moral agents who embrace a plurality of values balancing the intrinsic worth of all land members with their instrumental role in human flourishing. An evolution of consciousness that develops “ecological conscience” is described, which ultimately requires embracing the path of self-realization. This can lead to identifying environmentally friendly economic values by viewing nature through the lens of biomimicry, which reveals hidden potential in unassuming land members. With that being said, this present section will address the fourth aspect of the above ethical standard, which necessarily concludes in elucidating its connection to the first aspect.

Leopold prefaces “the land pyramid” section of The Land Ethic by stating that “[a]n ethic to supplement and guide the economic relation to land presupposes the existence of some mental image of land as a biotic mechanism. We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in” (Leopold 1949, p. 214). Consciously developing an intimate connection with the land (or anything to which we are establishing connection) requires a clear conception of what we are relating to and why it matters to us. Ethics delineating proper conduct (conscious action) within a relationship presupposes an established conscious connection between the relata. If that connection is not established, then ethics are practically worthless. Thus, J. Baird Callicott describes ”the land pyramid” as the “pivotal section” and “summum bonum” of The Land Ethic (Callicott 1987, pp. 202–4). Callicott is reputed as “a leading contemporary exponent of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic” (The Aldo Leopold Foundation n.d.) and “Leopold’s main interpreter and systematiser” (Dixon 2017, p. 269); thus, it is natural to turn to his work to get a better understanding of Leopold’s conception, as I did in earlier drafts of this article. However, it turns out that while Callicott’s rendition of Leopold acknowledges the deficiency of the notion that humans are meant to control and exploit nature, as well as the fundamental interconnectedness between humanity and nature, it does not adequately value the contribution of the individual to the collective. As will be seen, Leopold has a more nuanced and balanced perspective that is not reflected in Callicott’s version. While emphasizing the collective, Leopold simultaneously recognizes that an interdependence exists between the collective and the kinds or functions of its constituent species. The present form of this article necessarily addresses the shortcomings of Callicott’s interpretation, while preserving the more nuanced aspects of Leopold’s original work that were lost in such renditions.

In “the land pyramid,” Leopold constructs a conceptual pyramid representing the dynamic patterns of energy exchange through layers of consumer (predator–prey) relations that connect all living entities:

“Plants absorb energy from the sun. This energy flows through a circuit called the biota, which may be represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil. A plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the insects, and so on up through various animal groups to the apex layer, which consists of the large carnivores. The species of a layer are alike not in where they came from, or in what they look like, but rather in what they eat. […] The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the co-operation and competition of its diverse parts. […] Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil […] The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on the complex structure of the plant and animal community, much as the upward flow of sap in a tree depends on its complex cellular organization. Without this complexity, normal circulation would presumably not occur. Structure means the characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic kinds and functions, of the component species. This interdependence between the complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes. […] Waters, like soil, are part of the energy circuit. Industry, by polluting waters or obstructing them with dams, may exclude the plants and animals necessary to keep energy in circulation”

(Leopold 1949, pp. 215–17).

Therefore, for Leopold, “land” refers to the entire ecological community, inclusive of biotic (plants and animals) and abiotic (soil and water) entities. However, Callicott explains that within this energy circuit of biota, “[i]ndividual plants and animals become less autonomous beings than ephemeral structures in a patterned flux of energy” (Callicott 1987, p. 203). He reinforces this by quoting Yale biophysicist Harold Morowitz: “‘the reality of individuals is problematic because they do not exist per se but only as local perturbations in this universal flow’” (Ibid). This interpretation does not clearly give scope for considering the diverse functional value of particular species or individuals within a species. Functional value refers to the significance of their specific role(s) within the ecological community. Rather, Callicott’s version tends to one-sidedly emphasize the importance of the collective (or the ecological whole), despite Leopold explicitly stating that “interdependence between the complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit is one of its basic attributes,” where structure refers to “characteristic kinds and functions, of the component species,” as referenced above.

Callicott’s interpretation does not properly empower individuals to act, which is detrimental to the entire purpose of the land pyramid. Again, Leopold prefaced this section of The Land Ethic by explaining that the pyramid is intended as a “mental image” of the land to which people “can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.” If the collective is the primary agent, however—as the overtones of the superorganism paradigm allude to (Callicott 1987, p. 200)—and we are all just “ephemeral structures” and “local perturbations” of its energy flow, then the collective can take care of itself. This does not inspire individual responsibility or care. If, on the other hand, individuals have the option to act in a manner detrimental to the collective, this means that there is a more dynamic interplay at work where the individual and collective share interdependent agency over each other. As will be explained in Section 3, it is significant that Naess’ deep ecology rejected approaches attempting to annihilate individuality due to the cultural and ecological need for diversity. An environmental ethic that genuinely hopes to prioritize collective well-being and appropriately inform economic decisions impacting nature must encompass a comprehensive estimation of unique individual capacities that inevitably serve as vital functions within the community (which may correspond to an economic value that is contextualized within biocentric values), as well as the individual rights necessary to allow those unique capacities to flourish. This is in line with the ethical standard that Leopold established in his original writing.

The significance of acknowledging the “interdependence between the complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit” cannot be overstated. The land’s structure refers to the kinds and functions of species comprising the land, while functioning as an energy unit refers to the hierarchy of predator–prey relations throughout trophic levels. Considering both aspects is essential for well-informed conservation. Ignoring the nuanced ecological functions of individual species in favor of one-sidedly ascertaining their value through their place on the food chain is troublesome, as it leads thinkers such as Callicott to believe that “among our cardinal duties is the duty to preserve what species we can, especially those at the apex of the pyramid—the top carnivores” (Callicott 1987, p. 204). This conclusion is based on the assumption that apex carnivores like lions, bears, and sharks reserve the role of keystone species—species that serve to balance entire ecosystems (by maintaining population sizes, regulating natural resource consumption, etc.) in a manner disproportionate to their population size within the ecosystem. However, this assumption overlooks more inconspicuous keystone species such as bumble bees, whose ecological function as pollinators makes them essential to the upkeep of the very food chains that support apex land carnivores. Such thinking might also lead one to overlook the positive role that humanity’s capacity for higher thought can have on the land community, given that “Man shares an intermediate [trophic level] layer with the bears, raccoons, and squirrels which eat both meat and vegetables” (Leopold 1949, p. 215). This would undermine the necessary context of an environmental ethic arising through the psychological and sociological evolution of a thinking community as described by Leopold in what follows.

As Leopold originally intended, once we have a mental image of the land as an interconnected dynamic whole within which we can fully locate ourselves, we are in good shape to develop the ecological conscience necessary to act and relate ethically with the land. Navigating and growing in our newfound relation to the whole requires an evolution of consciousness. Leopold explained:

“Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land. […] The ‘key-log’ which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. […] I have purposely presented the land ethic as a product of social evolution because nothing so important as an ethic is ever ‘written.’ Only the most superficial student of history supposes that Moses ‘wrote’ the Decalogue; it evolved in the minds of a thinking community, and Moses wrote a tentative summary of it for a ‘seminar.’ I say tentative because evolution never stops. The evolution of a land ethic is an intellectual as well as emotional process”

(Leopold 1949, pp. 223–25).

Here, Leopold describes the evolutionary process as being effected by thought, and suggests that evolutionary progress requires prioritizing a more organic, holistic, and integrative conception of nature, rather than a strictly reductionist or mechanistic one. He also reaffirms value pluralism by advocating considering moral and aesthetic value in ecological decision-making. Others have also recognized that “Leopold intellectually commits himself to value pluralism and to a consistency maximisation of values [aligning one’s actions with their values], entailing that both these elements need to be present within any understanding of a land ethic properly deemed Leopoldian. Such an understanding of Leopold’s ethics stands in strong contrast to two of the most famous interpretations put forward by J. Baird Callicott” (Dixon 2017, p. 270). The social evolution that Leopold discussed is truly an evolution of consciousness, where based on the ever-changing interdependent dynamic between individuals and the environment, the thoughts that individuals and entire societies have about their definition of and relationship to the environment can evolve. This evolution does not originate in the body but within the mind or consciousness, although it may very well lead to biological changes inasmuch as transformations in mindsets affect how we act in and shape our environments, i.e., niche construction as described below.

In Callicott’s interpretation of The Land Ethic, he entrenches it in 19th and 20th century biological assumptions that have been significantly challenged, if not disproven by 21st century biology. The two primary examples are as follows. Callicott quotes from The Land Ethic and adds his own parenthetical remark, asserting that biological evolution is an “ateleological” process: “‘the trend of evolution [not its ‘goal,’ since evolution is ateleological] is to elaborate and diversify the biota’” (Callicott 1987, p. 204). The work of American molecular biologist James A. Shapiro (from the University of Chicago) and British physiologist Denis Noble (Oxford University) clearly shows that evolution is teleological (purposeful or goal-directed), and they explicitly describe how it is so. In 2022, Noble publicly debated Richard Dawkins on this very topic (Noble 2022), as well as previously chairing a similar debate between Lynn Margulis and Dawkins (Vinny 2012).

The second example is Callicott’s claim that a “species is what it is because it has adapted to a niche in the ecosystem. The whole, the system itself, thus, literally and quite straightforwardly shapes and forms its component parts” (Callicott 1987, p. 200). This description of how natural selection acts on an individual within a certain environment does not give the whole story, as it ignores the phenomenon of niche construction, where organisms significantly influence their surroundings, which in turn impacts their adaptation to said environment. Niche construction challenges the original notion of natural selection that Charles Darwin gave, since natural selection is a non-purposeful mechanical activity where the environment influences an individual organism, while niche construction is a purposeful activity where an organism influences its environment to fulfill its needs and desires. American evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin published papers on adaptation, describing the phenomenon throughout the 1970s and 1980s, although it was not termed “niche construction” until 1988 (Laland et al. 2016, p. 192). Perhaps Callicott did not recognize its importance due to his commitment to demonstrating agreement between Leopold’s and Darwin’s ideas, presumably to increase the influence of The Land Ethic among mainstream thinkers, as Callicott openly admits there was a need for, but this move may have been counterproductive given the aforementioned developments of 21st century biology. It is notable that while Leopold mentions “evolution” 12 times in The Land Ethic, he never mentions Darwin’s name. Callicott mentions “evolution” 18 times and “Darwin” 20 times in The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic. As offered above, there is a strong argument to be made that Leopold had a broader notion of evolution than just the biological kind. Whatever evolutionary framework one embraces, we must acknowledge that evolution has led to the human form of life possessing extraordinary capacities for thought and self-consciousness that are not manifest in any other species of life. There is a reason that humanity had the capacity to become the conqueror of the environment (at least temporarily), and no other species did. Now, acting as conqueror of nature is foolish, self-destructive, and a misappropriation of humanity’s special gift, and a truly progressive environmental ethic must take this into consideration and redirect or re-engage humanity’s extraordinary gifts to raise nature up instead of pulling it down. Such an approach can lead to innovation in biomimicry, which will be explored in Section 4.

This section identified Leopold’s fourfold standard for an adequate environmental ethic, while defending his original conception from misleading interpretations that lose his dynamic nuance. We have demonstrated that emphasizing the community’s significance in a manner that loses sight of the unique functions and contributions that individuals make is one-sided and ultimately ineffective in offering a comprehensive environmental ethic. This is why Callicott’s version of the land ethic must be rejected. Such a conclusion is not unique to this paper. Due to “Callicott [implying] that, ultimately, a land ethic identifies the locus of supreme moral value as residing within biotic wholes (i.e., ecosystems), not within any individual type of organism, human or otherwise” (Dixon 2017, p. 272), “Tom Regan charges that the [Callicottian interpretation of the] land ethic amounts to ‘environmental fascism’. […] [I]ndictment of the land ethic as being fascistic is wrongheaded, as is Callicott’s early interpretation of Leopold which supports such a skewed hierarchical view” (Dixon 2017, p. 275). Embracing Leopold’s mental image of the land pyramid and discerning how to properly relate to it in order to develop ecological conscience allows us to further consider a broader spectrum of values and how they might nurture individual responsibility and care for the land.

2. Developing Biocentric Values

Embracing biocentric values entails accepting that every individual living entity has intrinsic value that is independent of (1) usefulness for other individuals and (2) the lifeform’s awareness of its own value. This value system can accommodate anthropocentric, economic, and other kinds of values as long as they do not inappropriately infringe upon the basic needs of members of the ecological community. Biocentric values are virtue-oriented, where (1) moral decision-making relies on virtuous persons who can spontaneously and appropriately adjust to context rather than following predetermined rules despite unique circumstances that arise, and (2) human flourishing (eudaimonia in Greek) requires acknowledging the interdependent dynamic relation between self and other, which has ecological and theological implications.

Biocentric individualism is an ethical framework that believes all living entities, from single cells to apex predators, have inherent value just because they are alive, whether or not they are aware of this value. Therefore, “biocentric” refers to this focus on the living aspect of nature, and “individualism” refers to the idea that every living individual possesses intrinsic value independent of their utility for other individuals, i.e., independent of their function within the collective. Since life has a value that is not reducible to anything else, haphazardly and unnecessarily destroying living entities and their habitats is morally wrong. This conclusion affects our behavior towards the environment. As established in Section 1, one-sided approaches that emphasize either the collective over the individual, or in this case, the individual independent of the collective, produce misleading or incomplete ethical guidelines for behavior.

This issue manifests within discussions of biocentric individualism as the struggle to determine how far we should take respecting all life forms. Every time we breathe, airborne bacteria enter our mouth and perish. One solution is continuing to wear N95 masks as people were habituated to during COVID-19. However, then we must consider the insects that are crushed when we walk outdoors. These considerations are not realistic for most people to consider, even if they desire to respect nature. On the other hand, some people are so repulsed by the thought of such ethical calculations that they abandon any effort to respect nature at all. Recognizing the fundamental interdependency between the individual and collective rectifies this problem by considering the unique functions and contributions that an individual serves within the collective and how the collective supports and facilitates these activities.

Scholars who address biocentric individualism are concerned about stifling human activity by becoming caught in an endless web of calculating which of our actions infringe least upon the existence of other living entities, from bacteria to polar bears. Thus, some suggest that any proper moral theory inevitably depends on the reasonable discernment of a concerned and committed moral agent who can consistently recognize ethically problematic scenarios and identify the most critical as well as peripheral aspects of such scenarios (Kawall 2003, p. 18). Further, such scholars hold that realistic and informed environmental decision-making must embrace a plurality of values, including reverence for the intrinsic value of life, consideration of degree of sentience and suffering, aesthetic values, and anthropocentric concerns such as economic considerations (Kawall 2003, pp. 13 & 24). The necessity for this concerned moral agent in biocentric individualism complements the land ethic’s emphasis on encouraging individual responsibility and care in private land owners. Leopold described that:

“When the private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act for the good of the community, he today assents only with outstretched palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but when it costs only forethought, open-mindedness, or time, the issue is at least debatable. […] [A] system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts. It tends to relegate to government many functions eventually too large, too complex, or too widely dispersed to be performed by government. An ethical obligation on the part of the private owner is the only visible remedy for these situations”

(Leopold 1949, p. 214).

He was also very much aware that “[o]bligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to land” (Leopold 1949, p. 209). This extension of social conscience is the evolution of consciousness introduced in Section 1. Leopold’s value pluralism becomes particularly clear in this regard. He says that “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, of course, I mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense” (Leopold 1949, p. 223). The role of appropriate moral agents who embrace a plurality of values is an important consideration for a theistically conscious biocentric environmental ethic; however, what is meant by “value” and the precise emphasis of “biocentric” remains to be explained.

In short, value refers to a condition of importance. Intrinsic or inherent value refers to that which contains its importance within itself; thus, its value is not relative to any external thing. Instrumental value, on the other hand, refers to what is important only in relation to something other than itself. Nature is composed of living (biotic) and non-living (abiotic) entities and their dynamic relationships. Biotic aspects possess intrinsic value, and non-living aspects possess instrumental value relative to the biotic. A living entity acts for its own internal purposes, and these internal purposes are what is inherently valuable. The enactment of these purposes is what drives all biological and ecological activity on planet Earth, including human civilization. Non-living entities are acted upon by external influences such as natural forces or the exertion of the will of a living entity. Thus, the non-living entity only has instrumental value in so far as it serves the purposes of the living entity. Consider how all living entities actively defend themselves, and if they are harmed despite these efforts, they will heal. This demonstrates that biotic individuals contain their importance within themselves such that biological processes operate to maintain the integrity of the internal value. Abiotic entities do not actively defend themselves or heal because there is no intrinsic value to drive such behavior.

This framework is meant to facilitate an evolution of consciousness such that people rise from an exploitive anthropocentric perspective of nature where everything has instrumental value relative to humanity’s whims, to a more holistic biocentric perspective where respect for the intrinsic value of life positively influences humanity’s interactions with other species, as well as the utilization and conservation of natural resources. Here, considerations of intrinsically valuable biota and instrumental abiota are utilized as convenient designations to gradually help people embrace a more thoughtful and spiritual perspective of nature through observable distinctions of natural phenomena. Speaking in terms of these binary categories is not meant to imply an absolute dichotomy between life and matter. A deeper perspective of how matter and life are understood as distinct yet coexisting moments unified on a continuum of Spirit will be explored in Section 3.

A group that does not properly integrate its members will merely externally impose purposes on individuals, which may confront their inner purposes. Here, individuals will still act according to their internal inspiration, which will conflict with the group’s interest. This is not a well-functioning collective. This is relevant to modern industrialized culture, where nature is viewed as a supply of raw materials. Climate change and the increased frequency of natural disasters are a product of the discrepancy between humanity as the conquerors of nature, imposing misled expectations on the environment and nature defiantly behaving according to its own purposes. In a community that effectively integrates its members, however, the inner purposes of individuals can be expressed fully by engaging in activities that completely fulfill them, for the sake of the collective, as one of the community’s functions. The biocentric emphasis does not favor individualism or collectivism but instead recognizes that both perspectives are irreducibly connected. An effective environmental ethic should not only respect but also support and enable the self-determined activities of all living entities, with special attention to the unique functions that certain species serve within the ecological whole.

Holmes Rolston III’s notable skepticism about the predominating theory of evolution is also relevant while considering how to effectively implement biocentric valuation. He feels that “[t]he West desperately needs an account of evolutionary nature that can explicitly enable its valuation, especially in view of the fact that many scientifically based accounts conclude that nonhuman nature has no value at all” (Barnhart 1997, pp. 417–18). Darwin’s notion of evolution by natural selection promotes survival of the fittest, emphasizing scarcity and competition as predominating features of nature. Thoughtful scientists such as Harvard biochemist Ruth Hubbard recognized that this characterization may not be a result of unbiased observations but rather a projection of Darwin’s social conditioning onto nature.

“[Hubbard] saw in Darwin’s portrayal of the animal world as a ‘kingdom’ marked by cutthroat competition for scarce resources, not objective science but a reflection of the society in which the English naturalist lived. Looked at from a different perspective, Hubbard thought, one could just as easily see the centrality of cooperation in species survival and flourishing, as the Russian zoologist, geologist, and revolutionary Peter Kropotkin had in his 1902 book, Mutual Aid. Increasingly, she saw supposedly objective scientists ‘reading their social arrangements’ into nature”

(Massari 2023).

This is an example of theory-ladenness, where scientists’ mental predispositions distort perceptions and descriptions of natural phenomena, which will be discussed further in Section 3. Continuing to emphasize competition and scarcity as predominating features of nature reinforces humanity—a very small portion of humanity—as the conqueror of nature. It is not conducive to a biocentric view that seeks to understand the common intrinsic value of all living entities. An environmental ethic seeking to accommodate a plurality of values to meet the ecological necessity for curtailed human behavior should be founded on a conception of evolution that gives scope for the importance of all life forms, including “the centrality of cooperation in species survival and flourishing” recommended by Hubbard.

In this regard, Rolston advocates the position that “‘Self-governed genes are ‘smart’ machines in the current vernacular sense. Smart genes suggest smart cells and smart evolution. It is the promise of radically new genetic and evolutionary principles that are motivating today’s study’” (Rolston 2001, p. 83). While 21st-century biology has progressed beyond the 1983 paper that Rolston is quoting—such that biologists now recognize that all genetic activity completely depends on activation from cellular and organismic processes where cells and organisms are living cognitive entities and genes are nonliving structures used by the living (Noble 2017, p. 35)—the idea that evolution is smart in a self-governed sense is profoundly important. This brings us back to niche construction. The intentional activities of an individual directly affect their own and their community’s evolutionary trajectory, and the association of the members of that community can support or hinder an individual’s intentions. The manner in which people engage with their surroundings significantly affects (1) their own consciousness, i.e., reinforcing habituation of certain thought patterns, (2) the physical state of the environment, and (3) how present and future generations adapt to that altered environment. From this perspective, evolution refers to organismic adaptations (microevolution) and the development of consciousness. It does not necessarily imply speciation (macroevolution), i.e., the transformation of one species into another. Considering the evolution of consciousness—which is concerned with the spectrum of cognitive development among the variety of species of life on Earth—gives scope for assessing and learning more about the individual value of diversified lifeforms based on the unique function that they serve within the ecological community.

3. Self-Realization, Theistic Consciousness, and Organic Wholism

Now that the biocentric emphasis of the proposed ethic has been established, the theistically conscious aspect can be explained more clearly. This aspect will further explicate the need for properly discerning moral agents, as well as clarify how to regulate humanity’s relation with nature through reasonable moral and social standards. As mentioned previously, establishing an environmental ethic that sincerely intends to prioritize collective well-being must recognize the unique individual capacities that inevitably serve as vital functions within the community and the individual rights necessary to allow those unique capacities to flourish.

For a theistically conscious biocentric environmental ethic, it is essential that the qualified moral agents who properly discern ecologically progressive and socially tolerable decisions embrace the path of self-realization. Within the field of environmental ethics, a gentleman named Arne Naess established a conceptual framework called deep ecology or ecosophy, which heavily relies on the idea of self-realization. This complements biocentric values by emphasizing the importance of self-realization for comprehensive environmentally conscious decision-making. An individual informed by these views is fit to enter the economic arena and make unbiased choices that benefit the ecological community as a whole.

Based on everyday observations, Naess described that the self has a fluid boundary. It not only encompasses one’s own person—yourself or myself—but also the clothes one wears, the computer one uses or the house one lives in, and even our loved ones. He ultimately suggested that the self be identified with all those in the ecological community where “the interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or interests” (Naess 1985, p. 225). In Naess’ initial conception, the emphasis remains on self-centered interest, but the negative ecological implications of selfishness are bypassed by theoretically extending the self to include all living entities. This is what he considers the practical state of self-realization to be. By considering Vaiṣṇava philosophy from ancient India, we are able to penetrate deeper into the ecological implications of the ideas that Naess initially raised, going beyond self-centered motivation.

Interestingly, the basis for Naess’s conception of self is the Sanskrit word ātman. Further, his idea of the highest attainment of self-realization comes from Bhagavad-gītā verse 6.29. Naess offers four translations that roughly amount to the same interpretation of this verse. Here is the first translation offered: “He whose self is harmonized by yoga seeth the Self abiding in all beings and all beings in Self; everywhere he sees the same.” Inspired by this verse, Naess concludes that the “absolute maximum” of self-realization is “the mature experience of oneness in diversity” (Naess 1985, p. 224). Here, it is significant that Naess is not advocating some mystical oneness in which individuality is annihilated. This was the basis for our argument against Leopold’s land ethic in Section 1. Naess clearly rejects “mystical traditions [that] stress the dissolution of individual selves into a nondiversified supreme whole. Both from cultural and ecological points of view diversity and individuality are essential” (Naess 1985, p. 225). This position is in line with the Vaiṣṇava perspective, which will be significant in what follows. Naess’ conclusion regarding “oneness in diversity” is respectable, but the translations that he offers do not clearly communicate the theological import of the verse in question. The well-known Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava leader Śrīla A. C. Bhaktivedānta Swāmī Prabhupāda offers the following translation of verse 6.29: “A true yogī observes Me in all beings and also sees every being in Me. Indeed, the self-realized person sees Me, the same Supreme Lord, everywhere” (Prabhupāda 1972, p. 337). As Prabhupāda says, this verse is meant to describe the simultaneously immanent and transcendent omnipresence of God, Who is the infinite Self and not a finite self. Naess’ translation of the verse spelled Self with a capital S; therefore, it is possible he understood the meaning of this verse as referring to the infinite Self which contextualizes and unifies the diversity of finite selves, although he chose not to emphasize its significance. This Bhagavad-gītā verse reorients the finite self from self-centeredness to Absolute-centeredness. How this is relevant to regulating human behavior in environmentally beneficial ways becomes clear with a further analysis of Vaiṣṇava theology, which recognizes that God or Kṛṣṇa (the Name of God, meaning “all-attractive”) is an Organic Whole.1

In Section 2, we offered a framework for ecological decision-making, arguing that living entities have intrinsic value and non-living entities (inert matter) have instrumental value dependent on the living. Justified from observations of defending and healing behavior of cells and organisms, this man’s-eye-view admittedly has a restricted scope from a higher perspective. While living entities contain their value within themselves, they are fundamentally limited due to their continued existence requiring energy exchange with the external environment. Ecosystems rely on an exchange of energy with the organisms that inhabit it and surrounding ecosystems, while individual organisms depend on each other and the environment. Beyond energy exchange through breathing and nutrition, organisms further rely on other organisms to create them via reproduction. In nature, we observe that life comes from life, i.e., biogenesis. The law of biogenesis has been affirmed by leading 19th century scientists such as Louis Pasteur and Rudolf Virchow, who concluded that “all life is from life” (omne vivum ex vivo) and that “every cell comes from another cell” (omnis cellula e cellula), respectively (Steele et al. 2018, p. 5; Wright and Poulsom 2012, p. 145). Further, 20th-century planetary scientist Carl Sagan (1974) defended distinguishing between biogenesis and abiogenesis—life coming from matter.2

Due to modern scientists’ understanding of matter as a mind-independent substance (Das 2023, pp. 84–85)—which differs from the processual understanding of matter as a moment of the continuum of ever-becoming Spirit offered in forthcoming paragraphs—claiming that the origin of life is matter divorces life from being inherently connected to mind, cognition, or consciousness. This was a problem of which Pasteur was keenly aware, as explained by microbiologist René Dubos.

“Pasteur was unquestionably sincere in affirming his willingness nay, his eagerness to believe in the spontaneous generation of life provided adequate proof was brought forward to demonstrate its occurrence. His religious faith was independent of scientific knowledge. Well aware of the limitations of the experimental method, he knew that his work had not proved that the generation of life de novo was impossible, and that he had done nothing more than show the fallacy of all known claims. [Quoting Pasteur] ‘I do not pretend to establish that spontaneous generation does not occur. One cannot prove the negative.’ But by the same token he protested the assumption, for which no evidence is yet available, that spontaneous generation had been the origin of life in the universe”

(Dubos 1950, p. 396).

“[Quoting Pasteur] ‘Once the germ exists, it needs only inanimate substances and proper conditions of temperature to obey the laws of its development … it will then grow and manifest all the phenomena that we call ‘vital,’ but these are only physical and chemical phenomena; it is only the law of their succession which constitutes the unknown of life. This is why the problem of spontaneous generation is all-absorbing, and all-important. It is the very problem of life and of its origin. To bring about spontaneous generation would be to create a germ. It would be creating life; it would be to solve the problem of its origin. It would mean to go from matter to life through conditions of environment and of matter. God as author of life would then no longer be needed. Matter would replace Him. God would need be invoked only as author of the motions of the world in the Universe.’

Like an obsession, there recurs time and time again through his writings, often in unpublished fragments, the statement that ‘Life is the germ and its becoming.’ The concept of ‘becoming’ was obviously borrowed., perhaps unknown to Pasteur, from the Werden of the Hegelian doctrine. This taught a logical or dialectic development of things according to which the whole world—spiritual phenomena, man, together with all natural objects—was the unfolding of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind”

(Dubos 1950, pp. 395–96)

Nobel laureate George Wald also held that mind is necessary for the existence of life, as discussed shortly.

The problem with understanding matter as a mind-independent substance is that as a phenomenon, all of our experience and knowledge of matter is filtered through consciousness. Science deals with the being-for-consciousness of matter, i.e., its appearance to consciousness through the senses, not matter’s being-in-itself or existence independent of observation. This was acknowledged by quantum physicist Werner Heisenberg (Das 2023, p. 85). As such, mind and matter (or subject and object) are inextricably linked, such that they determine each other. The subject perceives the object based upon the inherent categories of thought that it possesses, while the object impresses particular qualities upon the subject. Due to this interpenetrating dynamic, a kingfisher can be understood as a small and brightly colored tropical bird requiring preservation, a bad omen for the Dusun warriors of Borneo, a symbol of love in Greek mythos, a biomimetic model for Japan’s Shinkansen bullet train, or all of the above. Each group has a unique perception of the kingfisher depending on their particular needs and sociocultural context.

To this day, life arising from non-life has never been observed in nature or demonstrated in a lab3, so abiogenesis remains purely theoretical. Such speculation has historically garnered support by scientists due to their lack of acknowledging the fundamental role that consciousness plays in drawing conclusions from empirical observations, including being self-aware of axiomatic presuppositions at the root of science, such as causal closure. Causal closure is the presumption that “all physical things can have only physical causes” (Ravelli 2020). This axiom—where axioms are experientially unprovable foundational claims—leads to materialistic views that the origin of life is a physical event and that life and consciousness are reducible to matter. Now, scientists are not wrong to have metaphysical axioms, but it is incorrect to deny or ignore their existence. Immanuel Kant’s 18th century “Copernican revolution” proposed “that if we are to make any progress on understanding the relation between perception, cognition and external objects, we need a fundamental shift in thinking” (Swanson 2016, p. 4). Kant showed that empirically observed objects conform to the consciousness of the observer, i.e., that mental predispositions influence our experience of the world. This is a reversal of the traditional materialistic perspective that consciousness passively conforms to external objects, which is fundamental to modern science. Discussions of the theory-ladenness of science also acknowledge that mental predispositions can (1) directly influence perception of objects, (2) unavoidably influence descriptions of objects, and (3) unintentionally emphasize certain observations over others (Schindler 2013, p. 89). It is important to acknowledge the role of consciousness in science, as this directly effects the conclusions that scientists reach, as well as subsequent decisions and worldviews based on such findings. Properly adjusting our definition of matter to include mind-dependence will facilitate progress in origin of life research. The experimental work of scientists such as James Shapiro, Denis Noble, and Michael Levin demonstrate that life is inherently cognitive from single cells to complex organisms, as has been referenced in other parts of this article. Since biogenesis encompasses life coming from a pre-existing cognitive entity, it seems like a more justifiable basis for establishing a mind-dependent understanding of matter and its relationship to life and Spirit.

According to Vaiṣṇava theology, living entities and the material world are emanations from Kṛṣṇa, God, or Spirit, coinciding with a devolution of consciousness. Here, the overarching spiritual continuum includes a natural spectrum of life and matter corresponding to degrees of attenuated consciousness. During the Science and Scientist 2019 international conference, B. Mādhava Purī brilliantly likened this to the relationship between sound and silence.

“It’s not that silence and sound are not connected with one another—they’re directly connected. When the volume goes up, you hear sound; when the volume goes down, you have silence. It’s just a matter of degree of attenuation. So, consciousness is like that. Matter is attenuated consciousness, and Spirit is full consciousness, awakened consciousness”

(Mahaprabhu Broadcasting Channel—MBC 2024).

As will be seen in what follows, this is not claiming that the origin of life can be explained by special divine creation, where God intervenes to generate life from non-life. Rather, the origin of life is an emanation of God’s consciousness. Pasteur referred to “God as author of life.” This view was also appreciated by Nobel laureate George Wald during Los Alamos National Laboratory’s 1986 fellows colloquium on unsolved problems in the science of life. Wald said:

“Previously I had always thought of consciousness, or mind, as something that required a particularly complex central nervous system and was present only in the highest organisms. The thought now was that mind had been there all the time, and the reason this is a life-breeding universe is that the pervasive, constant presence of mind had guided the universe that way”

(Wald 1988, p. 10).

During the panel discussion at the end of the colloquium, Wald publicly contemplated “The Judeo-Christian god made the universe; the Hindu supreme god Brahman thinks the universe. Is it possible to think reality? Theoretical physicists seem to do it” (Bitensky 1988, p. 73).

Vaiṣṇavism is derived from the Bhāgavat, which is celebrated as the ripened fruit of the tree of Vedic knowledge. The following brief historical sketch contextualizes and clarifies the authority of the scriptural statements quoted below, meant to concisely articulate Vaiṣṇava theology as relevant to the purposes of this paper. The four Vedas, the canonical texts of Hinduism, were compiled by Vyāsa (also known as Bādarāyaṇ) thousands of years ago. Prior to this, Vedic knowledge was only distributed orally (śruti) from Guru to disciple, such that Vyāsa received the teachings from Nārada Muni. Some time after compiling the Vedas, Vyāsa composed the Vedānta-sūtra, which is universally accepted as the end or conclusion of the Vedas. At the culmination of Vyāsa’s manifest pastimes on Earth, He wrote the Bhāgavat-purāṇa, containing the distilled essence of Vedānta. The Vedic literature, particularly the Ṛg-veda, is commonly accepted among the most ancient scriptures on the planet.

Vedānta begins with the aphorism athāto brahmajijñāsā—“Now, therefore, inquire into the nature of Brahman (Spirit).” The second verse—janmādyasya yataḥ—says that Spirit is the origin of the world. Developing from there, the first verse of the Bhāgavat further articulates what the precise nature of that spiritual origin is:

janmādy asya yato ’nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ svarāṭ

“The origin of everything is That which is independent and cognizant.”

Later in the first canto of Bhāgavat-purāṇa, this Original Independent Spiritual Cognition is described as the non-dual truth with three distinct yet non-different aspects corresponding to the universal, particular, and individual.4 Its holistic nature becomes evident in the invocation of Īśopaniṣad, which explains the truth as the Complete Whole from which lesser wholes emanate, where the Original Whole is not diminished by such emanations.5 This brief synopsis of the Organic Whole as the Non-Dual Original Independent Spiritual Cognition outlines a deeply coherent account of a holistic and consciousness-based worldview from an ancient culture, which is being empirically validated by discoveries that 21st century biologists are just starting to understand and recent philosophical frameworks such as panpsychism have started to explore (Shapiro 2021, p. 134; Levin 2022, p. 2). The central tenet of the Bhāgavat is that the Organic Whole is self-conscious, as It has an “I” sense as the Supreme Personality. Thus, Kṛṣṇa says: “I am the source of all spiritual and material worlds. Everything emanates from Me.”6 Here, we arrive at the axiomatic foundation of Vaiṣṇava theology.

Returning to how the origin of life and the material world emanate from Kṛṣṇa, life is the condition of souls (finite spirit) who resist their constitutional relationship with the Organic Whole (Infinite Spirit). The greater the degree of desired separation and false independence, the deeper into the darkness of ignorance finite spirit descends. This is the devolution of consciousness that accommodates all different species of life from humans to insects and single cells. So-called inert matter is a finite spirit whose consciousness is completely attenuated. Here, the totality of material nature is Kṛṣṇa’s external energy (bahiraṅga-śakti), which emanates from Him through an expansion called Mahā-Viṣṇu engaged in mystic slumber (yoga-nidrā). As described by Prabhupāda’s Śikṣā-guru (instructional preceptor), Śrīla Bhakti Rakṣak Śrīdhar Dev-Goswāmī Mahārāj, the souls distracted by self-centered endeavors immersed in nature have the opportunity to strive for self-realization (relationship with the Organic Whole) and uplift their material condition through the yogic discipline of devotion (Bhakti-yoga), which facilitates an evolution of consciousness from the plane of exploitation to the plane of dedication (Śrīdhar 1989, p. 55). This ancient perspective corresponds to modern insights by philosophers from what has come to be known as German Idealism.

“A rational consideration of Nature must consider how Nature is in its own self this process of becoming Spirit, of sublating its otherness—and how the Idea is present in each grade or level of Nature itself; estranged from the Idea, Nature is only the corpse of the Understanding. Nature is, however, only implicitly the Idea, and Schelling therefore called her a petrified intelligence, others even a frozen intelligence; but God does not remain petrified and dead; the very stones cry out and raise themselves to Spirit”

(Hegel 2004, pp. 14–15).

“When Leibniz calls matter the sleeping state of monads, or when Hemsterhuis speaks of it as congealed mind, there lies in these statements a meaning very easy to discern from the principles now put forward. Matter is indeed nothing else but mind viewed in an equilibrium of its activities”

(Schelling 1978, p. 92).

Acknowledging ideas of nature as being ossified or slumbering Spirit and the need to awaken from that condition has emerged in Eastern and Western cultures, during vastly different periods of time, which may prove the non-sectarian self-evident nature of Truth for purified individuals with sincere hankering.

As discussed at the beginning of this section, Naess predicated deep ecology on the cultivation of self-realization culminating in “the mature experience of oneness in diversity.” His conception was directly inspired by Bhagavad-gītā verse 6.29, which referred to seeing the Self in everything. This implies that seeing oneself in the environment and the environment in oneself would promote as much respect for nature as one has for themself. After reading Prabhupāda’s translation of the verse, the emphasis of “Self” as God (the Universal Self) rather than the individual self became clarified. Here, one should love and respect nature as much as they do God. Deeper nuance is added when we consider verse 5.29:

bhoktāraṁ yajña-tapasāṁ, sarva-loka-maheśvaram

suhṛdaṁ sarva-bhūtānāṁ, jñātvā māṁ śāntim ṛcchati

“A person in full consciousness of Me, knowing Me to be the ultimate beneficiary of all sacrifices and austerities, the Supreme Lord of all planets and demigods, and the benefactor and well-wisher of all living entities, attains peace from the pangs of material miseries.”

This establishes God as the Supreme Proprietor. Recognizing nature as His property—upon which we are temporary inhabitants—encourages humanity’s respectful stewardship of planet Earth as a means of lovingly serving God. Prabhupāda referred to this verse as the “peace formula” due to it resolving disputes concerning provincial sectarian interests. Ecologically destructive wars are fought over considerations of in whose purpose should endeavors be dovetailed, who owns what property, and from which alliance will one benefit most. Kṛṣṇa says that His purposes are the final end of all sacrifice and austerity, He is the master of all domains, and dearest friend of everyone. Given the nuanced and deeply relevant insights of the Bhāgavat, this “peace formula” can be accepted as scientific conception of the dialectical Organic Whole as the overarching spiritual unity that harmonizes natural diversity.

Important scholars working at the intersection of Indian philosophy and environmental ethics who advocate the necessity of embracing the idea of satyagraha—referring to “insistence or persistence in search for truth”—recognize the value of the dialectic nature of the Organic Whole (Dwivedi 1990, pp. 642–43 & 648).7 For Vaiṣṇavas, the truth is not a static notion to be captured and exploited by finite human minds; rather, the Truth is living, infinite, and Absolute, independent from anything other than Itself, since It finds only Itself in otherness. The Truth is the whole, the Organic Whole, of which all relative finite entities, including humanity and nature, are a part or participant.

From this higher, more wholesome, and accommodating perspective, everything, living and non-living alike, is dependent on or instrumental to the Organic Whole. In Section 2, intrinsic value was defined as “that which contains its importance within itself, thus, its value is not relative to any external thing.” The intrinsic value of all living entities is valid from the man’s-eye-view perspective due to different individuals existing external from one another and pursuing internally motivated goals that are apparently independent from the goals of others (this does not preclude the collective goals of swarms and the like). However, from God’s-eye-view, nothing is external to God, the infinite context of all finitude. Each of those “independent goals” from the man’s-eye-view is actually a function of the Absolute as the Organic Whole, similar to how particular cellular activities serve as functions within the organism as a whole.8

Applying Vaiṣṇava satyagraha to Naess’ deep ecology profoundly enriches its ability to offer a comprehensive view of reality and positively regulate human behavior. Naess recognizes the importance of a Gestalt or unifying principle (Naess 1985, p. 220), and the Absolute Truth is the Supreme Gestalt, since It does not rely on anything outside of Itself. All finite gestalt prove inferior, since they rely on contexts that subsume them; thus, ultimately, they are all nested within the Absolute Gestalt. As exemplified by the Vaiṣṇavas, people who are self-realized recognize and honor God as the Supreme Proprietor of nature and develop the virtues of humility, tolerance, and respect for others without demanding respect for themselves; such people recognize that nothing in nature belongs to them. Nature is God’s property, not humanity’s. Becoming endowed with these virtues through the progression of the evolution of consciousness, and awakening to self-realization, which culminates in refined theistic intelligence, means that moral agents who make environmentally progressive and socially tolerable decisions are best equipped to successfully enable ecological conscience and prosperity.

4. Aligning Environmental Ethics with Innovation in Biomimicry

Humanity has the capacity for a positive relationship with nature. Humanity is the aspect of nature that is self-conscious and possesses the ability for highly developed thought. This allows people to inquire about their origin, identity, and purpose, which has produced a second nature consisting of government, art, religion, science, and philosophy, which are expressions of attempts to satisfy those deep, perennial questions. At this point in human development, we recognize the futility of trying to conquer and exploit nature. Our capacity for insightful reflection and penetrating insights can serve to not only conclude to cease harming nature, but we can actually contribute to its upliftment by learning the subtle and nuanced ways in which it already operates and then apply that to how humanity integrates with the ecological community. This is the premise of the up-and-coming field of biomimicry, which is extremely relevant to the application of a theistically conscious biocentric environmental ethic.

A self-realized moral agent equipped with biocentric values recognizes the inseparability of not only the individual and collective but also the individual and the environment, or the self and other. The individual is shaped by its environment, both physically and mentally, and it also shapes its environment. The self both influences and is influenced by what is other than it. An observer, a subject, determines and is determined by the observed, i.e., an object. The object determines and is determined by the subject (Purī 2012, p. 5). Through this fluidity of consciousness, the self-realized agent determined to make ecologically beneficial decisions is able to perceive solutions to the environmental crisis in nature herself. This is what the discipline of biomimicry amounts to.

Based on society’s needs, scientists, engineers, and innovators turn to the form, behavior, or overarching system of life on Earth to find solutions. Examples of biomimicry include using the form of the kingfisher’s beak to engineer a less resistant nose on Japan’s Shinkansen bullet train or termite mounds inspiring passive temperature regulation of Zimbabwe’s Eastgate Centre. Essentially, biomimicry is the idea of an object (the observed) being a reflection of the subject (the observer), where, depending on the unique perspective and needs of the subject, the object appears differently. Thus, the kingfisher appears as a bird in need of conservation for some folks and a model for a really fast train to others. In Leopold’s time, no one really thought of biomimicry. Thus, he felt that:

“One basic weakness in a conservation system based wholly on economic motives is that most members of the land community have no economic value. […] Lack of economic value is sometimes a character not only of species or groups, but of entire biotic communities: marshes, bogs, dunes, and ‘deserts’ are examples. […] In some instances, the assumed lack of profit in these ‘waste’ areas has proved to be wrong, but only after most of them had been done away with”

(Leopold 1949, pp. 210–12).

Who would have thought that the value of kingfishers and termite mounds included being models for sustainable building and technology? Peering through the biomimetic lens reveals the instrumental value of land members in a manner that harmonizes human flourishing with ecological well-being.

While the aforementioned examples of biomimetic innovation are based on natural forms, applying this approach to natural systems has interesting implications for new economic models. The process of nutrient cycling involves nutrients within the soil such as carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus being consumed by plants, which are eaten by primary consumers, who become prey to secondary consumers, up to the level of apex carnivores. Then, when these top predators die, their bodies are consumed by decomposers such as insects, fungi, and bacteria, eventually allowing the nutrients to return to the soil, only to be consumed by plants again, restarting this circular process. Through a biomimetic approach, this natural nutrient cycling model has given rise to circular economic models such as the circle economy and doughnut economics, which are both being implemented throughout the world.

If a linear economy like capitalism is composed of point A (natural resources), point B (production of goods), point C (consumption), and point D (creation of waste), then a circular economy is formed by creating a loop between points B and D. Waste is recycled or repurposed to create new viable resources for the production of goods instead of accumulating in landfills and other waste sites. It also gives natural regenerative resources an opportunity to replenish. This simple principle is what underlies reusable shopping bags made out of recycled materials, and innovation geared toward implementing and expanding this principle is called ecological economics. Eco-conscious colloquial wisdom tells us “live simply so that others may simply live.” Naess concurred regarding the significance of simplicity. Thus, he established the motto of deep ecology as “simple in means, rich in ends” (Naess 1985, p. 218). This sentiment is expressed most fully by the Vaiṣṇavas, who often emphasize the importance of “simple living and high thinking,” where thoughts are focused on meditating upon one’s eternal loving relationship of service to the Supreme Proprietor, the Organic Whole (Śrīdhar 2006, p. 12).

5. Conclusions

This paper hopes to contribute to the emerging field of ecology and religion, as well as environmental ethics in its own right. Leopold said, “No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions. The proof that conservation has not yet touched these foundations of conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have not yet heard of it” (Leopold 1949, pp. 209–10). This article has established that being theistically conscious demands ecological conscience.

Based on the scaffolding of Leopold’s fourfold ethical standard in The Land Ethic, we have constructed an extended synthesis of biocentric individualism, deep ecology, and Vaiṣṇava theology, and showed the reciprocal complementarity between the ethic and progress in biomimicry. The natural development of deep ecology, as it was originally framed by Naess, culminates in the realization that all aspects of practical human activity, including economics, are meant to gradually nurture an evolution of consciousness that necessarily matures into a theological worldview. This conclusion does not annihilate such activities but rather facilitates their highest expression and fulfillment in human flourishing through developing love of God (Kṛṣṇa-prema).

The breadth of Leopold’s awareness and the depth of his compassion provide a solid foundation for a theistically conscious biocentric environmental ethic in the 21st century. Synthesizing biocentric individualism and deep ecology demonstrates the kind of values that are necessary to progress beyond the self-destructive phase of humans as the conquerors of nature. It offers a model for the kind of people who are mature enough to make sensible ecological decisions about what, where, when, why, and how to discern the use of natural resources in a manner that is conducive to the flourishing of the ecological community. Humanity’s capacity for thought is distinct from all other species of life, but this unique gift is meant to raise nature up instead of pulling it down. On the socially progressive level, people who are adequately trained in biomimicry can perceive how nature provides the tools with which humans can positively contribute to the development of nature, uplifting through self-conscious expression. The deeper self-realized import of biomimicry is the fluid interpenetrating dynamic between the observing subject and the observed object. As our consciousness evolves, so too does the environment within which we find ourselves.