Camma (Hide or Leather) in Theravāda-Vinaya: The Tension Between Permission and Prohibition

Abstract

This paper examines the issue of Buddhist monastics’ use of leather by analyzing the cases of leather (camma) in the Pāli vinaya. Leather is a household item that can conflict with the core Buddhist values of non-killing (ahiṃsā) and compassion (karuṇā), because it is obtained through the killing of animals. Therefore, the issue of leather use by monastics should be carefully investigated. According to the Pāli vinaya, the use of leather is sometimes permitted and sometimes prohibited, but the criteria for making this judgment are not clear. In the commentaries on the Pāli vinaya, “use” (paribhoga) is permitted, but “carrying around” (pariharaṇa) is prohibited. However, when looking at the leather-related cases in the Pāli vinaya, there are cases where monastics are reluctant to use leather itself, so there are still some parts that cannot be fully explained in the commentaries. Focusing on the rules regarding the use of leather in the Pāli vinaya, this paper examines the primary factors that have become the criteria for permitting or prohibiting the use of leather by monastics. Through this, the paper aims to reveal that the rules on the use of leather are more deeply connected to the perceptions of secular society than to the core Buddhist values of non-killing and compassion.

1. Introduction

Buddhism is a religion that emphasizes the commiseration and protection of all living things, with non-killing (ahimsā) and compassion (karuṇā) as its core values. In particular, the bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs must strictly observe the precept1 of non-killing, which affects their overall lifestyle. However, this principle is not always strictly applied, and, sometimes, lifestyles that contradict the precept of non-killing are found, such as the consumption of meat or fish. The use of leather is another typical example.

Despite the fact that the use of leather obtained through the killing of animals may conflict with the precept of non-killing, there are cases where the use of leather is permitted in the Pāli vinaya, which regulates the daily life of Buddhist monastics. However, there are also cases where the use of leather is prohibited, making it unclear what stance Buddhism actually takes on the use of leather. In this regard, Kieffer-Pülz argues that the commentaries on the Pāli vinaya literature show a common position: that the use of leather (paribhoga) is permitted but carrying it around (pariharaṇa) is prohibited (Kieffer-Pülz 2013, pp. 1310–13). However, when looking at the related cases in the Pāli vinaya, there are some parts that cannot be fully explained. For example, there are cases where monastics feel uncomfortable about using leather. If the core of the problem is indeed about “carrying it around”, monastics should not have felt uncomfortable if they simply used leather without carrying it around themselves.

To date, there has not been sufficient research on the use of leather by Buddhist monastics. The only study that directly addresses this topic is by the aforementioned Kieffer-Pülz (2013). However, that study focuses only on the commentaries on the term “an animal’s skin” (cammakhaṇḍa) in the 14th article of the offense of expiation (pācittiya), which is limited in that it does not fully discuss the Buddhist position on leather. There is also an article by Bose Shibani that explores the issues of animals and leather that appear in the Pāli canon in the context of discussing mega-mammals in ancient India (Bose 2020, pp. 152–55). There, Bose points out that Buddhism prohibits harming animals and taking their homes, as well as discouraging the use of animal skins in order to observe the precept of non-killing. His research analyzes the Buddhist double attitude of permission and prohibition regarding fish and meat, but the scope of the discussion is limited because it focuses solely on the prohibition of leather.

This study aims to examine the records of the use of leather in the Pāli vinaya, analyze the cases in which the use of leather is permitted or prohibited, and identify the criteria for making such judgments. In particular, by arguing that the criteria for prohibition were more closely related to the perception of leather in secular society at the time than to core Buddhist values such as non-killing and compassion, this paper sheds new light on the ways in which the vinaya was coordinated with social and cultural factors.2

2. The Cases of the Use of Leather in the Pāli Vinaya

2.1. The Cases of Permission

The Pāli vinaya contains various examples of the use of leather by bhikṣus. A typical example is the record relating to the dutiyasenāsanasikkhāpadaṃ (the second rule about lodgings), article 15 of the pācittiya (an offense of expiation). According to this article, if a bhikṣu uses a sleeping place (seyyā)3 in a dwelling belonging to the order and leaves it without tidying it up, he is guilty of a pācittiya (Vin IV, p. 41:20–23). Here, a piece of leather (cammakhaṇḍa, a piece of [animal] skin) is mentioned as a type of bedding, indicating that monks used leather for their sleeping places. The Samantapāsādikā (hereafter Sp), a commentary on the Pāli vinaya, explains the term “piece of leather” as follows:

“A piece of leather” refers to all kinds of leather, including the leather of lions, tigers, leopards, and hyenas.

cammakhaṇḍaṁ nāma sīha-byaggha-dipī-taraccha cammādīsu pi yaṁ kiñci cammaṁ.

(Sp IV, p. 776:6–7)

The commentary interprets the leather piece as including the leather of all animals, not just specific ones. Therefore, if this interpretation is adopted, it can be seen as allowing the use of any leather for a sleeping place.

Meanwhile, the Pāli vinaya also contains instances that demonstrate that bhikṣus used leather for various other purposes. First, there is a “piece of leather” (cammakhaṇḍa) that seems to have been used as a water container. In the Khuddakavatthukkhandhaka, three containers are permitted as water-drawing tools: a copper jar (lohavāraka), a wooden jar (dāruvāraka), and a piece of leather (cammakkhaṇḍa) (Vin II, p. 122:16–18). Among these, a piece of leather is explained in the following way in Sp:

“A piece of leather” refers to a container made of leather that is to be attached to a lever or pulley.”

cammakhaṇḍaṃ nāma tulāya vā karakaṭakena vā yojetabbakaṃ cammabhājanaṃ.

(Sp VI, p. 1208:10–11)

Horner translates “tulā”, translated here as lever, as “well-sweep” (BD V, p. 168). In the Sp, “tulā” refers to “a lever that draws water for vegetables” (tulan ti paṇṇikānaṃ viya udakaubbāhanatulaṃ) (Sp VI, p. 1208:6–7). From the explanation, it appears to be a device that utilizes the principle of a lever, similar to a well-sweep, to draw water from a well. On the other hand, “karakaṭaka”, translated here as a pulley, is explained in the Sp, “karakaṭaka refers to pulling long ropes either by harnessing bulls or by using hands” (karakaṭako ’ti vuccati goṇe yojetvā hatthehi vā gahetvā dīghavarattāhi ākaḍḍhanayantaṃ) (Sp VI, p. 1208:7–9). From this, “karakaṭaka” appears to refer to a tool that uses a long string to pull the jug with an ox or a hand to scoop up water. Therefore, it would be reasonable to interpret a leather piece as an “animal-leather bucket” used to draw water using a lever or pulley, as in the translation of Upasak.4

In addition, the Senāsanakkhandhaka also mentions an example of allowing the use of bear leather (acchacamma) as a towel for wiping one’s feet5 (Vin II, p. 174:24–27), along with cases where the use of a round pad called “cakkalī”6 is permitted (Vin II, p. 174:27–28). Since “cakkalī” is also called “camma-cakkalī”, it is likely that it was a product made of leather (Vin II, p. 179:23). As such, it can be seen that leather was used not only for a type of bed, but also for various purposes in the daily life of laypeople, such as a water container, a towel for wiping one’s feet, and a round pad.

2.2. The Cases of Prohibition

The cases of prohibitions on the use of leather by the monastics can be found mainly in “Cammakkhandhaka”, the fifth chapter of the Mahāvagga of the Pāli vinaya. There are three main ones.

First, the wearing of shoes decorated with leather was prohibited. When the Buddha allowed the wearing of sandals with one lining,7 the group of six monks wore shoes of various colors and shapes, including shoes decorated with leather. Upon seeing this, Buddha banned the wearing of shoes decorated with leather. Here is the rule:

Case ①

Now at that time the group of six monks wore sandals decorated with lion-skin … with. tiger-skins … with panther-skins … with black antelope-skins … with otter-skins … with cat-skins … with squirrel-skins … with owl-skins. People looked down upon, criticised, spread it about, saying: “like householders who enjoy pleasures of the senses.” They told this matter to the Lord. He said: “Monks, sandals decorated with lion-skins … with owlskins are not to be worn. Whoever should wear (any of these) there is an offence of wrong-doing.”

(BD IV, p. 247)

tena kho pana samayena chabbaggiyā bhikkhū sīhacammaparikkhaṭā upāhanāyo dhārenti, vyagghacammaparikkhaṭā up. dh., dīpicammap. up. dh., ajinacammap. up. dh., uddacammap. up. dh., ulūkacammap. up. dhārenti. manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: seyyāthapi gihī kāmabhogino ’ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave sīhacammaparikkhaṭā upāhanā dhāretabbā … na ulūkacammap. up. dhāretabbā. yo dhāreyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti.

(Vin I, p. 186:18–27)

Here, wearing shoes decorated with the skins of eight animals, including lions, tigers, leopards, goats, otters, cats, squirrels, and owls, is prohibited. In particular, with regard to the expression “decorated with lion-skin” (sīhacammaparikkhaṭā), the Sp says that “decorated with lion-skin” refers to being edged with lion skin, like fabrics sewn on their edges (sīhacammaparikkhaṭā nāma pariyantesu cīvare anuvātaṃ viya sīhacammaṃ yojetvā kata) (Sp V, p. 1084:19–20). Considering this, the rule can be interpreted as not banning all shoes made of animal skin but banning shoes made by attaching the skin of animals such as lions to the edge of the shoes for decoration.

The second prohibition was against using large hides (mahācamma). When the Buddha prohibited the use of high and broad things to recline upon (uccāsayanamahāsayana) (Vin I, p. 192:4–20), the group of six monks cut large hides, such as a lion’s hide, a tiger’s hide, and a panther’s hide, into pieces and laid them on the insides and outsides of beds and chairs. Then, the Buddha forbade this and established the following rule:

Case ②

Monks, large hides should not be used: a lion’s hide, a tiger’s hide, a panther’s hide. Whoever should use (any of these), there is an offence of wrong-doing (BD IV, p. 257). na bhikkhave mahācammāni dhāretabbāni, sīhacammaṃ, vyagghacammaṃ, dīpicammaṃ, yo dhāreyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti.

(Vin I, p. 192:29–31)

Third, the use of all leather, including cowhides, is prohibited. When the use of large leather was banned (as in case ②), the group of six monks cut cowhides and used them to cover the insides and outsides of their beds and chairs. One day, a certain depraved monk visited the house of a certain depraved lay follower and saw a very young and beautiful calf, which resembled a baby leopard. When the depraved monk stared at the calf, the lay follower asked the reason. The monk replied, “I want the skin of this calf.” The lay follower then killed the calf, skinned it, and gave the leather to the depraved monk. The monk took the leather and secretly hid it under his outer cloak (saṅghāṭi). The cow, saddened by her calf’s death, followed the monk. When other monks saw this and inquired about the matter, the monk pretended not to know. However, when the monks saw that the monk’s outer cloak was stained with blood, they condemned his act of killing (Vin I, pp. 192:31–193:38). As a result, the Buddha established the following rule:

Case ③

Monks, there should be no inciting (anyone) to onslaught on creatures. Whoever should (so) incite, should be dealt with according to the rule. Nor, monks, should a cow-hide be used. Whoever should use one, there is an offence of wrong-doing. Nor, monks, should any hide be used. Whoever should use one, there is an offence of wrong-doing.

(BD IV, p. 259)

Na bhikkhave pāṇātipāte samādapetabbaṃ. Yo samādapeyya, yathādhammo kāretabbo.8 Na, bhikkhave, gocammaṃ dhāretabbaṃ. Yo dhāreyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. Na ca, bhikkhave, kiñci cammaṃ dhāretabbaṃ. Yo dhāreyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti.

(Vin I, p. 193:33–38)

The three main rules were established in the wake of the actions of the monk who made the layperson kill the calf to obtain its hide. First, one should not make others kill to obtain something one desires; second, cowhide is prohibited; and third, all animal hides are prohibited. Among these, the third rule, “Nor, monks, should any hide be used” (Na ca, bhikkhave, kiñci cammaṃ dhāretabbaṃ), the underlined sentence in the case ③ quotation, requires careful understanding of its meaning. If this is understood literally as a complete prohibition on the use of all hides, it would contradict the examples of the permissible use of hide mentioned in Section 2.1 of this paper. Case ③ should be read in the context of vase ②, where the group of six monks, after the ban on the use of large hides, cut cowhide and used it to line both the insides and outsides of their beds and chairs. In short, the third rule in case ③ refers to the prohibition of placing any hide cut on beds or chairs. Thus, in “Cammakkhandhaka”, there are three cases of the prohibition of the use of leather.9

3. The Position in the Commentaries, Such as the Sp, on the Use (Paribhoga) and Carrying Around (Pariharaṇa) of Leather

As seen thus far, the Pāli vinaya contains cases where the use of leather is both permitted and prohibited. This being the case, what is the criterion for determining such permissions and prohibitions? In this regard, the Sp’s comment on the “cammakhaṇḍa” (leather piece) in the 14th article, “paṭhamasenāsanasikkhāpadavaṇṇanā” (the first rule about lodgings), of the pācittiya is worth noting. The 14th article prohibits the act of leaving a place after using a couch (mañca), chair (pīṭha), mattress (bhisi), stool (koccha), or other lodgings (senāsana)10 owned by the saṃgha and leaving it unattended in the open air. Such acts constitute a violation of the pācittiya. However, in the part that presents the case precedents related to article 14, it is stated that if something belonging to a sleeping place (seyyā), such as carpet (cimilikā) or a piece of leather (an animal’s skin), is left in the open air, the offense of evil action (dukkaṭa) is applied, which is less severe than the offense of leaving a lodgings (senāsana) (Vin IV, p. 40:26–31). Here, the leather piece, which is mentioned as a type of sleeping place, is explained in the Sp as follows:

Case ④

“Cammakhaṇḍa” refers to all kinds of leather, including that of lions, tigers, leopards, and hyenas. Indeed, in the [ancient] commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā, commentaries), we do not see any leather that is forbidden for use in the residence. Therefore, we should know that the prohibition of wearing lion skin, etc. is only for carrying.

Cammakhaṇḍaṁ nāma sīha-byaggha-dipī-taraccha cammādīsu pi yaṁ kiñci cammaṁ. aṭṭhakathāsu hi senāsanaparibhoge paṭikkhittacammaṁ nāma na dissati, tasmā sīhacammādīnaṁ pariharaṇe yeva paṭikkhepo veditabbo.

(Sp IV, p. 776:7–10)

Almost the same content appears in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī (hereafter Kkh), the commentary on the Pāṭimokkha:

A piece of [animal] skin” means: whatever [animal] skin, for only in carrying [them] around is there a rejection of lion skins, etc., but with respect to [their] usage for furnishings (or lodgings) there is no unlawful [animal] skin.

(Norman et al. 2018, p. 314)

cammakkhaṇḍo nāma yaṃ kiñci cammaṃ, sīhacammādīnaṃ hi pariharaṇe yeva parikkhepo, senāsanaparibhoge11 pana akappiyacammaṃ nāma n’ atthi.

(Kkh, p. 159:1–3)

Three important points can be drawn from these comments. First, there is no leather that is prohibited for use as bedding. Second, according to the ancient commentaries, there is no leather that is prohibited for use in accommodations. Third, lion skin is prohibited only for carrying. In other words, a piece of leather, which serves as a form of bedding, can be made from the skin of any animal, and it is especially permissible to use it in accommodations. However, carrying around lion skin and the like is prohibited, and “Cammakkhandhaka” indicates that the use of a large piece of leather, including that of lions (case 2), is prohibited because it is carried around.

Kieffer-Pülz has already pointed out the position of this comment that leather as a type of bedding is only a matter of possession and its use in residential facilities is permitted, analyzing relevant examples shown in aṭṭhakathā and ṭīkā (Kieffer-Pülz 2013, pp. 1310–14). She analyzes that the position of the Sp shown in the above case ④, that the leather “only in carrying [them] around” (pariharaṇe yeva) is problematic, is common in other aṭṭhakathā or ṭīkā, and adds that the commentaries also agree that this position should also be applied to the cases presented in “Cammakkhandhaka”, i.e., cases ① to ③ of the prohibition of the use of leather presented in Section 2.2 of this paper (Kieffer-Pülz 2013, p. 1311). In short, the reason for prohibiting the use of leather in cases 1 to 3 is that the monks carried leather with them, not that the use of leather itself is problematic.

Based on the explanation of these comments, Kieffer-Pülz points out that the verb “dhāreti” (see parts in bold in cases ① to ③ in this paper) has the potential to have two meanings: “carry around” and “use” (see note 3 on Kieffer-Pülz 2013, p. 1311). This verb, derived from the root “√dhṛ”, has various meanings, including “bear, hold, carry, preserve, keep, uphold, maintain, use, wear” (Monier-Williams 1960, p. 519; Davids and Stede 1921–1925, p. 341). In case ①, it is used to mean wearing shoes decorated with leather, so it can be translated as “wear” or “use”. In fact, Horner also translates “dhāreti” as “wear” in this context (BD IV, p. 247). On the other hand, it is difficult to determine the meaning of “dhāreti” in cases ② and ③. According to the explanation in the commentaries, this can be understood as prohibiting the act of carrying leather around and cutting it to the size of a bed or chair, but if the interpretation of the commentaries is excluded, it can also be interpreted as simply cutting leather to the size of a bed or chair and using it. In fact, Horner translates “dhāreti” in cases ② and ③ as “use” (BD IV, pp. 257–59). Therefore, there is no reason to understand “dhāreti” in cases ② and ③ as limited to the meaning of “carrying around.”

Above all, the origination story that appears following case ③ raises fundamental questions about the interpretation of the annotation that leather is prohibited in the case of “carrying around”. When the Buddha forbade the use of all leather, including cowhide, for beds and chairs, the bhikṣus did not want to sit on people’s (manussa) beds or chairs covered with leather (cammonaddha) or bound with leather (cammavinaddha). These beds and chairs were either placed in the homes of the laypeople or provided by them to the monastics. Upon hearing of this incident, the Buddha established the following rule: “It is good to sit on a bed or chair belonging to a householder (gihivikataṁ),12 but it is not good to lie down on it” (Vin I, p. 194:1–5). In addition, when the bhikṣus saw that various monasteries (vihāra) were lashed together13 with thongs of hide (cammabandha) and did not sit down out of aversion, the Buddha allowed them to sit down if there were just thongs (Vin I, p. 194:5–8).

The stories in these two rules illustrate situations where the monks are reluctant to use leather at all. If the problem is simply in the possession of leather, there is no need to feel uncomfortable about sitting on a leather bed or chair belonging to or provided by a householder. Considering these cases, the problem of Buddhist monastics using leather cannot be fully explained by the explanations in the commentaries, and it is a topic that requires further discussion from a different perspective.

4. Why Are the Monastics Reluctant to Use Leather?

The position of the commentaries on the use of leather is that it is not the use but the carrying around that is the problem. However, we have seen that the monastics are reluctant to use leather. So why do the monastics dislike the use of leather? This question can be linked to the broader question of what criteria are used to permit or prohibit the use of leather. Bose briefly reviews the cases of leather bans in the Pāli vinaya and points out that it is necessary to question whether these bans are based on the precept of non-killing that the Buddha passionately advocated or whether there is another reasonable explanation (Bose 2020, p. 153). Since leather is obtained through the killing of animals, it is impossible to ignore the conflict with the precept of non-killing. Therefore, further discussion is needed to determine whether the primary reason for the ban on leather use is directly related to the precept of non-killing or whether other social and ethical factors are also involved.

However, as with meat-eating, it is difficult to find direct descriptions in the Pāli vinaya where the monastics refrained from using leather themselves to comply with the precept of non-killing or that the Buddha prohibited it. As a matter of course, the 61st article of the pācittiya says that “Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a living thing of life, there is an offence of expiation” (yo pana bhikṣu sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyya, pācittiyan ti) (Vin IV, p.124), prohibiting the deliberate taking of life and thereby clearly stating its stance on the protection of life. However, no examples of this precept of non-killing being applied directly to the issue of meat-eating or the use of leather are found in the Pāli vinaya.14 On the contrary, in the Sn’s “Āmagandhasutta” (Tainted fare), it is argued that meat-eating is not tainted but that evil acts such as harming life, stealing, and lying are tainted (Sn verse. 239–252; Norman 1992, pp. 27–28). In this regard, it is necessary to consider the ban on the use of leather in conjunction with other social and cultural factors rather than basing it solely on the precept of non-killing.

In this regard, Shimoda Masahiro’s study, which examines the regulations regarding meat consumption in the vinaya literature, is illuminating. He traces how mainstream Buddhism, which originally permitted meat consumption, gradually imposed restrictions, such as prohibiting the consumption of specific types of meat, like elephant, horse, and dog, or introducing the so-called principle of the “three kinds of pure meat”, where one must not consume meat if they have seen, heard, or suspect that the animal was killed specifically for them. He demonstrates that although mainstream Buddhism fundamentally maintained a permissive stance on meat-eating, it gradually moved in the direction of expanding restrictions. In particular, he shows that this shift was influenced not by an internal conflict with the precept of non-killing, but rather by the sociocultural context surrounding the monastic community. This context, according to him, includes the general perception of meat as a luxury or delicacy and the impact of Hindu norms, which regarded the consumption of certain animals’ meat as objectionable. His research suggests that the emergence of the prohibition of meat-eating in mainstream Buddhism was not due to doctrinal inconsistencies with the precept of non-killing, but rather a response to the expectations and perceptions of the surrounding society (Shimoda 1989, pp. 1–21; Shimoda 1997, pp. 388–419).15

A similar situation is observed in the context of partial restrictions on the use of leather by monastics. Although the reason for the restrictions on the use of leather is not directly stated in the Pāli vinaya, the common factor for the ban is the criticism from laypeople. In other words, the general public’s view of leather is adopted. In case ① in Section 2.2, laypeople, who saw the monks wearing shoes decorated with the skins of lions and other animals, criticized them, saying that they were “like householders who enjoy pleasures of the senses” (BD IV, p. 257) (seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino) (Vin I, p. 186:23). Meanwhile, in case ②, laypeople touring the dwelling places saw the group of six monks placing a large piece of leather on a bed and chair and similarly criticized them (Vin. I. 192:26–28). In other words, in both cases, the rule was made in response to the criticism of the laypeople. The expression “seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino” is a standard phrase used by lay Buddhists to criticize monks when they behave inappropriately as ordained members of the order. Bhikṣu Pāsādika classifies the term “enjoyers of sense pleasures” (kāmabhogin), used in the Saṃyutta-nikāya and the Aṅguttara-nikāya, into ten types. According to this classification, although there are differences in that each type is characterized by either good or bad deeds, the term is common in that it describes a layperson who values building a family and accumulating wealth (Bhikṣu Pāsādika 2000, pp. 147–54). In other words, it is a term used to describe a layperson who lives in the secular world, as opposed to a monk who seeks liberation by renouncing worldly desires.16 The reason this expression was used to criticize the use of leather is that the behavior of monks using leather seemed to laypeople to be no different from their own behavior of living a life of unbridled desires.

According to Sahu, there are many references to leather crafts in ancient Indian literature, including the Jātakas, and, in particular, there are descriptions in the Arthaśāstra that show that hides were considered an important resource and were stored in cities (Sahu 1987, pp. 72–73). From this, it can be inferred that leather was a highly valued commodity at the time, and it would have been a luxurious act to decorate shoes with it or to use large pieces of leather cut freely. In addition, pointing out that in the Mahā-Sudassana-Suttanta the Buddha, teaching the impermanence of all things, recalled his past life as the “great king” and described his dwelling as having a chariot covered with the skins of lions, tigers, and leopards,17 Bose supposes that animal skins must have been items that symbolized high status and wealth (Bose 2020, pp. 153–54). As a reward for performing the sacrifice ritual, the priest is given a chariot drawn by four horses, the cover of which is made of tiger skin, the bowstring of which is made of leopard skin, and the quiver of which is made of bear skin, and, in this chariot, there is a warrior riding with horned-rhino-skin armor on him for battle (Jamison 1998, p. 255). Since leather was considered such a precious commodity in ancient Indian society, the act of a monk decorating his shoes with it or using a large piece of leather freely would have been considered inappropriate in the eyes of laypeople.18

This phenomenon was also reflected in the way the particularity of a certain region was taken into account. In other words, in some regions, leather was used on a daily basis, so even if a monk or nun used it, laypeople were unlikely to condemn them. This is evident in the five petitions of Soṇa in “Cammakkhandhaka.” At the request of Elder Mahākaccāna, Bhikṣu Soṇa asks the Buddha to relax the five rules in the southern part of Avantī, a border region of India. The fourth rule was, in particular, related to the use of leather:

Lord, in the southern region of Avantī hides (are used as) coverings19: sheep-hide, goat-hide, deer-hide. As, Lord, in the middle districts, eragu, moragu, majjhāra, jantu (are used), so, Lord, in the southern region of Avantī hides (are used as) coverings. Perhaps the Lord would allow hides (to be used as) coverings in the southern region of Avantī: sheep-hide, goat-hide, deer-hide.

(BD IV, p. 263)

Avantidakkhiṇāpathe bhante cammāni attharaṇāni,20 eḷakacammaṃ ajacammaṃ migacammaṃ. seyyathāpi bhante majjhimesu janapadesu eragu moragu majjāru jantu, evam eva kho bhante Avantidakkhiṇāpathe cammāni attharaṇāni eḷakacammaṃ ajacammaṃ migacammaṃ. app eva nāma bhagavā Avantidakkhiṇāpathe cammāni attharaṇāni anujāneyya eḷakacammaṃ ajacammaṃ migacammaṃ.

(Vin I, p. 196:4–10)

In the middle districts, they make and use coverings (attharaṇa) from four types of grass,21 including eragu grass. However, in the southern region of Avantī, they make and use coverings from sheep hide, etc. Therefore, here they request that the use of sheep hide, etc., be permitted. Soṇa emphasizes that leather is a common bedding material in border regions, such as southern Avantī, just as grass is commonly used in the central region. This can be interpreted as the premise that a monastic has no reason to be criticized for using leather as a material for their bedding.22 In addition to leather, Soṇa’s five requests concern the number of bhikṣus who can confer the full precepts, as well as shoes, bathing, and extra robe material (Vin I, pp. 195:32–196:15). Most of these requests take into account the customs and particularities of a region. The Buddha granted all of Soṇa’s five requests.

Considering these various examples, the background behind the ban on the use of leather in the Pāli vinaya is most likely due to the general public’s views and customs regarding leather.

5. Concluding Remarks

This paper examines various instances of leather use in the Pāli vinaya, examining the criteria for permitting or prohibiting the use of leather by monastics. The paper’s main conclusions are as follows:

First, it was found that the use of leather in the Pāli vinaya is partially permitted or prohibited, and the standards are not consistent.

Second, the commentaries on the Pāli vinaya focus on leather as a bedding material, explaining that while “use” (paribhoga) is permitted, “carrying around” (pariharaṇa) is prohibited. However, when looking at the various cases of leather use in the Pāli vinaya, this explanation is not enough. Above all, in many cases, it is found that the monastics are reluctant to use leather itself, making it difficult to explain all cases with the interpretation of the commentary that relies solely on possession as a criterion.

Third, it is revealed that the background to the restriction on the use of leather by monastics was that the perceptions and values of secular society played a more important role than the core Buddhist values of non-killing and compassion. In the case of the use of leather being prohibited in the vinaya, the main reason for the regulation was the criticism of laypeople who saw monastics using leather. For example, the fact that the expression “like householders who enjoy pleasures of the senses” (seyyāthāpi gihī kāmabhogino) was used to criticize the use of leather by monastics indicates that the use of leather was perceived as a luxurious and worldly act. In addition, the case of Soṇa, who petitioned for the use of leather in the Indian borderlands, not only reveals a situation in which regional customs and practicality were applied differently but also suggests that the use of leather in the region was relatively free from criticism from laypeople.

In conclusion, the monastics’ use of leather cannot be explained solely by the precept of non-killing but rather is a complex issue deeply influenced by the perceptions of secular society, cultural values, and regional customs. This study demonstrates that the vinaya was flexibly adapted to the time and environment, indicating that the life norms of Buddhist practitioners were shaped not by a simple doctrinal approach but rather in tension with social reality. Future research will need to consider the social and cultural context of other lifestyle norms, not just the use of leather. This study did not address the reasons why Buddhism, with its core values of non-killing and compassion, has a relatively lenient attitude toward meat-eating and leather use, but in-depth research will be needed in the future.