Monogenism Revisited: New Perspectives on a Classical Controversy

Abstract

Recent attempts to reconcile the doctrine of original sin with evolutionary theory have sought scientific validation for the historicity of Adam and Eve, particularly through arguments for a single ancestral pair. This paper critically examines such efforts, arguing that they constitute a disguised form of creation science, selectively engaging with evolution to preserve classical Christian anthropology. Through biblical exegesis, theological hermeneutics, and biological research, this study demonstrates that these approaches rest on uncertain scientific and theological premises. Genesis 1–11 is sapiential rather than historical, and genetic evidence biological evidence points to population-oriented emergence of our species. Theological attempts to preserve a literal Adam and Eve rest on an outdated view of revelation as mere information transfer, leading to conceptual confusion and misinterpretation. The pursuit of a historical Adam and Eve as a scientific reality ultimately distorts both theology and science, reducing theology to ideology and fundamentalism while undermining its engagement with mystery and transcendence.

1. Introduction

The development of contemporary biology has been generating considerable challenges for the traditional tenets of the Christian faith (e.g., Russell et al. 1998). In particular, this concerns the origins of human species which, in light of the theory of evolution, is a result of the growth of complexity driven by the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection. As it is commonly known, the theory of evolution explains the descent of human species by means of common ancestry. The study of the human genome reveals not only precise connections between humans and other organisms (e.g., Perelman et al. 2011; Upham et al. 2019) but gives detailed insight into the history of our ancestors and their populations (e.g., Su et al. 1999; Ragsdale et al. 2023; Li et al. 2024). With modern genetics in hand, one no longer needs to rely on a mere comparison of the morphology of organisms to establish their descendance. This minimizes the risk of establishing false relatedness between organisms due to similarities of morphological structures.

The main motivation to undertake the inquiry set forth in this study consists of attempts to provide biological arguments in favor of the historicity of Adam and Eve, which may qualify as a rebirth of classical creation science (e.g., Keane 1999; Huskinson 2020). This rebirth bears visible signs of mitigation as compared to its original version; however, it does not aim at contradicting the theory of evolution directly but, on the contrary, uses this theory to demonstrate the possibility of the descendance of mankind from a single pair of humans. Thus, the rebirth conceived is narrower in scope as it aims at the defense of an important aspect of Christian anthropology, that is, the doctrine of original sin in particular.

The principal goal of this study is to evaluate the contemporary attempts to resurrect the literal take on the Book of Genesis in regards to anthropology. In particular, this has to do with a number of recent studies pursuing the historicity of Adam and Eve in order to support the doctrine of monogenism, that is, the descent of mankind from a single pair (Swamidass 2019; Craig 2021). Inasmuch as monogenism is a matter of scientific hypothesis for biology, it bears significant value from the point of view of classical Christian theology as it safeguards one of its basic tenets, that is, the doctrine of original sin. It will be shown that these efforts lack cogency on both scientific and theological counts and, as such, may lead to fundamentalism that does not serve the defense of Christianity but is to its detriment. Considerable biological evidence rendering monogenism untenable has been already presented by Ayala and his collaborators (Ayala 1995; Ayala and Escalante 1996).

The goal will be carried in four consecutive steps. Firstly, a contemporary approach to the understanding of the nature of the theological language, both in the Scriptures and in doctrinal pronouncements, will be presented with particular emphasis on the distinction between what constitutes the content of a revealed truth and what is a means of communication only. These tools will illuminate possible theological inconsistencies of those who insist on turning some aspects of the literal layer of language into a theological invariant. Secondly, the concept of biological species will be surveyed to show that the multitude of its meanings in biology renders inferences made with its use in theology inconsistent. Thirdly, it will be clarified why the biologically imposed constraints on the original population of Homo sapiens do not suppress its count to the level, making monogenism a tenable hypothesis. And fourthly, a philosophical analysis will reveal that attempts to biologically validate Adam and Eve as genetic ancestors accord with neither biological nor theological contextuality. The main difficulty of this study consists in a relatively limited amount of peer-reviewed research in this area, with a contribution of publications representing common sense reasoning that does not always follow the rigor of the scientific method. Although these publications could be easily ignored for this reason, their significant impact on broader and oftentimes scientifically uninformed audiences makes their critical appraisal all the more pressing.

2. Exegesis

The first line of argumentation in challenging the historical authenticity of Adam and Eve comes from theology. In particular, this concerns two aspects: (1) contemporary exegesis of the Book of Genesis and (2) reflection on the nature of the theological language that arose within theological hermeneutics in the 20th century. The approach assumed in this paper does not aim at directly challenging the detailed exegetical argumentation of the contemporary advocates of the historicity of Adam: William Lane Craig and S. Joshua Swamidass. Instead, the fact that they both engage in constructing biological arguments in favor of the historicity of Adam and Eve is taken as confirming this particular exegetical stance as theirs (otherwise, why bother) and, as such, requires a critical response. Craig affirms a form of biological monogenism, proposing that Adam and Eve were real historical individuals from whom all modern humans biologically descend. In contrast, Swamidass does not promote biological monogenism but affirms genealogical monogenism, arguing that Adam and Eve could have been a historical couple specially created by God who became the genealogical (but not genetic) ancestors of all humans. Both uphold the historicity of Adam and Eve but differ in how they reconcile that with evolutionary science and the theological transmission of original sin. As a result of this, it seems fitting to use them as examples of contemporary literal interpretations of the Scripture to highlight the problems that such attempts generate.

Inasmuch as the detailed engagement with exegesis is outside of the scope of this study, some general remarks on why Craig and Swamidass may not exactly align in their claims with the contemporary exegesis seem fitting. The literary style of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, often referred to as biblical prehistory, indicates its sapiential and timeless rather than historical nature (Westermann 1984; Wenham 1987; Barton and Muddiman 2001, pp. 40–48). The primary aim of these chapters was to illustrate the religious truth about humanity and its relationship with God as Creator using contextual language comprehensible to the people of that era. In short, it does not describe a natural history of humanity. The stories presented are elaborate metaphors, drawing their mythical elements from Near Eastern mythology, absorbed as a cultural context by the Israelites in exile and, consequently, by the authors of Genesis (Brueggemann 1982; Albertz 2003). For example, the creation and the subsequent narratives reflect motifs and thematic parallels of Mesopotamian poems: Atrahasis and Enuma Elish, and the Sumerian King List (Dalley 1991; Jacobsen 1976; Hallo and Younger 1997). In regards to Romans 5, 12, a key Pauline text regarding the fall, James Dunn interprets this passage as presenting Adam and Christ as typological representatives, where Adam symbolizes the universal reality of human sinfulness, not necessarily as a historical individual. In contrast, Dunn insists that Christ is not merely a symbolic counterpart but a fully historical person, whose real life, death, and resurrection form the indispensable foundation of Paul’s theology of salvation and the reversal of the condition Adam represents (Dunn 2008, pp. 101–6).

What is most relevant to the current discussion is that the metaphorical nature of biblical prehistory makes it interpretatively open. The Bible itself makes no claims regarding the biological mechanisms responsible for the diversity of life forms, both extinct and extant, thereby affirming the autonomy of scientific inquiry in this field. Consequently, the interpretative flexibility allows the use of science to verify which aspects of the literal text do not constitute part of the unchanging deposit of faith (Barbour 1974; Haught 2008). Based on the presented arguments, it can be asserted that contemporary exegesis of the Book of Genesis does not support the historical authenticity of Adam and Eve, making room to seek consistency between revelation and the evolutionary origins of the human species.

3. Theological Language: Contextuality

The second aspect of theological objections to the historical claims of Craig and Swamidass comes from the study of the nature of theological language. This aspect projects on the understanding of the doctrine of original sin, which is considered as a key doctrine of the Christian theological anthropology. The classical doctrine of original sin, rooted in Romans 5, 12 and developed by early Christian theologians such as, e.g., Augustine (2011), asserts that all humans inherit a sinful nature due to the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Their original act of defiance against God, often referred to as “the Fall”, introduced sin into the world, corrupting human nature and severing humanity’s relationship with God. As a result, every person is born with an inherent tendency toward sin and a spiritual separation from God, necessitating the Divine grace for redemption. This doctrine underscores the need for salvation, which, according to Christian belief, is made possible through the atoning work of Jesus Christ (e.g., Schmaus 1990, pp. 80–111).

The doctrine has been famously defended by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical Humani Generis issued in 1950 (Pius XII 1950). In this document, the Pope clearly voiced his opposition to polygenism which, in his view, directly challenged the integrity of the classical doctrine of original sin. Despite the document’s high profile, at least within the Catholic Church, its meaning has been progressively weakened as new insights on the nature of the theological language became more widely accepted (e.g., John Paul II 1998; Hofmann 2020, 2021). Major reinterpretative efforts have also been long underway regarding the doctrine of original sin, which constitutes the primary focus of this study (e.g., Rahner 1967; Domning and Hellwig 2006; Schwager 2006; Haught 2008; Oviedo 2022). In regards to Catholic theological thought, John Paul II’s 1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences affirms that evolution is compatible with Christian faith. Joseph Ratzinger interprets Genesis 1–3 as symbolic in form yet grounded in a real historical fall, involving a free and decisive rupture in humanity’s original relationship with God (Ratzinger 1995). Karl Rahner emphasizes original sin as the universal misuse of human freedom, treating Adam and Eve more as representative symbols of humanity than as individual historical progenitors (Rahner 1982, pp. 106–15). John Haught, working at the intersection of theology and evolutionary science, views the Genesis account as a mythic reflection on the emergence of moral awareness, without requiring a historical couple or singular event (Haught 2008, pp. 145–52). In light of evolutionary research, traits such as self-preservation, competition, and fear—while vital to human development—also give rise to the natural predispositions that make the reality of sin both plausible and universally observable. In light of these positions, the claims of Craig and Swamidass on the historicity of Adam turn out to be much too restrictive, and they do not align with the contemporary theological understanding of the doctrine of original sin. They ultimately bind this doctrine to the empirical postulation of a historical ancestral pair. This limits the symbolic and developmental possibilities explored in modern theology. We critique grounding freedom’s misuse by Adam in a single event as both biologically implausible and theologically unnecessary.

In order to substantiate the developments of the doctrine of original sin, it is worth noting that, as their background, they have an in-depth theological reflection on the general nature of the theological language. This study proceeds from a faith-based theological perspective, which differs from strictly historical-critical methods that treat the biblical text as a product of its time. However, as authors like Ratzinger (2007) and Gnilka (1999) have shown, theological interpretation can remain critically informed while grounded in a commitment to the revealed nature of Scripture. Each theological doctrine is a body of knowledge that offers a conceptual exposition of the content of the Divine revelation as it arises from an encounter of the human mind with the revealed content. Revelation is not a mere transfer of information, and conceptual frameworks of purely natural origin must be used in order to provide the proper expression of meaning of this content (e.g., Flannery 1981; O’Collins 2016). Concepts can never grasp the infinite Divine essence in a literal sense but by means of metaphorical language only. Each metaphor is equipped with both subjective and objective components, and the proper interpretation of a metaphor demands involvement on the part of the recipient (Soskice 1985; Lakoff and Johnson 2008). This, in turn, gives rise to the contextual character of the language of theology (Pears 2010; Bergmann and Vähäkangas 2021; Gantenbein 2021).

This set of ideas found its expression in the works of two famous 20th century theologians, Edmund Schillebeeckx and Karl Rahner. In one of the most important works on theological hermeneutics, Schillebeeckx proposed that the Divine revelation is never received as a nuda vox Dei, but each expression of the revealed content is phrased in such a way as to permit a concrete recipient living in concrete times to comprehend the Divine message (Schillebeeckx 2014, pp. 1–29). Karl Rahner thought of each dogma as an amalgam uniting both variable and invariable elements:

The truths which from the dogmatic point of view are absolutely binding can be expressed and handed down by means of ideas (propagated de facto at a given period in time by means of models and accepted patterns of reasoning), conveyed inseparably with the with the basic doctrinal statement, and later on considered as having no binding power or even false.

(Rahner 1977)

Divine revelation unfolds within history, meaning that it is always received and expressed through the historical, linguistic, and cultural frameworks of particular times and places. This historical dimension of revelation underscores why theological expressions must be contextual and dynamic, adapting to new intellectual and cultural horizons while preserving the core truths of faith.

The process of communicating what is objective, essential, and invariable with the concomitant elimination of contextual assumptions bears the name of the development of dogma, and it proceeds according to specific criteria (Newman 1845; Congar 1964; Dulles 1992; Seewald 2018). It turns out that there are many Christian doctrines that were attempted to be realigned with the achievements of science following the guidelines regarding the language of theology. In one of his seminal works, Resting on the Future: Catholic Theology for an Unfinished Universe, John Haught presents outcomes of interpretative efforts of a number of Christian doctrines in light of the scientifically motivated dynamic image of the Universe. For instance, these are protology, eschatology, christology, evil and morality. Works of other prominent writers focus on such issues as anthropology (Murphy 2006), Divine action (Peacocke 1993), Trinity (Edwards 1999; Polkinghorne 2010), and resurrection (Peters et al. 2002).

4. Problems with Concepts

4.1. Origins

The second group of arguments cast doubt on the coherence of attempts to justify the historicity of Adam and Eve as biological in nature and requires a number of precise conceptual clarifications. A key issue in interpreting the Book of Genesis is whether humans descended from a single pair of ancestors or from multiple pairs within a population. The historical context of the debates on human origins reveals four fundamental positions: (1) monogenism—humans descended from a single pair of hominids (often referred to as “the first people”); (2) polygenism—humans descended from multiple pairs of ancestors; (3) monophyletism—humans descended from one common ancestral species; and (4) polyphyletism—different groups of humans originated from several ancestor species. These distinctions are made by Tabaczek (2023) and, to some extent, similar ones are proposed by Swamidass (2019). Based on them, Tabaczek asserts that contemporary biology supports monophyletism—that is, all humans are of the same descent—and polygenism—all humans come from a population, not a single pair.

While these distinctions are valuable, the terminology remains problematic and can lead to misunderstandings. As Tabaczek (2023) notices, historically polygenism was sometimes used to mean not only descent from a population but also the independent origin of distinct human groups. Similarly, monogenism was associated with the origin of humans from a single lineage. Given that a biologist understands monogenism and polygenism not in terms of the distinctions emphasized by Tabaczek, but in light of their historical context, they may assume that monogenism is associated with monophyletism, and polygenism with polyphyletism. That is, the former concept means originating from common ancestral species and the latter from several ancestral species. On the contrary, if a theologian is not familiar with the technical biological meaning of mono- and polyphyletism, they may assume that those are somehow similar to their understanding of mono- and polygenism (i.e., humans originating from one pair or many). These intuitive associations may lead to a situation in which a biologist claims that contemporary science affirms monogenism, and a theologian concludes from it that the science now supports the historical existence of Adam and Eve as a single pair. Such misunderstandings underscore the necessity of careful and consistent use of terminology in discussions about human origins. Without agreed-upon definitions, even basic distinctions can blur, leading to significant misinterpretations, especially in interdisciplinary discussions.

4.2. Species

The concept of species in biology is far from self-evident. One of the most widely known definitions, Ernst Mayr’s biological species concept, defines species as groups of organisms that can interbreed in natural populations and are reproductively isolated from other groups (Mayr 1942). However, Mayr acknowledged the limitations of this definition. For example, taxonomists often rely on subjective judgment when groups interbreed to some extent, deciding whether to classify them as one species or several. Proving that individuals belong to the same species requires documenting successful mating and viable offspring, which is impractical and often inconclusive. Moreover, Mayr noted that his definition is most applicable to well-studied, bisexual animals and is difficult to apply to many other organisms, such as parasites, hermaphrodites, bacteria, and fungi. Fossil species must also often be classified based solely on morphology, risking misclassification due to intraspecific variation, or the assignment of juveniles and different sexes to separate species. Despite these challenges, contemporary biology is able to address at least some of these problems through the integration and critical evaluation of evidence from various subdisciplines, such as morphology, biogeography, and genetics, leading to more robust species delineation. This is possible because different subdisciplines of biology generally agree that species represent distinct evolutionary lineages (e.g., De Queiroz 2007).

Compounding the issue, Stankowski and Ravinet (2021) found that biologists use at least sixteen different species concepts, with definitions varying by subfield. For example, ecology, microbiology, and paleobiology each prioritize different aspects of species. Additionally, phenomena such as species complexes (e.g., Pelophylax esculentus) and ring species (e.g., Ensatina) defy the common-sense notion of discrete species. These challenges grow even more pronounced when discussing extinct species known only from molecular or fossil evidence. Ultimately, all living and extinct organisms represent populations that have evolved continuously over 3.8 billion years, complicating any static definition of species.

This ambiguity creates significant challenges for philosophy and theology, where the concept of species often carries ontological weight. Philosophers and theologians, especially those following traditions of Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, use “species” in ways that do not match its technical meaning in biology. In most cases, a philosopher conceives of species as fixed, essential categories, while biologists view them as fluid and contingent upon evolutionary processes. Misunderstandings arise when these differing assumptions are conflated—for instance, when speciation is interpreted as a discrete, instantaneous event rather than a gradual process. Such conceptual mismatches can lead to flawed reasoning in theological or philosophical discourse. Therefore, interdisciplinary dialogue requires careful attention to the distinct uses and meanings of “species” in biology and philosophy.

4.3. Human

Similar difficulties arise in case of the concept of a human. The theory of evolution explains the descent of human species as common ancestry, and the investigations carried out in genetics with the use of molecular methods have resulted in significant progress in this area (e.g., Smith and Ahern 2013). As it has been already indicated, discussions on whether there could be any place for Adam and Eve in contemporary biology to render the classical doctrine of original sin consistent increased in intensity quite recently. For instance, McKnight and Venema (2017) made an attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of the origin of the human species from a single pair based on the population genetics. In response to this, Swamidass argued that population genetics does not exclude such a bottleneck and that insufficient research has been conducted on this possibility. To address this, Swamidass developed a model to calculate the time to the most recent four alleles (TMR4A)—the time required to produce today’s genetic diversity from a pair of individuals with four alleles. His model suggests that this could have occurred approximately 500,000 years ago, allowing for the theoretical possibility of humanity descending from a single pair at that time. The study does not indicate that humanity originates from two individuals: it merely demonstrates that, assuming the model’s underlying premises, it is possible to generate the expected genetic diversity from a single pair that lived at least 500,000 years ago. At the same time, it rules out the possibility that such a hypothetical pair existing within the last 500,000 years as the original couple would have needed to possess more than four alleles, which is inconsistent with the biology of Homo sapiens. As a result of this, any other model that does not account for these boundary conditions would push the possibility of the original couple even further back in time. Presently, these results are highly speculative and illustrate only a theoretical possibility, not a plausibility.

In addition to this genetic model, Swamidass (2019) proposed a genealogical hypothesis: Adam and Eve are not universal genetic but genealogical ancestors. He explains that genetic material from ancestors is not always passed down to the offspring, so some ancestors leave no genetic trace. Thus, Adam and Eve could be genealogical ancestors without contributing to the human genome. Swamidass argues that attempts to prove or disprove Adam and Eve based on genetics misunderstand the theological focus of Genesis, which emphasizes genealogy, not genetics. He suggests that a universal genealogical ancestor could have lived as recently as 6000 years ago, due to the limited migration of humans by the first century CE. This framework allows Swamidass to propose a relatively recent Adam and Eve, created miraculously ex nihilo by God, who joined a population of Homo sapiens outside Eden. While this hypothesis may help to preserve the doctrine of original sin while leaving the findings of modern genetics intact, it not only openly violates the methodological autonomy of science and theology but is unacceptable from the theological point of view (e.g., Polkinghorne 1998, p. 92).

A different hypothesis was put forward by William Lane Craig (2021). While he opts for the origin of the human species from a single reproductive pair, he insists that this pair needs to introduce a certain novelty that is specific to mankind. In his search for Adam and Eve, Craig wishes to identify the first traces of “being a human” in the history of living organisms. Although these traces do not have to belong to the biological species of Homo sapiens, certain anatomical likeness as well as other characteristics are important, such as abstract thinking, ability to plan, symbolic thinking, and development of technology. In order to discover the first manifestations of these characteristics, Craig reaches out to paleoneurology and archeology to qualify as humans not only Homo sapiens but Homo neanderthalensis and the Denisovian as well.

Since the fact of “being a human” (and the existence of Adam, too) had to occur in an ancestor of these organisms, Craig proposes Homo heidelbergensis as a candidate. He maintains that this particular pair of humans was equipped with abilities later on attributed to Homo heidelbergensis. For Craig, Adam and Eve were the first people, that is, organisms equipped with specifically human features. They could live within the population of other Homo, and no cataclysm or bottleneck effects were necessary. However, a certain change might have occurred in these individuals (such as a mutation or a Divine intervention) that singled them out from the population of Homo as the only ones then and the first humans in history. A reproductive barrier occurred between them and the rest of the population, which has resulted in neither they nor their successors being able to mate with other Homo.

While for Swamidass (2019), a human counts as a genealogical descendant of Adam and Eve, for Craig (2021), a human is an entity exhibiting human characteristics. The first implies that there may have been representatives of Homo sapiens who were not considered human, although Swamidass explicitly rejects any notion of degrading such individuals on this basis. The second definition, grounded in empirical evidence, appears to suggest that other species could be considered human if they meet certain criteria. Drawing on this and a similar distinction proposed by Kemp (2011), it seems that although Swamidass and Craig rely predominantly on biological concepts, their primary concern is not the origin of strictly biological humans but rather the philosophical and theological understanding of human nature. They do not view humans as a biological species only but as species endowed with a specific kind of nature (e.g., animal rationale) capable of carrying a theological dimension (e.g., a God-given purpose).

One has to be careful about what a given author has in mind when they say “human”, even when the author is a biologist. When speaking about ancient representatives of the genus Homo, that is, species that existed long before Homo sapiens or even Homo heidelbergensis, biologists sometimes use the term “human”. For instance, Moorjani et al. (2016) assert that the histories of humans and chimpanzees split apart approximately 12 million years ago. Of course, this does not mean that Homo sapiens separated from Pan troglodytes 12 million years ago: neither species had been in existence for so long. What is implied here is the splitting apart of the evolutionary lines, leading in future to Homo sapiens and Pan troglodytes. This is a somewhat striking example but, without pertinent knowledge, the problem can become significant.

It turns out that there is another distinctive feature that sets our species (Homo sapiens) apart from other extant hominids (Hominidae), which picked up traction in connection with argumentation on single pair ancestry. It is the reduced number of chromosomes: humans have 46 whereas their closest relatives have 48. The event that led to the creation of such a genetic barrier seems like a promising candidate for tracing the origins of our species, particularly for a theologian seeking confirmation of monogenism. As it turns out, this event likely occurred only once, as is the case with most mutations (Stankiewicz 2016; Poszewiecka et al. 2022). However, since it occurred within a population, it must have caused numerous miscarriages when individuals with an abnormal number of chromosomes mated. Additionally, this event took place approximately one million years ago, certainly before the divergence of Homo sapiens, Homo neanderthalensis, and Denisovians from their common lineage.

Assuming the validity of these studies, they do not suffice to support monogenism on their own, and an additional hypothesis is required that extends beyond the scope of the research. Since, according to Stankiewicz, the reduction was stabilized in a polygamous population, justifying monogenism demands an additional claim that, following this stabilization, the only remaining genetic or genealogical ancestors were a single pair. Furthermore, one must accept the possibility that “Adam and Eve” were, as Craig also postulates, members of an ancestral Homo population—supposedly Homo heidelbergensis. This highlights the challenges of drawing conclusions from biological research, particularly when it is implicitly assumed that references to “humans” apply strictly to Homo sapiens. Such an assumption could extend that classification to species like Homo heidelbergensis. Moreover, if the chromosomal change is regarded as the defining moment, that is, an ontological leap marking the emergence of a distinct human lineage, a complex evolutionary process is inadvertently reduced to a single event. This is problematic not only when our past but also our present are considered. Modern populations occasionally include individuals with a reduced chromosome count of 44, a phenomenon that, at least in theory, could contribute to speciation (Song et al. 2016). Yet, these individuals would not be regarded as members of species other than humans, either in biological or philosophical terms. Similar issues arise if one postulates any other single event as species defining. Considering that the evolutionary process is dynamic and composed of many such events, a different one can be picked to explain an apparent ontological leap between species.

5. Essentialism Reconsidered

The operation of the concept of species within the evolutionary history of organisms suggests a dynamic rather than a strictly essentialist (ontological) understanding of the term. In other words, biology favors a much more fluid and context-dependent concept of species—including Homo sapiens—than what philosophers and theologians often require. As Austriaco suggests, the acceptance or rejection of anti-essentialism will determine whether species can be considered natural kinds (Austriaco 2018). While detailed engagement with the debate on the ontology of biological entities is beyond the scope of this study, a working hypothesis on how to link the biological concept of species with its essentialist view of a natural kind will be proposed. The hypothesis constitutes an approximation in which it is reasonable to expect that, over relatively short periods of time, variations in the characteristics of a given species remain negligible, allowing for a temporally invariant ontology in a local sense. It is not difficult to observe that this approach aligns with strategies already present in contemporary science. For instance, the differential manifold representing the global curved structure of spacetime in general relativity converges locally to a spacetime that is flat (e.g., Hartle 2003). This demonstrates that what varies globally may exhibit characteristics qualifying as invariants (or absolutes) in a local sense. Just as the variability of spacetime curvature does not imply ontological relativism—since invariance is secured by Einstein’s gravitational field equation—the variability of species characteristics presupposes the absolute character of natural selection and genetics. In short, invariants do not disappear but they shift to a more abstract domain.

At its outset, the presented hypothesis assumes that life is in constant evolutionary development. Each species represents a historically conditioned entity that changes over time, often in ways that render its distant descendants radically different from its original form. At different points in evolutionary lineage, different features become associated with a species. For example, artistic expression is not attributed to the first placental mammals, yet this ability is recognized in some of their descendants, such as Homo sapiens. From this perspective, belief in the unchangeability of a species’ essence may arise—not merely as a hypothesis but as a working principle.

From an evolutionary distance, organisms appear as part of a continuous process, with species boundaries and their defining traits manifesting as gradients rather than fixed entities. However, when viewed as contemporary snapshots, species appear more like substances with identifiable essential properties. Within the present context, it is reasonable to attribute essential qualities to humans, such as rationality and language. This serves as a useful approximation of what it means to be human. However, as this assumption is extended backward in time, its validity diminishes. What appears stable and essential in the present may be disrupted on a broader evolutionary scale. As a result, previous representatives of the genus Homo, though only gradually different from modern humans, may seem radically distinct. The ontological contrast between modern humans and earlier hominins can appear as an unbridgeable gap that might even prompt one to invoke a supernatural event to explain the emergence of uniquely human traits. It is not difficult to see that this problem has its source in applying the idea of human essence or nature outside of its local context and extrapolating it globally across the entire evolutionary history.

It turns out that essentialism taken in the local sense is quite common in biological classifications. Even among those who accept the evolutionary nature of species, it is often practical to think of species as possessing essential traits—such as when using an identification key to classify insects in a meadow. Similarly, essentialist characterizations of humanity may serve useful purposes in theology or philosophical anthropology. However, caution must be exercised when extending these essentialist traits to questions about the first human or broader ontological claims beyond the available empirical evidence.

6. Problems with Context: Misreading Theological and Biological Contextuality

Although the views of Swamidass and Craig on the origin of Homo sapiens are not explicitly opposed to science, they do not fully align with its methodological framework either. Rather than making positive scientific claims, they attempt to accommodate theological positions within existing scientific findings, arguing that a literal reading of scriptural passages remains possible. This is by no means a reductionistic portrayal of Craig’s or Swamidass’s positions as if they resisted the symbolic or theological dimensions of Genesis. Their statements are taken at their face value, and their stated goal of reconciling specific historical claims with scientific models is evaluated.

Demonstrating mere possibility is not the same as establishing plausibility. For example, by referring to informal discussions with Swamidass, Craig suggests that contemporary population genetics does not rule out the possibility that Homo sapiens originated from a single ancestral pair. While this assertion may be technically accurate, it does not constitute positive scientific evidence for such a genetic bottleneck in human history. In other words, noting that genetics does not preclude this scenario is insufficient to assert that it is scientifically plausible. If one were to argue that humanity originated from a bottleneck of two individuals, they would need to demonstrate that such a claim is consistent with evolutionary dynamics. This includes explaining how a single ancestral pair could have survived, reproduced, and sustained a viable gene pool, given the effects of genetic drift, ecological pressures, and species interdependence over evolutionary time.

The attempt to identify a single human ancestral pair outside the broader network of evolutionary processes misrepresents biological history. Human origins are not an isolated event but part of a complex, relational web of environmental interactions, genetic variations, and gradual adaptation. Evolution does not operate through discrete jumps but through population-level changes, shaped by ecological constraints and species interdependencies. The notion of a single originating pair, if understood as a historical event, overlooks how human traits, including cognitive faculties, social behaviors, and survival strategies, emerged incrementally rather than instantaneously. Craig, for instance, emphasizes abstract reasoning and tool use as defining traits of humanity. However, these abilities evolved in tandem with other social and biological adaptations, including extended childhood dependency, cooperative parenting, and inter-group interactions, all of which depend on a broader population structure rather than a single pair (e.g., Tomasello 2018). In light of this, Craig does not fully account for the fact that human traits did not emerge in isolation but developed through long-term evolutionary pressures acting on populations, making the concept of an ontological leap both biologically and theologically incoherent. Attempting to isolate a genetic Adam and Eve from this web of relationships amounts to the decontextualization of evolutionary biology, reducing human emergence to an artificial moment detached from the broader ecological and genetic realities that shaped it.

Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory of human cognition is best understood through cognitive science and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss 2005), which situate intelligence within a gradual continuum rather than a sudden ontological shift. To propose that human cognitive capacities arose through supernatural intervention not only lacks empirical grounding but also disrupts the internal coherence of scientific explanation. Such claims ultimately remove human origins from an interconnected framework and instead position theological affirmations as scientific hypotheses. This is an evident instance of a “God of the gaps” argument where theological assertions fill in the gaps of scientific knowledge rather providing justification of why scientific knowledge is possible at all (e.g., Heller 2003).

Just as biology requires contextual interpretation, so too does theological language, particularly in understanding the role of Adam and Eve within the Genesis narrative. The theological meaning of Adam and Eve cannot be isolated from the larger metaphorical structure of Genesis 1–3, as its semantic function depends on the network of relations within the entire narrative. In theological hermeneutics, metaphors are not merely decorative but are fundamental carriers of meaning (e.g., Soskice 1985; Lakoff and Johnson 2008). Their interpretative function is not determined solely by their individual components but by their embeddedness in a larger conceptual structure. A metaphor carries meaning precisely because all its components form an integrated conceptual web, wherein each element’s role is defined by its relationship to the whole. Consequently, removing Adam and Eve from their theological context in Genesis and attempting to validate their existence through genetic science imposes an inappropriate interpretative framework on Scripture, significantly restricting its symbolic and theological dimensions. In theological discourse, decontextualization occurs when a metaphorical and doctrinally flexible concept is frozen into a rigid historical claim, undermining its ability to convey deeper theological meaning. Decontextualizing Adam and Eve as isolated biological ancestors not only misrepresents the intent of Genesis but also conflates theological meaning with empirical history. Literalizing the figures of Adam and Eve does not preserve biblical revelation but rather misreads its theological language, which was never intended as a biological or historical claim in the first place. This decontextualization of theological language leads to overly rigid interpretations that prioritize historical factuality over the theological truths embedded in metaphor.

The remarks made so far suggest that by attempting to scientifically validate Adam and Eve as genetic ancestors, one violates the principle of contextuality in both science and theology. In biology, such an approach removes human origins from the evolutionary web, ignoring the relational and population-based nature of genetic inheritance. Evolution is a historical and ecological process, not an event that can be collapsed into an artificially isolated moment. In theology, it imposes a literal interpretation onto a narrative that was intended to convey metaphorical meaning, thereby distorting the author’s intended message. Theological claims are not reducible to genetic hypotheses, just as biological science is not meant to confirm theological metaphors as empirical facts.

A historically and contextually aware approach must recognize that science and theology operate within distinct but complementary domains. Theology does not need to seek scientific validation in order to retain its theological truth, just as science should not be expected to confirm theological metaphors as empirical facts. Instead, the proper theological task is to engage with revelation in a way that respects its historical unfolding, interpreting it in the light of both faith and reason, without conflating scientific method with theological discourse. This approach does not reject the importance of scientific discovery for theological reflection but calls for a methodology that honors the distinct roles of both disciplines. Theology must engage evolutionary insights in ways that deepen, rather than reduce, its doctrinal richness, ensuring that faith remains intellectually credible and spiritually meaningful in an age of scientific discovery.

7. Conclusions

As the course of this study comes to a close, it is fitting to restate the final claim that the study served to substantiate: the contemporary efforts to find ways of securing the historicity of Adam may quite easily fall into the trap of creation science in disguise. The disguise lies in the fact that, rather than launching a direct attack on the theory of evolution, these approaches engage with it persuasively to demonstrate supposed scientific support for the origin of Homo sapiens from a single ancestral pair. There are legitimate alternatives to this approach which, by positing that the historicity of Adam, literal or mythologized, no longer needs to be maintained, turn out to display more coherence on both theological and biological levels. The proponents of single-pair ancestry rely on shaky premises, and their claims remain inconclusive on both theological and biological grounds. Although these arguments largely operate in distinct domains of inference, they come together at a crucial point where their inconsistencies become even more apparent. It is not difficult to see that the ahistorical and sapiential character of biblical prehistory makes it difficult to extend the lineage of generations beyond the narrative transition that occurs in the Book of Genesis between chapters 1–11 and 12–50—the latter of which enjoys well-documented historicity. In short, the biological data point to the scriptural void.

The theological drawback of defending the historicity of Adam and Eve and, thus, to preserve the literal formulations of the classical doctrines as well as of the narrative of the Book of Genesis is that such an approach to the nature of theological language is currently not a preferred option in theology. Ultimately, this has its source in a different understanding of revelation by these authors who evidently cling to its more traditional understanding as transfer of information in a purely objective fashion. It turns out that this is not only impossible in theology but in science as well. Consequently, the attempts to do away with the contextual layers of the narratives—be it in science or theology—and to grant them the status of full objectivity end up in confusing these layers with the reality they refer to.