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Open AccessArticle

Cache Misses and the Recovery of the Full AES 256 Key

1
Integrated Systems Lab, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, ETSI Telecomunicación, 28040 Madrid, Spain
2
Center for Computational Simulation, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Campus de Montegancedo, 28660 Madrid, Spain
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9(5), 944; https://doi.org/10.3390/app9050944
Received: 8 February 2019 / Revised: 24 February 2019 / Accepted: 27 February 2019 / Published: 6 March 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Side Channel Attacks)
The CPU cache is a hardware element that leaks significant information about the software running on the CPU. Particularly, any application performing sequences of memory access that depend on sensitive information, such as private keys, is susceptible to suffer a cache attack, which would reveal this information. In most cases, side-channel cache attacks do not require any specific permission and just need access to a shared cache. This fact, combined with the spread of cloud computing, where the infrastructure is shared between different customers, has made these attacks quite popular. Traditionally, cache attacks against AES use the information about the victim to access an address. In contrast, we show that using non-access provides much more information and demonstrate that the power of cache attacks has been underestimated during these last years. This novel approach is applicable to existing attacks: Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush and Prime+Abort. In all cases, using cache misses as source of information, we could retrieve the 128-bit AES key with a reduction in the number of samples of between 93% and 98% compared to the traditional approach. Further, this attack was adapted and extended in what we call the encryption-by-decryption cache attack (EBD), to obtain a 256-bit AES key. In the best scenario, our approach obtained the 256 bits of the key of the OpenSSL AES T-table-based implementation using fewer than 10,000 samples, i.e., 135 milliseconds, proving that AES-256 is only about three times more complex to attack than AES-128 via cache attacks. Additionally, the proposed approach was successfully tested in a cross-VM scenario. View Full-Text
Keywords: side-channel cache attacks; cache misses; AES; cloud computing side-channel cache attacks; cache misses; AES; cloud computing
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Briongos, S.; Malagón, P.; de Goyeneche, J.-M.; Moya, J.M. Cache Misses and the Recovery of the Full AES 256 Key. Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 944.

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