2.1. Debates in the Literature Concerning the Reporting Performance in PHEIs
Reporting the performance of organizations may be a critical element of overall performance. Performance reports involve information about how effectively the organization is fulfilling its mission, expressed in specified goals and objectives (
Grossi et al. 2020).
Hatry (
2013) claims that reporting performance measures to external stakeholders allows citizens, elected officials, and interested parties to understand what public organizations are doing with their allocated resources. External reporting may encourage the organization to perform better on the measures it reports. Further, comparisons made of similar reported measures allow one organization to measure or benchmark success against another.
As has happened in many public service organizations, the last decade has seen unprecedented pressure to reform universities. The most relevant of these reforms is a shift from an elite to a mass higher education system; cuts in state funding and resulting difficulty financing the institutions exclusively with public funds; the emergence of new approaches, such as NPM; and greater competition between universities (
Siegel and Wright 2015). Those changes to universities’ hybrid behaviors use private sector mechanisms and tools within the public sector (
Grossi et al. 2020).
Growing demands to become more competitive, efficient, effective, and accountable have led to an increased interest in introducing control mechanisms to assess organizational performance. Consequently, performance management systems have been implemented in some universities, and the measurement and reporting of research and teaching performance have become increasingly common within universities. Wide varieties of performance indicators have been developed in different jurisdictions, mostly by government initiatives, to monitor the quantitative aspects of performance (
Ter Bogt and Scapens 2012). Here, we mention some examples in the United States (
Gordon et al. 2002), Finland (
Orr et al. 2014), Italy (
Bonollo and Merli 2018), and a few in Eastern European former communist contexts (
Scott 2007;
Dobija et al. 2018).
Concerning performance reporting at the international level, the
IPSASB (
2015) advances a principle-based recommended practice guideline (RPG3) regarding reporting the service performance information that may be considered a useful reference for a harmonized performance measurement and reporting system across EU member states (
Aversano et al. 2018). RPG3 defines effectiveness, efficiency, inputs, output, outcome, performance indicators, and service performance objectives. Moreover, the implementation examples that accompany RPG3 illustrate the terms defined above. RPG3 mentions that the reporting of service performance information should be annual, and it should cover the same period of reference as the financial reporting covers. IPSASB encourages the disclosure of all additional information relevant to the users.
Performance has long been a concern in higher education, especially in PHEIs, as it is connected with accountability and quality assessment, and international rankings. In this context, PHEIs’ voluntary or mandatory established performance measurements are useful in assessing the progress towards established goals (
Kyrillidou 2002). Moreover, there is an increased demand for PHEIs to disclose their contributions to society as part of the third mission regarding teaching and research (
Maingot and Zeghal 2008).
In Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia, central governments have been involved directly in developing ‘indicators’. Thus, the managers of public organizations may not have complete freedom to choose their performance measures. They may have to pay attention to the measures chosen by the government. Even when they must respond to outsiders’ measures, however, the managers of a public organizations are responsible for establishing an internal performance management system, including measurement and reporting performance information that will allow it to manage the organization (
Behn 2003). In the case of universities, the performance reporting needs to be connected to the stated mission by revealing whether the goals were achieved (
Kauppila et al. 2015). According to this, the performance reporting might include a section dedicated to teaching, a section dedicated to research, and another one dedicated to the relationship with the external environment (
Bonollo and Merli 2018).
The performance-reporting initiatives in PHEIs represent a set of changes in the relationship between governments and PHEIs. The state entrusts universities to meet the needs of the national economy in a dynamic global marketplace. However, in the meantime, the state carefully monitors universities’ overall progress and performance following national needs and objectives using financial incentives and disincentives. On the other hand, universities are trying to attract other financial resources from the state, different funders, or private partners. Tensions are possible between the state funding based on the state’s pre-established performance indicators and the university in this context. To obtain state funds, the universities must adjust this behavior (
Capella-Peris et al. 2020). In this utilitarian environment, governments will inevitably seek greater accountability and performance (
Alexander 1998). States are not driven in this direction because of an authoritative desire to control and regulate (
Levine 1997). States attempt to better monitor and assess PHEIs because they are responsible for acquiring more value for resources.
In the particular case of HEIs, some studies have demonstrated that voluntary disclosure results from multiple factors interacting with each other, including regulatory oversight, market forces, costs of disclosure, and organizational structure and governance (
Hyndman and Eden 2001). An organization’s mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure are influenced by the coercion of legislation, reporting and funding regulations, and other stakeholder requirements for information.
By adopting entrepreneurial behaviors and operating in a competitive market, universities have become aware that it is not enough to focus only on short-term economic and financial results to gain credibility and become competitive in the medium and long term. Non-financial information on governance, their social and environmental impact, and universities’ strategies could provide a better approach to addressing stakeholder concerns.
However, the role of financial information and its interdependence with non-financial information should not be overlooked. Favorable performance on non-financial measures seems to be irrelevant when performance on financial measures is unfavorable (
Ghosh and Wu 2012). At the same time, financial results indicate the consequences of decisions made in the past and are sometimes unable to show the causal factors that could lead to the given outcomes. In this dispute, universities would no longer have to publish their activities through disconnected financial and non-financial reports but would produce a single integrated report (
Caputo et al. 2021;
Lee 2021). The harmonization of financial and non-financial standards and research on universities’ IR are steps toward sustainability reports.
Moreover, in public organizations, the state can exercise its coercive powers directly or indirectly. For PHEIs, the state can enact laws and regulations that guide performance disclosure (
Bonollo and Merli 2018). The government can also indirectly exercise its coercive powers through institutions or establish specific governmental policies. Another significant fact refers to market forces. For universities, the rankings represent an essential indicator of their position in the national, regional, or worldwide educational market (
Urdari et al. 2017). Moreover, performance reporting may be used as an inexpensive marketing tool because the managers may voluntarily disclose that information on performance that gives the organization advantages compared with other educational competitors in the market. Other factors influencing the HEIs’ performance reporting are the ones that are organizational in nature, such as structure, implemented performance measurements and reporting procedures, internal politics (
Aversano et al. 2018), and governance in line with its declared mission.
2.2. Romanian PHEIs Main Characteristics
Since 1990, Romania has undergone a dramatic transformation, from a highly centralized totalitarian regime to democratic governance, following a radical change in its political and governing system. These changes affect the education sector as much as the economic sectors (
Curaj et al. 2015). The first 15 years (1990–2006) of the new higher education system were characterized by the new elements and changes imposed by the new legislative framework, including the universities’ autonomy, public financing mechanisms and a performance approach (Education Law 84 1995). University autonomy offers HEIs the right to establish and implement their developmental strategies and policies. However, the autonomy was limited in certain aspects, such as the personnel and financial policies that remained under state control. In this period, the number of public HEIs and specialized programs increased. Moreover, Romania became an exciting destination for international students (
Pricopie et al. 2009), but Romanian authorities were not prepared to accommodate them. The Bologna process alignment started in 2005, leading to an increase in the European comparability of the Romanian higher education system and the position of Romanian HEIs in the international higher education market (
Pricopie et al. 2009).
A change in the national educational strategy intervened in 2007, focusing on promoting excellence and scientific production. All universities were classified according to their mission into three main groups: advanced research and education, education and science, and education-centered (
Coste and Tiron-Tudor 2015). Another critical change refers to the ranking of study programs’ and universities’ classifications. This process aimed to provide information to potential beneficiaries regarding the quality of teaching, research, student services, community services, and internationalization, delineated into five categories (A > B > C > D > E, where > means ‘better results than’). Stakeholders argued against the process because the data processing methodology considered in the evaluation process was not made public.
Regarding the public funding of universities, the law introduced different types of financing, depending on their objectives, such as principal financing, complementary financing, institutional development financing, and so forth. The principal financing is allotted according to a per capita cost-differentiation formula, as the main part of the overall universities’ public funding. Complementary financing is based on a qualitative component (i.e., calculated by considering qualitative indicators, which were updated regularly).
The principal financing of universities, according to
Education Law 2011, considers the results of the national classification exercise and the different ranking processes. Unfortunately, the implementation of this issue was unsuccessful, as the link between these instruments and the funding methodology was not well maintained. Moreover, even if the law stipulated other forms of disbursing higher education funding, such as institutional development financing that was not influenced by the classification, the subsequent methodologies were developed and implemented only after 2015.
To increase university autonomy and public responsibility, the law proposed that universities establish their mission, institutional development strategy, curricula design and implementation, quality-assurance mechanisms, and financial and human resources management protocols. All these elements must be operationalized using performance measurements and must be periodically reported.
According to the National Education Law No. 84 adopted in 1995, reporting Romanian universities’ performance is mandatory. The rector is responsible for preparing a report describing the institutional state. Over time, the law has undergone several changes, and Law No. 1/2011 repealed it. The new education law brought significant changes, one of which was the rectors’ obligation to publish the annual report on the university’s website (
Education Law 2011, art. 130). The report presents the state of the university. The annual report must be publicly available to all interested parties. The minimum information to be provided in the report refers to the following issues: financial situation of the university by funding sources and types of expenses; study programs; staff structure and evolution; results of the research activity; quality assurance internal system; the degree of ethics in all university activities; and the situation of the professional insertion of the graduates from the previous promotions.
The information presented in the report on HEI status is based on relevant performance indicators for each category, demonstrating how financial and human resources have been used to fulfil the missions of teaching and learning, research and community-based services, or the impact on the economic and social environments (
Coste and Tiron-Tudor 2015). In addition to demonstrating the performance obtained, the rector’s report is an element of public responsibility and a primary condition for public funding (
Education Law 2011, art. 150, paragraph 3, p. 32).
The rector’s report represents the document in which the essential information that defines the HEI is presented. Law does not establish the specific performance indicators for each group of information; the rector can opt for specific indicators. Additionally, many universities provide additional voluntary information concerning significant elements for the previous year’s performance activity to the mandatory requirements. As an example, for 2019, the UBB Rector Report includes voluntary information concerning the following issues: non-traditional education; the University Publishing House (Cluj University Press); university extensions; relationships with the business environment, student and alumni practices; international cooperation; computerization and data communications; communication and public relations; relationships with students; administration and patrimony; and the UBB Centenary.
2.3. Theoretical Framework
The literature supports the implementation of performance reporting from several other theoretical frameworks, such as agency theory, public choice theory, and institutional theory (
Grossi et al. 2019). For our purpose, we use the institutional theory, as it explains why organizational structures and practices become entrenched and how and why changes occur (
Greve and Argote 2015). According to this theory, institutions impose norms or social coherence on human activity by producing and reproducing an environment for thinking and acting (
Burns and Scapens 2000). Research focuses on extra-organizational (social, economic, and political) influences on organizational practices (
Fligstein 1998). The theory describes the organization’s ability to change, following how institutionalized norms and values affect assumptions (
Liguori and Steccolini 2012) and espouses that the process of change finally generates an isomorphic equilibrium (
Dumitru et al. 2014).
The PHEI system is pressed for greater performance and quality. Efforts are made in order to adopt business-like attitudes that will keep them sustainable in a competitive economy and turn them into hybrid entities (
Grossi et al. 2020). This global reform movement is sustained by new public management principles (NPMs). According to this theory, public sector organizations can be managed and evaluated in the same way as private organizations—namely, through demands for accountability, transparency, efficiency, and responsiveness (
Gomes and Yasin 2017).
Performance indicators intended to measure progress towards established national/international goals (
Kyrillidou 2002) are asked to describe their contribution to society, often related to the quality of the university’s teaching and research process (
Maingot and Zeghal 2008). They are the cornerstone of adequate governance mechanisms in the universities, based on performance management measurement and reporting.
Romanian higher education reforms are the results of both global pressures and local demands. As a European Union member, we consider that the primary higher education system reforms’ main conditions are justified by global reform ideologies. As part of this, the factors that influence performance reporting are subject to global isomorphic pressures concerning transforming the process of governance models in higher education.
DiMaggio and Powell (
1983) defined isomorphism as the factor that encourages the similitude by which institutions tend to adopt the same structure and practices, resulting in their homogeneity (
Dobija et al. 2018). There are three processes of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism refers to the influence of political and governmental regulations on organizations. In our case, the universities are likely to implement changes within their policies to adjust to the government’s requirements due to coercive pressures (
Najeeb 2013). Mimetic isomorphism occurs when actors face uncertainty and try to emulate successful organizations as a solution. With an increasing level of competition and internationalization in the higher education context, universities have tried to model themselves on other prototypes in similar contexts through mimetic processes. Normative isomorphism (
Paauwe and Boselie 2003) arises primarily from professionalization. Within the higher education context, professionalization involves two aspects: one is the homogenizing influence of established norms (regulatory bodies), and the other is the professional organizations (e.g., accreditation agencies).
Under
Chen et al. (
2010) and
Dobija et al. (
2018), the study identifies the following theoretical decision-making mechanisms related to the isomorphism of Romanian national policy (factors) regarding performance reporting: level of implementation of performance-reporting systems; the size of the institution/type of university (coercive and normative); mobile/immobile resource; financing (coercive); and personnel recruitment/staff remuneration (coercive and normative). In all these items, we can find mimetic learning (
Cai 2010), as long as national higher education systems attempt to imitate prosperous nations when they face uncertainties or ambiguous development goals (e.g., Bologna process, European/international universities’ ranking).
However, some studies (e.g.,
Gonzales 2012) show that institutional analysis in higher education research focuses mainly on policy and management issues. Given that fund allocation (financing) for higher education institutions depends on the quality of human resources evaluated through the research (number/type/indexation of the article) and teaching outputs (
Agyemang and Broadbent 2015), we also consider that employees need to have the potential to impact the performance that is measured (
Bouckaert 1993). Performance evaluation is a mechanism by which individual goals and behaviors are aligned with organizational objectives, a process that helps employees understand and accept organizational norms (
Ayers 2015).
In this sense, our research combines the institutional theory with the operant theory. The reporting systems for which the operant theory may be applied include performance evaluations, whether they be quality control reports, personnel evaluations, or variance reports (
Lovata 1992). Many studies conclude that specific behavior results from its consequences (
Ulrich et al. 1974). The theory is suitable for our context—the universities’ funding levels depend on the employers’ results. Additionally, the individual income level is influenced by this individual factor. Thus, rewards such as money are considered positive reinforcement if their presence increases the likelihood that the behavior will recur. At the same time, the behavior is most easily modified when it produces a negative consequence. If the expected reward is not satisfactory, the motivation to exercise an increased quality in the developed activity will upturn. If, on the other hand, the system ignores or criticizes the employee’s results (e.g., changing the framing articles, excluding journals/databases, diminishing the article/journal ranking), this consequence is likely to make them avoid working hard in the future. This mix between the institutional and operant theories is meant to justify and analyze the main factors that influence the form and evolution of performance reporting used for Romanian higher education.
2.4. Research Hypothesis Development
The hypotheses developed further refer to the factors likely to influence the reporting of information on the performance of PHEIs in Romania. The main arguments considered for the factors’ inclusion refer to scientific references from the literature and their relevance in the Romanian context.
Hypothesis 1: Performance reporting is associated with the financial resources attracted: the more resources a PHEI attracts/obtains, the more information is reported.
The literature often mentions the level of financial resources as having a positive significance on reporting information in the public sector (
Maingot and Zeghal 2008;
Gallego et al. 2010;
Gallego-Álvarez et al. 2011). The link between the financial resources attracted by a PHEI and the level of information presented is a topic that, at first glance, seems to have no significance in the public sector. However, the decrease in public resources’ capabilities to satisfy the level, quality, and extent of public needs of the population is an indisputable reality (
Manolescu 2009). Thus, the fundamental nature of the traditional relationship between the government and higher education is in the process of undergoing significant changes to sustain more students in attempting to maximize economic returns (
Alexander 2000;
Garde Sanchez et al. 2020). This unequal ratio can be rebalanced by identifying solutions needed to supplement public funding. State reporting and funding mechanisms for HEIs are in the midst of a significant transformation from an input-based system to a more competitive outcomes-based approach (
Aversano et al. 2018). Through mimetic isomorphism, PHIE borrows solutions from private entities’ behaviors (e.g., marketing and promotion policies, a public–private partnership between universities and community, tuition fee strategies, other forms of collaborations with the private environment, and use of bank loans granted to the university/student), which, through coercive and normative isomorphism, are implementing legal rules in universities.
In this context, PHEI might be concerned with finding the proper balance between institutional autonomy and performance-based assessments to become competitive in the market. With greater expectations being placed on it, higher education is obliged to examine itself or be examined by others (
Alexander 1998). Accordingly, the growing societal necessity dictates that universities must become more responsive to economic needs and governmental demands for increased performance (
Sangiorgi and Siboni 2017;
Brusca et al. 2019;
Garde Sanchez et al. 2020). In Romania, higher education is funded from the state budget according to the size and the university category, under granted basic and additional financing forms; for the second factor, the higher education institution’s performance is an essential criterion. For primary funding, the government typically determines the value of resources for various students in their fields of study at a centralized level.
Hypothesis 2: Performance reporting is associated with salary costs.
Universities are ‘communities’, where individuals gather to invest in their human capital (
Alexander 2000). Overall, higher education systems’ regulatory framework has become more complex and expensive to sustain, particularly regarding, on the one hand, employee salaries and rights, and on the other hand, employer obligations and contributions related to employees. Moreover, equity issues concerning disability, race, and gender are entered into force (
Gordon and Whitchurch 2007).
The reality also shows an increasing diversification of academic tasks (teaching, scholarship, research, consultancy, community service, and administration).
Kogan et al. (
1994) note that the range of roles that an academic may be expected to undertake can include ‘teacher, scholar, practitioner, demonstrator, writer, model, discoverer, inventor, investigator, designer, architect, explorer, expert, learner, developer, collaborator, transformer, facilitator, enabler, evaluator, critic, assessor, setter, guide, colleague, supervisor, mentor, listener, adviser, coach, counselor, negotiator, mediator, juggler’. Therefore, the historical trilogy (teaching, research, and administration) of academic work (
Garde Sanchez et al. 2020) would appear to have been enlarged. Since the public institution’s financial resources did not increase directly proportional to the work’s complexity, the effect was to increase the level of quality/involvement required to correspond to a different reward based on performance criteria.
Thus, performance disclosure appears as a mediating, bidirectional positioned factor. Through coercive isomorphism, the educational institution has conditioned the financing of human capital’s performance, which in turn, according to the operant theory, can be motivated/demotivated by the level of remuneration received. A favorable expectation/reward will determine a motivated behavior in the future, with a favorable effect on the increase in the financing sources, while a negative one will demoralize the human factor, with adverse effects on the future performance indicators. Through normative isomorphism, these human capital politics and rules are put in a particular view to sustain the institutional or personal interests, based on academic particularities.
In too many cases, the primary performance-reporting quantifiable item is considered to be the quality or quantity of research (
Dunkin 2005;
Siegel and Wright 2015). This approach can decrease the importance of other duties, roles, and functions, especially teaching, serving, and displaying good academic citizenship. As a general remark,
Alexander (
2000) notes that the tension between the numbers and quality dominates higher education debates in most advanced countries.
Each university is responsible for having the capacity and intelligence to stimulate human capital and build on this capacity, both academic and professional. As
Dunkin (
2005, p. 8) notes, ‘The capacity to develop business/earn one’s salary/manage ‘client’ relationships, once missing from academics, is now part of the skills repertoire of our next generation of academics’.
In the empirical study, we considered the ratio between costs with salaries and the number of students as a factor that can influence the degree of reporting of information on public service performance. The scientific literature uses this item to a lesser extent (
Suryadi 2007), but in this research, we want to show that costs with salaries in the Romanian public sector positively influence the reporting of performance information.
Salary costs were included in the case study because, after studying the annual reports on universities’ states, we came across several documents claiming that the university’s performance was encouraged by providing financial benefits to teachers. Through mimetic behavior, also in some public entities, salary costs are an element that can influence the reporting of information on the performance of services because, in the private sector, the entity’s staff can obtain bonuses from the performance achieved; their payment correlates to the success achieved. Thus, the main arguments supporting the inclusion of variable costs with salaries in the empirical study are given by the university employees’ financial advantage and by the university’s performance objectives, specified in the annual report on the university’s state.
The universities’ management was often interested in the result. The pecuniary benefits granted to the teachers encouraged the performance, thus obtaining at least two advantages for the two parties involved: one for the institution and the other for the academic staff. The publication of scientific research in internationally renowned journals is encouraged by the management of higher education institutions, because, on the one hand, it receives international recognition for research activity, and on the other hand, several performance indicators are met, and more information on scientific research will be published. First, accessing research projects is a method of attracting financial resources, an essential activity for the higher education institution and those involved in developing the projects. Secondly, with the help of research projects, academic staff publish scientific research in international databases and participate in international conferences, thus receiving international recognition for their studies; they are highlighted by the number of citations. The advantage of universities, in this case, is to meet performance indicators.
Hypothesis 3: Performance reporting is associated with the size of the higher education institution.
One of the most used factors in empirical research, identified as having a significant effect on the level of information presentation, is the institution’s size. The role of this factor in the private sector has a positive impact on information reporting (
Glaum et al. 2013), and one of the reasons is the need to inform shareholders about the position and the obtained performance so that the investments are made in the best conditions (
Gallego-Álvarez et al. 2011).
Regardless of how the size of public sector institutions, total assets, or the number of students was determined, the studies above proved a positive link between the institution’s size and a high degree of information reporting. The arguments presented above led us to set the first hypothesis for this study, the total assets being the size indicator of higher education institutions.
Hypothesis 4: Performance reporting is associated with the quality category of the higher education institution.
Performance disclosure can be used as a tool for HIE to compete in the international university arena and attract students and researchers (
Brusca et al. 2019). This target depends on the university’s profile: teaching or research. Thus, the research universities have a more substantial opportunity to obtain more research development funds through national or European competitions. For teaching universities, the theoretical and practical implications of the future profession—collaborations with employers—are just some of the specific information that increases this category’s market credibility. In this context, in line with
Maingot and Zeghal (
2008), we consider that these entities are stimulated to disclose performance information following their mission (type).
Based on specific legal rules and professionalization implications (coercive and normative isomorphism), university performance disclosure in two directions (research or teaching) becomes a critical factor in stakeholders’ visions. More specifically,
Maingot and Zeghal (
2008) state that students ‘outcomes are the results of universities’ developed educational offering and activities rather than the results of inputs (selection effects) or exogenous influences, such as economic conditions.