Social Representational Analysis as an Alternative Approach to Exploring Cultural Values

Abstract

Values remain notoriously difficult to “capture” because they cannot be directly observed. Attitudes and opinions are the only known indicators of their presence. The relationship between values and attitudes or opinions is that between latent and manifest, so that values can be justifiably inferred from observed attitudes and expressed opinions. Nevertheless, this is an epistemological limitation to reckon with. So, the alternative we propose is to explore cultural values as an integral part of social representations. We want to show that social representation theory can help with identifying values in an accurate and reliable manner. It is only due to the fact that we already have a common representation of social reality that we can develop attitudes that can then be manifested by expressing opinions. If values directly intervene in the formation of attitudes, they will surely be part of the representations that triggered that formation in the first place. Using a mixed-method approach, professionals’ representations of their professional role were explored in order to identify the values associated with it. As cognitively processed cultural constructs, values can be identified as elements of the central node of professionals’ representation of their profession.

1. Theoretical Introduction

1.1. Professional Values as Cultural Constructs

With all the epistemological limitations of the value concept, it seems that in social sciences, one cannot do without it (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013). Despite their centrality to understanding collective behavior, cultural values remain notoriously difficult to capture. Mainstream research often infers them from individual attitudes, treating these attitudes as manifestations of a predefined set of overarching social values. It is assumed that by aggregating individual-level data, shared cultural value orientations—understood as underlying, society-level dynamics—can be identified (Hofstede 2001; Schwartz 1994). Cultural differences are thus unpacked by measuring individual value orientations as reflected in verbalized or observed attitudes. However, this approach often overlooks the implicit cultural frameworks that operate at the group level—frameworks within which values are embedded and continuously evolve. To address this limitation, we examine professional values as socially constructed conceptions of desirability, particularly in the context of care work. Building on the premise that valorization processes are internalized through implicit cultural schemas, we emphasize the need to capture unconscious attitudes and value-laden cognitive processes. This requires tools capable of accessing non-verbalized, automatic evaluative responses, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). As knowledge systems rooted in everyday life, social representations often function as background collective assumptions that are often invisible to individuals. To analyze social representations, we draw on Moscovici’s (1979) foundational work and Abric’s (1994a) structural model—Central Core Theory—which locates values at their core. Our aim is to demonstrate that representational analysis can uncover latent value constructs that often remain hidden in explicit verbal discourse. By integrating affective, cognitive, and normative dimensions into a cohesive analytical framework, we propose that representational analysis can render values visible as culturally embedded “shoulds.”

The speculative character of the definitions given so far to values is due to the abstract nature of the concept, as well as the fact that it refers to both individuals and cultures or communities (Hechter 1993, 1994).

Affecting perception, cognition, and social behavior, personal values can be understood as relatively stable beliefs about what is good and desirable—beliefs that motivate and guide individual behavior (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1994). As cognitive representations of goals to be pursued, values are distinct from needs or motives, which also drive behavior but are not always accessible to conscious awareness (Rokeach 1973; Maio and Haddock 2010). The importance individuals attribute to specific values—their personal value orientation—tends to remain relatively stable over time and across contexts (Schwartz 1994).

While personal values may vary significantly among individuals, cultural values are commonly shared within social groups as assumptions about what is socially good and desirable (Schwartz 1994). When group culture is internalized at the individual level, its dominant value emphases contribute to shaping individuals’ understanding of the social world and serve as a basis for justifying choices. Theories of cultural values conceptualize them as personal beliefs that reflect collective commitments to culturally endorsed “shoulds” (Hofstede 2001; Inglehart 1977; Schwartz 2012). Rooted in collective judgments of what is “right” and “wrong,” cultural values encompass individual perceptions of what the broader community deems appropriate or desirable (Horne and Mollborn 2020).

If we admit that values exist as culturally hypothesized entities, then as aspects of culture, they motivate individual and group behavior and play an important role in decision-making processes (Kirkpatrick Johnson and Mortimer 2002). But, by saying that, we assume there is a necessary connection between what we know we should do and what we actually do, because if not, we would simply observe processes of valuation (Lamont 2012). In this regard, Levi Martin and Lembo (2020, 2021) argue that the connection between what we call commonly shared “values” and concrete social behavior may be overrated. They believe that the antinomy between “ought” and “is” that the study of values implies can be overcome if we understand processes of valuation in terms of interest. Having an interest in something implies a relationship of concern or care sufficient to motivate social action.

So, looking through the lens of the link between “ought” and “is”, if we are to go back to Rokeach’s (1973) founding account, values are individual as well as common beliefs that a certain manner of conduct, or, more abstractly, that a certain end-state of existence, is preferable to its alternatives, or even to its opposite. In this venue, Schwartz (1994, etc.) shows that values can be measured as relatively stable personal beliefs accounting for our commitment to transcultural shoulds. From a cultural point of view, they can be considered “guiding principles”: meaning-generating ideas that to a certain extent motivate our action (Longest et al. 2013, p. 1500).

In this sense, professional values can be understood—both individually and collectively—as beliefs about preferable modes of organizational behavior. These values develop through cumulative socialization processes and influence individuals both emotionally and cognitively (Aldag and Brief 1975; Rokeach 1973). As an integral part of organizational culture, such internalized belief systems are actively shared among members of a professional group, albeit to varying degrees.

Care work, in particular, offers a clear case for examining professional values, as it involves direct, interpersonal interaction between caregivers and those receiving care (Bubeck 1995). In fields such as social work, nursing, psychotherapy, and elder care, professional practice is culturally grounded in ethical values, including compassion, respect for privacy and autonomy, and recognition of each client’s or patient’s cultural identity. As a consequence, deontological codes are invariably based on declarations of commitment to a set of common values: respect for the person, the affirmation of human dignity, respect for client privacy, and concern for the well-being of beneficiaries (Cuthbert and Quallington 2017). However, given the intimate nature of the care relationship, the caregiver’s personal understanding of what constitutes care—whether marked by cynicism and indifference or, conversely, by altruism and sincere devotion—may carry greater weight than formal deontological prescriptions. Within organizational settings, practitioners often critically engage with dominant professional and institutional discourses, selectively rejecting or integrating elements into their pre-existing framework of beliefs, values, and knowledge, shaped through earlier stages of socialization. As a result, they may experience dissonance or even conflict between personal values already internalized and those promoted through professional socialization.

Closely linked to how the goals of professional activity are formed within familial, educational, and occupational contexts (Kirkpatrick Johnson and Mortimer 2002), professional values—particularly in the realm of care work—are frequently intertwined with moral imperatives, rendering them susceptible to interpretation through ethical or even religious frameworks. Pryor (1979), in contrast, argues that professional values should not be equated with moral imperatives but rather understood as preferences. The author suggests they represent preferences concerning specific dimensions of work. The strength of this definition lies in its commitment to an empirical, non-speculative approach. As such, preferences regarding occupational life can be viewed as expressions of individuals’ professional values. Thus, before proceeding further in our discussion, we offer the following operational definition: professional values are socialized conceptions of what is considered desirable within the sphere of occupational life.

1.2. Capturing Cultural Values: Conceptual Ambiguities and Methodological Challenges

By acting as evaluation standards or choice criteria, values often appear as independent variables in the study of group practices. Given that together with norms or social needs, values actively influence the selection of modes, goals, and means of social action, they are seen as cultural imperatives (Kluckhohn 1951). Nevertheless, values remain notoriously difficult to capture because they cannot be directly observed. The problem is that the classical conception of culture as a system of symbols that shapes individual thinking, feeling, and action, and also as a socially given reality, somewhat external to the individual, favors predominantly quantitative approaches to analyzing answers to questions related to beliefs and attitudes (Lizardo 2016; Vaisey 2009). As observable preferences that social groups exhibit over time, values are to be captured by measuring attitudes as their indicators. Cultural differences are typically examined by measuring individual value orientations, as indicated by verbally expressed or observed attitudes. Through the aggregation of such data, shared value orientations are interpreted as latent, culture-level processes (Schwartz 1994, 2012).

Because in numerous empirical studies values appear interchangeable with attitudes, one first requirement is that the former must not be conceptually confused with the latter. Rokeach (1973) treats values and attitudes as independent concepts from the start. Values are more abstract concepts than attitudes, provided that from a sociological point of view, attitudes are understood as favorable or unfavorable evaluations of a concrete social object or a particular social situation. Having this in mind, Thomas and Znaniecki (1958) understand attitudes as a measurable effect of the awareness individuals have of their own values, which actually influence their social practices.

The notion of values has the status of an umbrella term in the sense that compared with attitudes, values represent a category of a higher order of generality and abstraction. Values inspire, influence, structure, and actively organize attitudes in social life, but because of the fact that the close relationship between attitudes and values cannot be undone, there are some distinctions to be taken into account in empirical research.

First of all, as Kluckhohn (1951) notes, attitudes can express an indifferent position towards a thing or a situation. In contrast to adhering to a value, having an attitude does not necessarily imply a sense of imperative desirability associated with axiological convictions.

Secondly, values are much more stable over time than attitudes or simple opinions (Konty and Dunham 1997). In this respect, it can be argued that attitudes express values insofar as they are associated with goals of social action that denote the existence of stable axiological structures having the ability to motivate social practice in the long term (Maio and Olson 2011). In conclusion, values and attitudes cannot be approached except as coexisting, correlated variables (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004).

There is another epistemological precaution to be taken into account. Because they result from socialization, values must be understood in close connection with norms. This is especially relevant when discussing professionalization as the socialization of a coherent system of norms and values within occupational groups. Social norms, as rules about permitted behavior, are specific to particular contexts. Marini (2000) offers a thorough theoretical and applied comparison between norms and values. Both rely on a form of social agreement, but while norms are situational and imply coercive sanctions, values are trans-situational and internalized cultural ideals.

Horne and Mollborn (2020) argue that norms, like values, are rooted in collective judgments and individual perceptions of right and wrong. Values, as internal states, function outside the logic of sanctions. Yet, norms legitimize social expectations (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004), serving to uphold social order, especially amid group-level value conflicts. In professions, norms often manifest as guiding principles, making them hard to distinguish from professional values. Within institutions, individuals may internalize norms, leading to commonly shared professional values. However, it is unclear whether these are truly internalized or merely accepted as normative demands. This question is central to this paper’s focus on professional values, particularly in care professions.

Should we accept that the epistemological relationship between values and attitudes or opinions is that between latent and manifest, as cultural entities, professional values could be justifiably inferred from observed attitudes and expressed opinions. However, in the last two decades, the methods of capturing cultural meanings have diversified and nuanced significantly (Jerolmack and Khan 2014; Lizardo 2016; Vaisey 2009). New analytical distinctions (Lizardo 2016) allow us to capture how cultural knowledge acts at different levels: public versus personal, and declarative versus nondeclarative.

Building on this conceptual development, we now turn to some of the practical and interpretive challenges associated with empirical research in this area. Specifically, we will summarize two major difficulties that arise both in constructing measurement items and in inferring underlying values from expressed opinions and attitudes.

First of all, from the perspective of common sense, there is a question concerning the level of intelligibility of the items themselves. Rokeach (1973) and Schwartz (1994, 2012) invariably start from the empirically unverifiable presumption that values are representations of real needs that have been previously identified by the researcher. Consequently, questionnaire items cannot help but retain a level of abstraction that places them somewhat outside that innate field of comprehensibility proper to common-sense thinking (de Wet et al. 2022). Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) note that Schwartz tried to remedy the problem by continuously lowering the level of abstraction of the formulations. We will keep this in mind for later.

Secondly, especially at the group level, as Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) note in their seminal paper, values tend to remain a latent social phenomenon. This means that the attitudes measured and the opinions collected are not necessarily valid indicators of social parameters. If we were to consider them as group variables, we would have to assume that in our case, professional values are shared by most if not all the group members. But quantitative approaches are limited to recording the degree of factual consensus by aggregating individual data, by calculating means and variance, etc. They cannot account for the extent to which these values are actually internalized (Thome 2015); therefore, determining the extent to which values are internalized would require some implicit measures of internalization. We will also bear this in mind because the problem of the relationship between reflective and pre-reflective thinking has always been debated, but the terminology gained accuracy with the distinctions between “automatic”, intuitive, fast, unconscious, “deliberate”, analytical, slower, and conscious cognitive processes (Lizardo 2016; Evans and Stanovich 2013).

Given the huge focus in sociology on culture and cognition in the past few years, the empirical approach to values using the theory of social representations incorporates cultural processes as a comprehensive resource. We believe that exploring the relationship between shared values and social representations can contribute to refining what Lizardo (2016) calls “cross-grain conceptualizations” on how culture, in this case professional culture, is acquired and internalized at the individual level.

1.3. Values and Social Representations

Cultural schemes have been studied using a large spectrum of methods, from forced-choice surveys and structured interviews to participant observation (Hunzaker and Valentino 2019; Miles 2019), that according to dual-process theory, massively employed currently in cultural analysis (Leschziner and Brett 2019; Lizardo 2016; Lizardo and Strand 2010), produce a mix of automatic and deliberate cognition (Vila-Henninger 2021; Miles et al. 2019). To consider that what we say we would do automatically indicates what we believe we should do and predicts what we will do is not methodologically sound (Levi Martin and Lembo 2020, 2021). Therefore, to account for how cognitive processes produce judgments and valuations, it is necessary to capture implicit cognitive schemas (Boutyline and Soter 2021; Miles 2019; Miles et al. 2019; Srivastava and Banaji 2011).

As shared systems of values, ideas, and practices, social representations organize social knowledge, shaping how individuals make sense of the world and guiding group behavior. These are “value-laden knowledge systems” (Wagner et al. 1999, p. 97), firmly anchored in cultural contexts. Ideologically driven moral values can contribute to the formation of strong collective opinions through shared social representations (Staerklé 2009). Rooted in everyday life, social representations often embody deeply held identity values that influence a group’s decisions regarding inclusion and exclusion (Breakwell 1993; Jodelet 1989, 2008).

Often operating at a non-discursive, or pre-rational, level (Breakwell 1993), social representations are, basically, systems of ideas that determine the way in which groups value and relate emotionally to a certain social object. Through representational processes, groups appropriate and reproduce their knowledge related to these social objects (Wagner 2020). In our case, that knowledge has a distinct axiological component. In care professions, values associated with care work are intensively socialized as an integral part of the practitioner’s professional role. It is to be expected that values are related both to the object of knowledge and to the group in which the representations are anchored.

Shaped by specific symbolic contexts (Pianelli and Saad 2016), social representations can reflect institutional ideologies, prescribing how individuals ought to feel, think, and behave, in order to enforce dominant cultural values (Jovchelovitch 2001; Marková 2003). This normativity supports a certain degree of value conformity within groups (Luhmann 1996). Nevertheless, social representations emerge through dialogue and negotiation, arising from continuous interaction between different individual perspectives, including even divergent voices (Marková 2003). Social groups can actively reinterpret imposed ideologies in order to reclaim their own identity (Howarth et al. 2014). As systems of beliefs, social representations have influence on individual values, but this influence cannot be treated as unitary or hegemonic (Guimelli 1993).

In light of this premise, the argumentation we present below, in support of the study of group values using the analysis of social representations, is based on the position of Moscovici (1979, 1984, 1998, 2000). Both opinions and attitudes must be studied as subordinated to social representations because the latter always takes precedence from an epistemological point of view. It is only due to the fact that we already have a common representation of a social reality that we can develop attitudes that can then be manifested by expressing opinions. While this reasoning is psychologically sound (Dany 2016), it must be said that this point of view remains valid only to the extent that the genesis of attitudes is socially determined. If values directly intervene in the formation of attitudes, they will surely be part of the representations that triggered that formation in the first place.

Further conceptual development is necessary. Social representations have an evaluative–normative, as well as affective, dimension. The evaluative component of social representations refers to common values, recognized norms, and inherited traditions that quietly manifest in group practices and make possible collective judgments regarding the objects of social representation (Bauer and Gaskell 1999). As a result of group history, they are closely related to ideologies helping group members distinguish themselves from those who diverge from the central opinion (Rateau et al. 2011). Because representations of certain social objects such as, for example, same-sex marriages are highly ideologized, they will involve positive or negative judgments directly related to the respondent’s moral values.

The affective component refers to the collective relationship with the representational object that can be desired and accepted or, on the contrary, detested and rejected by the group (Bouriche 2014). This dimension remains what Abric (2001) calls the “silent zone” of social representations because, when pressure intervenes, the evaluative–normative dimension tends to prevail over the affective one. Social norms can greatly influence collective thinking. Changes in social context can even trigger conflict over the object of representation, activating evaluative elements to a maximum. The previous example with same-sex marriages remains valid. Conflicts related to the socialization of professional values as opposed to family values can be analyzed from the perspective of social representations.

2. Identifying Professional Values Within Social Representations

2.1. Methodological Rationale

The present study investigates the role of professional values in shaping social workers’ representations of their profession, with a focus on how these values inform their conceptualization of professional identity.

Our research involved a purposive sample of 68 practicing social workers from Suceava County, Romania, with participant selection guided by three main criteria.

First and foremost, participants were selected based on their willingness and ability to reflect on personal beliefs and ethical decision-making within everyday professional contexts. Additionally, all participants held formal qualifications in social work—most with a bachelor’s degree (63%) and about 37% with advanced degrees—and had a minimum of five years of professional experience. Professional seniority was reflected in the average years of experience, with participants reporting between 5 and 28 years in the field (M = 15.04, SD = 5.86), capturing a continuum from early-career practitioners to those approaching retirement.

Second, the sample was intentionally structured to capture as wide a range of practice areas as possible—including substance abuse, school social work, child welfare, and elder care—in order to reflect the diverse contexts in which social work is practiced.

Third, to ensure institutional diversity, individuals were recruited from both non-profit organizations (46%) and public agencies (54%).

While age and gender were not explicitly defined as selection criteria, the resulting sample showed considerable demographic variation. Participants ranged in age from 28 to 64 years (M = 42.64, SD = 8.97). The gender composition reflected broader national patterns within the profession, with a pronounced female majority (77% female, 23% male).

A multi-method approach, as proposed by Abric (1994b), was employed in this study, incorporating Moliner’s (1995) two-dimensional or bipolar model of analysis. The research design reflects a mixed-method framework, combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques. In light of the epistemological limitations previously noted regarding the investigation of values through purely quantitative methods, this inductive approach presents several key advantages.

First, unlike traditional interrogative techniques, it emphasizes the spontaneity of participants’ responses, thereby reducing the influence of researcher-imposed structures.

Second, due to its relatively low level of researcher control, this method better accommodates participants who may struggle to articulate complex ideas, enabling richer data collection.

Third, it offers a potentially more effective alternative to standard interviews, as it facilitates the emergence of latent elements that often remain concealed in explicit verbal responses but may be inferred through indirect or non-verbal cues (Abric 1994a).

To understand how shared values contribute to the construction of a social representation of the profession of social work, it was necessary to identify the elements of its central node. Three indicators served this purpose (Abric 1993): the frequency of occurrence, the associative power, and the actual importance of the representational elements for the group.

The frequency of occurrence indicates the level of consensus around a representational element. A high frequency may indicate centrality by reflecting shared meaning across the group; however, while it remains a valid and informative criterion, frequency alone does not confirm an element’s central status.

More decisive is the element’s associative power or symbolic value, which, as Abric (1994b) argues, offers the most reliable indication of centrality and was assessed by asking participants to describe the object of representation. The rank or position of an element, relative to the group’s average rank, revealed its associative strength, with a higher rank implying stronger centrality by reflecting stable, shared connections to the object.

The third indicator—subjective importance—was evaluated by asking individuals to identify the elements most personally relevant to them when describing the object, thereby complementing group-level indicators by capturing individual-level significance and highlighting elements likely to persist across both shared and personal representations.

2.2. Research Procedure

The three steps—capturing the content of the representation, analyzing the relative importance and hierarchy of its elements, and identifying those that form its central core—reflect the integration of qualitative and quantitative strategies characteristic of a mixed-method approach.

Step one. Implicit cognitive schemes cannot be inferred without guaranteeing that they are also captured by stimulating implicit mental processes (Miles et al. 2019). So, in order to identify the constitutive elements of the representation, we chose the inductive method. Abric (1994a, 1994b) describes the following: starting from an inducing word, we asked the subjects to produce “all the words, expressions or adjectives that freely come to mind” (Abric 1994a, p. 66).

The social object was presented, and the subjects were asked to produce representational elements, hic et nunc, in order to describe it (Dany et al. 2015). A questionnaire built on the principle of free association (CA) was applied. Subjects were asked to provide the first four words or phrases that come to mind immediately, spontaneously, in relation to the social object of interest presented by the phrase “social worker profession”.

Step two. In order to highlight the structure of social representation, I used the method of questioning the central node (MEC), comprehensively presented by Moliner (1995). In order to identify the central elements of the representation of the professional role, a descriptive questionnaire (CD) was applied.

Based on the answers provided by the subjects, a descriptive questionnaire (CD) was built in order to highlight the central node of the representation of the “social worker”. I started from the observation that the defining property of the central elements is that they are indispensable in the construction of the object of social representation. The more central elements missing, the more difficult it is to recognize the object of social representation. The representational elements were placed in an ambiguous context with the expectation that the central elements will emerge due to the subject’s effort to disambiguate the description.

The construction technique of the questionnaire was that of double negation. Intentionally created, cognitive discomfort forces participants to weigh their answers much more carefully (Flament 2001). The representational elements were brought back into question in a negative form, aiming to elicit a confident rejection—a second denial. The subjects were asked to offer a scaled answer in three variants: “rather yes”/“don’t know”/“rather no”. Rejection by double negation was interpreted as strong confirmation, indicating that the respective representational elements are indeed central ones.

Step three. In order to capture the role of values in representing the social worker role, the evaluative component of the representation was explored using an evaluative questionnaire (CE). Let us remember that as Moliner (1995) argues, the descriptive dimension of a social representation brings together the quasi-totality of information regarding the object of the representation, information that remains significant over time, allowing the extraction of non-negotiable or fixed characteristics that form its central node. However, it is the evaluative dimension that interests us because it directly involves the values of the subjects, grounding their judgments on the object of representation (Moliner and Tafani 1997). In order to discern the social workers’ values, we constructed an evaluative questionnaire (CE).

Firstly, the subjects were asked to choose from the set of descriptive terms obtained by free association those that designate the most relevant characteristics of the represented social object. Then, after random remixing, the representational elements were presented to them again in textual form, and they were asked to choose variants that could complete two series of opposing statements referring to the object of representation.

The positive choice is described by the situation in which the respondent feels they can complete the affirmative sentence. For example: “In my opinion, a social worker should …”. A positive numerical value is assigned: +1.

The negative choice is described by the situation in which the respondent feels that they could complete the negative sentence: “In my opinion, a social worker should not …”. A negative numerical value is assigned: −1.

3. Results

3.1. The Constitutive Elements of the Representation of the Social Worker Profession

The investigated subjects produced 24 distinct words and expressions related to the inducing expression “social worker profession”, as presented below in

Table 1. Frequencies of obtained words and phrases.

Word or Phrase Given by Subjects	Frequency	Percentage (N = 68)
“it means to help people”	37	54.4%
“it means to have the ability to relate to others”	21	30.9%
“it involves knowing the laws”	20	29.4%
“being a good listener”	19	27.9%
“state salary”	14	20.6%
“getting involved in protecting minors”	13	19.1%
“feeling a sense of gratification when you manage to change something”	11	16.2%
“being ready to help the vulnerable”	11	16.2%
“being tolerant with those who do not think like you”	8	11.8%
“you need emotional strength”	7	10.3%
“good professional training”	7	10.3%
“knowing how to work with children and vulnerable adults”	6	8.8%
“knowing how to inspire trust in others”	6	8.8%
“the lack of state funds in the system”	5	7.4%
“being able to make difficult decisions”	5	7.4%
“it consists mostly of paperwork”	4	5.9%
“being able to work with people with special needs”	4	5.9%
“defending children from dysfunctional families”	3	4.4%
“psychological pressure”	3	4.4%
“collaborating with non-profit organizations”	2	2.9%
“respecting the laws”	2	2.9%
“responsibility”	1	1.5%
“patience”	1	1.5%
“an important role in society”	1	1.5%

.

Although frequency as an indicator cannot be considered sufficient for determining centrality, it can be observed that a number of items reached a significant degree of consensus. This allowed us to move on to the next step: identifying the central elements of the representation that social workers have about their profession by repeatedly putting in discussion its central node. A descriptive questionnaire was used, but only the “rather not” answers were taken into consideration, calculating the frequency and percentage for each of the items. We present the results in

Table 2. Frequency of “rather not” responses to the centrality questionnaire.

Word or Phrase Given by Subjects	Frequency	Percentage (N = 68)
It does not involve helping people	65	95.59%
It does not involve the ability to relate to others	59	86.76%
It does not involve knowing the laws	57	83.82%
It does not involve being a good listener	53	77.94%
It does not involve living on a state salary	51	75.00%
It does not involve getting involved in protecting minors	43	63.24%
It does not involve feeling a sense of gratification when you manage to change something	42	61.76%
It does not involve being ready to help the vulnerable	39	57.35%
It does not involve being tolerant with those who do not think like you	37	54.41%
It does not involve emotional strength	9	13.24%
It does not involve good professional training	46	67.65%
It does not involve knowing how to work with children and vulnerable adults	60	88.24%
It does not involve knowing how to inspire trust in others	24	35.29%
It does not involve working in a system insufficiently funded by the state	23	33.82%
It does not involve being able to make difficult decisions	22	32.35%
It does not involve a lot of paperwork	21	30.88%
It does not involve being able to work with people with special needs	20	29.41%
It does not involve defending children from dysfunctional families	19	27.94%
It does not involve withstanding psychological pressure	18	26.47%
It does not involve collaborating with non-profit organizations	15	22.06%
It does not involve respecting the laws	37	54.41%
It does not involve responsibility	43	63.24%
It does not involve patience	17	25.00%
It does not have an important role in society	8	11.76%

.

3.2. The Structure of the Representation

The components of the central node of the “social worker” representation were identified by comparing the percentages obtained for the responses “rather not” for each of the items. The distribution of item frequency was analyzed using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to establish the statistical threshold below which an item is to be considered rejected (the value in this case is 72.8%). The frequencies that exceeded this threshold, provided that they did not differ significantly from 100% (p ≤ 0.05), indicated the centrality of the items that describe sine qua non representational elements. The results are presented in

Table 3. Central items of social worker representation.

	Percentage
it means to help people	95.59%
it means to have the ability to relate to others	86.76%
it means being a good listener	77.94%
it means knowing how to work with children and vulnerable adults	88.24%
it necessitates knowing the laws	83.82%
it involves living on a state salary	75.00%

.

Six descriptive items met the required conditions, highlighting the structure of the central node. According to the procedure of repeated discussion of the central node, it can be considered that the central node of the representation that social workers have about their profession consists of the following six descriptive dimensions: it means to help people, it means to have the ability to relate to others, it means being a good listener, it means knowing how to work with children and vulnerable adults, it requires knowledge of legislation, and it means living on a state salary.

Finally, in order to identify the evaluative component of the representation, the data from the evaluative questionnaire were processed and interpreted.

The average score for each possible answer, which can have values between −1 and +1, was calculated by dividing the total frequency of choices that the respective item registered (positive or negative) by the total number of subjects who answered the evaluative questionnaire (N = 68). The results obtained for each discussed item in order to observe the extent to which average scores differ significantly from the neutral value of 0 are presented below in

Table 4. Average scores on the evaluative questionnaire.

A Worker Within the Social Care Field Should	Positive Choice	Negative Choice	Average Calculated Score
Have the ability to relate to others	25	2	+0.34
Know the laws	10	8	+0.03
Be a good listener	13	7	+0.07
Have an important role in society	4	10	−0.09
Live on a state salary	10	6	+0.06
Get involved in protecting minors	31	5	+0.38
Work in an insufficiently funded system	16	4	+0.17
Be ready to defend the vulnerable	26	3	+0.34
Be tolerant with those who think differently	3	2	+0.01
Have emotional strength	1	-	+0.01
Know how to work with children and vulnerable adults	8	-	+0.11
Be well-trained professionally	6	2	+0.05
Help people	39	2	+0.54
Be able to make difficult decisions	4	8	−0.06
Do paperwork	13	19	−0.09
Be able to work with people with special needs	2	9	−0.10
Defend children from dysfunctional families	9	6	+0.04
Withstand psychological pressure	8	17	−0.13
Collaborate with non-profit organizations	8	2	+0.09
Respect the laws	4	-	+0.05
Be responsible	7	2	+0.07
Know how to work in a team	4	2	+0.03
Be patient	-	1	−0.01
Feel a sense of gratification when having managed to change something	36	3	+0.48

.

3.3. The Evaluative Component of the Representation

Provided that they exceed a certain threshold of significance, the positive and negative evaluations denote the way in which the students evaluate various aspects related to their future profession. We then applied the Z Statistical Significance Test for the purpose of differentiating the responses. At a probability of 0.95%, the index ǀZǀ has the value 1.96. Assuming that we have a normal data distribution, we can distinguish evaluative responses as those for which the value of ǀZǀ ≥ 1.96. The values of the ǀZǀ index in relation to the minimum allowed value, for all tested items, are presented below in

Table 5. ǀZǀ index values for tested items.

A Worker Within the Social Care Field Should	ǀZǀ Index Value
Have the ability to relate to others	4.96
Know the laws	0.33
Be a good listener	1.05
Have an important role in society	−1.36
Live on a state salary	0.76
Get involved in protecting minors	2.91
Work in an insufficiently funded system	-
Be ready to defend the vulnerable	3.90
Be tolerant with those who think differently	0.38
Have emotional strength	-
Know how to work with children and vulnerable adults	-
Be well-trained professionally	1.37
Help people	5.28
Be able to make difficult decisions	−0.95
Do paperwork	−0.57
Be able to work with people with special needs	−2.21
Defend children from dysfunctional families	0.61
Withstand psychological pressure	−1.21
Collaborate with non-profit organizations	0.34
Respect the laws	-
Be responsible	1.67
Know how to work in a team	0.71
Be patient	-
Feel a sense of gratification when having managed to change something	4.28

.

In conclusion, the evaluative dimensions of the representations social workers have about their profession, made up exclusively of positive answers expressing desirability and that reached or exceeded the critical threshold of significance (Z = 1.96), are the following: a social worker has the ability to relate to others, gets involved in protecting minors, is prepared to defend the vulnerable, helps people, and feels rewarded when he succeeds in making a difference.

Finally, only the distribution of the answers that refer to the central node, both descriptive and evaluative, is presented in

Table 6. The distribution of answers referring to the central node.

Descriptive Pole	Evaluative Pole
knows how to work with children and vulnerable adults knows the laws lives on a state salary is a good listener	has the ability to relate to others + gets involved in protecting minors + is prepared to defend the vulnerable + helps people + feels rewarded when he succeeds in making a difference +

since the ever-changing peripheral system of the representation is of no interest here. The descriptive dimensions are overlapped with the evaluative ones, while keeping within the area of the descriptive pole only the elements that are not also found in the evaluative pole area.

4. Conclusions

Given that the objective was to assess the significance of the value component within representations of the social work profession, an extensive content analysis was deemed unnecessary. Instead, the inquiry focused on how values operate as culturally constructed “shoulds”, typically aligning with highly desirable aspects located on its evaluative pole.

At the very core of this representation, social justice functions as an anchoring value, shaping the expectation that the social worker should engage in child protection and advocate for the vulnerable. Furthermore, the social worker is expected to assist others and to derive a sense of fulfillment from making a meaningful difference, with altruism emerging as a value closely linked to professional identity. The social worker should also possess the ability to relate to others, as professional competence is primarily understood as the development of empathy and understanding rather than the ability to navigate organizational systems or coordinate efficiently in response to field-level challenges.

In conclusion, as cultural constructs, the professional values specific to social work are an integral part of how social workers represent their profession, particularly in terms of the desirable aspects related to professional practice. A beneficiary-centered conception of social work foregrounds altruism and social justice, while downplaying its organizational–institutional dimension (Hackett et al. 2003).

This perspective aligns with Moscovici’s argument that both group opinions and attitudes are subordinated to social representations; this remains valid if we accept that the genesis of attitudes is socially determined. It is only due to the fact that we already have a common representation of one social reality or another that we can develop attitudes that can be discursively manifested through opinions. The more values intervene in the formation of attitudes and in the expression of opinions, the more they enter into the composition of the representations that triggered them. As a constitutive element of group culture, professional values contribute to the construction of professional role as an object of representation.

Exposure to culture activates, at the individual level, unconscious cognitive associations. There are still challenges in studying cultural schemas using associative methods. The most used instruments to capture unconscious attitudes or valorization processes are the Implicit Association Test and the Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne et al. 2005, 2008). With all the justified enthusiasm for associative methods, it must be said that in capturing relational cultural schemas, further validation is still necessary (Boutyline and Soter 2021). The IAT raises serious recoding problems that can call into question validity (Gast and Rothermund 2010; Karpinski and Hilton 2001). By comparison, AMP produces much more stable results (Miles 2016; Miles et al. 2019). Respondents are asked to spontaneously associate between multiple categories of concepts (IAT) and visual symbols (AMP), the way they evaluate them being inferred by comparing reaction times or by quantifying the dichotomous judgments obtained. Our argument is that both the IAT and AMP, while designed to capture valuations as automatic cognitive processes, inherently rely on abstract conceptual constructs that are predefined by the researcher from the outset.

By comparison, starting from the idea that the evaluative aspects of cultural schemas become internalized, representational analysis is also an associative method by design, but is less controlled by the researcher at least in its primary phase. Assuming that social representations function as background assumptions that are not based on pre-formulated concepts, participants are instead asked to produce their own associations. This facilitates the expression of latent elements that often remain hidden in explicit verbal discourse. In the following phases, the emerging representational elements are repeatedly discussed. If we accept that values are assumed beliefs and meaning-generating ideas, then we are interested not only in the spontaneous but also in the conscious, reflexive, and axiological choices of the group. Representational analysis can capture values as particular cultural constructs that are cognitively processed.

In conclusion, exploring the relationship between shared values and social representations can contribute to refining what Lizardo (2016, p. 132) calls “cross-grain conceptualizations” on how culture, in this case professional culture, is acquired and internalized at the individual level. Although there is still a long journey ahead, charting social representations proves to be a promising, less researcher-controlled associative method for exploring value-based cultural constructs.