Mining Extractivism, Climate Stress, and Water Injustice: A Case Study of the Proposed Jindal Iron-Ore Mine in Melmoth, KwaZulu-Natal and Hydrosocial Justice

Abstract

In water-stressed regions of South Africa, the expansion of extractive industries is compounding the effects of climate change and poor governance, threatening local water security and socio-ecological resilience for hydrosocial justice. This chapter examines the proposed Jindal iron-ore mine in Melmoth, KwaZulu-Natal and its anticipated impact on water availability, quality, and governance. Drawing on in-depth interviews with farmers, residents, and environmental stakeholders, the findings reveal a region already suffering from recurrent droughts, El Niño-related climate variability, and over-allocated water resources. Findings reveal concern that the mine would further strain surface and groundwater systems, especially given the industrial demands already placed on the Goedertrouw dam. Other concerns about potential water contamination from tailings, dust, and runoff echo experiences from neighbouring mining areas, where degraded water quality has affected both domestic use and cultural practices. The study also uncovers governance gaps, including weak regulatory oversight, non-compliance with environmental safeguards, and flawed consultation processes that overlook downstream impacts. By situating Melmoth within wider debates on extractivism, climate stress, and environmental justice, the paper calls for an urgent reconsideration of extractive approvals in ecologically vulnerable regions that threaten water security, livelihoods, cultural practices, and sense of place. Ignoring interconnected dimensions risks reinforcing existing vulnerabilities, undermining resilience, and entrenching long-term injustices.

1. Introduction

Across the Global South, large-scale extractivist projects are intensifying environmental pressures on already vulnerable ecosystems and communities. Nowhere is this more evident than in water-stressed rural regions, where mining ventures intersect with climate variability, weak governance, and deep-rooted structural inequalities to deepen socio-environmental injustices (Leonard 2023; Bebbington et al. 2008). In such contexts, water security encompasses the reliable availability of sufficient and safe water for all individuals to support healthy, productive lives, both now and for future generations. However, growing constraints on water availability and quality increasingly jeopardize secure access to water for various essential uses (Mishra et al. 2021). Southern Africa is emblematic of these dynamics.

The region is experiencing mounting climate variability, with erratic rainfall patterns and prolonged droughts exacerbated by global climate change (Lombe et al. 2024; Fonjong et al. 2024). As mining companies expand their operations into ecologically sensitive and agriculturally reliant rural areas, local communities are forced to contend with the triple burden of water scarcity, climate impacts, and pollution. This jeopardises not only agricultural productivity and access to safe drinking water but also undermines cultural and spiritual practices intrinsically tied to water resources (Leonard 2023; Agaba 2022; Emmanuel et al. 2018). Further complicating the situation is the fragmentation of water governance systems, often marked by regulatory inconsistencies, non-compliance with environmental standards, and limited opportunities for meaningful public participation (Antwi et al. 2025).

This paper explores these intersecting concerns through an in-depth case study of the proposed Jindal iron-ore mine in Melmoth, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The area is characterised by high ecological sensitivity, strong reliance on subsistence and small-scale agriculture, and dependence on the regional Goedertrouw Dam as a vital water source for domestic, agricultural, and industrial use. The dam is principally for the provision of water to the industrial complex at Richards Bay and serves as a reservoir for irrigation and domestic use.

Against the backdrop of increasing water insecurity and climate impacts, the paper investigates how the proposed mining project may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and disrupt the socio-ecological balance of the region. Drawing on key informant interviews with farmers, residents, and environmental representatives, this paper critically examines three interconnected dimensions of concern, namely: the compounding impacts of climate variability and industrial water demand on water availability; local fears about water contamination and degradation linked to mining operations; and inadequacies in governance, regulatory oversight, and public participation that constrain local communities’ ability to safeguard their water resources.

This paper contributes to the academic literature by bridging the gap between studies on extractivism and those on water security in rural Southern Africa. While much research has focused on the socio-economic and environmental consequences of mining, few studies have offered grounded, empirically rich analyses of how proposed mining developments interact with local hydrological stress and governance weaknesses at the community level. Even fewer have documented community perceptions of water risks linked to full-scale extraction.

By situating the Melmoth case within broader debates on extractivism, rural marginalisation, and water justice, the paper reveals how state-endorsed development models can undermine sustainable water use and community resilience. It argues for the urgent need to reimagine water governance frameworks that centre local ecological realities, uphold environmental justice, and ensure equitable access to water in the face of intensifying extractive pressures.

1.1. The Nexus Between Extractivism, Climate Change, and Water Insecurity

The global expansion of extractive industries, particularly across the Global South, has intensified scholarly attention on the interlinkages between extractivism, climate change, and water insecurity. These issues are especially pronounced in ecologically sensitive and socioeconomically marginalized areas, where mining activities often threaten both ecosystems and human well-being (Leonard 2023). Research has demonstrated that extractive operations, especially in rural and Indigenous territories, disrupt hydrological systems, contaminate freshwater sources, and entrench socio-environmental inequalities (Jimenez et al. 2015; Rodríguez-Labajos and Özkaynak 2017). These impacts extend beyond ecological degradation, intersecting with broader issues of power, dispossession, and democratic exclusion (Le Billon and Duffy 2018). In this context, the relationship between extractivism, climate change, and water security has emerged as a global concern. This paper is in dialogue with a limited number of papers in the Global South linking mining, climate change, and water security. For example, the paper by Guo et al. (2019) for China highlighted that both climate change and coal mining have impacts on soil and water, with reduced streamflow. The paper by Leonard (2023) explored the relationship between climate change, mining development, and water security in Fuleni, Northern KwaZulu-Natal, and highlighted how both climate change and mining impact water security for residents.

Other limited studies also highlight that mining activities, already placing stress on water systems, are exacerbated by climate variability and thereby impact livelihoods. In El Salvador, for instance, civil society groups have raised alarm over the compounded effects of mining and climate change on water availability. A Strategic Environmental Assessment confirmed that mining would deplete increasingly scarce water supplies and that intensified storms could compromise mine infrastructure, leading to severe contamination (Odell et al. 2018). Across Latin America, similar patterns of community resistance have emerged, rooted in concerns about environmental degradation, water pollution, and the erosion of livelihoods (Walter and Urkidi 2017). It is important to clear the debate about mining job creation, which is often an argument raised by the government and industries to enable mining development. However, Frempong et al. (2025) investigated the effect of mining activities on health care, income, and water deprivation in Africa and observed that proximity to active mining sites is associated with self-reported improved water security, access to health, and economic opportunities, but only with improved local governance. Although the study highlighted the water pollution and water insecurity risks that mining poses, it did not explore the limited and highly skilled jobs required for mining or the fact that, after mining ceases (i.e., a temporary operation), jobs also stop. On the other hand, a study by Leonard (2016) compared the sustainability of mining versus tourism in terms of job creation and livelihoods in Dullstroom, Mpumalanga. The study found that mining posed serious environmental risks, particularly to river systems and livestock water sources, while providing limited short-term employment for residents and no environmental protection for future generations. In contrast, tourism offered more long-term sustainable job opportunities, supported by Dullstroom’s rich natural heritage and activities such as fly-fishing, mountain biking, hiking, and horse endurance events. Thus, it is a misconception to think that mining creates jobs that will improve local livelihoods and local infrastructure. The literature presented in this paper supports this argument and highlights that mining worldwide contributes more negatively to environmental destruction and the erosion of livelihoods.

Increasingly, scholars conceptualize extractivism not merely as a means of resource exploitation but as an entrenched political–economic system shaped by colonial legacies and neoliberal ideologies. Post (2023) emphasises extractivism as “accumulation by dispossession,” wherein state and corporate actors prioritize raw material exports at the expense of local communities and ecological integrity. This logic has prompted the securitisation of water and the criminalisation of dissent in countries such as Peru, the Philippines, and Colombia (Middeldorp and Le Billon 2019; Temper et al. 2015). Within this framework, water insecurity is not simply a matter of technical management or infrastructure. It is fundamentally a question of justice shaped by unequal access, benefit distribution, and environmental burdens. Feminist scholars such as Khadam et al. (2024) and Sultana (2018) argue that water injustice is deeply gendered and racialised, disproportionately affecting women but also Indigenous groups and rural populations. This has given rise to hydro social movements across Latin America, where communities defend their right to water through legal strategies, protest, and direct action (Boelens et al. 2016). At the core of these struggles is the commodification of water, a trend reinforced by both extractive industries and neoliberal governance, which increasingly frame water as a private commodity rather than a public good or ecological common (Bakker 2004). Mining companies frequently receive preferential access to water under the justification of economic development, while communities endure scarcity, deteriorating water quality, and exclusion from decision making. In Australia’s Pilbara region, for instance, iron-ore mining has depleted groundwater reserves, adversely affecting agriculture and Aboriginal heritage sites (Australian Water Association 2024). In India’s Odisha state, bauxite mining has disrupted water cycles and tribal farming systems, leading to sustained community resistance (Hansen et al. 2023). These cases underscore a broader pattern of global resistance against extractive industries. Far from isolated grievances, such opposition reflects a systemic critique of the capitalist model of development, which routinely privileges corporate profit over ecological sustainability and community rights (Leonard 2024; Conde 2017).

Despite growing awareness, global policy frameworks have largely failed to address the root causes of water insecurity in extractive contexts. While international goals like the UN Sustainable Development Goal 6 emphasise access to clean water, they often neglect the political and economic structures that drive water dispossession. Furthermore, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), the principal regulatory mechanism for evaluating mining projects, have been critiqued for their technocratic approach and their inability to capture long-term socio-ecological harms (Leonard 2017). In response, scholars and activists are calling for a reimagining of water governance grounded in principles of environmental justice, decolonial thought, and community-led management. Zwarteveen and Boelens (2014) propose the concept of “hydrosocial territories,” which recognises water as embedded in cultural, political, and ecological relations rather than as an abstract resource. This aligns with decolonial frameworks that prioritise Indigenous worldviews and relational understandings of land and water (Escobar 2018).

Though under-researched compared to Latin America, similar patterns of water dispossession and resistance are emerging across Africa. In Ghana’s gold mining regions, artisanal communities report river pollution and the collapse of livelihoods, often without access to justice (Nti et al. 2023). In Zambia, the result of historical relics of copper mining has impacted the environment and health of surrounding communities, giving rise to increases in disease prevalence and waste impacting the environment (Mwansa 2016). These cases illustrate the urgent need for context-sensitive governance that respects local knowledge, safeguards ecosystems, and enforces corporate accountability. Extractivism and water insecurity reveal a consistent pattern of ecological degradation, social inequality, and corporate dominance. While governments and industry promote mining as a pathway to development, the lived experiences of many communities tell a different story, one marked by deepening vulnerability and contested control over vital water resources (Leonard 2016). A transformative approach to extractive governance is urgently needed, one that centres equity, sustainability, and meaningful democratic participation, particularly in rural areas where water is not only a basic need but a symbol of resistance and resilience.

1.2. Extractivism and Water Security in South Africa

In South Africa, extractivism, particularly in the mining sector, has long been entangled with issues of water insecurity and socio-environmental injustice. The country’s history of resource exploitation, rooted in colonialism and apartheid, continues to shape contemporary struggles over water access, contamination, and governance (Quiroz et al. 2024). Scholars have argued that the expansion of mining operations frequently undermines local water rights, pollutes critical catchments, and displaces rural livelihoods (Schoderer and Ott 2022). Communities located near mining zones often bear the brunt of this degradation. In many rural and peri-urban areas, residents report reduced access to clean water, competition with mining operations, and a lack of consultation in water-related decision making (Leonard 2017). These dynamics are further exacerbated by climate variability and drought, making water scarcity both an environmental and a political issue (Unfried et al. 2022).

Mining activities in key provinces such as Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and KwaZulu-Natal have led to severe water degradation through acid mine drainage, heavy metal pollution, and over-extraction (Ochieng et al. 2010). Some scholars have warned about the declining quality of surface and groundwater in mining-intensive areas, raising concerns about both ecological integrity and human health (Leonard 2024). Despite South Africa’s progressive water laws, such as the National Water Act of 1998, the enforcement of these protections has been weak, especially when confronted with the economic power of extractive industries (Forrest and Loate 2017). In 2019, a parliamentary report revealed that 118 mines were polluting rivers, many of them without sufficient water contamination monitoring. Moreover, the number of mines operating without valid water permits rose to 115, up from 39 in 2014 (Olalde and Matikinca 2019). In KwaZulu-Natal, the collapse of a waste slurry dam at the Zululand Anthracite Colliery (ZAC) resulted in 1.5 million litres of toxic coal waste flowing into the Black and White Umfolozi River system. This incident sparked public outcry from environmental groups, local communities, and the provincial conservation authority, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, particularly considering the mine’s excessive water use during droughts (Carnie 2022). Moreover, water governance in South Africa is shaped by uneven power relations. Corporate actors, through partnerships with government or via regulatory loopholes, often secure preferential water access while local communities remain marginalized (Klug 2022). This has led to a rise in environmental justice movements, with affected groups demanding greater accountability, community participation, and the recognition of water as a human right (Leonard 2023). Overall, South Africa illustrates how extractivism contributes to water insecurity by prioritizing profit over ecological and social sustainability. Calls are growing for a just transition, one that centres the rights of communities, protects water resources, and reimagines development beyond extraction (Cock 2019).

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Case Study Site: Melmoth, KwaZulu-Natal

The proposed Jindal iron-ore mine is located approximately 25 km southeast of Melmoth, within the Mthonjaneni Local Municipality in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa (Refer to Figure 1, which shows the location of the municipality). This area falls under the broader uMlalazi region, where agriculture plays a significant role, contributing around 33% to the region’s Gross Geographic Product and employing a substantial portion of the workforce. The local economy is primarily supported by sugarcane farming, alongside timber production and citrus cultivation in the nearby Nkwaleni Valley. Mthonjaneni enjoys a warm and humid subtropical climate, ideal for agricultural activities and large-scale forestry operations. In addition to sugarcane, timber, and cattle farming, the region produces avocados, citrus fruits, and ornamental cut flowers for export. On average, the municipality produces approximately 300,000 tons of sugarcane and 470,000 tons of timber annually. While some light industries exist, agriculture remains the backbone of the local economy. Approximately 75% of the labour force is engaged in farming, either commercially or through small-scale subsistence agriculture. The municipality is also located near ecologically significant areas, including the Hluhluwe-iMfolozi and Opathe game reserves, and is home to around 38,000 residents (Mthonjaneni Municipality 2024).

2.2. Data Collection

This research was undertaken in response to local concerns and mobilised as part of engaged scholarship. Fieldwork was conducted in March 2024 to examine community resistance to the proposed mining development in Melmoth. A qualitative research design was adopted to capture nuanced perspectives and community experiences regarding extractivism and its implications for water security and as part of the broader study. This research design was chosen to capture the complex nature of human experiences, social interactions, and cultural context factors that are difficult to quantify (Mozersky et al. 2021). Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews with a range of key social actors, including commercial farmers, farm owners, residents, and civil society groups supporting anti-mining efforts. These included individuals from neighbouring communities also affected by mining, such as Fuleni, Somkhele, Ulundi, and Richards Bay, as well as community-based organisations and a public interest legal group advocating for the protection of local resources. Interview invitations sent to the Jindal mining consultants and the local government were not responded to. A snowball sampling technique was used at times to identify participants, wherein initial informants referred the researcher to others within their networks. A total of 15 interviews were conducted. Interviews lasted between 40 min and 1.5 h, depending on the participant’s availability, and were digitally recorded with their consent.

2.3. Data Analysis

Data were analysed using grounded theory methodology, allowing for theory generation through systematic coding and thematic analysis. Open coding was employed to disaggregate the interview data into discrete parts, facilitating the identification of recurring patterns, themes, and sub-themes (Priest et al. 2002). This approach was essential for highlighting the lived realities and socio-political dynamics shaping local responses to extractive development. For this paper, three themes are highlighted as relevant for water security: Theme 1: Water insecurity due to climate change and industrial usage; Theme 2: Water contamination concerns linked to mining activities; and Theme 3: Poor governance and a lack of compliance and consultation, threatening water security.

3. Results

Water insecurity in Melmoth, KwaZulu-Natal, has become a point of growing concern as communities face overlapping challenges of climate stress, poor governance, water stress, and the threat of extractivist developments such as the proposed Jindal iron-ore mine. Drawing on interviews with local stakeholders, this paper explores three interrelated themes (as highlighted above). By weaving together first-hand accounts, the analysis highlights how development decisions exacerbate existing inequalities and threaten both livelihoods and ecosystems.

3.1. Water Insecurity Due to Climate Change and Industrial Usage

Water availability in the region was increasingly unreliable due to long-term climatic variability and recurrent droughts, in addition to industrial usage pressure. Farmers and residents alike described extended dry periods over the years, dwindling dam levels, and water restrictions and the consequences for agricultural productivity and household water use. As Informant C, a flower and citrus [White] farmer in the Nkwaleni Valley, noted for climate change impacts:

“We’ve been here at [X] Farm since 2010, and in the last 14 years, we’ve gone through four extended dry periods. You wouldn’t think so now, but leading up to 2010, our dams were bone dry…the sustainability of our water resources [was in jeopardy].”

Water insecurity due to climate change and the impact of El Nino (i.e., a naturally occurring climate phenomenon characterized by the unusual warming of surface waters in the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, which typically occurs every 2 to 7 years and can last anywhere from 9 to 12 months) was noted to be challenging. Southern Africa often experiences hotter, drier conditions, leading to droughts, crop failures, and water shortages. Jindal mine, after conducting its environmental impact assessment, indicated that there would be no water insecurities, which, several informants interviewed claimed, was false. Informant R, project office at the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), a non-governmental organization working on wilderness preservation and the reduction of human impact on the environment, noted the non-compliance of development concerning water security threats and potential pollution impacts in the region:

“…I think one of the big water security challenges here has been the major 2016 drought, where the dam was almost dry, [at level] 16%, and that kind of galvanised big businesses, industries, stakeholders to come, try to work together. So, there’s a need to have a catchment focus…”

As Informant G, a flower and citrus [White] farmer in the Nkwaleni Valley, further elaborated:

“I came here in 2002. In 2002/2003 we had good rains. Then came a period of relative drought. The dam went down to about 44% around about year 2007/2008, and then we had some rain. Until 2010, it was really bad, and then came some normal rains. And then in 2014/15/16 and into 17 we had bad years…This dam went down to like 16/17%…so low that you nearly got to the point of no further extraction. So, all growers here were restricted to a maximum of 30% of [water] allocation…This was the time when a lot of the growers decided to take away a lot of sugar cane and rather focus more on citrus because…application of your water and the evaporation rate of the water is much less…So when Jindal did their EIA and their due diligence, they were basically on a best-case-[water] scenario…We are entering El Niño right now…The bit of rain that fell this week and last week came too late…the maize crop has failed, so El Niño, for the next few years, it’s going to be a reality…the difference here in our region between winter and summer is getting less. So, you do not get those cold winters any longer. The summers are getting hotter. We had this year not so many days more than 40 °C, but in 2023, we had a period of nearly two weeks where we were each day more than 40 °C. But we have in the last few weeks [in 2024]…very dry wind to damage our water surplus.”

Besides climate change already impacting the region and water supply, the added pressure of industries in the region has also constrained water resources. The addition of mining development would thus add to water pressures. Informant C highlighted the existing water pressures in the region and how mining would not be feasible:

“Jindal…was to augment their water supply from the Tugela, but the Tugela runs dry. I mean, the Tugela Transfer Scheme [an irrigation project developed in the Drakensberg mountains] struggles from time to time to support the outgoing water to industry and ourselves, and communities, and the environmental requirement. So, now add another set of massive pumps on the river, it isn’t sustainable…All it would take is a less-than-sympathetic member of the government to facilitate a transfer of water rights from agriculture to mining.”

The pressure on water from industry was emphasised by Informant S, one of the residents who began fighting and educating the community about the mining application and potential impacts on the region:

“…All of Richards Bay and industry feeds off our [Goedertrouw] dam…now it’s gonna have a mine on it. The other mine’s Tronox…PHP Billiton and South 62, [industries like] Mondi [paper], all of them are going to be affected. Because this is their water source. I contacted the EIA specialist for Mondi…and I said you guys need to join this fight…[Mondi] flew up to Richards Bay…to see…the head of the South African Water Board, and they just said if this mine comes, kiss Richards Bay industry goodbye…So it’s amazing that we’ve got this giant dam that feeds literally this entire area…[and] known to be like a drought-ridden area…”

3.2. Water Contamination Concerns Linked to Mining Activities

In addition to the threat of drought, there are growing concerns about water contamination, particularly linked to mining activities. Surrounding areas around Melmoth where mining is active have already impacted local water resources, which have become unsafe for both drinking and cultural use. This indicates the impact that mining will have on Melmoth. According to Informant N, a resident of Ulundi, a town neighbouring Melmoth and home to the mine, the Zululand Anthracite Colliery (ZAC), noting the impacts of mining in her area which she informed Melmoth residents about:

“…The water is not clean in the rivers because of the fact that the mine is in operation. You can’t just drink the water. You have to do things to drink that water…When it used to rain before the mine became operational, you could just collect water, like a bucket system, where you collect water, and then the water that you collected, you were able to drink. But since the mine is in operation, the rainwater that is polluted has dust. So, you can’t drink it…”

Informant N, also a resident of Ulundi and a traditional healer, noted how the mining pollution of water has impacted her spiritual and cultural practices:

“[I am a] traditional healer by profession…performing spiritual rituals in water. So now, since the water is affected and dirty and there’s waste in it, you can’t now [use dirty water]. Because what we do is, we go and cleanse our bodies. So, if you cleanse yourself from the negative [elements] that you are leaving behind, you can’t do that in dirty water.”

Water scarcity and pollution thus intersect to shape a context of environmental and spiritual deprivation, made worse by the demands of extractive industries. If mining when ahead in Melmoth, it would have a severe impact on water security and cause pollution of the available water source. As Informant C highlighted about mining impacts in Melmoth: “…if they’d [Jindal mine] got the go-ahead then, they [would] still have the disaster of the tailings dam…Imagine when that sludge wall gives way, the impact it would have on the water and the communities downstream…” Informant G also had concerns about the mining dust pollution on water sources, which would be disastrous for groundwater:

“…So, for us, the big concern is, of course, the dust, the iron that they are going to mine, you know, iron has got a very negative effect on the water. It’s got a very negative effect on…the effect of aquifers…So a profound negative effect on the availability and the quality of both the groundwater and the surface water, which will have an extreme negative impact on activities…”

From the above evidence, the convergence of pollution, drought, and extractive pressures underscores how mining would severely exacerbate existing water insecurity, compromising not only basic needs but also cultural and ecological well-being.

3.3. Poor Governance, Lack of Compliance, and Consultation Threatening Water Security

Despite the evident water crisis, government departments did not provide consistent, transparent, or just governance over water resources. Participants described how existing water resources are overallocated and mismanaged, even as authorities plan for new industrial developments. Informants noted that the region is already one of only three regions with mandatory licensing due to over-allocation. Informant G noted the problem with over-allocation and questioned the need for the government to expand industrial development:

“So, a problem with this water source here is that it is already overallocated. So, it’s one of only three water resources where there’s already a mandatory license from the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) because it’s so overallocated…You have to be registered as a licensed water user because it’s overallocated. So, of course, the Department has a mandate from the Government that they need to address wrongs of the past…a certain portion is, of course, allocated to the expansion of Richards Bay and Empangeni industrial areas. But there is no possibility for extra water for agriculture per se, and they still have to allocate a certain portion extra for traditional communities that did not have access to water. So, water is critical in this area…The overwhelming bulk of the water that is necessary for this whole subregion is coming from the Goedertrouw Dam…You have got millions of people that are dependent on that water source as so how can it be that the Department of Mineral Resources and the Department of Water and Sanitation can even consider granting these [mining] licenses knowing that it’s overallocated…”

Informant C pointed out a fundamental contradiction in the state’s allowance of mining in the region and its impact on water security. According to the informant,

“It goes back to water scarcity, prior to our meeting with [government] it was clear that they were going to try and [change] the minimum freshwater requirement per person from 25 litres a day to 15 litres a day, so already there was this mechanism where they were trying to [limit water use]. So, how could they start pushing this agenda of more water [use for mining] and then actively support a threat to the sustainability of our only water source here? Because…this dam supplies the Mthonjaneni community…Two years ago…you were looking at 1.4 million people who relied on this water source alone…”

The misalignment between development and ecological constraints raises deeper concerns about governance and justice. Informant R, project office at the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), noted the non-compliance of development concerning water security threats and potential pollution impacts in the region:

“…Of course, [with] mining, there’s…big impacts on water resources…from the demand perspective…there is no spare water in this catchment. So, you can’t just have a big land use coming in without strategically reprioritising certain things…We classify them [mining] as costly, destructive land users, and the reason for that, in most cases, there’s a lot of non-compliance…There are critical areas and places where you shouldn’t be doing that…”

Unfortunately, due to poor governance and oversight, the Jindal mining consultation process was also viewed as flawed in the attempt to get the mining approved. Poor governance from both the government and the mining company, therefore, threatened water resources. As informant R further noted, the poor consultation and communication with stakeholders throughout the water catchment:

“…in the upper catchment where the mine is going to be…there was very little focus on the middle part of the catchment, where there would be the tailing dams…which was not far off from the…biggest water source for the catchment. And there was no engagement, to my understanding with the bottom part of the catchment, like your Emfuleni, coming to Richards Bay. Again, if you impact the upper catchments, then of course the bottom part of the catchments will be impacted as well. So, there was that lack of full consultation…An opencast mining on the top of the catchment with a poor understanding of water resource impact and tailing dams next to your main source of river…it just doesn’t make sense…They [Jindal] come up with around 1000-page reports looking at all sorts of things…you can’t give that to communities and farmers and say, interpret that. It doesn’t work like that. …there was not enough evidence on how, for example, Jindal is going to get the amount of water that is required for the mining operation, but also the processes on managing the risk…”

The findings reveal a system in which short-term economic interests override long-term sustainability and public interest. This is especially stark considering ongoing struggles by rural and farming communities to access adequate and clean water.

4. Discussion: Situating Melmoth’s Water Insecurity Within Broader Extractive and Climate Governance Debates

The findings from Melmoth reveal a complex and multi-scalar crisis of water insecurity that resonates with, and expands upon, the critical literature in political ecology, environmental justice, and extractivist studies as highlighted earlier. The results presented underscore how climate stress, industrial overreach, and state-endorsed extractivism are converging to intensify the precarity of both livelihoods and ecological systems in the region. The results illustrate how climate variability is compounding already fragile water systems, leading to erratic rainfall, extreme heat, and recurrent droughts. These local accounts mirror global patterns identified by scholars like Sultana (2018), who underscores how climate change disproportionately impacts marginalized communities with the least adaptive capacity. Farmers’ in Melmoth echo this trend, as they recount dam levels dropping below sustainable thresholds and shifts in agricultural practices, such as replacing sugarcane with citrus to conserve water. These adaptations, while innovative, are indicative of a coping mechanism in the face of systemic neglect and climatic unpredictability. Water pressures are exacerbated by industrial and extractive demands, notably the proposed Jindal iron-ore mine, which stakeholders fear will further destabilise an already overstretched catchment. The scepticism around Jindal’s environmental assessment, highlighted by informants and their lived experiences, challenges the technocratic rationalities underpinning environmental impact assessments. As Boelens et al. (2016) argue, such assessments often serve as instruments of “hydrosocial depoliticization,” rendering invisible the socio-political struggles and asymmetries inherent in water access and allocation. The threat of pollution and tailings dam failures also reflects the broader literature on the socio-ecological consequences of mining in fragile landscapes (Bebbington et al. 2008). Testimonies from neighbouring communities, such as in Ulundi, provide warnings: rainwater once potable is now rendered unusable, cultural and spiritual practices are interrupted, and the very sanctity of water as a shared public good is undermined. These experiences echo Buenafe et al. (2024) call to understand water not merely as a resource but as a relational substance imbued with cultural, spiritual, and ecological significance.

The case also underscores how poor governance structures and institutional fragmentation contribute to persistent water injustices. The lack of coordination between the Department of Water and Sanitation and the Department of Mineral Resources, coupled with opaque and exclusionary licensing processes, reflects what Zwarteveen and Boelens (2014) identify as the inherently political nature of water governance. They argue that water issues are not only technical or environmental challenges but also fundamentally questions of justice, shaped by power, inequality, and contested authority. Water must be understood as both a material and a social resource, embedded in cultural, ecological, and political relations. Thus, achieving water justice goes beyond fair distribution; it also requires cultural recognition, democratic participation, and the protection of ecosystems. The failure to ensure these dimensions in the Melmoth case illustrates the broader structural inequities in extractive water governance.

Water allocation here becomes a political act that privileges industrial and urban interests, such as Richards Bay, over rural, agricultural, and traditional communities. The over-allocation of water rights, even in an already overdrawn catchment, exemplifies Leonard’s (2023) critique of post-apartheid development planning as being insufficiently grounded in ecological limits and local consultation. The failure of meaningful public participation, particularly in environmental assessments and water governance, amplifies procedural injustices. As informants pointed out, the inaccessibility of technical EIA documents and the exclusion of downstream stakeholders from consultations compromise the democratic legitimacy of development decisions. These findings reinforce the arguments by Boelens et al. (2016) and Sultana (2018), who emphasise the importance of knowledge pluralism, transparency, and localised authority in ensuring equitable water governance.

Overall, the case of Melmoth illustrates how intersecting ecological, socio-political, and governance failures are reproducing a deeply uneven water landscape, where the burdens of scarcity, pollution, and displacement fall disproportionately on already vulnerable populations. The proposed Jindal mine is thus not an isolated threat but part of a broader extractivist logic that externalises environmental costs and sidelines community agency, as we have seen across the South African and the global landscape, as highlighted in the literature presented earlier. In resisting the mine, local stakeholders are not merely defending a water source but asserting a broader claim to environmental justice, cultural continuity, and political voice. As such, this case contributes to a growing body of scholarship and activism that calls for decolonial, place-based approaches to climate resilience and resource governance in the Global South.

5. Conclusions

This study has illuminated the deepening water insecurity in Melmoth, KwaZulu-Natal, driven by the intersecting pressures of climate change, poor governance, and proposed extractivist developments such as the Jindal iron-ore mine. Drawing on the voices of local residents, farmers, and experts, the findings reveal a highly vulnerable hydrosocial landscape, wherein water scarcity is both an ecological and political condition shaped by governance neglect and contemporary exploitation. The impacts of climatic variability, particularly the intensification of El Niño-induced droughts, have already strained water systems, jeopardising agricultural livelihoods and household access. Industrial and commercial competition for water has further eroded resilience, particularly among small-scale users and marginalised communities. The region’s existing over-allocations and history of recurrent droughts underline that any additional large-scale extractive development will tip the scales towards ecological collapse.

The Jindal mine’s proposed operations not only risk exacerbating regional water scarcity but also introduce serious pollution threats through dust, waste, and potential tailings dam failure, which could contaminate surface and groundwater sources vital to both human and spiritual life. Testimonies from neighbouring areas already affected by mining operations provide a sobering glimpse into Melmoth’s potential future. The study highlights major deficits in governance and democratic participation. Licensing processes are marked by non-compliance, a lack of transparent consultation, and a disconnect between environmental realities and state developmental priorities. Despite the area being recognised as over-allocated, approvals for further industrial expansion continue, suggesting governance structures that prioritise short-term industrial gains over long-term social and ecological sustainability. The Melmoth case exemplifies the wider crisis facing many rural communities in the Global South, where extractive ambitions collide with ecological limits and social justice imperatives. Unless urgent and transformative steps are taken to protect water sources and democratise environmental governance, the region risks entrenching a future of environmental dispossession and hydrosocial inequality. Sustainable development must centre the voices and needs of those most affected, not those who profit most.

Recommendations

Given the precarious state of water availability in Melmoth, a moratorium should be placed on new mining developments in the Goedertrouw Dam catchment and surrounding areas until comprehensive, independent hydrological assessments are undertaken. Stakeholders must also implement a catchment-wide water governance framework that integrates agricultural, industrial, domestic, cultural, and ecological water needs. This approach must prioritise equity, sustainability, and resilience to climate change. National and provincial departments, particularly the Department of Water and Sanitation and the Department of Mineral Resources, must enhance monitoring, enforcement, and sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance. Licensing processes should be independently audited and made fully transparent. Community consultations must be restructured to ensure accessibility, especially for rural and marginalised stakeholders. This includes providing summaries of technical environmental reports in local languages, facilitating community workshops, and incorporating traditional knowledge systems into environmental governance. Water governance frameworks must recognise water not only as a resource but also as a cultural and spiritual necessity. This includes ensuring the availability of clean water for spiritual practices, particularly for traditional healers and faith-based communities.

Any consideration of mining must be assessed holistically in terms of climate change impacts, agriculture and food security, and the cultural and spiritual use of water. This means evaluating not only the economic benefits of extraction but also the cumulative ecological costs and social disruptions that mining introduces. Water is not merely a resource for industrial use, it sustains local food systems, supports biodiversity, and holds deep cultural and spiritual significance for many communities. Ignoring these interconnected dimensions risks reinforcing existing vulnerabilities, undermining resilience, and entrenching long-term injustices. A just and sustainable approach requires inclusive decision making, ecological sensitivity, and the prioritization of long-term communal well-being over short-term economic gains.