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Article

The Impact of Contract Functions on Contractors’ Performance Behaviors: A Mixed-Methods Approach

by
Mingzhu Yang
1,2,
Haitao Chen
1,*,
Yongshun Xu
3,* and
Jinjian Wu
4
1
School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China
2
School of Economics and Management, Jilin Jianzhu University, Changchun 130118, China
3
School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Hainan University, Haikou 570228, China
4
China Construction Eighth Engineering Division Corp., Ltd., Shanghai 200112, China
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Buildings 2025, 15(19), 3438; https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings15193438
Submission received: 28 August 2025 / Revised: 18 September 2025 / Accepted: 20 September 2025 / Published: 23 September 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Construction Management, and Computers & Digitization)
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Abstract

Understanding how contract functions influence contractors’ performance behaviors is critical for improving project outcomes in the construction industry. Drawing on contractual governance theory, this study explores the differential impacts of three core contract functions—control, coordination, and adaptation—on contractor behaviors, distinguishing between perfunctory and consummate performance. A mixed-methods approach is employed, combining a survey of 345 contractors with semi-structured interviews. Quantitative results indicate that contract control increases perfunctory behavior and reduces consummate behavior, contract coordination stimulates both types of behaviors, while contract adaptation reduces perfunctory behavior and enhances consummate behavior. Qualitative findings further identify boundary conditions such as fairness, trust, and project uncertainty. From a theoretical perspective, the study refines contractual governance theory by clarifying the behavioral implications of multifunctional contracts. From a practical perspective, it offers guidance for contract design that balances compliance and collaboration to encourage proactive contractor engagement.

1. Introduction

In construction project management, effective governance mechanisms are crucial to ensuring timely, cost-effective, and high-quality project delivery [1]. Among these mechanisms, formal contracts play a pivotal role by defining responsibilities, allocating risks, and aligning stakeholder interests [2]. Traditionally seen as legal tools for enforcement and dispute resolution, contracts in construction now also serve as governance instruments that shape behavior and foster collaboration in complex projects [3].
Contractual theory recognizes that contracts perform multiple functions beyond compliance enforcement [4]. Specifically, control, coordination, and adaptation are the three core functions underpinning contractual governance in construction projects [5]. The control function involves the specification of tasks, sanctions, and accountability mechanisms to minimize opportunism and ensure that parties fulfill their obligations [6]. The coordination function addresses interdependencies among stakeholders, providing clear communication channels and decision-making procedures to synchronize activities [7]. The adaptation function, in turn, enables flexibility and responsiveness to dynamic project conditions through clauses that allow for change and renegotiation [8].
While the technical and legal dimensions of contracts have been well studied, growing attention has turned toward the behavioral consequences of contractual arrangements—particularly how different contract functions influence the performance behaviors of contractors [6,9]. In practice, contractor behaviors are not uniform; they range from perfunctory performance, where individuals do the bare minimum required, to consummate performance, characterized by proactive engagement, discretionary effort, and cooperation beyond contractual mandates [10,11]. These behavioral variations have significant implications for project performance, influencing quality, cost control, risk mitigation, and stakeholder satisfaction [12,13].
Recent research suggests that contractors’ behavioral responses are not merely a function of personal traits or organizational culture but are shaped by the governance environment—especially the structure and design of contracts [9,10]. For instance, overly rigid control clauses may signal distrust and induce risk-averse, minimal compliance behavior [14]. Conversely, well-calibrated coordination and adaptation mechanisms may foster an environment conducive to innovation and collaboration, thereby encouraging consummate performance [9]. However, empirical evidence on the joint and differential impacts of contract control, coordination, and adaptation on contractor behavior remains limited and inconclusive. Furthermore, most existing studies examine these relationships through either quantitative or qualitative lenses, often lacking integration between empirical validation and contextual understanding [7,15]. This gap highlights the need for a more nuanced investigation into how multifunctional contracts shape contractor behaviors in real-world settings.
To address these research gaps, this study employs a mixed-methods approach to explore the effects of contract functions on contractors’ perfunctory and consummate performance behaviors. The quantitative phase involves a large-scale questionnaire survey to statistically test the hypothesized relationships between the three contract functions and the two behavioral outcomes. The qualitative phase complements the empirical findings by drawing on insights from semi-structured interviews with experienced practitioners and academics in the field. This dual-phase design enhances both the robustness and contextual richness of the analysis, enabling a deeper understanding of the mechanisms and boundary conditions at play. The key research objectives of this study are threefold: (1) to test the hypothesized effects of contract control, coordination, and adaptation on contractors’ perfunctory and consummate performance behaviors; (2) to compare the relative strength and direction of these effects, thereby clarifying potential trade-offs between perfunctory and consummate responses; and (3) to explore contextual factors—such as trust, fairness, and project uncertainty—that may moderate these hypothesized relationships.
This study contributes to theory and practice in several ways. From a theoretical standpoint, it deepens the understanding of contractual governance by unpacking the distinct behavioral impacts of various contract functions and incorporating them into an integrated analytical framework. This approach moves beyond viewing contracts solely as control mechanisms, positioning them instead as instruments that shape and influence stakeholder behavior. On the practical side, the findings offer actionable insights for project owners and managers aiming to craft contracts that not only protect their interests but also foster proactive, high-quality engagement from contractors.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Contract Functions in Construction

Contracts play an important role in the governance of construction projects by defining the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of parties involved [16]. In the construction industry, where projects are typically marked by high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and stakeholder interdependence, the role of contracts extends well beyond that of mere legal instruments for dispute resolution [5]. Beyond serving as tools for enforcing compliance, contracts in this context fulfill a range of functions that can be broadly categorized into control, coordination, and adaptation functions [5,17]. The control function refers to the use of formal mechanisms—such as specifications, sanctions, and monitoring—to ensure compliance and limit opportunistic behavior [6]. The coordination function emphasizes aligning the roles, expectations, and actions of different stakeholders by providing clear procedures for communication, task allocation, and information sharing [7]. The adaptation function, by contrast, enables parties to respond to unforeseen changes and evolving project conditions through renegotiation clauses, flexibility provisions, and mechanisms for joint decision-making [8]. Together, these three dimensions reflect a more comprehensive view of contractual governance, accommodating both the need for structure and the dynamic nature of construction projects [3].
Prior studies have examined contract functions from multiple perspectives, but their findings reveal both complementarities and gaps. For instance, Wang et al. (2018) [18] conceptualized contract complexity as a three-dimensional construct, highlighting the explicitness of control, coordination, and adaptation clauses. Building on this perspective, Chen et al. (2018) [17] showed how the distribution of these clauses varies across different FIDIC standard contracts, illustrating the influence of project delivery systems on contract design. While these studies emphasized structural characteristics of contracts, Gao et al. (2018) [3] moved further to investigate the boundary conditions under which each function effectively governs complex projects. More recent contributions, such as Lee et al. (2020) [16] and Cheng et al. (2021) [19], shifted the focus from structural design to performance outcomes, demonstrating that joint contract functions can enhance project performance through fairness, trust, and relationship quality, particularly under conditions of uncertainty. In addition, methodological advances have provided more fine-grained tools for analyzing contract functions: Fu et al. (2023) [20] introduced a machine-coding model to capture the complexity of control, coordination, and adaptation, and Qi et al. (2024) [21] combined manual and machine coding to demonstrate how flexible adjustment, when paired with strong control, promotes risk transfer and reduces opportunism. Despite these advances, existing studies often examine the three functions in isolation or emphasize their joint effects, leaving limited understanding of how each function distinctly shapes contractors’ behavioral responses. Addressing this gap, the present study integrates control, coordination, and adaptation into a unified framework and links them explicitly to perfunctory and consummate performance behaviors.

2.2. Contractors’ Performance Behaviors

Contractors play an essential role in the execution of construction projects, and their performance behaviors directly influence project outcomes such as cost, schedule, quality, and stakeholder satisfaction [13]. In construction management research, contractor performance is no longer viewed solely in terms of meeting technical or contractual requirements [9]. Increasingly, attention has turned to the behavioral aspects of performance—how contractors engage with their responsibilities, collaborate with partners, and respond to project dynamics [22]. Scholars have identified a distinction between perfunctory performance behavior, characterized by performing only what is contractually required [10], and consummate performance behavior, which reflects a more active and committed approach, including voluntary cooperation, problem-solving, and contributions that support overall project success [11].
Understanding the drivers of these behavioral differences has become a central focus in recent research. Rather than attributing these behaviors solely to individual characteristics or motivations, scholars have increasingly emphasized the role of the broader project governance context. Features such as contract design, perceived fairness, interorganizational trust, and project-specific conditions all contribute to shaping how contractors approach their work—whether they merely comply with basic requirements or take a more engaged and cooperative stance [23,24,25].
Building on this line of inquiry, prior studies have examined how contract mechanisms shape behavioral responses. For example, Zhang et al. (2018) [6] highlighted the interactive effects of contracts and power on cooperation between owners and contractors, while Yan et al. (2020) [11] demonstrated that attitudes and perceived behavioral control significantly enhance consummate performance intentions. More recently, Lu et al. (2024) [9] and Guo et al. (2024) [7], drawing on contract function and regulatory focus theory, investigated how different contract configurations or complexity dimensions affect contractors’ discretionary behaviors. Complementing these perspectives, Cao and Yan (2025) [25] emphasized that contract flexibility can simultaneously shape perfunctory and consummate behaviors through the dual lenses of trust and control. Collectively, these studies indicate growing recognition that contract design plays a pivotal role in influencing contractor behavior.
While increasing attention has been given to identifying the antecedents of contractors’ performance behaviors, there remains a limited understanding of how different contract functions—particularly control, coordination, and adaptation—jointly influence these behavioral responses. Bridging this gap is essential for advancing contractual governance theory and improving construction project delivery through more targeted and behavior-sensitive contract design.

3. Hypothesis Development and Theoretical Model

3.1. Contract Control and Contractors’ Performance Behavior

Contract control is a widely used governance mechanism in construction projects to mitigate risks, define obligations, and ensure compliance [21], especially in contexts characterized by goal conflict and information asymmetry. While contract control is instrumental in ensuring task completion and delineating responsibilities [26], it faces various internal and external challenges that may lead to unintended consequences [27], such as perfunctory performance behavior [12]. This behavior is marked by contractors fulfilling only the basic obligations outlined in the contract, often with a lack of innovation, flexibility, or responsiveness to project dynamics [13]. High levels of contract control may signal distrust or overly punitive enforcement, leading contractors to focus narrowly on avoiding penalties rather than contributing constructively to the project [28]. This often induces a compliance mindset in which contractors prioritize risk avoidance and liability minimization over cooperative behavior, thereby increasing the likelihood of perfunctory performance behavior.
In construction projects, contract control typically specifies explicit acceptance standards, deadlines, and accountability mechanisms to deter opportunism and secure compliance under conditions of goal conflict and information asymmetry [7,8]. Yet an emphasis on control reorients attention toward verifiable, legally enforceable minima and away from discretionary, extra-role effort. Moreover, detailed control clauses can reinforce this tendency by communicating distrust [29]. When cooperation is attributed to coercion rather than goodwill, pro-social contributions decline, and adversarial contracting routines erode trust and collaboration [30,31]. As a result, contractors tend to adhere literally to contractual minima, with discretionary efforts correspondingly diminished [26]. In addition, when contracts serve as reference points for entitlements and obligations, they can reduce the urgency or motivation for contractors to strive for high performance, encouraging them do only what is strictly necessary [32], and thus withholding voluntary effort. In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1. 
Contract control positively affects contractors’ perfunctory performance behavior.
H2. 
Contract control negatively affects contractors’ consummate performance behavior.

3.2. Contract Coordination and Contractors’ Performance Behavior

Contract coordination reflects the extent to which contractual mechanisms facilitate communication, problem-solving, and synchronization of interdependent tasks among project stakeholders. In construction projects, which are characterized by high complexity, task interdependence, and dynamic conditions, contract coordination is essential for reducing ambiguity, enhancing communication, and promoting efficient execution [1]. However, despite its collaborative intent, due to contract coordination, contractors may consider and even exploit mechanisms [7], such as information-sharing protocols, dispute resolution procedures, and coordination clauses, as loopholes to reduce effort or shift blame, reinforcing perfunctory performance behavior. Coordination often implies joint decision-making and mutual dependence, which, although beneficial in theory, can reduce individual responsibility in practice [26]. Contractors may strategically rely on these mechanisms to defer decisions or delay actions, avoiding full accountability for their deliverables. In such contexts, contract coordination does not enhance engagement; instead, it becomes a tool for performing at the lowest acceptable standard.
Contract coordination mechanisms can also enhance consummate performance behavior by enabling real-time communication, joint problem-solving, and responsiveness to changing conditions [7,33]. Coordination facilitates the exchange of tacit knowledge, supports adaptive decision-making, and fosters a cooperative climate [8,26]. When contractors feel supported by a contract framework that encourages collaboration, they may be more likely to take initiative, contribute ideas, and go beyond their formal obligations. In this sense, contract coordination can serve as a platform for trust-building and value co-creation, motivating contractors to act in the broader interest of the project. In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H3. 
Contract coordination positively affects contractors’ perfunctory performance behavior.
H4. 
Contract coordination positively affects contractors’ consummate performance behavior.

3.3. Contract Adaptation and Contractors’ Performance Behavior

Contract adaptation mechanisms, such as change orders, variation clauses, and renegotiation terms, are essential for maintaining flexibility and continuity in construction projects, where complexity, uncertainty, and environmental volatility are common [7,34]. By institutionalizing rule-based responsiveness, adaptation provisions promote predictability and fairness in adjusting scope, time, and compensation, thereby reducing adversarial incentives to “play it safe” and meet only the contractual minimum. Specifically, clear adjustment rules enhance procedural and distributive fairness, strengthening contractors’ willingness to cooperate rather than default to literal compliance [9]. By offering “initiative insurance,” adaptation lowers the risk that proactive problem-solving will be penalized ex post [32], thereby making discretionary contributions more rational than minimal compliance. Codified change procedures also enable teams to address unforeseen issues promptly [35], which further curbs perfunctory performance behaviors.
At the same time, contract adaptation promotes collaborative problem-solving and long-term cooperation, encouraging contractors to stay actively engaged throughout the project lifecycle. This flexibility fosters consummate performance behavior, involving proactive, high-quality effort that goes beyond minimum obligations [9,26]. When contractors know that the contract allows for fair and responsive adjustments, they are more likely to fully commit even under uncertain conditions. Such adaptability not only lowers the perceived risk of being penalized for unforeseeable issues [36] but also signals fairness and openness to mutual problem-solving, thereby fostering trust—a key driver of consummate performance [37]. When contractors feel supported rather than constrained, they are more inclined to display discretionary effort, act in the project’s best interest, and demonstrate creativity in addressing challenges, leading to increased consummate performance behavior. In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H5. 
Contract adaptation negatively affects contractors’ perfunctory performance behavior.
H6. 
Contract adaptation positively affects contractors’ consummate performance behavior.
Drawing on the foregoing assumptions and discussions, the theoretical model is depicted in Figure 1. Building on the literature, this study proposes a conceptual framework that links the three core contract functions (control, coordination, and adaptation) to contractors’ dual performance behaviors (perfunctory and consummate). By introducing this behavioral distinction into contractual governance theory, the framework provides a novel lens that explains how different contractual mechanisms generate contrasting behavioral responses. Moreover, analyzing the three functions within a unified framework underscores their potential trade-offs and complementarities, extending beyond prior studies that either considered them separately or aggregated them without differentiation.

4. Methods

To better validate this research model, a mixed-methods approach was adopted, combining quantitative analysis with qualitative interviews [38]. First, to test the research hypothesis, a scale of relevant variables for this study was constructed. Secondly, we collected data through questionnaire surveys and tested the hypothesis of the model. Finally, in order to further validate the results of the empirical study and map the boundary conditions of the impact of contract functions on contractor performance behavior, qualitative studies, namely semi-structured interviews, were conducted.

4.1. Questionnaire Design

To ensure the scientificity and validity of indicator design, the measurement items of this study were primarily summarized from relevant literature, covering five constructs: contract control, contract coordination, contract adaptation, perfunctory performance behavior, and consummate performance behavior. On this basis, the questionnaire scale was further adapted from mature instruments used in prior studies, ensuring consistency with established measures while tailoring the items to the construction project context. As a first step, the draft instrument was refined through discussions with three academic researchers and five industry professionals specializing in construction contract management, which helped to improve the relevance, clarity, and practicality of the items. Subsequently, a pretest was conducted with 18 contractor project managers, who completed the questionnaire and provided feedback on item wording, interpretation, and survey length. Based on this feedback, ambiguous items were refined, redundant questions were removed, and formatting was optimized. In addition, to eliminate the potential influence of other factors, two control variables were set, namely prior cooperation relationship and future business prospects [6,10]. The specific measurement items are detailed in Table 1. In the quantitative phase, all items were measured using a five-point Likert-type scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” In contrast, the qualitative phase employed open-ended questions to elicit in-depth insights.

4.2. Data Collection

In the quantitative phase, data were collected via a questionnaire survey. Because this study addresses contract functions and contractors’ performance behaviors, the questionnaires were distributed to participants who met two criteria. First, participants must be contractor project management personnel (e.g., project managers, business managers, etc.) and have a clear understanding of contracts and contractor behavior. Second, participants must demonstrate a clear willingness to respond and be able to answer the questions sincerely. In addition to field research, this study also employed a snowball sampling method. After distributing the questionnaire to eligible participants, participants were asked to identify other eligible project members to expand the sample. To mitigate potential bias associated with snowball sampling, recruitment was conducted through diverse channels (government service centers, industry associations, and active project sites), and strict screening criteria were applied to verify respondent eligibility such as project role, company size, and contract experience. To ensure the generalizability of the findings, we diligently collected data from diverse regions and projects. The final sample came from various provinces in China, including Jilin, Heilongjiang, Guangdong, Hainan, and Shandong. Project types included tunnels, high-speed rail, highways, airports, and housing construction. Over a five-month period, a total of 381 questionnaires were collected. 36 responses were excluded due to logical inconsistencies, extremely short response times, and linear responses, resulting in a total of 345 valid responses. In addition, robustness checks were conducted by comparing early and late respondents, and no significant differences were observed. Table 2 provides detailed information on the participants.
Quantitative data can validate hypotheses, but it lacks sufficient explanation for these quantitative conclusions. Therefore, nine experts from the construction industry were invited to participate in semi-structured interviews. These qualitative interviews were intended primarily for triangulation and illustration, not for statistical generalization. To obtain more authentic and valid perspectives, they came from various sectors (such as government departments, construction companies, and engineering consulting firms). They had at least 10 years of practical project experience. Interviews were conducted in person or via Tencent Meeting (video conferencing software, Version 3.36.10(416)) and were recorded with the interviewee’s prior consent. Each interview lasted approximately 25 to 60 min. The experts’ extensive practical project experience can provide feedback and explanation for the results of the quantitative analysis above and offer specific observations on how contract features influence contractor performance in engineering practice, thereby expanding the scope of this study.

4.3. Common Method Bias (CMB)

To mitigate and assess the potential impact of CMB, participants were screened based on their knowledge of contract management and contract performance and were assured that any information they provided would remain confidential. CMB was tested using the Harman single-factor test recommended by [39]. The results showed that a single factor explained 25.33% of the information, far below the minimum acceptable level of 50%. Furthermore, a test for complete collinearity was conducted according to the recommendations of [40]. The variance factors (VIFs) for all variables ranged from 1.335 to 1.909, all well below 3.3. These results indicate that CMB was not prevalent in this study. The collected data were also analyzed for non-response bias [41]. The analysis employed a two-sample t-test, which revealed no statistically significant disparity between the outcomes of the two waves of survey data. Thus, non-response bias was absent.

5. Data Analysis and Findings

5.1. Reliability and Validity Test

The reliability and validity of the measurement model were evaluated, with results presented in Table 3 and Table 4. All item loadings were significant and exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.7. The Cronbach’s α and composite reliability (CR) values for all constructs surpassed the suggested criteria, indicating the high internal consistency and reliability of the measurement items [42]. Discriminant validity was established as the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) for each latent variable that exceeded the correlation values between the latent variables.

5.2. Model Fit and Hypothesis Testing

This study evaluated the structural model using the coefficient of determination (R2), out-of-sample predictive power (Q2), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). The R2 and Q2 values were calculated, as shown in Figure 2. The R2 values for PPB, and CPB were found to be 0.103 and 0.139, respectively. Although these values are modest, such levels of explained variance are common in behavioral studies where outcomes are shaped by multiple organizational and contextual factors [42]. This suggests that while contract functions significantly affect contractors’ performance behaviors, other governance and contextual variables (for example, trust, fairness, and project uncertainty) are also likely to play important roles. With regard to Q2, all values were above zero, indicating the predictive relevance of the model. To assess Q2 more accurately, PLSpredict was employed following the recommendations of [42]. A comparative analysis with a naive Linear Regression Model (LRM) benchmark revealed that the PLS model had lower prediction errors based on the root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE) for all dependent variable indicators. Furthermore, the squared values Q2predict values for the PLS model indicators were higher than those obtained using the LRM. Moreover, the SRMR value of the overall model was 0.062, which was less than the required value of 0.08, indicating that the overall model had a good fit.
This study used the bootstrap function in SmartPLS (Version 4.0), setting the size of the replicated subsample to 5000 to verify the hypothesized relationships in the model. Figure 2 and Table 5 present the details of the path analysis and the hypothesized results. The results indicate that contract control is positively associated with PPB (H1: β = 0.256, p < 0.001) and negatively associated with CPB (H2: β = −0.249, p < 0.01), supporting H1 and H2. Contract coordination is positively associated with PPB (H3: β = 0.194, p < 0.05) and CPB (H4: β = 0.245, p < 0.01), supporting H3 and H4. Similarly, contract adaptation was negatively correlated with PPB (H5: β = −0.198, p < 0.05) and positively correlated with CPB (H6: β = 0.290, p < 0.001), supporting H5 and H6. This study also examined the impact of control variables on PPB and CPB, finding that prior cooperation relationship was not significant, while future business prospects were.

5.3. Qualitative Analysis: Feedback and Explanations from Experts

To complement the quantitative findings, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with experienced professionals from construction firms, consulting companies, and government departments. Their insights confirmed the robustness of the hypothesized relationships while shedding light on underlying mechanisms and contextual boundary conditions.
In terms of contract control and performance behaviors, experts generally agreed that contract control provides a strong compliance signal but tends to induce perfunctory performance behaviors (H1). They noted that excessive monitoring and punitive clauses are often perceived as signs of distrust, reinforcing risk-averse compliance while simultaneously discouraging discretionary contributions. This aligns with prior research suggesting that formal controls can crowd out trust and voluntary cooperation [43]. Conversely, the negative effect of control on consummate behaviors (H2) was also recognized, as interviewees emphasized that contractors constrained by rigid clauses often lack motivation to go beyond minimal obligations.
In terms of contract coordination and performance behaviors, respondents confirmed the dual role of contract coordination. On the one hand, highly procedural coordination mechanisms sometimes provide opportunities for shirking responsibility and delaying decision-making, leading to perfunctory behaviors (H3). On the other hand, when coordination is transparent and encourages joint problem-solving, it fosters communication and enhances mutual understanding, thereby stimulating consummate performance (H4). These views resonate with [7], who highlighted the ambivalence of coordination in shaping relational behaviors.
In terms of contract adaptation and performance behaviors, experts consistently highlighted the positive role of adaptation clauses. By institutionalizing flexibility through fair renegotiation and adjustment procedures, contract adaptation was perceived to reduce adversarial incentives and support proactive engagement. This corroborates the survey finding that adaptation decreases perfunctory behavior (H5) while enhancing consummate behavior (H6). Interviewees emphasized that adaptation offers “initiative insurance,” assuring contractors that proactive problem-solving will not be penalized ex post, a finding consistent with [25].
Beyond validating the six hypotheses, interviewees also pointed out that the impact of contractual functions on contractor behaviors is not uniform but contingent upon the broader project environment. From the internal environment perspective, perceived fairness was repeatedly emphasized as a critical factor. When contract enforcement is perceived as equitable, the negative effects of rigid control can be alleviated, fostering a climate of trust that encourages contractors to go beyond minimal compliance. Similarly, a high level of trust within project teams amplifies the benefits of coordination and adaptation, enabling contractors to interpret formal mechanisms as supportive rather than restrictive. Organizational culture also plays an important role. In firms where collaboration and learning are valued, contractors are less likely to respond with perfunctory behaviors even when exposed to highly formalized clauses, since the cultural context reinforces proactive engagement.
From the external environment perspective, experts highlighted that environmental uncertainty—such as market volatility, regulatory change, or technological disruption—magnifies the importance of adaptation mechanisms. In such contexts, contractors depend on flexible adjustment clauses to remain engaged rather than reverting to risk-averse minimalism. Governmental oversight and policy environments were also noted as shaping behavioral responses: where compliance and accountability are heavily emphasized by authorities, control clauses may dominate contractors’ interpretations of contractual governance, sometimes at the expense of relational mechanisms. Furthermore, the intensity of market competition was regarded as another important boundary condition. In highly competitive settings, contractors tend to be more sensitive to contractual safeguards, which amplifies the role of control while potentially constraining the space for discretionary contributions. These insights illustrate that contractual functions should not be viewed as universally effective; rather, their influence on contractor behaviors is mediated by both internal organizational conditions and external environmental pressures.

6. Discussion and Implications

6.1. Discussion of Results

The empirical findings of this study provide a nuanced understanding of how different contractual functions shape contractor behaviors. Consistent with our hypotheses, contract control was found to increase perfunctory performance behavior while reducing consummate performance behavior. This result supports prior scholarship emphasizing that highly rigid contractual clauses tend to send signals of distrust and over-monitoring [44]. When contractors interpret control mechanisms primarily as punitive safeguards, they often adopt a compliance-oriented mindset, focusing on avoiding penalties rather than pursuing project success. This interpretation aligns with [6], who argued that excessive reliance on control mechanisms reinforces opportunistic orientations and diminishes cooperative intent. At the same time, our qualitative findings suggest that this negative effect may be mitigated if control is embedded in a broader climate of fairness and procedural justice, echoing the “control–trust complementarity” perspective highlighted in [45]. Thus, the results confirm the double-edged nature of control, functioning as a necessary safeguard but one that must be carefully balanced to avoid eroding proactive contributions.
The results regarding contract coordination reveal an interesting paradox. Quantitative analysis showed that coordination positively affects both perfunctory and consummate performance behaviors, suggesting that contractors can use coordination clauses in different ways depending on their strategic orientation. On one hand, coordination reduces ambiguity and provides mechanisms for dispute resolution, which can be exploited to shift responsibility or delay decisions, thereby encouraging perfunctory compliance. This echoes the findings of [46], who observed that coordination sometimes facilitates “loophole behavior” when contractors rely on joint-decision protocols to deflect accountability. On the other hand, when coordination is implemented with transparency and mutual commitment, it fosters communication, knowledge sharing, and joint problem-solving, which stimulates consummate behaviors. This is consistent with [47], who showed that collaborative attitudes and social value orientations amplify the positive potential of coordination mechanisms. From a theoretical perspective, this dual effect can be explained through organizational information processing theory and relational governance theory. Coordination mechanisms provide additional information-processing capacity that reduces uncertainty, thereby supporting compliance with baseline tasks. At the same time, they cultivate relational norms of reciprocity and mutual adjustment, which create conditions for voluntary cooperation. The coexistence of these two pathways illustrates that coordination functions ambivalently, shifting between compliance-oriented and collaboration-oriented outcomes depending on how information flows and relational expectations are managed within the project context. As a boundary-spanning mechanism, coordination simultaneously fulfills informational and relational needs, which helps contractual governance theory explain why the same function may yield divergent behavioral outcomes under different project conditions.
The role of contract adaptation emerged as particularly important in explaining contractor behaviors. Adaptation was found to significantly reduce perfunctory behavior and enhance consummate behavior, confirming its value as a mechanism for maintaining fairness and flexibility in dynamic environments. Experts repeatedly highlighted that adaptation provides “initiative insurance,” reassuring contractors that discretionary efforts will not be penalized when conditions change unexpectedly. This finding resonates with [48,49], who emphasized that adaptation provisions can strengthen trust and reduce adversarial tendencies by institutionalizing fairness in adjustment processes. Furthermore, the consistent positive effect of adaptation in both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggests that it may be the most robust contractual function for encouraging long-term cooperation and proactive engagement in construction projects. This is particularly relevant in the Chinese construction industry, where projects are frequently exposed to environmental volatility and scope changes, making adaptive mechanisms indispensable.
Beyond the hypothesized relationships, the analysis of control variables provides further insights into contractor behaviors. Interestingly, the results show that prior cooperation relationships did not significantly influence contractor behaviors, whereas future business prospects exerted a strong effect on consummate behavior. This indicates that contractors are primarily forward-looking and motivated by prospective opportunities rather than by past ties. Such a result contrasts with [8], who found that prior relational ties significantly enhanced trust and performance in BIM-enabled projects. One possible explanation is that the Chinese construction market is characterized by relatively high turnover and project-specific contracting, which limits the enduring influence of historical relationships. Contractors may not interpret past cooperation as a guarantee of future collaboration, thus reducing its behavioral relevance. In contrast, the anticipation of future business prospects directly affects reputation concerns and long-term incentives, making it a more powerful determinant of consummate contributions. This highlights the relational and dynamic nature of contractor motivation, where reputation-building and forward-looking considerations outweigh historical experience.
Taken together, these findings contribute to a more refined understanding of contractual governance. They demonstrate that contractual functions do not exert uniform effects; instead, their behavioral consequences vary depending on the nature of the function, the interpretive context, and the broader governance environment. Control appears as a double-edged sword, coordination as a paradoxical mechanism, and adaptation as a consistently enabling force. Moreover, the asymmetry between prior cooperation and future prospects underscores the importance of forward-looking incentives in shaping contractor engagement. These insights not only extend contractual governance theory but also provide a richer explanation of why the same contractual design can produce divergent behavioral outcomes across projects and contexts.

6.2. Theoretical Contribution

This study contributes to the literature on contractual governance in several ways. First, it explicitly links multifunctional contract design (control, coordination, and adaptation) with dual contractor behaviors (perfunctory vs. consummate), extending prior research that has typically examined contract functions in isolation. Second, by identifying paradoxical effects—particularly the ambivalence of control and coordination—it advances a more balanced view of contracts as “double-edged swords” in shaping behaviors [50]. Third, by integrating internal (fairness, trust, culture) and external (uncertainty, regulation, business prospects) moderators, this research highlights boundary conditions that enrich the contextualization of governance theory. Finally, methodologically, the combination of PLS-SEM with expert interviews exemplifies a mixed-methods approach that enhances both explanatory rigor and contextual richness, responding to calls for deeper integration of quantitative and qualitative insights in project governance research.

6.3. Practical Implications

The findings of this study have several practical implications for contract designers, project owners, and contractors. One key insight is that control clauses, although indispensable for ensuring baseline compliance, should be crafted in ways that avoid sending signals of excessive distrust [51,52]. For example, rather than relying solely on punitive sanctions and intensive monitoring, owners could combine control provisions with mechanisms that highlight procedural fairness—such as transparent inspection standards or dispute-resolution protocols. By doing so, compliance is secured without discouraging contractors from contributing discretionary effort. The results also show that coordination mechanisms require careful calibration. If coordination clauses only formalize responsibilities without clarifying accountability, contractors may strategically use them to shift blame or delay decisions. In practice, this means project managers should complement coordination clauses with explicit accountability frameworks, such as designated responsibility matrices or joint decision-making committees with clearly defined authority. At the same time, digital platforms (e.g., BIM-based communication systems) can be leveraged to make coordination more transparent, which fosters trust and encourages contractors to take initiative in problem-solving [53]. Adaptation provisions emerged as the most effective tools for sustaining proactive engagement under uncertain conditions [54]. For project owners, this suggests that flexible renegotiation clauses, change-order procedures, and fair risk-sharing arrangements should be embedded explicitly in contracts [55]. For example, contracts could stipulate pre-agreed adjustment mechanisms for price fluctuations or unforeseen geological conditions, ensuring that contractors do not fear being penalized for circumstances beyond their control. This not only reduces risk-averse tendencies but also encourages contractors to address problems proactively to maintain project continuity.
Another practical implication lies in the role of forward-looking incentives. Contractors were found to be more motivated by the prospect of future collaboration than by prior cooperation experiences. For owners, this implies that contracts should be framed within a broader relational strategy. Explicitly linking current performance evaluations to the likelihood of future bidding opportunities, preferred-partner status, or long-term framework agreements can serve as strong motivators for consummate behaviors. In other words, emphasizing continuity and reputation in contractor selection processes is as important as the immediate legal safeguards embedded in the contract [56]. Taken together, these implications suggest that contracts should be designed not merely as instruments of legal enforcement but as governance tools that actively shape behavior. A practical balance can be achieved by combining control with fairness, coupling coordination with accountability and transparency, embedding flexible adaptation clauses, and explicitly signaling long-term cooperation opportunities. Such a balanced approach transforms contracts from static documents into dynamic frameworks that promote trust, collaboration, and proactive engagement throughout the project lifecycle.

7. Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research

This study examined the behavioral consequences of contract functions in the construction industry, focusing on how control, coordination, and adaptation influence perfunctory and consummate contractor behaviors. The mixed-methods approach validated six hypotheses and revealed that control exerts a compliance–crowding-out effect, coordination plays a paradoxical role, and adaptation consistently promotes proactive engagement. The analysis further demonstrated that while prior cooperation relationships are not decisive, future business prospects strongly motivate consummate contributions. This study contributes to the refinement of contractual governance theory by clarifying how different contract functions shape both perfunctory and consummate performance behaviors, and it provides practical guidance for designing contracts that are explicitly oriented toward shaping contractor behaviors through the calibrated use of control, coordination, and adaptation mechanisms.
Nonetheless, several limitations of this study should be acknowledged, which at the same time open up promising directions for future research. First, the data were collected exclusively from Chinese construction projects. Although this context provides valuable insights given China’s highly dynamic project environment, it raises questions about the cross-cultural generalizability of the findings. Contractual governance mechanisms may operate differently in institutional environments with stronger rule-of-law traditions or in markets where relational governance dominates. Future studies could therefore adopt comparative designs across different cultural or institutional settings to examine whether the behavioral consequences of contract functions identified here hold universally or vary contextually. Second, while this research identified several important moderating factors (such as trust, fairness, and environmental uncertainty), these were captured qualitatively rather than tested quantitatively. Their contingent effects therefore remain suggestive rather than conclusive. To strengthen the evidence base, future studies could explicitly incorporate these moderators into large-scale survey models or experimental designs, thereby providing more rigorous tests of their boundary conditions. For instance, testing how environmental uncertainty magnifies the role of adaptation clauses, or how fairness perceptions buffer the negative impact of control, would refine and extend contractual governance theory. Third, the study employed a cross-sectional design, which restricts the ability to capture how contractor behaviors evolve over the project lifecycle. Construction projects are inherently dynamic, and contractors may initially adopt perfunctory compliance but later shift toward consummate engagement as trust develops and relational incentives accumulate. Longitudinal research designs, such as panel surveys or diary studies, would enable a more nuanced understanding of these behavioral trajectories and their interplay with evolving contractual governance mechanisms. Finally, although this study employed a mixed-methods design that combined quantitative and qualitative evidence, future work could extend methodological diversity even further by using case studies, contract text mining, or computational modeling. Such approaches would complement survey-based analyses and generate richer insights into how formal clauses interact with informal practices in shaping contractor behaviors.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, M.Y., Y.X. and H.C.; methodology, M.Y. and Y.X.; software, M.Y. and Y.X.; validation, M.Y. and J.W.; formal analysis, M.Y. and Y.X.; investigation, M.Y. and J.W.; resources, J.W. and H.C.; data curation, M.Y. and J.W.; writing—original draft preparation, M.Y. and Y.X.; writing—review and editing, M.Y., Y.X. and H.C.; supervision, H.C.; project administration, Y.X.; funding acquisition, Y.X. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research is partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72461006), Jilin Provincial Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 2024J12), Hainan Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 525RC706 and 723QN217).

Institutional Review Board Statement

Ethics Approval waived because the research involved expert consultations and surveys that focused exclusively on professional insights into contract functions and contractor performance behaviors. No sensitive personal data or identifying information was collected.

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement

The data used to support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.

Conflicts of Interest

Author Jinjian Wu is employed by the China Construction Eighth Engineering Division Corp., Ltd. The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Buildings 15 03438 g001
Figure 1. Theoretical model.
Figure 1. Theoretical model.
Buildings 15 03438 g001
Buildings 15 03438 g002
Figure 2. Model path coefficient result (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; N.S. = non-significant).
Figure 2. Model path coefficient result (*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; N.S. = non-significant).
Buildings 15 03438 g002
Table 1. Constructs and items.
Table 1. Constructs and items.
ConstructItemsSources
Contract control
(CT)		CT1: The contract defines the rights of both parties specifically.[3,7]
CT2: The contract specifically stipulates the rights entitled to one party when the other party breaches the contract.
CT3: The contract specifically stipulates provisions on early termination after breaching the contract.
CT4: The contract specifically stipulates how the party awarding the contract monitors the contractor.
Contract coordination
(CD)		CD1: The contract provides detailed technical specifications and drawings.[3,7]
CD2: The contract specifically stipulates the quality acceptance procedures.
CD3: The contract specifically stipulates the personnel qualifications or dispatching issues.
CD4: The contract defines the division of labor of both parties specifically.
Contract adaptation
(CA)		CA1: The contract specifically stipulates the adjustments due to the changes in cost.[3,7]
CA2: The contract specifically stipulates the adjustments due to the changes in exchange rates.
CA3: The contract specifically stipulates the handling procedures when climatic conditions, against which an experienced contractor could not reasonably have been expected to react, arises.
CA4: The contract specifically stipulates the handling procedures when geological conditions, against which an experienced contractor could not reasonably have been expected to react, arise.
Perfunctory performance behavior
(PPB)		PPB1: The contractor can carry out the construction according to the construction drawings and standard specifications provided by the employer.[10,13]
PPB2: The contractor can carry out the construction according to the contract requirements or agreement.
PPB3: The contractor can complete all the ancillary tasks required by the project.
PPB4: The contractor can complete the construction tasks stipulated in the contract or agreement.
Consummate performance behavior
(CPB)		CPB1: The contractor will volunteer to make an extra effort for the project.[10,13]
CPB2: The contractor will take the initiative to put forward reasonable proposals for the employer.
CPB3: The contractor will help the relevant participants to adapt to the construction site.
CPB4: The contractor will voluntarily inform the employer of the drawings or the errors or omissions in the contract.
CPB5: The contractor will actively control and internalize project risks and reflow the risk back to the employer.
Table 2. Demographic information (N = 345).
Table 2. Demographic information (N = 345).
CharacteristicCount%
Educational levelDoctor’s degree123.48
Master’s degree10129.28
Bachelor’s degree22464.93
College degree or below82.32
Working experience
(years)		<5339.57
5–1017149.57
10–159226.67
≥154914.20
Job titleGeneral manager195.51
Project manager7521.74
Site manager7220.87
Chief engineer6017.39
Business manager9226.67
Other managers277.83
Table 3. Reliability and validity test.
Table 3. Reliability and validity test.
Latent VariableItemFactor LoadingαCRAVE
CTCT10.8560.8000.8680.622
CT20.893
CT30.873
CT40.902
CDCD10.7830.7470.8390.565
CD20.766
CD30.817
CD40.838
CACA10.8400.7490.8410.570
CA20.885
CA30.868
CA40.819
PPBPPB10.8870.7830.8580.576
PPB20.962
PPB30.914
PPB40.932
CPBCPB10.7820.8160.8710.602
CPB20.756
CPB30.758
CPB40.753
CPB50.786
Table 4. Fornell-Larcker criterion.
Table 4. Fornell-Larcker criterion.
CTCDCAPPBCPB
CT0.788————
CD0.6060.752———
CA0.6630.6330.755——
PPB0.2510.2990.1050.776—
CPB0.0790.2690.2680.0990.759
Table 5. Hypothesis test results.
Table 5. Hypothesis test results.
HypothesisPathCoefficient (β)T Statisticsp-ValueResult
H1CT→PPB0.2563.8110.000Supported
H2CT→CPB−0.2492.7260.006Supported
H3CD→PPB0.1942.4010.016Supported
H4CD→CPB0.2453.3470.001Supported
H5CA→PPB−0.1982.4670.014Supported
H6CA→CPB0.2903.5420.000Supported
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Yang, M.; Chen, H.; Xu, Y.; Wu, J. The Impact of Contract Functions on Contractors’ Performance Behaviors: A Mixed-Methods Approach. Buildings 2025, 15, 3438. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings15193438

AMA Style

Yang M, Chen H, Xu Y, Wu J. The Impact of Contract Functions on Contractors’ Performance Behaviors: A Mixed-Methods Approach. Buildings. 2025; 15(19):3438. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings15193438

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yang, Mingzhu, Haitao Chen, Yongshun Xu, and Jinjian Wu. 2025. "The Impact of Contract Functions on Contractors’ Performance Behaviors: A Mixed-Methods Approach" Buildings 15, no. 19: 3438. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings15193438

APA Style

Yang, M., Chen, H., Xu, Y., & Wu, J. (2025). The Impact of Contract Functions on Contractors’ Performance Behaviors: A Mixed-Methods Approach. Buildings, 15(19), 3438. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings15193438

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