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Article

Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision

1
School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, No. 2006, Xiyuan Ave, West Hi-Tech Zone, Chengdu 611731, China
2
Glasgow College, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, No. 2006, Xiyuan Ave, West Hi-Tech Zone, Chengdu 611731, China
3
Department of Economics and Finance, Hang Seng University of Hong Kong, Hang Shin Link, Siu Lek Yuen, Shatin, Hong Kong, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Symmetry 2025, 17(11), 1884; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17111884
Submission received: 1 September 2025 / Revised: 27 October 2025 / Accepted: 4 November 2025 / Published: 5 November 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Symmetry/Asymmetry in Operations Research)

Abstract

With the advent of the digital age, platform ecosystems have emerged as a crucial organizational form. Focusing on innovation-oriented platforms where collaborative innovation is paramount, this study developed a two-stage principal–agent model to examine how a platform enterprise’s value preference parameter governs collaborative outcomes. Our framework demonstrates that this parameter systematically regulates the endogenous portfolio of incentives and supervision, determining governance effectiveness and value co-creation outcomes in platform ecosystems. Further analysis revealed that as the platform enterprise deepens its understanding of an embedded enterprise’s capabilities, its governance mode spontaneously transitions from supervision-intensive to incentive-intensive, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of value creation. These findings provide a principled basis for designing dynamic governance mechanisms and advance the platform governance literature by establishing the central role of the platform enterprise’s value preference parameter in coordinating endogenous governance instruments.
Keywords: value co-creation; dynamic incentive mechanisms; supervision; innovation-oriented platform ecosystem; symmetry/asymmetry value co-creation; dynamic incentive mechanisms; supervision; innovation-oriented platform ecosystem; symmetry/asymmetry

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MDPI and ACS Style

Wang, X.; Lei, M.; Wang, D.; Cao, J. Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision. Symmetry 2025, 17, 1884. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17111884

AMA Style

Wang X, Lei M, Wang D, Cao J. Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision. Symmetry. 2025; 17(11):1884. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17111884

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wang, Xiaoming, Mengxi Lei, Diyuan Wang, and Junyi Cao. 2025. "Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision" Symmetry 17, no. 11: 1884. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17111884

APA Style

Wang, X., Lei, M., Wang, D., & Cao, J. (2025). Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision. Symmetry, 17(11), 1884. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17111884

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