Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Shapley Value Approach and TOT Project Overview and Application Research
2.1. Shapley Value
2.2. Research on TOT Project Revenue Allocation
2.3. Application of Shapley Value Method in TOT Project
3. Basic Definition and Revenue Sharing Model Construction of TOT Project
3.1. Basic Definition
3.1.1. Definition 1
3.1.2. Definition 2
3.1.3. Definition 3
3.1.4. Definition 4
3.2. Construction of Revenue Sharing Model for TOT Projects
3.2.1. Fuzzy Payment Value and Shapley Value of TOT Project based on Triangular Fuzzy Structure Element
3.2.2. Construction of TOT Project RSM Based on Initial Correction Coefficient and Fuzzy Payment
3.3. Execution Degree
4. Case Analysis of TOT Project
4.1. Basic Situation of the Case
4.2. Revenue Sharing of TOT Projects Based on Modified Shapley Value
4.2.1. Revenue Sharing of TOT Projects Based on Classical Shapley Value
4.2.2. Revenue Sharing of Government and Private Partner Based on Fuzzy Payment
4.2.3. Revenue Sharing and Membership Functions of Government and Private Partner Based on Modified Shapley Value
5. Result Discussion
5.1. Project Overview and Parameter Determination
5.2. The Effect of the Initial Correction Coefficient on the Revenue Sharing of Both Parties
5.2.1. Results Comparison of Classical Shapley Value and Shapley Value Improved by Initial Correction Coefficient
5.2.2. Results Comparison of Shapley Value with Fuzzy Payment and Modified Shapley Value
5.3. The Effect of Fuzzy Payment on the Expected Revenue of TOT Projects and the Shapley Value of Both Parties
5.3.1. Results Comparison of Classical Shapley Value and Shapley Value with Fuzzy Payment
5.3.2. Results Comparison of Shapley Value Improved by Initial Correction Coefficient and Modified Shapley Value
5.4. Potential Application of the RSM Based on Modified Shapley Value
5.5. Comparison of RSMs Based the Modified Shapley Value with Methods of References
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Influence Factor | Weighting | All Factors Include Indicators | Proportion |
---|---|---|---|
Risk control capability | 0.42 | Soundness of risk management system | 0.32 |
Effectiveness of risk measures | 0.41 | ||
Control experience of similar risks | 0.27 | ||
Risk tolerance | 0.28 | Risk Reserve Ratio | 0.28 |
Profitability | 0.42 | ||
Asset liability ratio | 0.30 | ||
Willingness to take risks | 0.30 | Risk preference | 0.21 |
Expected return / risk management cost of risk | 0.37 | ||
Control awareness | 0.20 | ||
Investment proportion | 0.22 |
Influence Factor | All Factors Include Indicators | Government Side | Private Party |
---|---|---|---|
Risk control capability | Soundness of risk management system | 35 | 65 |
Effectiveness of risk measures | 40 | 60 | |
Control experience of similar risks | 30 | 70 | |
Risk tolerance | Risk Reserve Ratio | 30 | 70 |
Profitability | 20 | 80 | |
Asset liability ratio | 30 | 70 | |
Willingness to take risks | Risk preference | 50 | 50 |
Expected return / risk management cost of risk | 30 | 70 | |
Control awareness | 50 | 50 | |
Investment proportion | 48 | 52 |
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Du, Y.; Fang, J.; Zhang, J.; Hu, J. Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value. Symmetry 2020, 12, 882. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12060882
Du Y, Fang J, Zhang J, Hu J. Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value. Symmetry. 2020; 12(6):882. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12060882
Chicago/Turabian StyleDu, Yanhua, Jun Fang, Jingxiao Zhang, and Jun Hu. 2020. "Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value" Symmetry 12, no. 6: 882. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12060882