# Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value

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## Abstract

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## 1. Introduction

## 2. Shapley Value Approach and TOT Project Overview and Application Research

#### 2.1. Shapley Value

#### 2.2. Research on TOT Project Revenue Allocation

#### 2.3. Application of Shapley Value Method in TOT Project

## 3. Basic Definition and Revenue Sharing Model Construction of TOT Project

#### 3.1. Basic Definition

#### 3.1.1. Definition 1

#### 3.1.2. Definition 2

#### 3.1.3. Definition 3

#### 3.1.4. Definition 4

#### 3.2. Construction of Revenue Sharing Model for TOT Projects

#### 3.2.1. Fuzzy Payment Value and Shapley Value of TOT Project based on Triangular Fuzzy Structure Element

#### 3.2.2. Construction of TOT Project RSM Based on Initial Correction Coefficient and Fuzzy Payment

#### 3.3. Execution Degree

## 4. Case Analysis of TOT Project

#### 4.1. Basic Situation of the Case

#### 4.2. Revenue Sharing of TOT Projects Based on Modified Shapley Value

#### 4.2.1. Revenue Sharing of TOT Projects Based on Classical Shapley Value

#### 4.2.2. Revenue Sharing of Government and Private Partner Based on Fuzzy Payment

#### 4.2.3. Revenue Sharing and Membership Functions of Government and Private Partner Based on Modified Shapley Value

## 5. Result Discussion

#### 5.1. Project Overview and Parameter Determination

#### 5.2. The Effect of the Initial Correction Coefficient on the Revenue Sharing of Both Parties

#### 5.2.1. Results Comparison of Classical Shapley Value and Shapley Value Improved by Initial Correction Coefficient

#### 5.2.2. Results Comparison of Shapley Value with Fuzzy Payment and Modified Shapley Value

#### 5.3. The Effect of Fuzzy Payment on the Expected Revenue of TOT Projects and the Shapley Value of Both Parties

#### 5.3.1. Results Comparison of Classical Shapley Value and Shapley Value with Fuzzy Payment

#### 5.3.2. Results Comparison of Shapley Value Improved by Initial Correction Coefficient and Modified Shapley Value

#### 5.4. Potential Application of the RSM Based on Modified Shapley Value

#### 5.5. Comparison of RSMs Based the Modified Shapley Value with Methods of References

## 6. Conclusions

## Author Contributions

## Funding

## Conflicts of Interest

## References

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**Figure 1.**Comparison of the revenue of the Transfer-Operate-Transfer (TOT) project and the revenue sharing of the government and private partner considering the initial correction coefficient and without considering the initial correction coefficient Unit: million yuan.

**Figure 3.**Relation diagram between the government fuzzy revenue sharing and its membership function.

**Figure 4.**Relation diagram between the fuzzy revenue sharing of the private partner and its membership function.

**Figure 5.**Relation diagram between fuzzy revenue-sharing ratio (RSR) of the government and its membership function.

Influence Factor | Weighting | All Factors Include Indicators | Proportion |
---|---|---|---|

Risk control capability | 0.42 | Soundness of risk management system | 0.32 |

Effectiveness of risk measures | 0.41 | ||

Control experience of similar risks | 0.27 | ||

Risk tolerance | 0.28 | Risk Reserve Ratio | 0.28 |

Profitability | 0.42 | ||

Asset liability ratio | 0.30 | ||

Willingness to take risks | 0.30 | Risk preference | 0.21 |

Expected return / risk management cost of risk | 0.37 | ||

Control awareness | 0.20 | ||

Investment proportion | 0.22 |

Influence Factor | All Factors Include Indicators | Government Side | Private Party |
---|---|---|---|

Risk control capability | Soundness of risk management system | 35 | 65 |

Effectiveness of risk measures | 40 | 60 | |

Control experience of similar risks | 30 | 70 | |

Risk tolerance | Risk Reserve Ratio | 30 | 70 |

Profitability | 20 | 80 | |

Asset liability ratio | 30 | 70 | |

Willingness to take risks | Risk preference | 50 | 50 |

Expected return / risk management cost of risk | 30 | 70 | |

Control awareness | 50 | 50 | |

Investment proportion | 48 | 52 |

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

Du, Y.; Fang, J.; Zhang, J.; Hu, J.
Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value. *Symmetry* **2020**, *12*, 882.
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12060882

**AMA Style**

Du Y, Fang J, Zhang J, Hu J.
Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value. *Symmetry*. 2020; 12(6):882.
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12060882

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Du, Yanhua, Jun Fang, Jingxiao Zhang, and Jun Hu.
2020. "Revenue Sharing of a TOT Project in China Based on Modified Shapley Value" *Symmetry* 12, no. 6: 882.
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym12060882