1. Introduction
In recent years, extreme weather events and slow-onset environmental pressures have begun reshaping the global risk landscape with unprecedented scope and intensity [
1,
2]. Continuous assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs) indicate that climate risk has transcended the singular realm of environmental science. It has evolved into a core variable that threatens the sustainable development of human society and induces systemic crises [
3]. As the world’s largest developing country, China faces particularly severe climate challenges. In 2024, for instance, extreme weather and natural disasters affected over 94.13 million people nationwide, causing direct economic losses of 401.11 billion RMB. These staggering statistics not only reflect substantial macroeconomic tolls but also expose the profound vulnerability of critical urban infrastructure to extreme shocks, directly leading to supply chain disruptions and a sharp decline in the stability of public service provision [
4,
5]. With its high complexity and destructive power, climate risk poses a systemic threat to social governance in the modernization process. Consequently, the Chinese government has placed a high priority on climate adaptation and risk management. From integrating adaptation concepts into macro-level top design via the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035, to promoting the transition toward risk-driven early warning models in the Action Plan for Enhancing Meteorological Disaster Risk Early Warning Capabilities (2025–2027), constructing a forward-looking, proactive, and efficient climate risk management framework has become a central agenda for enhancing national climate resilience and ensuring sustainable development.
Against this macro backdrop, large cities—complex giant systems with highly concentrated populations, capital, and critical infrastructure—constitute key spatial nodes for absorbing risk shocks and exploring adaptive governance. High-density built environments and highly interconnected urban networks give rise to significant cascading effects, making local climate disturbances highly susceptible to evolving into systemic failures of public service systems [
6,
7]. The urban resilience literature provides an important theoretical foundation for understanding these challenges. Urban resilience is commonly understood as the capacity of urban systems to absorb disturbances, reorganize resources, and maintain essential functions under external shocks [
8]. Related studies have emphasized that resilience is multidimensional, involving social, economic, institutional, infrastructural, and community capacities [
9]. From this perspective, public service provision is a key dimension of urban resilience because education, healthcare, transportation, communication, and social security systems directly determine whether cities can maintain service continuity during and after climate-related disruptions. Recent climate assessments of cities, settlements, and key infrastructure further show that urban climate risk emerges from the interaction between climate hazards, infrastructure exposure, governance capacity, and social vulnerability [
10]. However, existing studies on urban resilience have paid relatively more attention to infrastructure robustness, disaster recovery, and community adaptation, while the fiscal, industrial, and knowledge-based channels through which climate risk affects public service provision remain insufficiently examined. Traditional literature frequently analyzes the drivers of public service provision using classical frameworks: scale, technology, and structural effects. Specifically, regarding scale effects, traditional urban economics posits that the agglomeration of population and economic activities generates significant economies of scale, thereby improving per capita supply efficiency and the spatial coverage of public services by amortizing high fixed infrastructure costs [
11,
12]. Regarding the effects of technology, existing studies emphasize that advances in information technology and digital government can dismantle bureaucratic information silos. By reducing administrative transaction costs and mitigating information asymmetry, technology reshapes the delivery process and optimizes the precision of public good allocation [
13,
14]. Structurally, classical public economics and polycentric governance theories suggest that fiscal decentralization, flattened governance architectures, and industrial upgrading can more flexibly align with heterogeneous local preferences, driving a systemic leap in public service quality from both the institutional and factor-supply sides [
15,
16].
Previous research has emphasized that mitigation and adaptation should not be treated as isolated policy domains, because climate policies may generate both synergies and trade-offs across development objectives [
17]. At the urban scale, mitigation measures may bring long-term environmental and resilience co-benefits, but they may also create short- to medium-term adjustment pressures for cities with carbon-intensive economic structures [
18]. These pressures may affect fiscal capacity, industrial restructuring, innovation incentives, and ultimately the ability of local governments to sustain public service provision. However, at the dual intersection of intensifying climate change and digital governance transformation, these existing theoretical perspectives fall short in fully capturing the novel, complex constraints facing public service systems in large cities. Specifically, the current literature requires deepening in three critical areas. First, studies on climate risk and urban systems have mainly emphasized physical hazards, infrastructure damage, disaster recovery, and economic losses, while less attention has been paid to how different dimensions of climate risk are associated with the continuity of public service provision [
19,
20]. Second, although the distinction between physical and transition climate risks has been widely discussed in climate-finance and sustainability research, it has rarely been incorporated into city-level analyses of public service systems. This limits our understanding of whether precipitation-related physical risk and carbon-related structural transition pressure are linked to public service provision through different economic and governance-related channels. Third, existing studies on digital governance and smart cities have often emphasized administrative efficiency, service delivery, or technological empowerment, but have provided relatively limited quantitative evidence on whether digital-governance-related conditions shape the relationship between climate risk and public service provision [
21,
22]. These gaps motivate this study to examine climate risk, public service provision, and digital governance within an integrated urban resilience framework.
To bridge these theoretical gaps, this study utilizes multi-source heterogeneous panel data from large Chinese cities to systematically examine the relationship between climate risk and public service provision and its underlying mechanisms. This study focuses on the following core questions: (1) How are physical and transition climate risks associated with urban public service provision capacities? (2) Are the associations between different types of climate risk and public service provision consistent with differentiated mechanism channels? (3) Under different geographical locations and city-scale characteristics, what asymmetric spatial heterogeneity do these climate shocks exhibit? (4) Can digital governance capacity—proxied in this study by open public data and AI-related development—condition the relationship between climate risk and public service provision? These indicators are used as observable city-level proxies for the theoretical constructs examined in this study, and their definitions, data sources, and measurement boundaries are further explained in
Section 3.3.
The contributions of this paper are reflected in three main aspects. First, this study brings the distinction between physical and transition climate risks into the analysis of urban public service provision. Rather than treating climate risk as a homogeneous external pressure, it examines whether precipitation-related physical risk and carbon-related structural transition pressure are associated with public service provision through different mechanism channels. This helps extend climate-risk research from general economic and infrastructure outcomes to the continuity of multidimensional public service systems. Second, this study links climate risk to public service provision through three city-level channels: entrepreneurial vitality, knowledge spillovers, and industrial structure upgrading. These channels connect climate-related pressures with the fiscal, innovation, and structural conditions that support public service provision. In this sense, the study provides a more specific empirical framework for understanding how urban resilience is shaped not only by infrastructure robustness and disaster recovery, but also by the economic and knowledge conditions underlying public service capacity. Third, this study incorporates digital governance into the climate risk–public service relationship as a conditional governance capacity. By operationalizing digital governance through AI-related development and public data openness, the analysis examines whether technological and institutional digital conditions are associated with differences in the climate risk–public service relationship. This provides empirical evidence on the role of digital governance in urban climate adaptation while also recognizing that such effects depend on broader institutional and technological conditions. In addition, the analysis of coastal–inland differences and city-scale heterogeneity connects the findings to land-use planning concerns, including risk-sensitive zoning, climate-adaptive infrastructure layout, and the spatial allocation of critical public service facilities.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 elaborates on the theoretical foundation and research hypotheses;
Section 3 details the research design and data sources;
Section 4 reports the empirical results and robustness checks;
Section 5 further explores the moderating role of digital governance; and
Section 6 concludes with policy implications.
5. Further Analysis: The Moderating Role of Digital Governance
Digital governance is introduced in this study not merely as a standalone policy instrument, but as a governance capacity that conditions how climate-related shocks are translated into public service outcomes. In this sense, digital governance may operate as a moderating mechanism because it affects the timeliness of information acquisition, the efficiency of cross-departmental coordination, and the adaptability of public decision-making under risk. At the same time, we acknowledge that digital governance can also function as a broader policy lever in urban adaptation. Critical studies of smart urbanism have shown that big data and real-time urban technologies may generate new governance risks, including technocratic decision-making, technological lock-in, privacy concerns, and uneven power relations in urban management [
75]. In the public sector, AI applications may also face challenges related to transparency, accountability, fairness, implementation capacity, and institutional oversight [
76]. If these issues are not properly addressed, digital tools may reinforce existing inequalities across districts, social groups, or cities with different administrative and fiscal capacities. Therefore, the role of digital governance in this study should be understood not as automatic technological empowerment, but as a conditional governance capacity whose effectiveness depends on institutional safeguards, data quality, transparency, and inclusive access.
To capture this dual character in an empirically tractable manner, this study operationalizes digital governance through two complementary city-level dimensions. The first is AI-related development, which reflects the technological infrastructure and intelligent analytical capacity that may strengthen risk sensing, prediction, and resource allocation. The second is public data openness, which reflects the institutionalized capacity for information sharing, interdepartmental coordination, and collaborative governance. For analytical convenience, these two dimensions are further interpreted as “hard resilience” and “soft resilience,” respectively.
5.1. The Non-Linear Moderation of “Hard Resilience”: A Threshold Effect Test Based on Artificial Intelligence
To empirically examine the moderating effect of “hard resilience,” this study draws on Wang et al. (2022) [
77]. It uses Chinese industrial and commercial enterprise registration data to quantify the AI industry’s development at the city level. Specifically, enterprises whose business scope includes core AI technologies (e.g., chips, image recognition, natural language processing) are defined as AI enterprises, and a city-level panel dataset is constructed from 2008 to 2019. The natural logarithm of the annual number of AI enterprises in a city is used as a proxy to measure urban “hard resilience” (Ai). This measure captures the local AI-related industrial base and technological application potential. Given the potential nonlinearity, the panel threshold regression model proposed by Hansen (1999) [
78] is employed for analysis. The threshold regression is estimated using the xthreg command in Stata/MP 17.0. In this framework, the threshold values are not specified manually; instead, they are endogenously estimated from the sample through a grid-search procedure that identifies the threshold points associated with the lowest residual sum of squares. Taking a double-threshold model as an example, the model is specified as follows:
where
is the threshold variable. If the expression within the parentheses is true,
takes the value of 1; otherwise, it takes the value of 0.
Table 7 reports the results of the panel threshold regression. Column (1) of
Table 7 shows that when the urban AI level is below 6.373, the coefficient of physical climate risk is significantly negative (coefficient = −0.396, significant at the 1% level). When the AI level is between 6.373 and 8.290, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. However, when the AI level exceeds 8.290, the coefficient turns positive and becomes statistically significant (coefficient = 1.378, significant at the 1% level). Similarly, Column (2) shows that when the AI level is below 6.599, the coefficient of transition climate risk is significantly negative (coefficient = −0.062, significant at the 5% level). After crossing the 6.599 threshold, the coefficient becomes positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.251, significant at the 1% level). Furthermore, when the AI level surpasses the second threshold of 8.398, the positive coefficient becomes larger (coefficient = 0.942, significant at the 1% level).
The above results suggest that the moderating role of AI in the relationship between climate risk and public service provision is non-linear. More specifically, the estimated coefficients are consistent with a pattern in which the moderating role of AI-related development remains limited at relatively low levels of development, becomes more visible after the first threshold is crossed, and strengthens further at higher levels of AI-related capacity. One possible interpretation is that the effectiveness of AI depends not only on the presence of digital technologies themselves, but also on a set of complementary conditions, including data infrastructure, implementation capacity, cross-departmental coordination, and the degree of integration between digital tools and governance processes. When AI-related development remains at a relatively low level, these complementary conditions may still be insufficient, so the attenuation associated with AI-related development remains limited. After the first threshold is crossed, AI-related capacities may begin to contribute more substantially to risk sensing, resource coordination, and adaptive response. At higher levels of development, the interaction between digital infrastructure, analytical capacity, and governance integration may become stronger, making the resilience-enhancing role of AI more visible in the empirical results. At the same time, the observed threshold pattern may also partly reflect measurement limitations in the AI indicator, differences in sample composition across cities, or other unobserved factors correlated with both AI development and governance capacity [
79].
These results suggest that the moderating role of AI-related development may be threshold-dependent. From a policy perspective, this implies that fragmented or low-intensity digital deployment may not be sufficient to generate visible resilience gains, whereas more integrated and sustained investment may be more likely to strengthen adaptive governance capacity [
80]. Substantively, since the AI variable is measured on a logarithmic scale of AI-related enterprises, the estimated thresholds can be understood as empirical markers of different stages of AI-related industrial accumulation and digital governance capacity. Cities below the lower threshold generally have a relatively weak AI-related industrial base, and the supporting conditions for AI-enabled climate adaptation may not yet be fully developed. Cities between the two thresholds may have begun to accumulate more visible AI-related resources and application capacity, allowing AI to play a more apparent buffering role. Cities above the higher threshold are more likely to have a stronger AI ecosystem, better data-processing capacity, and a more developed digital governance infrastructure.
5.2. The Linear Moderation of “Soft Resilience”: An Interaction Effect Test Based on Open Public Data
To explore the role of “soft resilience” in mitigating climate-related shocks in large cities, this study further analyzes the moderating effect of open public data policies on the relationship between climate risk and public service provision. Regarding variable measurement, drawing on the methodology of Lv et al. (2026) [
81], this study defines city-level open public data as a binary dummy variable (Open). Specifically, if a city has established a government-led open public data platform and this platform has been integrated into the national government data-sharing and exchange system, Open equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0. Based on this, this study constructs a moderating effect model incorporating the interaction terms between the climate risk variables and open public data (Cpr × Open and Ctr × Open), specified as follows:
Table 8 reports the results of the moderating effect analysis. Columns (1)–(2) show that the coefficient of the interaction term between open public data and physical climate risk is 0.342, which is significant at the 1% level. Additionally, the coefficient of the interaction term between open public data and transition climate risk is 0.025, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that public data openness is associated with an attenuation of the negative relationship between climate risk and urban public service provision. This pattern may be related to several governance functions associated with data openness. First, the open sharing of multi-source data—such as meteorological, geospatial, and governmental data—may help urban policymakers identify risk exposure points, assess vulnerabilities, and simulate transmission pathways. This may support more timely coordination and allocation of emergency resources [
82,
83]. Second, the unimpeded flow of critical data (e.g., carbon emissions and energy consumption) across different departments and administrative levels helps dismantle information silos and promotes policy synergy, effectively reducing institutional friction and coordination costs within large cities [
84,
85]. Third, open data platforms provide standardized channels for market participants, social organizations, and the public to access authoritative, timely risk information. This transparency helps stabilize market expectations, maintain socio-economic order, and stimulate the active engagement of diverse stakeholders in climate adaptation and mitigation actions [
86,
87]. Open public data platforms are often introduced as part of broader digital-government reforms. In this sense, the Open variable may capture not only the presence of a data platform, but also related institutional conditions such as administrative transparency, interdepartmental coordination, and digital infrastructure readiness. This variable captures the institutional presence of an open-data platform, but it does not directly measure platform quality, dataset coverage, usage intensity, or actual governance performance. The moderating role of open public data should therefore be understood as part of a broader digital-governance environment.
This finding is consistent with the policy emphasis on accelerating the cultivation of the data factor market outlined in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Digital Economy. It suggests the potential value of data openness as one component of broader digital governance capacity for enhancing urban climate resilience.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
6.1. Research Conclusions
This study examines the relationship between climate risk and public service provision in large Chinese cities and explores the potential mechanism channels and moderating role of digital governance. By employing econometric models such as two-way fixed effects, mediation effects, and panel threshold regression, a systematic empirical analysis was conducted. The main conclusions are as follows:
First, physical and transition climate risks are significantly and negatively associated with public service provision, but the estimated mechanism patterns differ across risk types. The results are consistent with the view that physical risk is linked to public service provision partly through entrepreneurial vitality, while transition-related adjustment pressure is associated with weaker knowledge spillovers and slower industrial upgrading. This pattern suggests that climate risk should not be treated as a single homogeneous pressure, but as a multidimensional source of disruption connected to urban economic, innovation, and governance conditions.
Second, the estimated associations show spatial heterogeneity. The negative relationship between climate risk and public service provision is more pronounced in coastal cities and cities with larger population scales. This suggests that climate-related pressures may interact with geographic exposure, infrastructure density, industrial structure, and governance complexity, leading to differentiated public service vulnerabilities across urban contexts.
Third, digital governance, reflected here in AI-related development and public data openness, may condition the relationship between climate risk and public service provision. AI-related development shows a non-linear threshold pattern, suggesting that its resilience-enhancing role becomes more visible after cities accumulate stronger digital and technological capacities. Public data openness is also associated with a weaker negative relationship between climate risk and public service provision. These findings suggest that digital governance may contribute to urban climate resilience, although its role depends on technological, institutional, and governance conditions.
6.2. Policy Implications
Synthesizing the empirical findings, this study derives several policy implications for climate-adaptive public service governance in large Chinese cities. These implications are primarily grounded in the sample of 99 large Chinese cities during 2008–2019. Therefore, their applicability to other countries or regions should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the empirical patterns examined in this study may offer conditional reference points for other rapidly urbanizing contexts that face similar pressures of climate adaptation, low-carbon transition, public service expansion, and digital governance transformation.
First, policymakers may consider differentiated adaptation strategies based on heterogeneous climate-risk pathways. For large Chinese cities, policy design can distinguish between precipitation-related physical risks and carbon-related structural transition pressure, rather than relying on one-size-fits-all climate responses. To address physical risks, priority should be given to investing in smart infrastructure capable of real-time monitoring and response, such as sensor-deployed flood control systems and sponge cities. Additionally, exploring and promoting parametric catastrophe insurance linked to climate thresholds can provide rapid payouts and emergency credit to affected market entities, thereby safeguarding micro-level entrepreneurial vitality. To address transition risks, regional climate transition innovation cooperation centers should be established, mandating the participation of leading high-carbon enterprises and linking them with research institutions to unclog knowledge spillover channels. Simultaneously, modular green skills training programs should be rolled out to ensure the smooth transition of the labor force during industrial restructuring.
Second, an asymmetric resource-tilt mechanism based on dynamic risk assessments should be established to strengthen high-risk areas. For coastal cities and larger-scale cities in the sample, the results suggest greater sensitivity of public service provision to climate risk. This implies that risk-sensitive resource allocation and spatial planning may be particularly important for cities with higher exposure, denser infrastructure networks, and more complex public service systems. In particular, high-resolution climate-risk assessments should be embedded into urban master planning, land-use approval, and major infrastructure siting decisions. For highly exposed urban areas, planners should avoid the excessive concentration of critical public service facilities, guide new development away from high-risk zones where appropriate, and strengthen the spatial integration of blue-green infrastructure, sponge-city systems, emergency shelters, and resilient transport networks. In this way, land-use planning can serve as a forward-looking instrument for reducing exposure, redistributing vulnerability, and enhancing the continuity of public service provision under climate stress.
Third, the threshold results suggest that digital-governance capacity is more likely to support climate-adaptive public service provision when data infrastructure, application scenarios, and institutional coordination are jointly developed. To strengthen institutional “soft resilience” and support the use of AI-related technologies, cities may clarify responsibilities for cross-departmental data sharing and improve institutional arrangements for data governance. Policymakers should lead the development of national or regional climate resilience data standards to ensure interoperability across systems. This will encourage the private sector to contribute high-granularity commercial and mobility data under the premise of guaranteed security, leveraging data flows to drive the adaptive allocation of public service systems and the low-cost training of AI early-warning models.
More specifically, the findings of this study also carry direct implications for land-use planning. Since climate risk does not affect all urban spaces equally, land-use regulation should move beyond efficiency-oriented allocation and incorporate resilience-oriented spatial governance. In high-risk coastal and large-scale cities, the siting of schools, hospitals, elderly care facilities, transport hubs, and other essential public services should take climate exposure into account more explicitly. At the same time, local governments should use zoning tools and development intensity controls to reduce the clustering of vulnerable populations and critical facilities in hazard-prone areas, while expanding the coverage of green buffers, drainage corridors, sponge-city infrastructure, and other nature-based solutions. Such planning adjustments can help transform the paper’s empirical findings into spatial strategies for safeguarding the continuity and equity of public service provision under climate change.
6.3. Limitations and Future Prospects
Although this study has conducted a meaningful exploration of the intersection of climate risk and public services, there remain limitations that require further exploration in future research. First, there are limitations in the measurement of physical climate risk. In this study, physical climate risk is proxied by the annual frequency of rainstorms, which captures an important dimension of precipitation-related extreme events but does not fully represent the broader spectrum of urban physical climate hazards, such as heat waves, droughts, typhoons, and compound flooding. Although we conduct a robustness test by replacing rainstorm frequency with rainstorm intensity, this still remains within the domain of precipitation-related risk. Future research could construct a more comprehensive multi-hazard physical climate risk index, develop richer transition-risk measures incorporating carbon-intensive employment, environmental regulation intensity, energy-structure dependence, and policy uncertainty, and strengthen causal identification through policy shocks, instrumental variables, or other quasi-experimental designs when suitable data are available. Another limitation concerns potential spatial dependence and cross-city spillover effects. Climate risk, public service provision, and urban development are spatially embedded processes. Extreme weather events may affect neighboring cities through infrastructure networks, commuting patterns, supply chains, and emergency-resource coordination. Future research could extend the analysis by constructing spatial weight matrices and applying spatial panel models, spatial Durbin models, or spatially weighted climate-risk indicators to examine whether climate risk and public service provision exhibit significant spatial spillover effects. In addition, the public service provision index is constructed from available city-level statistical indicators and entropy weights. Although the equal-weighting robustness check shows broadly consistent results, the index remains an empirical approximation of multidimensional public service capacity. Future research could incorporate resident preferences, expert weights, service accessibility data, or sub-dimensional indices to further refine the measurement of public service provision.