Tension, Conflict, and Negotiability of Land for Infrastructure Retrofit Practices in Informal Settlements
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Research Design and Methods
3. Case Study, Results, Findings, and Analysis
3.1. Case Study Setting
3.2. Linking Theoretical Perspectives to the Negotiation Approach
3.2.1. Divergence of Interests
3.2.2. Mutual Interdependence
- Rights-based advantages refer to one’s ability to negotiate and benefit from a negotiation situation based on the land rights granted by law or customary arrangements. Rights-based advantages provide the rights-holders with enforcement opportunities (potential power) to gain, maintain, or control interests in land [17,18]. An example of this is observed where the uncertain status of alleyways in a resettled community created conflict between households and the head of community unit (Rukun Tetangga or RT), followed by denying the households’ rights in decision making about the use rights in this part of the settlement. The households who do not retain such rights—e.g., due to unclear land status after resettlement, are dependent on other rights-holders to gain or maintain a benefit—e.g., maintaining the rights-of-way or connecting to infrastructure. Those registered land rights protected by law, custom, or convention often provide a more significant say for their holders in the decision-making process. An example of this is the case of squatting on private land, where squatters around formalised plots (land ownership certificates) are often excluded from upgrading projects despite the obtained permission from the landowner and approval of the head of community unit or neighbourhood unit (RT/RW heads).
- Spatial and location-specific advantages in the RISE context are attributed to the location-specific opportunities that enable a household to connect to shared infrastructure located on public land with no land contribution. In other cases, taking advantage of shared infrastructure depends on private land contributions from other households—e.g., for pressure pods, sewer collection pipes, and access. In this case, a connected chain of decisions may create high levels of interdependence, subsequently providing more power to some households and rights-holders and putting others in a more power-disadvantaged position.
- Perceived needs for basic infrastructure and individual preferences are also strongly linked to the negotiability of a unit of land for public infrastructure. The households’ perception of the necessity or benefits of wastewater collection infrastructure affects their decisions and justifies their willingness to contribute land for improved infrastructure. According to the interviews with the RISE negotiation facilitators, many households consider higher values for the direct benefit of infrastructure to their family—e.g., an individual toilet, compared to the environmental benefits provided by improved wastewater collection infrastructure. In this case, if the household has a toilet, they may see no value in connecting to the system and may refuse to contribute land for infrastructure. Furthermore, based on interviews with the RISE Project’s negotiation facilitators and representatives from local government agencies (including the Spatial Planning Unit, Regional Development Planning Agency, and Public Works Unit), the perceived lack of demand for wastewater infrastructure and unwillingness to contribute can also be related to the fact that the urban poor have more important priorities than wastewater removal.
- Relational advantages mediate land negotiations for retrofitting infrastructure in several ways. In the micro-scale exchange processes, relational advantages such as the relationship with authority holders (e.g., government officials and community leaders), alliances formed by social relations (with neighbours), social identity, and a sense of belonging to a community or group (social or ethnic groups), determine the dynamics in the practice of negotiation.
- ○
- Selling opportunities obtained by rights-based advantages;
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- Individual’s knowledge about the market;
- ○
- Other relational and spatial advantages such as the presence of a developer nearby who has an interest in the household’s land and available selling opportunities.
- Withdrawal happens if the rights-holders put a low value on shared infrastructure or their social relations. According to the interview with the RISE negotiation facilitators, withdrawal is also observed in a few locations where some households do not possess enough land to contribute. Therefore, receiving the basic infrastructure and benefiting from the project depends on the land contribution from other households. Depending on the relationship between households, they may decide to withdraw from the project—for example, if the infrastructure provision requires defusing the enduring dispute and tension between neighbours.
- Status-giving in the RISE Project is seen where the household who has enough land for infrastructure finds higher values in cooperation with other neighbours and establishing a better relationship with them through contributing land for infrastructure.
- Social network extension can also be an alternative solution for balancing unequal power relationships in land negotiation processes, mainly where longstanding tensions and disputes exist among neighbours. In this case, the power-disadvantaged households seek out new relations with other neighbours who together can form a more stabilised servicing cluster. The instances of this situation are observed in several clusters in the RISE settlements where longstanding tension exists between the head of the RT unit’s family and other neighbours. The land negotiations in these circumstances are facilitated by changing cluster arrangements and forming better socially adjusted groups cooperating for shared infrastructure components. The potential for social network extension is closely associated with spatial and location-specific advantages. For example, the opportunities for rearranging clusters may be limited to a few neighbours living in the same alleyway.
- Coalition formation usually happens following the network extension by the power-disadvantaged households and rearranging clusters. In such a situation, the household that is left out (due to tension with others) has few alternatives for getting connected to the provided infrastructure. If the household possesses suitable land for infrastructure, they can contribute a part of their unoccupied private land for on-plot individual wetlands, septic tanks, and other infrastructure components, otherwise they will not benefit from the project. There are several examples in the RISE Project where the rights-holders have been able to keep their property self-contained and receive an individual, on-plot blackwater treatment infrastructure system. This situation often leads to a greater demand for private land contribution from households.
3.2.3. The Ability to Communicate
- Direct land negotiation between different parties involving direct interactions and discussions about the exchanges between the households in the absence of negotiation facilitators and local team members. When facilitators are not present to mediate and assist the parties in reaching a satisfactory agreement peacefully, direct land negotiation between different parties can escalate into tension or conflict. The conflict situations are also reported for direct land negotiation between immediate family members who are not from the same household units (e.g., between parents and children).
- Negotiations between representatives and their constituencies involving negotiations between the representatives of parties—e.g., the head of a large family group, or the representative of a group such as servicing clusters—and local government representatives, including the head of RT/RW units, or in some cases, Lurah (sub-district head), or government agencies. A typical example of representatives at the cluster level is where parents and married children live on informally subdivided plots. According to the interview results and documented communications with households, often one person, for example, the son or the father, has more power in the decision making. This often relates to the family power structure or associates with being more knowledgeable.
- Direct land negotiation between facilitators (local team members) and different parties involving all the negotiations between facilitators with the rights-holders and households in the RISE settlements. Depending on the circumstances, facilitators may strategically hold separate meetings with selected parties, particularly where tension exists between them. This type of communication can occur individually (with a single household) or collectively (with more than one rights-holder). At the cluster and household levels, this communication channel is essential for negotiating land for critical infrastructure components. This type of negotiation enables facilitators to more actively raise the households’ awareness of the criticality of their contribution to system functionality and encourage private land contributions where no other alternative for locating infrastructure is available.
4. Discussion: Land Negotiation Strategies for Community-Scale Infrastructure Retrofit Practices
4.1. Co-Design and Participation
4.2. Working with Small Social Units or Clusters
4.3. Moderating Social Interactions through Strategic Selection of Participants in Sensitive Situations
4.4. Infrastructure as a Tool for Formalising Land Boundaries
4.5. Infrastructure Upgrades as an ‘Acupunctural’ Strategy
4.6. Accepting Land Boundary Uncertainties and Prioritising Negotiation Approaches over Conventional Land Surveying
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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Mesgar, M.; Ramirez-Lovering, D.; El-Sioufi, M. Tension, Conflict, and Negotiability of Land for Infrastructure Retrofit Practices in Informal Settlements. Land 2021, 10, 1311. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121311
Mesgar M, Ramirez-Lovering D, El-Sioufi M. Tension, Conflict, and Negotiability of Land for Infrastructure Retrofit Practices in Informal Settlements. Land. 2021; 10(12):1311. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121311
Chicago/Turabian StyleMesgar, Mahsa, Diego Ramirez-Lovering, and Mohamed El-Sioufi. 2021. "Tension, Conflict, and Negotiability of Land for Infrastructure Retrofit Practices in Informal Settlements" Land 10, no. 12: 1311. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121311
APA StyleMesgar, M., Ramirez-Lovering, D., & El-Sioufi, M. (2021). Tension, Conflict, and Negotiability of Land for Infrastructure Retrofit Practices in Informal Settlements. Land, 10(12), 1311. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121311