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Open AccessArticle

Qualifying Coordination Mechanism for Cascade-Reservoir Operation with a New Game-Theoretical Methodology

State Key Laboratory of Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Science, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
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Water 2018, 10(12), 1857; https://doi.org/10.3390/w10121857
Received: 5 November 2018 / Revised: 26 November 2018 / Accepted: 12 December 2018 / Published: 14 December 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Water Resources Management)
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Abstract

The coordinated operation for hydropower generation in cascade reservoirs is critical to resolve the conflicts in hydropower needs between upstream and downstream reservoirs. Due to the individual rationality and collective rationality highlighted by game theory, we propose an integrated game-theoretical model to simulate the coordination behaviors among cascade reservoirs for hydropower generation. In the case study of a cascade-reservoir system in the Yangtze River of China, three operation models are compared and analyzed: the non-cooperative model, centralized model, and integrated game-theoretical model. The factors influencing the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model are also explored in this study. The results indicate that the system’s hydropower generation obtained by the integrated game-theoretical model is closer to the ideal solution obtained by the centralized model compared to that obtained by the non-cooperative model. Moreover, individual hydropower generation in non-cooperation (rational individual gains) is guaranteed by the integrated game-theoretical model, which is neglected by the centralized model. Furthermore, the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model is influenced by the water availability variation and regulation capacities of cascade reservoirs. View Full-Text
Keywords: coordination; Stackelberg theory; Nash-Harsanyi bargaining theory; cascade reservoirs; Hydropower generation coordination; Stackelberg theory; Nash-Harsanyi bargaining theory; cascade reservoirs; Hydropower generation
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Xu, Y.; Fu, X.; Qin, J. Qualifying Coordination Mechanism for Cascade-Reservoir Operation with a New Game-Theoretical Methodology. Water 2018, 10, 1857.

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